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SUMMARY OF THESIS
This thesis investigates the appearance of two distinctive Galician political 
communities at the wake and aftermath o f the pivotal conjuncture o f the transition to 
democracy in Spain: "the co lon /, first, and later 'the nation'. Taking the movement at 
its own word, it argues that nationalism was to  a great extent sustained by a storied 
citation and (re)narrativization of the movement and the community from a hybrid 
'colonized' and 'national-popular' identity to  a purely nationalist 'popular' one. The 
main body of the thesis unravels the unstable logics, tensions and effects of the 
discourses of colonialism and sovereignty through an in-depth examination of their key 
enunciative strategy: their indexical and multilayered web of storytelling practices. The 
negotiation o f Marxism and nationalism in the movement over time is here used as a 
theme to  explore wider issues and mechanisms of national, collective identity 
construction, coherence and transformation.
The thesis is divided into three parts. Chapters 1 and 2 present the theoretical and 
methodological context o f the study, which draws on post-structural theories of 
discourse and narrative analysis. The second part -chapters 3 to  6- introduces the 
socio-historical context o f the case as well as the key storylines and strategies through 
which the 'co lo n / was performed. These narratives include the foundational myth of 
loss, the narratives of a modern colonization and the small tales o f 'national-popular 
struggles'. The third part -chapters 7 to  9- examines the key narrative strategies of 
ventriloquism and metonymic displacement in the tales which de-ambiguated the 
movement towards nationalism and performed a new discourse of 'sovereignt/, 
which ultimately allowed the radical movement to survive the transition.
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Introduction
This thesis presents an investigation o f the discourses of Galician nationalism at the 
wake and aftermath of the key time of the transition to democracy in Spain. Seeing 
nationalism and national identity as discourse and performed in and through 
narratives, it zooms into the multiple, complex and often contradictory storytelling 
practices of the movement and its political effects. Interdisciplinary in approach, it 
draws theoretically on post-structural theories o f discourse -mainly the work of 
Foucault, Laclau and Butler- and methodologically it uses narrative analysis to read the 
texts of the movement. The study traces the appearance of two differentiated political 
communities through storytelling and discursive practices: the colony and later, the 
nation. Examining in depth the discourse o f colonialism, its conditions of possibility 
and power effects, the thesis demonstrates how this was a hybrid, ambivalent identity 
which refused choice between the Marxist and nationalist masternarratives it 
mobilised. Then it shows how the end of the uncertainty opened up by the transition 
period with the establishment o f parliamentary democracy brought about a 
renarrativisation of the political community as 'nation' in the discourse and stories of 
'sovereignty'.
Galician nationalism has developed and gathered strength over time and it still locates 
itself firmly on the left of the political spectrum, but the question of its negotiation of 
different and contradictory masternarratives -Marxism and nationalism— mainly in its 
first decades of existence remains essentially unexplored. The theme of 'doing7, 
narrating Marxism and nationalism is key to understanding all the movement's 
ideological and material practices over those years, and it is also used in this study as 
an opportunity to tap into wider issues of national identity formation, continuity and 
change. Particularly, the study examines the role played by form, by storytelling as 
specific enunciative modality in the construction of national /  collective identity from a 
political perspective which has not been fully developed.
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The aim of this thesis is to provide a political account of the discursive and narrative 
construction of national identity through the examination of the Galician case as well 
as to complexify and further the understanding of the Galician movement. It is 
intended as a contribution to the fields o f nationalism, Spanish politics and narrative 
analysis.
The thesis is structured in three parts. The first two chapters provide the framework of 
the study. Chapter one is a summary overview of the 'sideways' shifts that have taken 
place in the research on nationalism, with particular attention to the place of minority 
nationalism, in order to locate the thesis at the confluence of different disciplinary 
fields. It examines specifically the confluence of anti-essentialist theories o f discourse 
with a narrative understanding of collective identity. Chapter 2 discusses the 
methodological decisions which underpin the research presented in the following data 
chapters, and combines a representation o f 'what actually happened' in this study with 
a discussion of the particular theoretical and practical questions concerning method 
within discourse analysis, qualitative research and my case.
The second part, chapters 3 to 6, examines the narrative and discursive strategies of 
the discourse of colonialism. Chapter 3 sets the scene, presenting the historical context 
and examining the conditions of possibility o f the story-lines. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus 
on the nuances and details o f the 'colonialism' narrative through an analysis of its main 
episodes and tales. Chapter 4 explores the myth of loss as a 'salvational' narrative 
which founded the political community. Chapter 5 examines the second episode in the 
story-lines: 'colonialism to d a /. This episode and the strategies it deploys constructed a 
hybrid identity which hardly contained its own tensions and contradictions. Chapter 6 
looks into the small stories o f the 'national-popular struggles' and their mobilisation of 
a sense of place which made political boundaries built up insisting on a social 
categorization of the nation more flexible.
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 form the third part o f this study and together examine the 
narrative transformation of the discourse of colonialism, and the emergence of a new 
discourse of 'sovereignty'. This discourse de-ambiguated the movement in the
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conditions of the new democracy and political conjuncture. Chapter 7 looks into the 
metonymical displacement of the discourse of colonialism towards the sphere of the 
'world-system'. It shows the ingenious form in which colonialism was simultaneously 
cited and disavowed. Chapter 8 focuses on the other side of the coin, the 
ventriloquation of Spanish democracy discourses and the kind of nation that was 
constructed in this new conjuncture. Chapter 9 deals with the frail beginnings of this 
new unity which at the time was not so much of an unity but a reorganization.
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1Reading on nation and narration.
1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a summary overview of the 'sideways' shifts that have taken 
place in the research on nationalism, with particular attention to the place of minority 
nationalism, in order to  locate the thesis at the confluence of different disciplinary 
fields. Firstly, it maps the opening up and fracturing of the field o f nationalism where 
from an almost unrivalled dominance o f the modernist paradigm in its very many 
forms, we arrive at a more diversified field where competing versions of nationalism 
coexist and where a post-structural framework of national identity as discourse -which 
maintains modernism under erasure— has gathered force. It then argues that national 
identity has come to be seen as a discursive formation. From discourse to narratives 
there is a short leap, and the chapter explains the confluence of anti-essentialist 
theories of discourse with a narrative understanding of collective identity. This study is 
located in this tradition. Finally, it introduces some general characteristics of the 
literature on Galician nationalism in relation to  the topic of the study.
1.2. From 'nation and nationalism' to national identification.
Classic modernist theories spelled out the premises of any possible, rigorous 
consideration of nationalism and became the privileged interpretation, but had 
problems coming to terms with non nation-state nationalism. Although the different 
versions of modernism differ greatly, there is a common kernel of truth among them. 
This is a belief in the modernity of both nations and nationalisms. Within a modernist
12
interpretation both phenomena appeared in the last two centuries and are the 
product o f 'specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence 
of the bureaucratic state, urbanization and secularism' (Smith 1994:377 quoted in 
Ozkirimli 2000). Or as Eric Hobsbawm clearly puts it: 'nationalism comes before 
nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round' 
(Hobsbawm 1990: 10). Karl Deustch and 'nation-building' or 'diffusion' theories in the 
1950s and 1960s were early exponents o f modernist theories. Later Eric Hobsbawm 
and A.D. Smith (from an ethno-symbolist position) are important examples of the 
debates and the views on minority nationalism.
Hobsbawm contends that despite being seemingly old, nations and nationalism are 
products o f 'social engineering'. The 'nation' comes about through an 'invention of 
tradition' which serves as a substitute for social cohesion (Hobsbawm 1983:1). 
Nationalism is then defined as a political programme 'and a recent one', that holds that 
groups defined as 'nations' have the right to, and therefore ought to, form territorial 
nation states (Hobsbawm 1996:256). He distinguishes three periods of nationalist 
mobilization, the first one being the period o f the 'great nations' (French Revolution - 
1914) and the second one the period of an 'apogee of nationalism' and of utopia 
(1918-1950). Both stages were 'unificatory as well as emancipatory' and central to 
historical transformation (Hobsbawm, 1990). In stark contrast to these, a third period 
of nationalism since the 1950s is 'functionally different... no longer a major vector of 
historical development' (Hobsbawm 1990:163). He is openly hostile in his 
characterization of minority nationalism: these are rejections of modern modes of 
political organisation, both national and supranational. Rather than nationalism these 
movements are about ethnicity, which is not 'a political concept' but 'a way of 
expressing a real sense of group identity which links the members of 'us' because it 
emphasizes their differences from 'them" (Hobsbawm 1996: 257-58).
Ethno-symbolism accepted the core modernist premises of the modernity of both 
nations and nationalism but criticised the lack of attention to  their 'ethnies'. In a 
nutshell, A. D. Smith's main theses were that modern nations cannot be understood 
without taking pre-existing ethnic components into account, the lack of which is likely
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to create a serious impediment to nation-building1. Smith rarely theorised specifically 
about minority nationalism, but when he did we arrive at one of the most pervasive 
classifications of minority nationalism, that o f 'ethnic nationalism' (Smith, 1979,1991). 
Ethnic nationalisms really are a protest against the centralist, undemocratic policies of 
nation-states in which they are inserted, and these movements are to be considered as 
merely autonomist2. They are also different in their tendency towards economic 
planning and rationalising and in their context.
To sum up, different modernist theories had assumed, in the 1950s, 1960s and even in 
the 1970s, Western Europe either to be devoid o f national minorities after successful 
processes of nation-state assimilation. As a result, they treated minority nationalisms 
as 'different', something other than what 'real' nationalism is or ought to be. The 
'resurgence' o f peripheral nationalisms in the 1970s made these theoretical premises 
unsustainable. The (deterministic) assumption of the nation-state as the only possible 
solution for nationalism was still upheld. Besides, minority nationalisms were labelled 
'ethnic' /  'demotic' -i.e. w ith restrictive membership to the 'nation' based on common 
descent, cultural sameness or even blood— rather than political movements. Overall, 
even if the nation was seen as 'fabricated' it was still reified in their writings, and 
invariable 'cores' o f ethnic soul were still being argued for. Modernization theories 
explained nationalism 'mechanically, seeking a cause that is outside any actual 
nationalist movement' (Finlayson, 1998:105).
In relation to their thinking on minority nationalism, these theories sparked a series of 
critical theoretical reactions and corrections. In the 1970s, these reactions were mainly 
'relative deprivation' theories and the 'new ethnicism'. Hechter, in 'Internal 
Colonialism', explained the revitalization of western nationalism in terms o f a cultural 
division of labour -which presupposed movements as rational actors and a 
methodological individualism— and whose main shortcoming was not fitting the 
reality on the ground (McCrone, 1998). Connor, instead, put forward a political 
explanation based on the expansion of the principle of self-rule to non-dominant 
ethnicities (Connor, 1977).
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Since the 1980s, scholars also aware of and sympathetic to minority nationalisms, took 
the lead. Michael Keating, David McCrone and Monserrat Guibernau, among others, 
set out to rethink and contest the characterisation of minority nationalism as 'non- 
nationalist' and 'ethnic' (Keating 1996, 2001b, 2002; McCrone 1998; Guibernau, 1996; 
1999). They mainstreamed the analysis of these movements, seeing them as clearly 
nationalist. They performed the de-linking of the categories of the 'nation' and the 
'state', a much needed step in order to  better comprehend the phenomena. Claims 
needed to be 'political' in nature, that is, about degrees of self-determination or 
presenting a demand to 'the right to  rule itself. These writers explained that 'neo­
nationalism' can exhibit a 'variable geometry' of goals because they have de-linked 
sovereignty from the nation-state, and so their nationalist character is not affected by 
settling for something different (Keating, 2001b, 2002). Definitions of nationalism 
hence dropped the nation-state as the only appropriate incarnation of the political 
community.
Besides, instead of 'ethnic' these movements are often defined as civic and 
democratic. The 'civic' version o f nationalism is that which promotes positive values of 
shared commitment to public institutions of the state and civil society, and which 
poses a more open even voluntary membership to the nation. These commentators 
stressed minority nationalism's positive and modern features, in studies where 
Scotland and Catalonia were model cases. These nationalisms from the periphery 
stand for a 'discontent' w ith the quality of democracy or the distribution of economic 
resources but generally they conform fairly open and strong civil societies. The 
description of rather instrumentalist movements is, however, still present. Many of 
these scholars built upon the work o f their forebears within modernist, ethno- 
symbolist and other frameworks, presenting mostly a form of inversion of their 
arguments.
Simultaneously, since the early 1990s, theoretical debates on nationalism shifted 
markedly as critical and deconstructive theories stemming from the linguistic turn in 
philosophy and the wider critique of the modern, 'centred' and sovereign concept of 
the subject flourished in literary, sociological and anthropological fields3 (Hall 1992,
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1996). 'Socio-constructive' and discursive conceptions of the nation started to gather 
pace in the work of identity and nationhood undertaken by Stuart Hall, Michael Billig, 
Craig Calhoun, Rogers Brubaker or Nira Yuval-Davies.
Socio-constructivism was not particularly concerned with 'minority nationalism' per se, 
but posed the most serious challenge to the underlying assumptions of the modernist 
paradigm and associated developments. They disputed the reduction of nationalism to 
a phenomena of a narrow (political /  ethnic) nature, dismantled the pervasive 
naturalisation and essentialization of the nation in the literature and its reliance on 
taxonomies and categorizations that re-created the fiction of homogeneous, 
monolithic and uncontested 'nation' and 'nationalism' for minority nationalisms and 
the 'nations' they create (Brubaker 1996, Billig 1995, Calhoun 1993, 1997, Hall 1990; 
Verdery, 1996). These critiques are varied in focus, but have in common the anti- 
essentialist understanding o f nationalism as discourse. Two key studies in the 1990s 
were Rogers Brubaker 'Nationalism Reframed' and Michael Billig's 'Banal Nationalism'.
Rogers Brubaker in Nationalism Reframed called against the conventional reification of 
the category 'nation'. Nationalisms should be understood now 'without invoking 
nations as substantial entities' (Brubaker 1996:7). Instead we should focus on 
'nationness' and 'nationhood' as 'nations' are primarily practical categories rather than 
analytical ones, institutionalized forms and contingent event' (ibid). In Nationalism, 
Craig Calhoun insists that nationhood cannot exist prior to political processes, but also, 
that these processes do not occur in a vacuum, but within the particular discursive 
contexts and narratives that surround people (Calhoun, 1997). In Banal Nationalism 
discursive psychologist Michael Billig argues that national identity is not psychological 
accessory internal to the person, but exists externally in the myriad small material and 
language practices which incessantly and subtlety remind us of our 'identity' (Billig, 
1995). It is in the common deployment o f banal words such as 'us', 'here', 'there' or 
the routine practices of flags in sporting events which do the identity work.
It is important to note, however, that new understandings did not completely reject all 
previous conceptualisations of nationalism. Rather, they subjected their essentialist
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concepts to a deconstructive critique. This means, as Stuart Hall explains, that these 
approaches put key concepts, such as 'nation', 'nationalism', 'identity', under erasure. 
They have not been superseded dialectically and have to be used, but in a new, 
deconstructed manner (Hall 1996:1). Therefore key truths of modernism are still 
upheld although now in a (truly) de-totalized form, no longer operating within the 
paradigm in which they were originally generated (Hall, 1996). The modernity of 
nationalism and nations, 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) and 
particularly the 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) are going to be key ideas 
giving an impulse to new theories of nationalism as discourse.
1.3. From the discourse of nationalism to national narratives
Thinking of national identity and nationalism as discourse, in Foucault and Laclau's 
terms, is to think o f them as the mobilization of particular signifiers (such as the 
'nation') through the deployment of myriad objects, concepts (i.e. the 'national w ill' or 
desire, 'national interest', 'national self-determination' and so on) styles, themes and 
strategies forming systems -regularities in dispersion— mobilized in power strategies 
and in linking practices. These strategies and practices construct precarious but 
coherent wholes to diverse degrees: from a nation-state in all its banality (Billig, 1995) 
to radical, opposition movements from the peripheries in all their precariousness.
Michel Foucault theorised discourses as constituted of 'statements', which are not 
simply sentences, utterances or speech acts in a formal sense. Thus, a statement is not 
a mere linguistic category. Discourse, Young remarks, is a 'border' concept, at the edge 
between language and material reality (Young, 2001). Foucault's later writings as well 
as Laclau and Mouffe's placed the notion of discourse, as chapter 2 explains, firm ly as 
encompassing the intricate embedding o f both language and material practices 
(Foucault, 1976; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).
Discourses, in Foucault's archaeological writing, are systems of heterogeneous and 
often contradictory statements or 'system o f dispersion', formed within specific
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conditions of existence. These conditions consist of rules which regulate the formation 
of objects about which statements are made; enunciative modalities or the discursive 
forms, sites and positions of enunciation; concepts involved in the discourse and 
strategies or the theories and themes developed. None of these elements individually 
necessarily provide for the unity o f a group o f statements (Foucault, 1969). The idea is 
rather to  study their dispersion, in order to  see whether it is possible to define certain 
orders, correlations, positions and functioning or transformations among the 
statements (Foucault, 1969:41). Such a system of dispersion and its regularities is a 
discursive formation. Discourses, then, are not homogeneous, are non-monolithic and 
they may have sub-groups - ' i t  was possible for men within the same discursive 
formation to  have different opinions, to make contradictory choices' (Foucault, 
1969/1989:221)— they allow for an abundance of themes and representations. They 
are the clusters o f semantic, structural and contextual meanings formed according to 
norms.
Being heterogeneous and contextual, discourses are not static entities but always 
changing. They are not timeless but historically, even conjuncturally, formed: 'posing 
the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its 
temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities o f time' 
(1969:131). Thus the continuity o f forms of knowledge, objects, strategies formed by 
discourse is contingent and contextual, potentially differing from period to period. 
Therefore, 'the co lon / in Galician discourse could only appear as a meaningful or 
intelligible construct within a specific conjuncture and discursive formation in the late 
1960s and 1970s.
In his later genealogical writings Foucault turned his attention to how discourses -now  
seen as 'blocks'— form intricate connections of power and knowledges. Instead of 
monolithic or all-pervasive, Foucault talks o f discourses as 'discontinuous segments' 
mobilized for a variety of purposes and with diverse tactical functions. That is:
'we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted and excluded 
discourse...but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various 
strategies' (1976:100)
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Hence, discourses are 'tactical elements' which might be mobilized, and even 
combined, by power strategies. Laclau and Mouffe firmly extended the idea of 
discourse to society as a whole (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). For Laclau discourses 
become the 'primary terrain of the constitution of objectivity7 (Laclau, 2005:68). That 
is, the entire social space is discursive: it is a symbolic order or 'a vast argumentative 
texture through which people construct the ir reality' (Laclau, 1993:341). Lacalu's 
theory of hegemony -stemming originally from Marxism, mainly developing as critique 
of Gramsci and Althusser— applies ideas of discourse and power to the social. 
Discourse becomes the linking and connecting politically of diverse groups or political 
demands, through contingent and precarious 'articulations', into a 'whole' or unity (i.e. 
a political project, an identity) in an attempt to achieve hegemony. The internal 
coherence of a discourse is -borrow ing from Foucault— that of the 'regularity in 
dispersion' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:105). However, Laclau and Mouffe stressed the 
idea of regularity and thought o f discourse as an ensemble of differential positions 
(ibid.:106). That is, in a discourse the identities o f all the elements or groups linked are 
relational -constituted in that articulation, and difference with others. Laclau and 
Mouffe propose a series o f interrelated concepts in order to think of society, mainly 
that o f discourse (structure), hegemony (politics) and social antagonism (conflict) 
‘ (Norval, 2000).
Discourses on nation are seen, besides, as the result o f political practices which try  to 
'hegemonize', to determine the precise particular content of the universal 'nation', 
producing a concrete version of the nation5. Nationalism's 'formal universality as a 
socio-culturai concept -everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 
'has' a gender— vs. the irremediably particularity o f its concrete manifestations' is, 
indeed, one of the paradoxes of nationalism already noted by Anderson (Anderson, 
1983:5). This is, nevertheless, less a paradox than the crux of the phenomena: what 
gives 'nation' its political effectiveness. As Alan Finlayson notes, nationalism is an 
ideological legitimation strategy 'revolving around the tension o f universal and 
particular7 where it works to build universals from the particular (Finlayson, 1998: 
103). Or, in Anderson's third paradox: 'the political power of nationalism vs. its
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philosophical poverty and even incoherence', there is an 'emptiness', a 'thinness' to 
nationalism discourse (ibid; Freeden, 1998).
For Ernesto Laclau there is in politics an irreducible gap between empty universals (i.e., 
principles such as nation, democracy, justice) and the particular (i.e. their contingent 
content) which needs the political operation o f hegemony in order to lay the 
ideological glue which binds a particular society together (Laclau, 2005). Each universal 
notion is always 'hegemonized' by a particular content which 'colours its universality 
and accounts for its efficiency' (2izek, 1999:204). These political strategies are achieved 
when a movement succeeds in the construction of 'e m p t/ or floating signifiers -the  
'nodal points', a particular notion which stands-in for the absent universal— in a 
discursive formation which becomes a rally for action, a myth and sometimes a 
political horizon6. This empty signifier or hegemonized universal becomes the point 
which ties a discourse, movement and eventually a society together. The discourses of 
nationalism would, then, be political struggles over the hegemonization of the 
universal 'nation' by particular, contingent meanings through the multiple articulation 
of groups or political demands. Nationalism operates by dividing 'us1 from 'them1, 
constituting commonalities and differences between self and others, via the drawing 
of political and symbolic boundaries (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Hall 1996; Yuval-Davies, 
1997; Norval, 2000).
If nationalism is a particular kind of discourse (a certain 'genre') and each nation is the 
real /  symbolic result o f myriad particular practices, objects, concepts and strategies 
mobilized in its own name, then the particular 'nationality' which Anderson mentions 
or 'national identity' is not a given, objective fact but a reality constructed through 
discourse. Identity, Stuart Hall notes, or rather identification, is always a construction 
within discourse, among modalities of power and logics of inclusion and exclusion 
(Hall, 1996:4). In fact, Homi Bhabha remarks, the nation is the structure of exclusion 
par excellence (Bhabha, 1990). Identities are, Hall says, a 'process never completed' 
which does not eliminate difference. That is, identity needs an 'Other', what it leaves 
outside, to define itself (Hall, 1996:3). Hence, for him (national) identities are
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fractured, multiple, constructed across difference, antagonisms and the criss-crossing 
of discourses which strive for unity and closure (ibid, 4).
In this anti-essentialist version of identity, national identities are constructed within 
discursive representations of the nation. Hence we arrive at the connection between 
identity and narrative: 'identities arise from the narrativization of the self (ibid. 4). 
That is, identity is not seen as being inside the person -the  kernel of a nut— but exists 
only as narrative, for as Mark Currie explains, 'the only way to explain who we are is to 
tell our own story* and we learn how to tell our story from all other stories to which we 
listen (Currie, 1998:17). Or as Francesca Polletta notes, it is '[in] telling the story of our 
becoming as a nation, a people, we establish who we are1 (Polletta, 1998:422). This 
narrative, discursive character does not make identity any less real and material. As 
Homi Bhabha insists, material reality and metaphorical narrations are inseparable in 
the nation (Bhabha, 1990).
What are narratives?
Historically, Aristotle in his Poetics provides one of the first, and most enduring, 
definitions of narratives: these are a 'whole' which has a beginning, middle and an end. 
Narratives then, are commonly understood as accounts of events chronologically 
connected (Czarniawska 2004:17). Nevertheless, most theorists would point out that 
narratives exhibit some other specific elements, chiefly causation and human interest 
(Cortazzi, 1993:85). Barthes suggests that practically all human forms of expression are 
narratives or at least can be treated as such:
"The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious 
variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances -as though any 
material were fit to receive man's stories. Able to be carried by articulated language, 
spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these 
substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, 
drama, comedy, mime, painting, [...] news item, conversation. Moreover, under this 
almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every 
society..."(Barthes, 1996:46)
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Trans-national, trans-historical and trans-cultural; this is how structuralism defined 
narratives as they constitute one of the most important means of human sense- 
making. From a hermeneutic viewpoint, Ricoeur explained how we make sense of our 
reality through narratives because it is through them that human beings experience 
and humanize time (Ricoeur, 1984). This relevance of narratives for human 
understanding has been put forward in different ways: 'so natural is the impulse to 
narrate' Hayden White remarks, 'so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report 
on the way things really happened, that narrativity could appear problematic only in a 
culture in which it was absent' (White, 1987:1). Hayden White sees narratives as a way 
to 'fashioning human experience into a form  assimilable to structures of meaning that 
are generally human' (White, 1987:1; my cursive). For Jerome Bruner narratives are a 
principle through which 'people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and 
transactions with the social world' (1990:35). Catherine K. Riessman notes simply and 
powerfully that story-telling is 'what we do to create order' (1993:1).
In reviewing contemporary problems of knowledge and information, Lyotard 
compared and contrasted narrative knowledge to scientific knowledge. For him 
narration is a kind of rationality, the 'quintessential form of traditional knowledge' 
(Lyotard, 1984:19). Contrary to scientific knowledge which is concerned with speaking 
the truth about a referent in verifiable or falsifiable statements, narratives allow the 
societies in which they grow to define 'criteria of competence' and to evaluate that 
competence (or in White's terms narratives moralize the world); they appear in a 'web 
of forms' with multiple functions; their transmission is often governed by rules and 
rights of telling and hearing, and they have rhythm7 (ibid. 19-22). The same 
comparison was later taken up by Jerome Bruner, who reminded us that we do not 
learn about social worlds by growing up as 'little  logicians or mathematicians' (Bruner, 
1991:4). Bruner distinguishes several features as the defining traits of narrative 
rationality, among them: diachronicity as it is an account of events over time, 
canonicity and breach of the canonical which warrant tellability; referentiality 
understood in terms of verisimilitude and readability; genericness or the recognizable 
kinds of narrative; normativeness as a breach presupposes a norm; and context 
sensitivity and negotiability (1991:4-18).
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Socio-narratology and (national) identity
The key theme in ail views on narrative is that narratives construct (social) orders. 
Events, be they political, historical or fictional, acquire meaning through their 
connection to other events in a timeline through a theme (Polkinghorne, 1988). This 
key theme is the plot, where the end often explains the logical connections between 
episodes. Ordering takes place, Polkinghorne notes, because diverse events and 
elements are linked in a temporal line and their meanings are acquired through 
emplotment. Switching languages between narratology and discourse theories, the 
narratological concept o f emplotment bears a remarkable similarity to discourse, 
where the plot would be the 'empty7 signifier or 'nodal point' knotting the web of 
meanings into a system.
Indeed, although postmodernism is taken to mean the demise of metanarratives, the 
analysis of social narratives has bloomed in the social sciences, being called already the 
narrative turn (Lyotard, 1984; Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997). This is partly as 
consequence of the linguistic turn and of post-structuralism in narratology, which 
provoked a major expansion of the scope of objects for narrative analysis (Currie, 
1998). Moreover, even poststructuralist theories o f discourse are starting to claim that 
rather than proclaiming the end of metanarratives we should think of them 
differently8. Thus, there has been widespread interest in the narratives and 
metanarratives of history (White, 1987), sociology (Mumby, 1993; Plummer, 1995; 
among very many others) economics (McCloskey, 1985), feminism and gender (Davis, 
1989), organizations (Czarniawska, 1998) or even science (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). 
Within the field of politics, Walter Fisher proclaimed the narrative turn (1987) and 
narratives have been studied in social movements' research (Andrews, 2002; Davis, 
2002; Polletta, 1998), and nationalism (Mottier, 2000; Campbell, 1998, Bhabha 1990).
From a post-structural socio-narratology perspective (Currie, 1998), the relevance of 
the narrative form for human identity and understanding is also emphasized. However, 
rather than seeing narratives as somehow corresponding to, developing or perhaps
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articulating a given "pre-narrative identity", narratives are seen as an intrinsic social 
and political act which creates orders out o f "chaos" -disordered worlds (Hinchman and 
Hinchman, 1997; White, 1987). Narratives, however, are not mere fictions, inventions 
product of the imagination but political and ideological practices which are real and 
material. In Currie"s words narratives are "as much part of the material texture of 
reality as bombs and factories, wars and revolutions" (Currie, 1998:90). Besides, 
contrary to the rigidities o f structuralism, and similarly to theories o f discourse, socio- 
narratology stresses that the (social and political) orders built in narratives are always 
contingent and precarious, they might fail.
From a social sciences perspective, the discursive turn allows us to think of narratives 
as social representational practices and their performative nature (Austin, 1962). 
Narratives are also seen as not just expressing pre-given, natural identities in a mirror­
like fashion, but functioning as speech acts which bring into being that which they 
name (ibid.; Mottier, 2000). In other words, narratives -as part o f discourses— are 
about the world, but in their processes of representation they also build the world 
(Wetherell, 2001). Narratives are practices which both enact and perform the nation, 
accomplishing different functions (Davis, 2002; Atkinson and Coffey, 1996). Discourses, 
even though wider in scope than narratives, are reproduced and transformed to a 
great extent through individual and collective narratives which are practices that have 
effects on the social. One of the most important consequences of these 
conceptualisations is that narratives are seen now as the bases of identity and 
pathways to understanding culture. In Ken Plummer's words narratives are 'the key to 
creating communities' (Plummer, 1995:18). Key among the community created in 
narratives is the nation.
The study which undoubtedly brought this point to stark relief was Homi Bhabha"s 
"Nation and Narration". Written in the field of post colonial criticism, Bhabha took 
Anderson"s idea of the relevance of the novel in the imagination of the nation. 
Locating the nation as half way between a thing and an idea, he stressed is character 
as a strategy of totalization and structure of exclusion: any attempt to define it will 
necessarily marginalize those who are not seen as representative of whichever the
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'nation' stands for (Bhabha, 1990). His edited volume explores the relation of 
nationhood and realist narrative and tries to dismantle the narrative homogenization 
of national time -te lling a single story of a single thing— which 'smuggles' an origin 
and constructs the myth o f a continuous community. Instead he calls for a 'double 
time': the attention to the tensions between nationalisms' 'pedagogical efforts' and 
their living present (Currie, 1998:93).
Citationality and iterability: (re)producing nationhood
Here and in the next section I would like to take up two important ideas about 
narratives deployed in the thesis. One is that the performative character o f national 
narratives should be better seen within Judith Butler's concept of performativity, that 
is, as citation and iteration (Butler, 1990, 1993, 1997). The other is the role of power 
and narratives, the political deployment o f counter-narratives as the power to resist 
and oppose.
'Everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender' says 
Anderson (1983:5). I bring up this quote comparing nationality and gender as it is 
somewhat prescient of this discussion on performativity. Judith Butler's conception of 
performativity arose out o f her deconstruction of gender identity in Gender Trouble 
(Butler, 1990). Butler took trouble with the essentialist construction of the category 
'woman' as the necessary identity for feminist politics and 'the gender categories that 
support gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexualit/ (Butler, 1990: x-xi). Instead, 
she suggested that the categories o f gender and sex are regulatory practices, norms 
instituted as result of what one does rather that what one is (ibid.; Culler, 2007:157). 
Gender identity is a constitutive effect o f our practices, a performance. The notion of 
performance is refined in later writings, where she rejects the theatrical connotations 
of performance and the criticism of seeing 'gender as a choice' and stresses instead 
the notion of 'performativity'. Performativity 'must be understood not as a singular 
and deliberate act, but rather as the reiterative and citational practice by which 
discourse produces the effects that it names' (Butler, 1993: 2).
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The key difference is that borrowing from Derrida Butler shifts Austin's notion of 
'speech act' from a single 'sovereign' and all-capable act of institution commanded by 
a subject, into 'c ita tiona lit/: a repetition and iteration of norms where the subject 
itself emerges. Gender/sex become a social construct -where construction is 'a 
process o f reiteration where by which both subjects and acts come to appear' (Butler, 
1993:9) -  in which the very materiality of bodies is the effect of power, o f regulatory 
norms, and performativity is understood as the 'reiterative power of discourse to 
produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains' (Butler, 1993:2). In her 
emphasis on the importance of repetition of norms in producing performative effects 
Butler, Culler says, takes up a model of authoritative speech (2007:159). But, contrary 
to Austin, authority is not taken for granted as residing in the position of the subject 
(such as a judge or any other authority) but in the repetition itself: citation helps 
create authority9 (ibid.). In this sense, citation is also linked to Bakhtin's notions of 
intertextuality and accent, in that instances of speech always echo similar ones in 
other times /  contexts (Bakhtin, 1981).
Are national identity and nationality really equivalent to gender? It seems from a 
discursive perspective that the answer is a positive one. But, can we say that the 
power of citation and iteration of national norms writes the nation on the body, 
producing the body, as gender /  sex categories produce gendered subjects? The nation 
as discourse and regulatory ideal can be seen as establishing norms that regulate in 
myriad ways our day to day living, who we are and who does not belong to 'us' often 
interpellating us in almost invisible ways -as Billig described in Banal Nationalism 
(Billig, 1995). Seeing it at a bodily level (as typically heard 's/he looks Welsh') points to 
the connection between nationalism and racism. Nevertheless, the important idea to 
take from Butler's concept of performativity is her insistence on citation and iteration.
Many social scientists already understand narratives as performatives. Atkinson and 
Delamont dedicated one of their four volume collection on narrative methods to 
'performance' (Atkinson and Delamont, 2006b). In fact Atkinson and Delamont talk of 
a convergence between the 'narrative' and 'performative' turns (2006b: xxxv). 
However, most sociological and anthropological studies tend to rely on either Austin's
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notion o f speech act or on sociological, "theatrical" versions of the concept of 
"performative" following the pioneering work of Goffman. This is partly because most 
studies are concerned with the study not of collective narratives but with individually 
produced or even singular ones. The idea of "generic" narratives in Baynham conveys 
the notion of a singular narrative which relates a sequence of events which happen 
repeatedly over time (Baynham, 2005:16). Although genericness can be seen as a 
mechanism of citationality and the conveying of norms -in  fact conveying typicality— 
it does not necessarily capture the idea of massive social repetition of narratives and 
norms which performativity does.
National narratives, we noted above, are social and political practices which build the 
nation, but they do not do so at one stroke or from a necessary a priori position of 
authority, but from their incessant repetition in which norms and authority are 
themselves created. This allows us a way to think of subversion and resistance to 
power, in this case to the nation-state, through the telling of oppositional stories or 
counter-narratives (Delgado, 1988-1989; Andrews, 2002).
Counter-narratives o f the nation
Narratives, Hinchman and Hinchman remarked, "emphasize the active, self-shaping 
quality of human thought, the power o f stories to create and refashion [..] identity" 
(Hinchman and Hinchman, 2001). Telling 'our' story is always bound up with issues of 
power and questions of domination (Bennet and Royle, 1995). By ‘telling their own 
story' groups select key events which they consider characterise them, leaving out 
others which might serve to  question, for instance, the unity or coherence of their 
project. Events are organised according to the formal principles of a narrative. That is, 
stories do not simply mirror reality but "involve selectivity, rearranging of elements, 
redescription and simplification" (Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997: xvi). Groups tell their 
version of reality by creating particular meanings through the way these events are 
linked among themselves -are emplotted— in a time and story-line.
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Their connections and meanings, however, are not just invented or created out of thin 
air. Stories are grounded, Plummer says, in 'historically evolving communities of 
memory structured through age, class, gender' (Plummer, 1995: 22). That is, stories 
derive from accumulated dynamic social use in particular social contexts and historical 
conjunctures, from a dialogue and struggle with other (dominant) stories past and 
present, and with different purposes (Bakhtin, 2000).
Stories, then, are multiple and indexical. There are always competing stories in a 
dialogue (Bakhtin, 2000) which attempt to  hegemonize the constitutive narrations of 
the nation. Nevertheless, not all social groups are equally able to tell their own story 
and even less to achieve ideological hegemony. Stories are, thus, sites of struggles and 
of difference (Volosinov, 1973). They are places where Values and preconceptions, 
beliefs and prejudices, knowledge and social structure may be produced and 
transformed' (Bennet and Royle, 1995). Powerful groups' hegemonizing stories will be 
de-contested and imposed as the common sense of a particular society, its ideology, 
while others struggle 'to be heard' (Plummer, 1995). There is a political economy of 
storytelling.
If telling a story is to exercise power (Chambers 1984 quoted in Bennett and Royle, 
1995), then, stories are social weapons. And they are particularly useful ones for the 
constitution and maintenance o f counter-identities (Andrews, 2002; Davis 2002, 
Polletta, 1998). Of course, similarly to social movements, (oppositional) nationalist 
groups 'do more than tell stories' (Polletta, 1991:420). However, stories have also been 
widely used as oppositional practices: as practices of resistance used by the weak 
against the dominant. In the language of discourse theory stories can be seen as 
'practico-theoretical efforts to modify the discursive field and deliberately open up 
political opportunities' (Bastow and Martin, 2005: 219).
Counter-narratives are always in a struggle with dominant master narratives. They 
work to expose the dominant stories' hidden boundaries, exclusions and hierarchies 
(Delgado, 1988-89) and aim to transform reality. Besides, narrative power might even 
be one of the few strategies left for subaltern groups, those who are dispossessed: at
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the margins o f the dominant nation, with no control of any 'traditional' centre of 
power (means of production, state apparatuses or alternative formal or informal 
power conduits). This is due to stories' narrative power or 'n a rra t iv ity they grip us, 
keep us listening or reading, and interpellate us. Thus, they can constitute a means for 
resistance.
Narrativity tends to be based on the cultural readability or plausibility of a story, 
relying on well-known ways of emplotment (Czarniawska, 2005; Polletta 1998, Bennett 
and Royle 1995; White 1987). In the language of discourse theory, narrative power 
relies on the way stories are grounded on familiar discourses, articulating familiar 
elements around the key nodal point. Moreover, narrativity is also based on the gaps 
left by stories. Through their narratives subaltern groups bring alternative 'histories' 
into being which defy the master narratives or their time.
1.4. Literature on Galician nationalism: a critical note.
I draw extensively and engage critically with the literature on Galician nationalism in 
the body of this study, hence here I would only to bring up a few general traits relevant 
to the topic of the thesis which tend to characterize most of the accounts. This 
literature, mainly historical and political accounts of the origins and developments of 
nationalism and nationalist parties, is taken as a point of departure for the 
investigation of national narratives (Barreiro Rivas, 2003; Beramendi, 2007; Beramendi 
and Seixas, 1995; Beramendi and Maiz 1991; Fernandez Baz, 2003; Maiz, 2001, 1984; 
Nufiez Seixas, 2007, 2001b, 1994).
First of all, the character of the Galician movement in the 1970s as nationalist has not 
been seriously questioned. There is a certain neglect of the specificity of the 
ideological form which the movement took. As a result of that, even though the 'break' 
after the civil war and the 'no ve lt/ of a Marxist nationalism is consistently noted 
(Nuftez Seixas, 2007, 2001b; Beramendi, 2007; Maiz, 2001), the contemporary 
movement is implicitly or explicitly plotted as the last moment in a timeline which
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starts and descends -w ith  notable hiccups nonetheless— from the provincialismo in 
the 1840s (Barreiro Rivas, 2003; Beramendi, 2007). As its nationalist character is 
established by definitional fiat, their Marxist language is seen often as no more than a 
superficial twitch.
Secondly, but related to this, the discourse of colonialism has not been examined in 
depth. Colonialism has been recognized as the underpinning of many practices of the 
movement. It is even commonly noted that nationalism in Galicia today still needs to 
'grapple' with that past as this has supposedly never been done -even though I argue 
in this study, grappling with colonialism is precisely what nationalism did incessantly. 
Part o f the problem is that, after the blank years of the dictatorship, there is still plenty 
of research to be done. As it is understandable and necessary, most studies of Galician 
nationalism had focused on pre-civil war nationalism. When contemporary nationalism 
is examined, it tends to be done as useful but general overview articles comprising two 
or three decades, which struggle to examine any epoch in detail or as the hurried last 
chapter o f monographs telling the 'fu ll' history of the nationalist movement in Galicia. 
The monographs dealing with particular times such as, for instance, Rubiralta Casas 
(1998) or Fernandez Baz (2003) deal w ith the period just before the apogee of 
colonialism (1959-1974) or just after (1981-1982). The only study of nationalism as 
discourse is a contemporary analysis of the views of a few nationalists in the 1990s 
(Cabrera Varela, 1992). Cabrera's study is affected by a reliance on a qualitative data 
collection method -twelve in depth interviews with key representatives of 
nationalism— which is later analysed largely in a quantitatively (and structuralist) 
manner. Although there is a wealth o f short studies examining the international 
connections of the UPG in the 1970s an other specific themes, these are only partial 
studies.
The Marxism of the movement, the narratives of colonialism and their ultimate failure 
tend to be assessed within the framework of a 'super-offer' type of explanation 
(Beramendi, 2007; Maiz, 1996; 2001). That is, it is argued that nationalisms' demands 
were characterized by being too radical, and therefore these 'non podia ser asumida 
polo electorado, a pesar de que os inqueritos socioloxicos dende a transicion mostran
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que o sentimento do que poderiamos chamar 'identidade galega' esta presente de 
forma notable en Galicia' (Beramendi and Seixas, 1995: 253). There are several 
problems with this common explanation. Mainly it assumes the failure of nationalism 
to be a matter of degrees of radicalism (of an essentially correct position). Had 
nationalism made more moderate claims, it is implied, they would have succeeded as 
there was a 'sentiment' of Galicianness in the population. Implicitly then, it 
essentialises the Galician population as 'conservative' or 'moderate' as well as it 
establishes a link between a diffuse sentiment of identity and support for nationalism. 
It is difficult to understand, then, how in the first regional elections it was the radical 
nationalism not the moderate one which obtained relatively better results (or how 
present day very moderate nationalism keeps losing votes). Besides the 'super-offer7 
explanation, a common way to deal w ith the radicalism of the movement is to 
establish a clear divide between institutional and ideological practices. This divide 
prevents the examination of the interrelation between ideology and practices, as if 
what nationalism did, in parliament or in the streets, could be neatly disassociated 
from what they said and the stories they narrated. However, the material practices of 
the movement can hardly be understood without an examination of their language 
and their embedded-ness in stories and accounts. As historian Stedman-Jones clearly 
explained as regards explanations of the Chartist movement:
“An analysis of [a group's] ideology must start from what [a group] actually said or wrote, the 
terms in which they addressed each other or their opponents. It cannot simply be inferred -  
with the aid of decontextualized quotation— from the supposed exigencies, however 
plausible, of the material situation of a particular class or social group. Nor is it adequate, as 
an alternative, to adopt a more subjective approach and to treat [the group's] language as a 
more or less immediate rendition of experience into words. [...] It is argued that if the 
interpretation of language and politics is freed from a priori social inferences, it then 
becomes possible to establish a far closer and more precise relationship between ideology 
and activity than it is conveyed in the standard picture of the movement. [...]lt is not a 
question of replacing a social interpretation by a linguistic interpretation, but rather it is how 
the two relate that must be rethought." (1983:94-95)
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1.5. Conclusion.
This chapter has mapped the shifts in the theories and conception of nation and 
nationalism. It has briefly presented the main challenge to the modernist paradigm in 
the form of socio-constructivist and post-structuralist theories of national identity as 
discourse and narrative. These ideas serve to locate the thesis and as a succinct 
introduction and discussion o f concepts which will be drawn upon in the data chapters.
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2Methodology: a natural history of the thesis.
2.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodological decisions which underpin the research 
presented in the following chapters containing the data used. I have called it a 'natural 
history', following Silverman, as this term combines a representation of 'what actually 
happened' in this study with a discussion o f the particular theoretical and practical 
questions concerning method within discourse analysis, qualitative research and my 
case (Silverman, 2010). Each section includes descriptive details of how the research 
was conducted and developed together with a concise discussion of associated 
methodological and theoretical issues. My aim is not to provide a comprehensive 
account o f the discourse, narrative analysis or qualitative research used, but to 
highlight the key issues that arise when applying them to the research of a nationalist 
movement which involves also a historical dimension.
2.2. Research Questions and Methodology.
Contrary to the canonical 'lineal model' conception of research design (Burnham et al.,
2004), within qualitative research -the  methodology in which this thesis is squarely 
inscribed— the choices of interpretive paradigm, theory, design, data, and analytic 
strategy are not isolated or consecutive but 'knit together', iterative decisions (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005). Indeed, even though the choice of methodology should be attuned 
to the kind of questions we set out to investigate; it is generally acknowledged in 
qualitative and discursive approaches that methodological issues cannot be separated
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from theoretical assumptions. In what follows, my research questions, theoretical and 
methodological choices can be seen to be intricately bound.
Research topic and questions
The choice of topic for my thesis stemmed from my MSc research dealing with 
minority nationalisms and the process of European integration, with a focus on the 
case of Galicia. While researching Galician nationalism I was intrigued by its 
participants' strong, but shifting, identity related claims to both Marxism and 
nationalism. Despite the fact that a difficult relation or even incompatibility between 
Marxist and nationalist principles has been well established among both Marxist and 
non-Marxist scholars10 (Nairn, 1977; Anderson, 1983; Nimni, 1991; Lowi, 1998; etc.), 
participants o f the nationalist movement did not seem to perceive it: 'what 
contradiction?' I often heard. As organizational sociologist Barbara Czarniawska notes, 
if an actor does not regard something as a contradiction and we do, then 'it is our task 
to see how this is possible' (1997:177).
I started then to 'problematise' this question in a double sense. I found the dominant 
academic stories of nationalism told during the 1980s and 1990s problematic. These 
established a norm of the 'good or correct' nationalism and encouraged their audience 
to see alternative 'performances' o f the 'script' as 'incompetent performances' or 
deviant cases11. Thus, it seemed to me that we were asking the wrong questions, and 
that a new model or story that allowed us to take fresh account of national identity 
and its processes of continuity and change was needed. Nevertheless, I also 
problematised the apparent coherence and seamlessness of the stories told by 
nationalists. Marxism and nationalism do manifest conflicting ways of structuring the 
social.
Hence, I decided to use a post-structural discursive framework as it is the emergent 
story that provided me with the assumptions, language and methodological tools to 
ask questions different to those concerning the origins and nature of 'nations' -
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typically 'what is the nation7 — and to understand identity in its full complexity, as an 
(unfinished) process rather than an accomplished fact (Hall, 1996a). It allows me to see 
nationalism in a dynamic way as the discursive approach to nationalism places 
emphasis on exploring the connections between political identities, power and politics 
(Mottier, 2000). This framework has been steadily used in an increasing number of 
studies of nationalism concerned with diverse facets of the phenomena since the 
1990s12.
My research questions became, then, geared towards examining the negotiation of 
Marxist and nationalist identities within the Galician movement. I meant to explore 
this negotiation by gaining an understanding of the specificity and variability of 
discourses and narrative practices in relation to the constitution of the political 
community and collective self set in place by the Galician movement, attending to 
their conditions of possibility, change and their political consequences. How do 
nationalists construct 'being nationalist7 and 'being Marxist? However, rather than 
taking these 'Marxist and nationalist7 identities for granted, I decided to take a 
(analytical) step back in order to take a closer look at the movement. Asking: how is 
the political community discursively constructed and performed? What stories did 
nationalists tell? How are masternarratives articulated in discourse? Which ones take 
pre-eminence? When? What are the political effects of storytelling practices? My 
questions continued to be modified as I analysed my data and my focus started to 
move in the direction of narratives as meaning-making devices and political practices.
This step back allowed me to keep an open mind and remain alert to other possible 
ways in which nationhood and nationalism might have been built. The questions are 
also attuned to the discourse theoretical problem driven approach and to its focus on 
understanding and interpreting socially produced meanings, with an emphasis on 
asking how questions, as opposed to retrieving causal accounts to be empirically 
tested and confirmed or to retrieving the true underlying meanings of texts /  actions 
(Howarth, 2000; 2005; Fairclough, 2001). In a similar way to Norval who, in her study 
of apartheid, 'rather than trying to penetrate below the surface [of apartheid]7 took as 
its object of investigation the discourse itself in 'its multifarious practices and rituals7,1
35
examine here the 'surface' of the discourse of nationalism (Norval, quoted in Howarth 
2000:136). The distinctiveness of this discursive study resides, nevertheless, in its 
specific attention to the discourse's narrative and storied dimension and practices, 
through which a certain sense of reality and understanding of society were 
constituted, performed, normalized, maintained and changed.
Discourse and qualitative research: assumptions & underpinnings
Ideas about how the world works, what people are like and others of a similar ilk are, 
then, already drawn upon and consolidated when asking questions within a qualitative 
methodology and interpretative approach to politics and they impinge on our research 
practices. Qualitative methodology is nevertheless plural, and as major commentators 
have noted, it has in recent years expanded, diversified and fragmented (Atkinson and 
Delamont, 2005). Theories o f discourse and discourse analysis are among the different 
socio-constructivist approaches, research and analytical strategies which have had a 
great impact within the branches of qualitative research which embody such ideas. 
They originated within a philosophical paradigm shift in the twentieth century -the  
linguistic turn— when language ceased to be considered a transparent medium with a 
cognitive function and began to be thought o f as social action constitutive of reality 
(Austin 1962). Moreover, language has also come to be seen as a material practice 
(Eagleton, 1995; Volosinov, 1979).
Social actions are, in turn, conceptualised as discursive. This is so because discourse is 
understood broadly as the study of 'human meaning-making'. Although there are 
many definitions of discourse - i t  is an umbrella term which refers to a variety of 
theoretical positions and analytical approaches13— within post-structuralism it is 
commonly understood as not being simply a linguistic concept. Instead discourse is 
about language and practice (Hall, 2001). For Stuart Hall discourse is a system of 
representation which 'comprises the languages, concepts, categories, imaginary o f 
thought and practices put forward by groups to make sense of the way in which 
society works' (Hall, 1996, my cursive). Foucault's concept of dispositif would be very
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close to this idea of discourse. The social space as a whole is seen as a Vast 
argumentative texture through which people construct their reality7 (Laclau, 
1993:341). This inclusive understanding of discourse amounts to insisting that people 
attribute meanings to objects and practices, and do so always from inside of socially 
constructed frameworks of intelligibility14. Social actions are discursive as they are 
meaningful, that is, organized by human values, norms and 'representations of human 
needs and aesthetics' (Wetherell 2001).
The bottom line is a much fuzzier boundary between language, now seen as a material, 
social and constructive practice, and other social practices which are shaped and 
apprehended through systems o f accounts and narrations. Accounts and narratives are 
social actions, as they are enacted and have a performative character. Conversely, 
actions and events are only intelligible because they can be narrated and talked about. 
Hence, Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont suggest that in qualitative research we should 
try to avoid the stark dualism between 'what people do' (as authentic) and 'what 
people say' (as fallible) as these are different types of social action (2003:106).
Assumptions about the world translate to assumptions about methods of undertaking 
research. To conceptualise 'what people say7 and 'what they do7 as different but 
enmeshed types of social action translates, in a research focus, into the social and 
political work done through them. As my research questions illustrate, discursive 
approaches regard 'discourse7 itself as the focus of interest, rather than being treated 
as a resource to unearth 'information7 about a particular topic. Besides, as Gilbert and 
Mulkay showed in their research on scientist repertoires, discursive variability is 
appreciated and examined instead of being seen as an anomaly the researcher has to 
eliminate in order to provide a coherent explanation (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984).
Research strategy: a case study.
In terms of strategy, the thesis is an in-depth study of one case: the discourse -the  
stories and narratives of nationhood— of Galician nationalism. The choice for case
study research is consistent with the epistemological assumptions of the post- 
structural discursive theories and qualitative methodology that underpin the study. As 
David Howarth notes, most of the empirical research using discourse theory is case 
based. If case study research has sometimes been considered a 'limited tool1 for 
research among some social scientists, it is an appropriate strategy in discourse 
theoretical research for epistemological as well as pragmatic reasons (Howarth, 2005: 
329).
Criticism of case studies is generally based on the idea that they do not provide 
researchers with 'information' which is amenable to devising generalizations or to 
theory building15. Nevertheless, the assumptions behind these ideas -th a t we ought to 
devise universal (context-independent) explanatory theories and generalisations— are 
not shared by discourse analysis nor by many other qualitative approaches, such as 
ethnography, nor approaches informed by the 'linguistic' or 'argumentative turn'. 
Instead, case studies are valued because they provide specific, contextual and well 
grounded, in-depth knowledge. The aim is akin to providing 'thick description' which 
tries to illuminate the overdetermined character of political practices, their multiple 
frames of reference and perspectives (Geertz, 1973). This is a more appropriate way 
for furthering understanding and for interpreting and explicating socially produced 
meanings and realities -which are explications of explications— which is the overall 
objective of interpretive and discourse theory (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Howarth 2000: 
128).
The choice of Galicia was an obvious one as my curiosity about processes of identity 
formation had been aroused by previous research on this particular case. My 
familiarity with it also contributed to my choice for the simple reason that it would 
facilitate the research process. However, if I were to decide on this case it was because 
I was convinced that its value went much further than just that. I think it has an 
exemplary status as it brings insights into processes common to other nationalisms 
and social movements on the construction, maintenance and transformation of 
identity and its effects, offering a clear opportunity and potential for deep learning 
regarding nationalist ideology (Stake, 2000). Thus, my interest in the case is a
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combination of its intrinsic value -through a thick description of nationalism and 
Marxism in Galicia— and an instrumental value -as Galician nationalism provides a 
means to  further understanding processes common to many other nationalist 
movements (ibid.). Although my intention was not to trade in sweeping 
generalisations, I agree with Denzin and Lincoln when they suggest that no individual 
case is ever really just individual (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). This case was interesting 
because it points to the complexity of nationalism as "lived-ideology".
More pragmatically, the case also made sense in terms of my personal, biographical 
experience16. Being Galician, the case offers advantages for research as I am fluent in 
the Galician language. As fluency and ability to understand the nuances of the 
language in which research is conducted are indispensable requirements in order to 
implement a discursive/narrative analysis, the advantage was undeniable. 
Nevertheless, as I was to realise later on, being Galician was a double-edged sword. 
Difficulties arose when being viewed with characteristic suspicion at times in the field 
-as I explain later on. Moreover, the topic of the study was my own "national identity" 
and I was unaware o f how deeply entrenched some of the more "banal" claims of 
nationalism and nationhood were in myself, even when I have always prided myself on 
having a critical outlook. I was native rather than "going native", and the issue was not 
how to achieve familiarity with the case, but rather how to de-familiarise myself with 
it. Living and working many miles away in the setting o f a British university was key to 
providing me with the necessary distance.
2.3 On data: collection methods, process, results and limits.
In trying to examine the discursive construction of national identity since the early 
1970s I had to collect data appropriate to the study of discourses from the appropriate 
settings and sources. In a study with a historical dimension such as this archival 
research was the obvious choice. I navigated through the difficulties of composing it 
with the aid of narrative interviews. Later on, as I started to examine it, I realised my 
data had provided me with a goldmine of narratives.
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Composing an 'archive'
Although in discourse an 'archive' has a double meaning, in my case these ended up 
coinciding. In qualitative research an archive refers to a method of data collection 
based on the examination of documentary data often stored in large quantities in the 
same physical setting. In looking for discourses, however, Foucault defined an archive 
as the system o f statements which formed 'the law of what can be said, the system 
that governs the appearance of statements as unique events, ...which determines that 
all things said...are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in 
accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific 
regularities./ (1969:145-146). These systems of statements are not necessarily 'neatly 
packaged' in particular settings, sites, nor fully embodied by determinate people or 
encapsulated in specific data forms -they can involve texts, a variety of artefacts, 
images and so on as appropriate data sets.
However, in my case -a  minority nationalism which spent two thirds of its existence as 
an opposition movement with limited resources, very little access to institutions and 
ideological apparatuses— I found that the easiest way of getting at these groups' 
discourses on collective identity was looking at their written words, the textual 
production of organised political sites. As Coffey and Atkinson explain, documentary 
data are key ways that groups and organizations have to represent themselves 
collectively to themselves and to wider audiences (1997: 45). The written documents 
produced by nationalists over the years also presented the advantage of being attuned 
to a discourse analytical ideal of 'naturalness', understood as using data which remains 
as uninfluenced by the researcher as possible (Taylor, 2001).
Besides, in order to investigate nationalist discourse over many decades, the use of 
documents saved me from dealing with issues of memory and 'retrospective 
rationalizations', which would have been an issue had I opted for interviews (Howarth,
2005). By collecting documents of the movement written since 1972 I had 'direct' 
access to discourses and narratives as they were produced, offering a rich source of 
self-representations as they were at the time o f production, in which the political and
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social contexts of the different political conjunctures was inscribed in the texts. As 
Homi Bhabha says 'to encounter the nation as it is written displays a temporality of 
culture and social consciousness more in tune with the partial, overdetermined 
process by which textual meaning is produced through the articulation of difference in 
language' (Bhabha, 1990:2). In other words, textual data helped me track the 
temporality and historicity of the discourse and stories of nationalism, seeing them as 
the partial results o f dialogues (or struggles) with different others.
I sampled documentary materials through a combination of representativeness, 
choosing the key sites producing the discourses compounded later by trying to be 
exhaustive, to illuminate particular periods and 'emblematic issues' (Hajer, 1995). 
Although the movement comprised an important array of sites, it was soon apparent 
which ones could be producers o f the systems of statements I was looking for. Initially, 
I read relevant secondary literature to become familiar with the groups and 
documents I should be looking for on the ground. I gathered documents mainly at the 
University o f Santiago's newspaper library in the Biblioteca Xeral, the party archives of 
the UPG and the Penzol archive. The BNG's Fundacion Galicia Sempre also helped me 
gather documents. Access to these sites was not an issue as I was allowed as part of 
my rights as a visiting researcher. A family friend -a t the time a relevant 'young' 
member of the UPG who later occupied a high position in the PSOE-BNG coalition 
government— aided my access to the UPG archives17. Nevertheless, even though I was 
allowed full access, and helpfully provided with copies, to all public documents18, 
access was partially restricted to non-public documents (mainly the internal 
communications bulletin 'Canle').
My preliminary explorations revealed a variety of documentary data from parties, 
social and cultural associations and platforms, newspapers (such as La Voz de Galicia 
or A Nosa Terra) and magazines (Tempos Novos, Grial, etc). Political conditions may 
constrain particular events and stories from being narrated (Riessman, 1993), and 
initially I expected the written production of nationalists during their clandestine years 
to be sparse. A dictatorship is a political order in which there is only one possible 
narrative to be, lawfully, told. Dissent was explicitly prohibited and punished in Spain
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from 1939 and for decades nationalists who were other than Spanish were silenced. By 
1964, however, economic, social and political conditions had changed enough to make 
this the starting point o f the new stories told by contemporary Galician radical 
movements. Then, I found there was no shortage of storied production, quite the 
opposite: a bewildering array of types of texts that came from a bewildering diversity 
of small groups. This was, paradoxically, the first obstacle I found as I faced the worry 
of my choices on what/how much data to select might influence findings and be 
detrimental to reliability.
I had to narrow my data down, so I decided to rely on party periodicals and documents 
as it became clear that parties and their active members were the 'founders of 
discursivity7 in the movement19 (Foucault, 1984:114). Also, there were strong 
hierarchical, top-down links between the parties and the myriad social organizations 
forming the movement, often described as the 'transmission-belt' for the parties in the 
literature. They were also the more stable sites; the UPG is in fact the only site which 
has had an uninterrupted existence since 1964. Thus, I focused on the public political 
language produced by the party political sites.
As a result, I do not claim that the study reflects the entirety of the language, 
narratives and strategies which the movement has deployed and performed. No doubt 
there is still public and private language and discourse used by the movement and 
organizations which remain to be examined and which contain their own specificities 
and bring to the fore different facets. In spite of the transmission-belt label, other sites 
had a life and dynamic o f their own -th is is particularly the case of the trade unions 
and green activism. However, I would suggest that even with their differences in 
emphasis and context—which might have produced different themes and subplots— 
they would all have been enmeshed in the story-lines and general strategies I describe 
in the data chapters.
Initially, I thought only having access to public data was a drawback. However, I soon 
realised that if it was, it was certainly only a minor one. It is to my advantage that 
discourse analysis does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of actors, their hidden
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intentions or secret plans. Because of this, it became transparent that I had to 
concentrate on the 'surface': the movements' representations of themselves and the 
country to themselves and significant others. The party magazines and congresses, 
actually any public documents, were ideal for these purposes. Ole Weaver and other 
analysts of discourse as well as historians such as Steadman-Jones have stressed the 
validity of this strategy (Waever, 2005; Stedman-Jones, 1983).
Composing my corpus was nevertheless a slow and painstaking process, reading and 
re-reading the documents, while photocopying and taking notes as appropriate, that 
lasted for around six months. Copying texts was necessary as I would need the 
originals to  proceed later to a detailed (or micro) discursive analysis of some of them, 
when away from the field. This lengthy examination and familiarisation with an ample 
body of texts in order to  build a corpus of data is quite common when looking at 
discourses from a post-structural, Foucauldian genealogical research standpoint 
(Carabine 2001; Howarth, 2000).
However, having narrowed down the number of sites, I was still looking at a variety of 
documents which spanned almost th irty years. I needed a clear focus which would 
allow me to attend to processes of identity formation and change whilst selecting 
further material. I decided that in order to  effectively examine processes of identity 
formation or dissolution I should zoom in on the textual production at key moments o f 
crisis and around emblematic issues (Hajer, 1995). The task was to identify these. 
Again, secondary literature was useful for this purpose, but I also decided to conduct 
some interviews with key actors as I was interested in obtaining an insiders' insight20. 
Thus, I carried out five exploratory unstructured interviews, each lasting around one 
and half hours, with actors chosen through a stratified purposive sampling21.
This was the type of interview best suited for my purposes: firstly, examining the 
participants own accounts as to moments o f crisis, when and why they had happened; 
secondly, and more generally, identifying analytical questions, picking up promising 
themes and leads that I could bring to bear or integrate, at the analytical stage, on the 
documents. In other words, I meant to use what has been called a 'following the
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thread' type of approach to integrating different data modes (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). 
This means that each data is analysed appropriately to find promising analytical 
questions -'contributing data and findings from its own epistemological frame'— that 
may be 'picked' and followed through other data sets. (2006:3). This is important as 
within qualitative research different methods and data modes are not seen as simply 
adding up to a 'fuller picture' of reality, but as revealing different facets o f the topic 
under study (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).
Introduction to the data
I collected party periodicals, texts of congresses, pamphlets and key oeuvres. Not 
simply choosing the particular sections which had seemed to be more relevant, such as 
editorials, I collected and later examined to different degrees each whole issue and 
text. The reason was to preserve their micro-context (Riessman, 2008). This context 
puts every theme, narrative and tale in relation to a whole, and is invaluable in 
discerning which stories were relevant (and how relevant) and the intertextual 
relations in different periods, adding reliability to the study. Below there is a general 
description of the most salient characteristics of the key data I collected:
Terra e Tempo ('Land and Time'; henceforth T&T)
Audience: the UPG militancy, the radical movement, the wider public to a limited 
extent.
I collected all the issues between 1964 and 1998 -w ith  the exception of one missing 
issue in 1984. T8iT was the voice of the central committee of the Union do Pobo 
Galego (UPG) which had the rights of telling in the party. It was written by a group 
commissioned from the secretariat o f the central committee. The second congress in 
1979 informs us of its aims: 'the party information., must have as its key objective [to 
obtain people's] adhesion and identification [with the party] on the basis of education, 
that is on the basis of [our] analysis and interpretations of particular political issues or 
those of a general subject matter, that provoke collective discussion' (UPG, II congress,
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pp 92-93). The distribution objective was "the streets and work places, but also at all 
levels, even commercial distribution' (ibid.). Articles in T&T were not signed, being 
presented as the centripetal, authoritative voice /discourse of the UPG as a whole. Its 
written word aspires to be monological: the dialogues, double-voicedness and 
heteroglossia within it often take place in spite o f the UPG. It tends to present generic 
narratives, where typicality and iterability are the point, rather than uniqueness 
(Baynham, 2005). It brims with a particular claim for narrative truth, that of 
representing not just the experience of the (collective self) but of the community as a 
whole.
T&T was published w ithout interruption but irregularly: production varied between 3 
and 6 or more issues per year initially, increasing sharply during the years o f the 
transition (1975-1980) to a monthly output (with bimonthly issues interspersed). 
Between issues 84 in 1981 and 85 in 1982 there was a period of ten months silence 
which marked the end o f one stage and the beginning of another. After that, during 
the 1980s, it was published around four times a year. The magazine set the UPG's 
policies and political analysis in the editorial and dedicated most of the remaining 
space to the treatment o f diverse topics, commenting on their own practice and their 
actuality.
Gallza Sociallsta ('Socialist Galicia'; henceforth GS)
Audience: as with T&T the PSG membership, the wider radical movement and limited 
social distribution.
I collected all issues of the Partido Socialista Galego (PSG) party periodicals between 
the years 1976 to 1982 -and some later issues in the 1980s whilst being already 
PSGEG. These issues comprise the second epoch of the PSG until it breaks away from 
the BNG. GS differs notably from T&T. Being also the voice of the party, this voice is 
highly heteroglot. The articles are signed (often under a pseudonym) reflecting a 
recognition of the individual voice as part o f but different from the collective self. 
There are claims to truth and genericness but GS is altogether more dialogized: that is, 
relativized, aware of competing definitions for the same things, less authoritative. It
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often presents modalized assertions and explicitly attributed quotes, which allow a 
view of different and opposed opinions to  those of the party and its membership -  
hardly ever traceable in T&T. Besides, it often reported dissent and its own failures. 
T&T and GS were involved in a dialogue-struggle.
Texts of the UPG Congresses.
These were the canonical, normative texts of the party. The congresses usually took 
place every two years, with some extraordinary ones, until the late 1980s when they 
became more infrequent. The texts present the novelty of being bimodal, both speech 
and text based. The opening and closing speeches were incorporated into the 
approved texts. Between 1977 and 1983, comprising the first four congresses, they 
present the political situation in Galicia and Spain first, dealing later with world issues. 
This ordering changed from the fifth congress in 1986 onwards where the world, Spain, 
Galicia and the p a rt/s  policies were examined. This shift in topic order is not 
inconsequential; it reflects the discursive and narrative modulations and shifts in 
antagonisms. The speeches are a narrative goldmine as they explicitly recount the Mife- 
s to r / o f the party in between congresses (Linde, 1993) They present a similar 
authoritative and un-dialogized voice to T&T.
Assembly texts Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)
I collected all the BNG assembly texts from 1982 to the early 2000s. The BNG 
congresses are 'pastiche' texts, composed of different data modes (speech and text) 
stylistic unities, voices and accents. They reflect the plurality of groups and the 
complex power (in)balances and mechanisms in order to deal with them in the bloc.
Apart from these key data sources, I examined multiple oeuvres of organic 
intellectuals, co-authored texts, pamphlets, explicative booklets, biographies and DVDs 
as well as other organizations' periodicals (ANPG). All this textual production was 
written in the Galician language -a  political act o f defiance and conscience raising in 
itself— presenting multiple orthographic vacillations. Some of these vacillations had 
clear ideological connotations: 'Galicia' in the 1970s will later on become 'Galiza'. 
Unfortunately, I did not have access to the PSG's congressional texts which were
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absent from the public archives. I had to rely on private collections to access them. 
This was unlucky, because pursuing them became difficult, explained by the busy, 
demanding lives of my interlocutors. However, I realized that GS was all I needed as 
my corpus was already large and the periodical presented clearly the discourse, 
narratives and voices of the PSG to the point of saturation.
The reason why I collected materials up to the very late 1990s is that initially I thought 
of examining three decades of narrative production. As I will explain later on, it soon 
became obvious, during analysis, that I was obtaining a wealth o f rich insights that 
would be lost had I chosen to expand the period under analysis. Thus, I decided to 
narrow the thesis down to the examination of one critical conjuncture: the transition 
to democracy and the construction of identity and its change before and after that. 
This was also the period when a most clear negotiation of Marxism and nationalism 
took place; when more creative discourses and practices where set and also one, 
particularly in the early 1980s, which has been studied less. Moreover, to my mind this 
is now a critical period as in the recent crisis resulting from losing the elections and 
government in 2008, it has been the period mythologized as a lost golden age.
2.4. Analysis: a discursive approach to narrative.
One of the momentous moments in this study came when, as I was reading and re­
reading my data and starting to be familiar with it, I realised that the texts were 
incessantly telling stories: about the nation, the parties, the next demonstration or 
about other groups. This was the case in spite of the relentless claims to authority 
through science explicitly made in the texts -linked to a particular, Marxist vocabulary 
of motives (Mills, 1940). The more I read, the more I was aware of the storied nature 
of the texts. Narratives and stories were the preferred enunciative modality: not 
reasoning by analogy, deduction, images, statistical calculations or any other form of 
statement22 as Foucault had encountered in the discourse of nineteenth century 
doctors (1969:55). Hence, I decided to focus primarily on the narratives and
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storytelling practices of the movement, understanding narratives as part of discourses 
(Mottier, 2000; Taylor, 2006).
Even if this had not been originally intended, the data, methods and even the research 
questions not only fitted very well with this focus, but had been conducive to it. The 
discourse analytic assumptions guiding the questions and data gathering are shared 
with narrative analysis -besides, the analysis o f narratives is also a variegated field 
within qualitative research where post-structuralism and discourse theory have had a 
great impact (Atkinson and Delamont, 2006). In my interviews I had decided to "warm 
up' by asking the interviewees to take a personal look before thinking about crises and 
ideology shifts, 'tell me about how you got involved in the movement', worked well 
and was an invitation to  tell a story23. The study o f identity has come to be seen as 
storytelling. Identities are created not by any action in itself, but by the narratives of 
self which are their 'skimmer', or as Currie says, 'the only way to tell who we are is to 
tell our own s to r / (Currie, 1998:17; Bruner, 1990; Hall,). Social movements, Fine says, 
are 'bundles of narratives' (Fine, 2002:229).
I see narratives, then, as social, performative and political practices which contribute 
to the (re)production and transformation o f discursive formations. Narratives are a 
particular kind of knowledge, rationality and of political practice which discourses 
entail (Lyotard, 1984; Plummer 1995). As well as being territories of knowledge, they 
are territories where power is effected (Foucault, 1977). They are also performative 
and citational practices which thread a thick web of constructions relating to the 
collective self which might become normative through iteration over time (Butler, 
1993). By narrative I mean, in a very general sense, the accounts o f events /  actions (or 
a series of them) chronologically connected and evaluated or moralized through a plot 
(Czarniawska, 2004). Therefore, I am eschewing the contemporary usage of the term 
where, as Riessman puts it, 'narrative has come to mean anything beyond a few bullet 
points' used by everybody from news broadcasters to researchers as narrative 
gradually achieves popularity in politics (2008: 4). Contrary to much sociological, 
literary and narrative analysis my focus is on collective narratives instead of personal, 
individual tales.
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Four analytical steps: highs and lows.
My next hurdle became apparent when deciding how to read systematically the 
narratives (indeed it began earlier than that, as I explain below). I wanted to use a 
"synthetic7 approach which combined the "macro7 discursive perspective characteristic 
o f post-structuralism, with a "micro7 reading or close attention to the texts themselves 
which is often lacking in the former (Wetherell, 1998). Hence, I immersed myself in the 
literature on narratives, finding sociological and literary perspectives useful as, with 
exceptions, politics has cared little about the "narrative turn"24. However, the first step 
was disheartening: if the analysis of discourse is already commonly described as a 
"craft skill7, narrative analysis was referred to as an "ample bag of tricks7 (Wood and 
Kroger, 2000; Czarniawska, 2004). By this, Czarniawska means that narrative analysis 
does not have a single set o f procedures to check the correctness of results (ibid). I had 
to adapt the concepts and strategies of discourse and narrative research creatively as 
tools appropriate for achieving my own goals and becoming a "bricoleur7, so 
characteristic o f qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).
The first step had been reading and familiarizing myself with the texts, as well as with 
the transcriptions of the recorded interviews, to get a "sense7 of the main ideological 
themes and plots. Here, another issue soon arose: stories are often blurred, have fuzzy 
boundaries, or span for issues /  years in serial-like types interspersed with non­
narrative parts and other embedded tales. Indeed, as Riessman comments, it is 
generally acknowledged in the human sciences that the researcher "does not find 
narratives but instead participates in their creation7, which holds even for non­
interview elicited texts (2008:21).
Nevertheless, I could soon identify and start classifying different types of tales. I 
identified story-lines and subplots. Among these, stories took different forms. "Story­
line7 was a useful middle range concept which Maarten Hajer7s Foucauldian inspired 
analysis of environmental discourse took from Davis and Harre in another attempt at 
arriving at a "synthetic7 approach (Hajer, 1995; Davies and Harre, 1999). It is an
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overarching plot, akin to what Foucault calls a discursive sub-group (1969:73). Hajer 
defines a story-line as 'a generative sort of narrative which allows actors to draw upon 
various discourses to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena' (Hajer, 
1995:57). Different story-lines coalesce to constitute a discursive formation, becoming 
its 'sjuzet': the literary concept which refers to the particular productions of the same 
play /  story. Story-lines resembled in their form Linde's description of a 'life s to r / in 
spite of their written character. That is, borrowing Linde's definition, story-lines consist 
of 'all the stories and associated non-storied units' (such as explanations or chronicles) 
and 'the connections between them' (Linde, 1993:21). Where I differ with Linde is that 
story-lines were not told by just one group, but as Hajer says they are better seen as 
inherent in practices rather than groups (ibid.). This long and mixed form became an 
issue when writing the data in the chapters (particularly in chapters 5 and 8) as it was a 
complicated process to find the extracts which would encapsulate certain ideas to a 
readership unfamiliar with the whole story, which spanned documents and multiple 
issues and could not be presented in their entirety. Hence, I had to rely on plot 
summaries and trust, which I tried to enhance by presenting multiple extracts.
These overarching plots were densely populated by additional (smaller, partial or 
sectorial) subplots, not all o f them living up to Labov's canonical form (Labov and 
Waleztky, 1997). They were often contained in clusters of 'small tales' -broken, 
imperfect, not fitting the canonical form (Georgakopoloulou, 2006) such as the stories 
of the 'national-popular struggles'— which I do not see as opposed to big stories, but 
rather as contributing to a story-line's unity as 'regularities in dispersion' (Tannen, 
2008; Foucault, 1969). By this time, however, similar to Stanley, who had also applied 
narrative analysis to a large corpus, I had already abandoned a common neat 
distinction in the literature between narrative and story as unworkable (Stanley, 2008). 
Once I had identified story-lines and subplots I searched in the data for every instance 
of that type of tale. Basic quantitative methods were also useful as a preliminary tool: I 
counted stories to know which tales appeared more often and which ones were 
prevalent at particular times. I collected them and read them together.
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The third analytical step (although here boundaries are fuzzy) was to look into the 
structural features of the tales. Labors classic model of stories worked well to guide 
me through the functions and constitutive parts of the tales, aware that its de- 
contextualization of stories posed problems as to their political reading (De Fina, 2000; 
Whooley, 2006). I compared clusters of tales among themselves in a preliminary form: 
their orientations, evaluations, and so on which were often suffused throughout the 
stories, remaining mindful, nevertheless, o f Riessman advice not to fracture narratives 
and lose context, which meant going back and forth between the tales and their parts 
(Baynham, 2006; Gwyn, 2006; Riessman, 1993). Even if the unpacking of structural 
features was not my ultimate goal, looking at how the tales were organized helped 
understand the points made and avoid focusing simply on content (Riessman, 2008). 
These comparisons gave me an insight into the function the stories were meant to 
perform. For instance, this strategy helped me see that the world-system stories 
described in chapter 7 were until 1985-1986 'success stories': whilst the themes of 
aggression and injustice were overwhelmingly present, their point was that the battle 
was still and could still be won. Indeed, the second congress of the UPG in 1979 
complained that rather than analysis, T&T had been publishing articles that were no 
more than a 'simple narration with an ideological 'whip' at the beginning, in the middle 
or in the end most o f the time' (UPG, second congress, pp 93). This structure forced 
the organization's aims without trying to convince and could easily backfire, 
positioning them as radical and intolerant. This preliminary stage revealed not only 
which themes were present, but what relevance or how relevant they were (Riessman, 
2008: 88).
The steps this far amounted to a concern with the 'manifest level' (Con Davis, 1984): 
the presence of the nationalists' stories and narratives. Posts-structuralist approaches 
to identity and narrative insists, however, that the plots /  orders built are inherently 
unstable and ultimately they fail (Currie, 1998). I had realised though that it was 
relatively easy to switch languages between discourse theory and narrative analysis. 
Therefore, implementing a double strategy was the next step. In reality, these steps 
overlapped to a great extent, being just a device to allow me to explain what I did. I 
had been 'coding7 the stories theoretically with the concepts provided by Foucauldian
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and Laclau's theories of discourse. By which I mean I was sorting the stories by 
analytical /theoretically guided concepts broadly and relying on analytical memos 
written down in the relevant chunks of text /  tales. I used coding software (Atlas.ti25) 
extensively relying on its 'memo' and 'families' feature. Having looked for plots I had a 
good idea of what 'nodal points' or 'discursive strategies' -the  narrative means by 
which a discourse is given meaning and force— were there. My next strategy was to 
read with an eye not just on plots, tales, 'objects' and strategies but on the gaps in the 
tales, the paradoxes, silences and generally where they failed to make sense -in  spite 
of all efforts. Meanwhile, I had been going back an forth between the texts and 
secondary literature on the political conjunctures I was examining, in a 'dialogical' 
analytical strategy (Bakhtin, 1981; Riessman, 2008; Whooley, 2006) which located the 
tales not only in their textual micro-context but also in their local and historical 
contexts and in the dialogues in which they were enmeshed. This helped me locate the 
narrative practices in the movement's wider discursive practices and attend to their 
ideological effects.
Overall, the main problem I faced was the wealth of information, stories and detail I 
was generating and how to transmit /  transpose this into my writing of the chapters. I 
was frustrated at leaving interesting detail aside, and worried that having produced a 
very rich analysis I would end up simply presenting watered down, uninteresting data 
chapters. Liz Stanley had reported similar when applying narrative analysis to large- 
scale and complex phenomena problems in her article 'Madness to the Method' 
(Stanley, 2008). Partly, my solution to this was to opt for a 'metonymic' approach. As 
Gwyn notes, in discourse analysis 'the part (the extract of the text) is seen to represent 
the whole (the wider discourse in the Foucauldian sense) and specific discursive 
practices cannot fail to throw light on the wider cultural practices in which they are 
embedded' (Gwyn, 2002: 30). This was the rationale which guided me when choosing 
some small tales to explain important discursive strategies (as in chapter 6) but also of 
the overall analysis of narratives as parts of wider discourses.
A note should be made on the language, even though I cannot do justice to the 
debates in translation and research. I read and analysed narratives in Galician. This was
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not a problem as I am a native speaker, but translating them as well as going back and 
forth between three languages (Galician, Spanish and English) was altogether more 
problematic. I found myself code switching often in my analytical notes, simply relying 
on the language which for different reasons better allowed me to quickly jo t down my 
ideas, notes from which I later had to compose a standard English text. Moreover, I am 
aware my translations had already become different texts from those I had examined. 
As Temple suggests, researchers might 'foreignize' or 'domesticate' texts when they 
translate; and may choose words to produce rhetorical effects rather than simply 
moving meanings across languages (Temple, 2008).
Not being a professional translator, I tried to represent in the English text, as well as I 
could, the language features I encountered in the Galician text, mindful that changing 
Galician words into English might simply evoke different contexts of understanding. 
The nationalists' texts were often cumbersome, complex, displayed strange 
grammatical patterns and vacillating orthography. They were often not easy to read, 
particularly those of the UPG. Part of this, I think, was simply due to a lack of 
normalization of Galician at that time26. Part of it corresponded clearly to their 'doing', 
'living' a particular repertoire: that of scientific Marxism. Indeed, the UPG relied on the 
supposed corrected-ness of their 'analysis' to self-attribute a vanguard position in the 
movement. Writing was an important means of conveying that and I wanted to 
preserve those meanings. Also, I had a responsibility for the ways in which I 
represented the discourse and groups in my translations. I tried to make up for losses 
in the texts by explanation of the extracts and mainly by making the original texts in 
Galician available in the appendix.
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2.5. Conclusion.
Overall, in my view the research strategy produced rich data and the analysis did 
produce a 'thick' approach in relation to my questions, with plenty of insights and 
questions being left for further writing and future research to develop. I hope the 
chapters will further understanding and make for a more complex picture of Galician 
nationalism and the role of storytelling in politics. However, on the downside, it was 
also a very labour and time intensive process.
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3Intertextuality and the nation: resources, antagonism and dislocations
3.1. Introduction
In this and the following chapters I trace the overarching plots in the Galician 
nationalist stories from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, with a special focus on the 
years of the Transition to democracy and the story-lines of colonialism. I examine 'big7 
nationalist plots as well as small stories of nationhood and Marxism as they appeared 
in periodicals, congressual texts and oeuvres of organic intellectuals. These stories are 
always historically (conjuncturally) situated, located in space and time coordinates27. 
These coordinates provide the conditions of possibility for the narratives: the dynamic 
historical, social and economic matrix inextricably linked to privileged frames of 
representation which provide the raw materials and symbolic resources for 
storytelling.
These chapters are, then, fundamentally concerned with intertextuality. This is, with 
the movement's narratives 'associated fields' -the  formulations within which they 
appeared, were referred to, opened up and whose status they share and take a place 
with (Foucault, 1969/1989:111). As Kristeva noted, 'every text is from the outset under 
the jurisdiction of other discourses which impose a universe on it' (cited in Culler, 
1981:105). These other discourses are not mere 'influences' on a pre-existent 
nationalist narrative. The story-lines of colonialism were, rather, 'a tissue of 
quotations' of discourses and practices in which they were historically and locally 
inscribed. History is inserted into them. These stories and utterances are threads of
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past and present dialogues and struggles. They connect with and disrupt other 
utterances and stories: past imaginings of nation, tales of oppression and resistance at 
a wider, 'world-historical' level and at the local level of power struggles for political 
spaces, for reconstituting norms and normalizing fields of resistance and nation anew 
at a time of social dislocation. These contexts show how living by Marxism(s) and 
nationalism simultaneously was not a highly unusual episode protagonized by a group 
of radicalized intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie disassociated from the society they 
inhabited. It was, instead, a cultural space within the left opened up by a specific 
political conjuncture and the enmeshment of frames of intelligibility from the Third 
World, Europe and Spain in the late 1960s and 1970s.
3.2. Storied context: dislocation, symbolic resources and antagonisms.
If in order to understand what work political narratives do, we need to embed them in 
their local and historical contexts -th a t is attend to their argumentative contexts and 
arenas of struggle (Billig, 1987; Volosinov, 1973)— then I should start here by 
presenting the contexts o f the Galician narratives of colonialism. These contexts form 
the conditions of possibility and symbolic resources of the nationalists' social 
constructions and narratives. These contexts were threefold. Firstly, the political 
conjuncture of organic crisis in late francoism and the transition which nationalism 
underwent. The transition to democracy was a terrain of political uncertainty and 
instability in which a plurality of political efforts and stories were mobilised, which 
aimed at hegemonizing the political space. But the transition did not simply consist of 
an empty time-space: old, inherited stories of nation as well as tales of resistance from 
abroad (often anti-colonial) populated it and contributed to its shaping. I examine here 
the three, starting with the earlier narratives of nation.
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Early stories o f 'old nations'
Spanish and and other related peripheral nationhoods developed as an ideological 
battle field of similar historicist and essentialist narratives which, nevertheless, 
supported different and sometimes opposite political strategies: the construction of 
either Spanish or peripheral national identities. This often, but by no means always, led 
to a reciprocal negation. Historians agree that tales of the Spanish nation first 
appeared around 1808 or 1812 (ignited by resistance to Napoleon) and since then 
there has been a continuous effort to narrativize and nationalize the country, either 
from a liberal, or, later, from a conservative perspective (Beramendi, 2007; Kamen, 
2008; Saz Campos, 2003). Despite their often remarked-upon weaknesses28, the result 
o f these initial nationalizing efforts was that at least throughout the XIX century no 
political current seriously questioned the political unity and national identity of Spain29 
(Beramendi, 2007; Riquer, 1996; Junco, 1996). Yet these nationalizing efforts also did 
not significantly erode alternative regional identities in the making. By the end of the 
century, however, a dislocatory event (the crisis of 1898) was to act as a catalyst for 
change.
Forever Celts: Galician nationalism's tale
Peripheral movements that had been constructing particular 'regional' identities, 
among them Galician, came then to tell a 'nation' story of their own. Most analysts 
locate the starting point of political stories of peripheral nations in Spain in the 
'disaster' of 1898, the crisis that simultaneously stimulated a conservative turn 
towards Spanish nationalism (Balfour, 1996; Beramendi, 2007; Fox, 1997; Saz Campos, 
2003; Riquer, 1996). Nevertheless, the first tales of a differentiated Galician identity 
had already appeared in the 1840s, in the 'provincialismo' and 'rexionalismo' 
movements (Beramendi, 2001, 2007; Beramendi and Nunez Seixas, 1995). It was, then, 
historians and literary writers such as Murguia - in  whom the boundaries between
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those activities was blurred— who would become the early founders of discursive 
interest in the Galician nation (Foucault, 1984).
Manuel Murgui'a was the leading regionalist narrating the Galician nation (Maiz, 1984). 
Politically liberal and a progressive historian, for Ramon Maiz, Murgui'a's ideas of the 
nation are a synthesis centrally informed by romantic German nationalism in the 
founding of difference and nationhood, and by Italian liberal nationalism in the political 
consequences deriving from this (ibid). Murgui'a drew upon the ideas on race 
expounded by the French and English romantic historiography (Thierry, Macaulay, 
Carlyle) and on theories of Aryanism. He founded the Galician nation on the 
intersection of two privileged elements: history (constructing an immemorial past) and 
ethnicity/race (Maiz, 1984). This race being the Celtic, a branch of the Aryan family, 
and foundational myth o f Galician nationalism for almost a century30.
The (hi)story of Galicia, then, is that of a people descended from a 'superior race' (the 
Celts) whose traits have essentially endured in culture, social organization, character -  
i.e. valour, intelligence, hate of alien domination, religiosity and love of land— and 
even physiognomy (Beramendi, 2007; Maiz, 1984). Galicians (that is, Celts and later 
also Swevians) staunchly resisted all invasions of the country by Roman, Visigoth or 
Arab conquerors in many a tragic-heroic episode such as the resistance of Mount 
Medulio31. Then, during the middle ages, Galicia repeatedly struggled to constitute a 
kingdom. However, it failed due to Castile's oppressive strategies and policies, which 
culminated with the successful centralisation perpetrated by the Catholic monarchs32. 
Thus, despite its 'higher dignity and nobility' than the 'Semitic-Spanish' peoples, Galicia 
found itself the victim in a situation of oppression, under an alien and distorting 
political domination. Murguia, therefore, as well as other non-Spanish nationalists, saw 
Spain not as a nation but as a group of nations that, willingly or not, live together 
under the same state structure (Beramendi, 2007:191).
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For Murgui'a, Maiz suggests, really tells a story of eternalization. Galicians not only 
were, but essentially ore, Celts: once ethnically constituted, the character of peoples 
remains essentially immutable with all other influences being negligible, even though 
the Swevians, represented as another 'Aryan race', that settled in the territory of 
Gallaecia in 411 AD were also granted a space in the plot (Maiz, 1984; Villares, 1992). 
Celtism is then the nodal point of the nationalist discourse articulated by Murgui'a 
(ibid.). Here culture more or less transparently reflects biology. Murgui'a also adheres 
and reinforces the romantic idea -already present in the 'provincialismos' and which 
will be taken up by the Xeracion Nos and later nationalisms (Beramendi and Seixas, 
1995; Patterson, 2006)— of the peasant as the repository of the essence of 
Galicianness, however defined (Beramendi and Seixas, 1995). The enemy constructed 
in the story was the 'Semitic race', archetype of the anti-Galician, generally embodied 
by Castile-Spain (Maiz, 1984:166).
Unsurprisingly, by way of founding difference on biological-cultural elements, 
Murgui'a's Celtism functions basically to ground the existence of the Galician nation 
independently of a state. The nation is for him the natural, objective result primarily of 
race, but also of land, character and language. This organic definition of nation 
legitimizes the claim for self-government despite the lack of self-consciousness or a 
history of state institutions in Galicia (Beramendi, 2007). However, Murgui'a does see 
national consciousness and political will as necessary in order to achieve his political 
goals. Thus, Maiz says, this racist foundation of the nation does not result in, as might 
be expected, in extreme political elitism or xenophobic aggressiveness towards the 
other, but in the idea of 'national decision of recovery of own dignity', for the idea of 
race is articulated within a wider liberal framework33 (1984:178-179). That is, a radical 
difference has given rise to a rather pragmatic politics.
Murgui'a's Celtic myth provides the basic script for Galician nationalism for over a 
century. It is with the ' Irmandades da Fala' and later with the Xeracion Nos that a 
Galician identity goes from being a cultural enterprise to a political movement 
(Beramendi, 2007). However, while always keeping its organic-culturalist basis, the
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intelligentsia of the Xeracion Nos and leaders of the Partido Galeguista in the 1920s 
and 1930s offer variations on the tale. Vicente Risco narrates a deeply conservative 
struggle of essences: a trans-historical opposition of 'collective spirits' -'atlanticist', in 
the case of Galicia, versus the Spanish 'mediterranean7— which are embodied in races 
or nationalities (Beramendi 2007:479). Risco and Otero Pedrayo construct the land ('a 
Terra', 'a Nosa Terra') as a key element of the nation, even though only in the case of 
Otero (influenced by Herder) to the point of displacing racist considerations 
(Patterson, 2006). For them, the essence of the Galician nation resides in the land as a 
rural and pre-capitalist se//(Maiz, 2000). The same story is also taken up by Alfonso R. 
Castelao who, nevertheless, transforms it into a progressive tale. Adopting Stalin's 
culturalist definition o f nation as made up of land, language, traditions and ethnicity, 
race becomes for him 'volksgeist' (Maiz, 2000). In this way, Maiz remarks, the Celtic 
myth of origins also remains for Castelao the foundation of the Galician community 
(2000:33). The Partido Galeguista was, then, ideologically heterogeneous -internally 
divided into a conservative and a social-democrat wing. In spite of the mythical 
foundation of radical difference from Castile, the main efforts of the party were 
orientated towards the achievement of a statute of autonomy for Galicia -lobbying for 
it and legally bringing it into being— similar to those elaborated during the Second 
Republic for Catalunya or the Basque country.
Castile, catholic and 'castizo': narrating Spanish identity
Meanwhile -a fter the 1898 Spanish 'disaster7, in the midst of the fin de siecle 
European crisis and reacting against the strengthening of peripheral identities which 
were perceived as a threat— a conservative Spanish nationalism was also gathering 
force. Formulated by the 'regeneracionismo' and the 'noventayocho' generation, that 
flagged the thinking of Unamuno, Maeztu and Ortega y Gasset, this nationalism 
questioned the efficacy of previous liberal nationalization efforts (Saz Campos, 2003). 
They mistrusted democratic institutions because they had built 'states without a soul' 
with their confidence in reason and the prescribed identity of individual and collective 
freedoms (ibid.). What was needed instead, they claimed, was a nation based on
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'deeper* (irrational) structures of feeling: land and blood, death and resurrection and 
volksgeist. This new conservative discourse, which both drew on and contributed to 
the widespread narratives of Spanish decadence and myth of weak nationalization, 
gave rise to intolerant rightwing Spanish nationalisms which would culminate in the 
military uprising against the Second Republic and Franco's nationalist dictatorship. 
Indeed, Saz sees Franco's dictatorship as the last and most durable consequence of the 
noventyocho generation (Saz, 2003). After the civil war the triumph of Franco results in 
the crushing of peripheral nationalisms (Recalde,1990).
Although initially the nationalist discourses and projects of francoism were complex 
and plural34, soon 'nacionalcatolicismo' became the hegemonic force. The Francoist 
ambiguous amalgam of nationalist components gave rise to two interrelated stories of 
nationhood. One tale was that of traditionalist and reactionary 'national-catholicism' 
which represented the Spanish nation as formed by a mixture of trenchant Catholicism, 
an immemorial past (as with peripheral identities, Spain also predated the Roman 
conquest), and a strong mysticism related to 'Castilian immutable essences' such as 
those reflected in the landscape, the language and volksgeist. The other story made 
use of the falangista' idea of 'unity of universal destiny' ('la unidad de destino en lo 
universal') that projected the 'indissoluble' unity of the nation from its immemorial 
past into the future. This tale became a solution to the 'regional problem', that is, the 
key to subordinating an acknowledged regional plurality of the country, to the idea of 
Spain as the only nation. Complementing this rhetoric of Spanish unity and superiority 
towards its internal constituent parts, was a myth of empire o r 'Hispanidacf: a rhetoric 
of cultural imperialism towards Latin America (Nunez Seixas 2001:721; Saz Campos, 
2003). Spain became during the dictatorship an ambiguous combination of a romantic 
tale of essences (Castile, Catholicism and, often, 'lo castizo') and of a fascist, forward- 
looking story of universal destiny and unity. What was unambiguous was that Spain 
was the only nationhood to be lawfully and safely narrated.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the ideological and political projects of the regime (the 
'fascist' Falange and the reactionary-technocratic Accion Espahola /  Opus Dei) were
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exhausted, if still locked in internal battles (Saz, 2007). The reactionary /  technocratic 
project had imposed itself and aspired to transform Spain into an apolitical, 
demobilized and economically satisfied nation. This project nevertheless failed. The 
Catholic church -a  pillar of francoism and central in shoring up Spanish national 
identity— had just held the Second Vatican council, virtually shattering the basis of the 
Catholic state and essence of the nation (ibid.). Internationally, however, the regime 
still saw the world split in a battle against 'communist imperialism' (Ysas, 2004; Vinas, 
2007). Having defeated communism on its own soil, the regime hardliners thought, 
Spain was a key objective of this enemy (Ysas, 2004: 140). Hence, the rhetoric of the 
regime was often still that of war. Mobilization continued in order to legitimize 
francoist rule against internal enemies. The dictatorship identified these as 
'communism', but also 'm asonr/, 'separatism' and 'subversives' in general -categories 
which were applied to any opposition. The long years in power were achieved at the 
cost of dire suppression of freedoms, as well as the social and economic rights o f the 
majority of the population. Hence, by 1975, at the time of the transition to democracy, 
Spanish nationalism had lost all legitimacy as a result of this total identification with 
the dictatorship (Nunez Seixas, 2007).
Stories o f Resistance: anti-colonialism and the popular fro n t
In Galicia by the late 1960s there was only a vague memory of past narratives of the 
nation -what the rather elitist enterprise of 'culturalismo'  and the editorial policy of 
Galaxia had allowed35 (Fernan Velio and Pillado Mayor, 1989; Nunez Seixas, 1994). 
However, there was at that time another powerful magma of symbolic resources 
available to resistance. Counter-narratives o f the nation in Spain -from  the periphery 
or radical left— were to be articulated not from the early discourses of romanticism, 
liberalism or imperialism, but in opposition to them and their perceived political 
consequences: colonial oppression and exploitation of nine-tenths of the world at 
colonialism's high water mark. Thus, this time oppositional cultures (nationalisms and
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far-left movements) were imbued in narratives of resistance and liberation articulating 
Marxist perspectives and 'other7 situated local knowledges from the colonies. That is, 
they were re-articulating anti-colonialism and, at the same time, their own identity 
boundaries.
If nationalism in the Third World was ever merely 'modular7 or derivative from Europe 
-a  common, if implicit claim which Chatterjee rejects (Chatterjee, 1993) -  the situation 
was to change as regards nationalist discourses in the 1960s and 1970s. During that 
period, it was the Third World which was exporting a model to Europe. Those were the 
times of the Cuban Revolution, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Vietnamese, 
Algerian and Angolan wars of independence (among many others) and of the writings 
of their socialist and communist leaders and intellectuals: Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, 
Mao Tse Tung, Amflcar Cabral and Albert Memmi. Their ideas of the individual and 
social alienation of the colonized and of interclasist national liberation fronts, among 
others, became widespread throughout Europe. 'Tricontinental7 knowledge and anti­
colonial emancipatory politics began to infiltrate back to the West (Young, 2001). 
Indeed, they assaulted the West's new leftwing radical and nationalist expressions.
These influences led to fuzzy boundaries between radical groups: nationalizing the far- 
left and radicalizing and re-energising Europe's minority nationalisms. From the French 
May of 1968 and the Italian 'hot autumn7 to the student unrests in Germany and the 
US -where the Black Nation movement was also emerging— radical activists were 
initiating new struggles either from (hybrid) Maoist positionings (such as Gauche 
Proletarienne) or more or less diffusely inspired by anti-imperialist struggle in Asia and 
Latin America (Badiou, 2010; Bourg, 2007; Wright, 2002). Similarly, in the US black 
activists sought to emulate the success of third world independence movements -  
Black Power advocates clenched their fists and claimed a black nation36. Old peripheral 
nationalisms were experiencing a resurgence all over Europe in the 1960s (Connor, 
1977; Smith, 1981; Tiryakian and Rogowski, 1985). These nationalisms (such as the 
Breton, Corsican or Flemish) had been in a long state of decay after their collaboration 
with fascism during World War II, their lack of electoral opportunities for consolidation
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and lack of ideological renovation (Nunez Seixas, 2007:61). They were now 
reinvigorated37. The Occitan writer Robert Lafont popularized the thesis of internal 
colonialism -which was to be applied to Galicia by the PCG. By 1974, fifty eight years 
after the Lausanne Conference, European peripheral nationalist movements had few 
bourgeois roots and tried to foster new solidarities, signing the Charter of Brest 'on the 
struggle against colonialism in Occidental Europe'38. Thus, as Young notes, European 
organic left /  nationalist intellectuals were able to draw on the resources of the 
theoretical anti-colonial work being done and the political identities developed during 
the independence movements (Young, 2001:65).
Hybridizing Leninism and local knowledges
It was Vladimir I. Lenin who had paved the way for a third world synthesis of Marxism 
and local knowledges with his writings on imperialism, colonialism and national self- 
determination. For Lenin, at the beginning of the twentieth century capitalism was in 
the middle of its imperialist stage. In his narrative capital was already international and 
monopolist, that is, highly concentrated in the hands of 'combines of the big 
capitalists' presided over by banks. 'Thus', Lenin said, 'the beginning of the twentieth 
century marks the turning point from the old capitalism to the new, from the 
domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital' (Lenin, 1997:46). 
Monopolies virtually ended free competition through a division of the world made in 
order to ensure profits for those who dominated financial capital. This economic 
division was crucially 'bound up' with a territorial division of the world, in a struggle for 
what he called 'economic territory':
'Colonial possession alone gives complete guarantee of success to the monopolies against all the 
risks of the struggle with competitors [...] The more capitalism is developed, the more the need for 
raw materials is felt, the more bitter competition becomes, and the more feverishly the hunt for raw 
materials proceeds throughout the world, the more desperate becomes the struggle for the 
acquisition of colonies' (Lenin, 1997:82).
Thus, Lenin plotted the latest scramble for territory as being causally related to 
capital's needs. Capitalist competition for colonial markets would transpose the class
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struggle to the international arena, creating a world divided between 'haves' and 
'have-nots'. He sketched a blueprint which was later developed and modified by many 
others.
Third World theorists mediated the translation of Marxism and Lenin's theory of 
imperialism to the specificities of non-European economic, historic and cultural 
contexts. Mao, Fanon, Guevara, and others took Marxism as a point of departure and 
adapted it. Sultan Galiev had boldly reformulated Marxism-Leninism into Muslim 
national communism. He modelled Lenin's dichotomy into a world made of oppressors 
and oppressed, shifting then the focus from classes to nations (Bennigsen and Enders, 
1979). There were now proletarian and non-proletarian nations. Besides, theorists 
insisted on the revolutionary potential of the peasants and stressed cultural struggle -  
and the need for human change, the 'new man'— against the alienation and inner, 
psychological, consequences of colonialism. Mao devised two concepts: 'principal 
contradiction'39 and 'the principal aspect of the principal contradiction' in order to 
ascertain which of the main societal cleavages (class or national) was more relevant at 
any given time. Thus, he effectively put national concerns on the same footing as class 
struggle for the Chinese communist party. He then elevated imperialism (the national 
cleavage) to the 'principal contradiction' to be tackled in China. These questions would 
not have been posed by classical Marxism. In Marxist theory it was simply axiomatic 
that class contradiction was 'the motor of history7. Besides, Mao exhibited a 
voluntarism in which 'man's conscious action' was viewed as an important historical 
force and viewed superstructures in some circumstances, as playing a leading role -  
even though Lenin's ideas on the party had paved the way for this development 
(Schram, 1983:334).
After the second world war Paul Baran's work served as hinge between Lenin's theory 
of imperialism and dependency theory. Dependency theorists (Frank, Wallerstein, 
Emmanuel or Amin) explained how colonized societies were internally disarticulated 
and integrated externally into metropolitan economies and the world system. Their 
role was that of producers and exporters o f raw materials and food which would be
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processed and profited from by monopolies in advanced capitalist states. Capitalism 
was theorised as a world system characterized by an inherent duality (centre- 
periphery dichotomy) which determines two different developmental possibilities. The 
transfer of resources from the periphery to the centre through mechanisms of unequal 
exchange in the international market means that some countries develop because 
others underdevelop (Larrain, 1989). The function of this narrative was to turn on its 
head the west's ideological justifications for colonialism of 'bringing civilization' and 
contributing to the 'common good' of the colonized societies (Meiksins Wood, 2002). 
Instead, uneven development or 'dependenc/ was intrinsic to the imperialist process 
rather than the result of backward, inept or corrupt societies and leaders. Thus, in a 
dialectic of the national with the international, the protagonists were not only 
oppressor and oppressed classes but also oppressor and oppressed nations, where 
'national wars [would be] waged against the international system of imperialism' 
(Young, 2001:125). Therefore, as Marx had remarked regarding the situation of the 
Irish and British working classes, the demands in the colonies for national liberation 
were narrated as an intrinsic part of the fight of all the proletariat against capitalism.
These hybrid theoretical developments were translated into the praxis of the popular 
or national front politics. The policy of the Popular (or people's) Front was inaugurated 
at the seventh world congress o f the Comintern in 1935. Initially it was a policy 
brought about in Europe as a result of the rise of fascism: the broadest possible unity 
of democratic forces was now needed40. Its political goals were governments which 
defended and extended the provisions of democracy. Soon it was adopted by Third 
World movements which rallied all possible forces around the unity of 'the people' 
against Imperialism.
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The transition as dislocation
While anti-colonial discursive practices were at their height, and for thirty six years of 
the twentieth century (between 1939 and 1975) Spain endured an authoritarian rule 
stemming from a bloody civil war provoked by a military uprising against the 
legitimately established Second Republic. This period ended after the death of the 
dictator, the internal exhaustion of the francoist projects, their increasing contestation 
on a plurality of fronts and the pressures of international economic and regional 
integration processes leading to a profound crisis, to political uncertainty, and finally to 
a period of transition (Saz, 2007; Ysas, 2004 and 2009; Vinas, 2007). The transition 
eventually gave rise to a new democratic system41. However, the discursive 
construction of the transition by all political forces involved at the time was one of 
crisis and conflict as well as democracy and later consensus (Saz, 2007; Del Aguila and 
Montoro, 1984). The transition to democracy was, in fact, a dislocation of Spanish 
society, an organic crisis in all spheres, product of the severe contradictions and the 
complex play of political, social and economic forces at work during the last years of 
the Francoist regime (Saz, 2007; San Martin, 2002; Preston, 1986).
The concept of an 'organic crisis' (or social dislocation^ originates in Gramsci's thought 
and it refers to a long-lasting, general 'rupture in the normalized order of things' 
(Gramsci, 1971). A crisis may have 'organic' (deep) and 'conjunctural' (or passing and 
momentary) aspects which need to be grasped in their mutual relations (Gramsci, 
1971:178; Boggs, 1976). Typical of organic crises are great social and political 
disruptions in the existing order. Gramsci defines it in the following terms:
"A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that 
incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves...and that, despite this, the 
political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are 
making efforts to cure them, with certain limits...These incessant and persistent
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efforts...form the terrain of the conjunctural and it is upon this terrain that the forces of 
the opposition organize." (Gramsci, 1971:178).
Indeed, the Spanish economic structure had been developing intensely and unevenly 
since 1959 whilst its political superstructure remained anchored in a deeply backward 
looking, authoritarian regime. Economic growth in the 1960s, Paul Preston notes, was 
'something of a political time-bomb' (Preston, 1986:11): it created structural problems 
which the regime proved unable to solve. Spain had experienced an economic 
liberalization which changed its social structure. The number of peasants and land 
labourers diminished considerably while those occupied in industry and the service 
sector increased. Concomitant to industrialization was a process of urbanization and 
inter-regional migration (often from Andalucia and Galicia towards Madrid, Barcelona, 
Vizcaya or Guipuzcoa) compounded with a strong European migration. These factors 
contributed to the formation of a modest consumer society (the 'desarrollismo' years) 
with the first home appliances and automobiles making their appearance. There was 
also a key generational change: the Spaniards reaching adulthood in the 1960s had 
neither first-hand experience of the civil war nor of its bleak aftermath. Furthermore, 
young men and women's migrant experiences not only brought a healthy flow of cash 
into the country, but also a new familiarity with European democracies, their values, 
freedoms and hegemonic discourses. This familiarity was enhanced by the new 
flourishing tourism industry, television and the general increase of travel abroad 
(Martin Garcia et. al, 2009).
If development became a legitimizing device for the regime -the  ideology of 
'desarrollismo' presupposed that the state's economic take off and the ensuing 
emergence of a modest consumer society would compensate for the lack of political 
freedoms—, it also provided the conditions of possibility for alternative socio-political 
responses. As social historians demonstrate, even though there was a considerable 
degree of acquiescence to francoism, the supposed apathy and passivity of Spanish 
society is a myth (Ortiz Heras, 2003; Ysas, 2007, 2004; Martin Garcia et. al, 2009). 
Workers, students, youth, the intelligentsia and the church, as well as peripheral
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nationalisms were reorganizing in ways which resisted, contradicted and sometimes 
even openly defied the regime.
Economic development and the progressive incorporation of Spain into the 
international economy contributed to the erosion of the basis of the paternalism and 
corporatism designed by francoism to disarticulate the working class42. Experiencing 
high levels of social conflict, businessmen found it more effective to deal with real 
trade unions, mainly the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) -linked to the communist party 
(PCE)— than with the bureaucracy of state-controlled unions (Balfour, 1990; Preston, 
1986). To be sure, the number of strikes after 1962 grew until it reached levels higher 
than those of European countries where there was a legal right to strike and they 
recrudesced from the early 1970s in the wake of the oil crisis and the later democratic 
transition43 (Balfour, 1990:13). These represented, nevertheless, a plurality of 
'workers' movements rather than a unitary struggle (ibid.).
Francoism had also lost the ideological battle in the universities and amongst the 
youth. University students and staff showed their dissent as early as 1956 and 
continued to do so in the frequent revolts during the 1960s and 1970s. These conflicts 
need to be inscribed within the local conditions of resistance against censorship and 
repression and the international context of student discontent in the 1960s. Even 
though radicalized students at the forefront of student opposition were only a 
minority, they nevertheless tapped into the feelings of the majority44. The university 
became a space of 'subversion' for the regime or 'a space of freedom' for the PCE 
(Ysas, 2004). So, too, did the myriad local youth and parish centres often sponsored by 
progressive priests. These were networks of micro-spaces of dissidence, much-needed 
arenas of a socializing alternative to the stale francoist sponsored clubs, which helped 
disseminate alternative political views among the young (Martin Garcia et. al, 
2009:23). The intelligentsia also positioned itself against the regime: numerous public 
declarations, petitions, open letters and other expressions of discontent from 
professional organizations, artists and intellectuals publicly undermined its legitimacy. 
Neighbourhood protests had a base in the demands created by a chaotic urbanization
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process and lackadaisical response to the most basic urban needs by francoist 
appointed mayors. Moreover, after the Second Vatican Council the Catholic church 
was progressively withdrawing support for the regime (particularly the Basque and 
Catalan churches) and drawing closer to the opposition (Fusi, 2000).
All these societal demands were compounded, in some of the Spanish peripheries, 
with the memory and organizations of past nationalisms and their territorial claims- 
particularly in the Basque country and Catalonia. The resurgence of peripheral 
nationalisms in Spain can also be seen as interlocked with their revival in Europe. 
Moreover, the relationship of the dictatorship with regional identities was nuanced. 
Indeed, subordinated regional identities were tolerated or even promoted as a way of 
acknowledging difference whilst buttressing a Spanish nation (San Martin, 2002; Saz 
Campos, 2003; Nunez Seixas, 2007). When, at this time, the Spanish national identity 
was suffering a powerful de-legitimization due to its appropriation by francoism, a 
variety o f alternative identities found the needed space for their own communitarian 
myths (San Martin, 2002). Peripheral identity claims were widely seen as legitimate, 
and articulated by state wide organizations, in their demands -a t least in terms of 
support for a federation. The key nationalist problem for the dictatorship was 
undoubtedly ETA (Fusi, 2000; Nunez Seixas, 2007). Political violence, however, was not 
restricted to ETA, but was also used by the extreme right and radical left.
Thus, the myth of 'twenty-five years of peace' laboriously threaded by the dictatorship 
was now undone by the high levels of repression unleashed to fight 'chaos' and 
'disorder'. The state o f exception became a common occurrence45. Thousands of 
detentions, military trials and prison sentences for workers, students and professionals 
were seen during that period (Ysas, 2004; Vinas, 2007). Suppression of strikes was 
harsh, and there were several high profile show trials and executions46. Curiously, as 
Ysas shows, the regime's response to regional nationalisms was more ambiguous. 
Francoist officials were more ambivalent about Basque and Catalan 'separatism' -they 
were barely mentioned in official documents dealing with 'subversion'47. This 
ambivalence was not extended to the Basque nationalist organization ETA. However,
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crucially, ETA was represented by the Francoist authorities as 'an instrument of 
communist subversion'48 -communism being the regime's enemy par excellence— 
rather than as 'separatist' (Ysas, 2004:147).
What is relevant about all these struggles is that, even though their demands were 
often local, corporate and limited, the stringent conditions of the dictatorship forced 
virtually any collective action to transgress rigid francoist legality. Hence, any collective 
demand became potentially a struggle against the established authority, that is, 
questioned the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. Consequently, these struggles 
carried out by an 'immense minority' created a climate of intense conflict, eroding the 
viability of the dictatorship.
Yet, if the exhaustion of the different projects of francoism was evident even inside 
the ruling elite (Saz, 2007; Preston 1986), this does not mean that the future of the 
country was any clearer. As Paul Preston's comments: 'when Franco died on 20 
November 1975, few Spanish politicians of either right or left could have predicted 
with any precision the country's political development over the subsequent decade. 
[...] There was hope but not certainty7 (Preston, 1986:1). Neither does the 
modernization thesis hold: the socioeconomic structural changes in themselves did 
not automatically bring about democracy nor did they explain the adoption of a critical 
attitude towards the regime (Saz, 2007; Ysas, 2007; Ortiz Heras, 2003). The organic 
crisis provoked contradictions, uncertainty and instability, opening up social spaces of 
contestation at the conjunctural level49. These spaces were taken up (with more or 
less success) by plural discourses, involving a multiplicity of social and political actors 
with diverse worldviews. These are what Stuart Hall calls the 'formative efforts' of 
creating a new balance of forces, productive attempts at reconstituting a new order, 
forging a new 'historic bloc' (1988:43).
The transition was such a time when left and right wing forces were immersed in 
'formative' political efforts. The climate of conflict of late francoism was narrated by
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the 'bunker7 and many radical parties in the opposition as a 'pre-revolutionary 
situation'. For the former, there was a need for more repression. For the latter, it was 
a tipping point for 'democratic rupture' (Soto, 2005:449; Balfour, 1990:18). These 
formative efforts can be seen in the antagonisms and realignments within different 
groups. Initially, left opposition parties had established alliances such as the Junta and 
Tabla Democratica (around the PCE and PSOE) preparing for the end of the 
dictatorship through their strategy of rupture which included ideas of democracy, 
Marxism, anti-imperialism, federalism and autonomies (Soto, 2005:81). However, soon 
these parties were co-opted by the differential strategy of 'democratic reform' and 
'consenso' and articulated themselves, and were transformed in the process, to 
former pillars of the dictatorship. In turn, some of those former pillars had moved 
towards reform, building up conservative parties which early on inherited the 
apparatuses of the state: the civil service, police and the army remained untouched. 
The opposition which from 1976 onwards still pushed for 'rupture' was eventually 
relegated to the margins o f society.
This discourse of consensus achieved, paraphrasing Gramsci, a 'passive reform' 
(Gramsci, 1971). Franco died, but francoism outlived him by a few years (Fusi, 2000). 
The transition was dominated by the manoeuvres of a weakened elite fraught with 
tension provided by pressures from civil society in the form of waves of strikes 
promoted by trade unions and radical left parties particularly during the years 1976 
and 1977 (Preston, 1986; Soto, 2005: 36-39). The reformist Suarez government 
formally initiated the political transformation of the regime whilst avoiding any 
vacuum of power50. In a difficult move for reformists to accept, political parties were 
legalized in exchange for their recognition of the Monarchy and the reform process 
(Soto, 2005). Left wing parties (mainly the PCE) accepted, fearing their marginalization 
from the process otherwise and arguing the need for 'responsibility' on their own part 
and 'consolidation of liberties' (Soto, 2005; Del Aguila and Montero, 1984). A scramble 
for power among elites occurred in the form of the newly created Union de Centro 
Democratico (UCD) and Alianza Popular (AP) conservative parties. The referendum on 
political reform in December 1976 was followed by elections in 1977 which was won
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by Suarez's party the UCD, and a new Constitution was drafted by conservatives as 
well as PSOE and PCE, Catalan nationalism and other minor parties (was approved in 
1978) without Basque consent.
'Consensus' and 'democracy' became the hegemonic discursive practices of the 
transition. It was a reformist political strategy trying to co-opt as many forces as 
possible. It refers to narratives and practices of 'reconciliation' understood as political 
amnesia as regards responsibilities for the past: a tabula rasa was applied to everyone. 
This discourse provided brand new democratic credentials to all by way of 'pacting'- 
pacts and transactions at the top: the Pactos de la Moncloa. These pacts implemented 
political, juridical, territorial and economic reform, and served towards the elaboration 
of a Constitution whilst demobilizing society. Soon 'desencanto' (disenchantment) 
became the byword in Spain referring to the process. The process of transition 
culminated, then, not with 'rupture' but, instead, with a reformist constitution in 1978 
and territorially with the creation of the Autonomic system. Here, however, the former 
left wing rhetoric o f federalism and demands for peripheral nationalism were 
substituted for a complex wording of 'plural nationalities' within the 'Nation'. 
Moreover, the constitution enshrined the 'indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation'.
Nevertheless, there were other, more marginal formative articulatory efforts trying to 
make sense of the renewal of radical energies symptomatic of this crisis. The 
international revolutionary climate and the renewal of social struggles in Spain had 
provided the symbolic resources which would be articulated by new opposition groups 
forming on the far-left that appeared in the 1960s. These forces opposed the 
dictatorship but were (for different reasons) also dissident from the PCE. Thus, a 
myriad of small communist parties mushroomed in the 1960s in the centre and at the 
periphery of the state, whether Leninist, Maoist, Trotskyites or Thirdworldist51 (Laiz, 
1995).
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They plotted out, in different ways, similar anti-colonial and Marxist discursive 
elements. They inherited (implicitly or explicitly) different narratives on nationhood: 
either Spanish or peripheral. Thus, their narratives (which often begin in medias res) 
variously constructed Spain as either 'the people' dominated by US Imperialism with 
help from the ruling class of the 'fascist' regime; or as a 'weak link' to capitalism and 
imperialism controlled by a bourgeoisie that was oppressing the proletariat; or Spain 
was itself a colonizer state of the peripheral nations aided by US imperialism. Thus, 
they sang to different heroes: the Spanish people, Spanish proletariat, or the Basque 
or Galician people. In all these stories there must be a class struggle led by the 
vanguard hero in the form, often, of popular fronts against US imperialism, 'yanqui- 
franquismo', the local oligarchy or the Spanish state. As their goal was to achieve 
national independence, democracy did not matter much, either goal being only a 
stopover before achieving socialism and communism (Laiz, 1995). These similar 
narratives where 'Spain' was constructed as colonizer or as colonized show in stark 
relief the strategical polyvalence of the anti-colonial discourses in Spain (Foucault, 
1976).
Galicia: uneven development and (dis)remembering
Galicia, on the north-western periphery of Spain, was undergoing similar changes to 
those affecting Spanish society as a whole, with its own specific features. 
'Deagrarianization', uneven industrialization, urbanization and mass migration marked 
the 'desarrollismo' years after 1959. The one time overwhelmingly rural communities 
had started to lose their socio-economic centrality in the early 1970s52 due mainly to a 
rural exodus to Spanish cities and to other European countries as cheap male industrial 
and female household labour. Hence, as result of its structural incapacity to absorb the 
sustained growth of its population, Galicia was socially and economically marked by 
migration. In contrast to this rural trend, city dwellers -the professional middle class, 
civil servants and workers— were growing fast. A process of '(rur)urbanization' was 
slowly taking place: the expansion of a virtual urban space along the Atlantic
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motorway, linking Ferrol, A Coruna, Santiago and Vigo which served to 'urbanize' 
smaller towns but not obliterate the rural (Leiceaga and Lopez 2000:40).
Galicia's social and physical landscape was indeed changing (Fdez Leiceaga and Lopez 
Iglesias, 2000). However, change was highly uneven. There appeared some big 
industries, but investments were strongly concentrated in energy (electricity), 
transport (shipbuilding) and the food production sectors (milk, tinned fish). There was 
a relatively high presence of international companies (mainly French, such as the 
Citroen factory in Vigo or Pechiney) and national public companies (INI) but a relative 
absence of Spanish private capital (Fdez Leiceaga and Lopez Iglesias, 2000). Besides, 
production was mainly geared towards export. Thus, big industries were islands in a 
sea of very small, artisan production and a dominant primary sector53 (ibid.). There 
was an industrial dualism where small, traditional companies coexisted with big 
enterprises in specific sectors only, without any real internal articulation between 
them (2000:499). Hence, the Galician economy was, during those years, a dependent 
economy.
Nevertheless, this process of island industrialization created in Galicia an incipient 
urban working class concentrated in the shipbuilding areas of Vigo and Ferrol where, 
similarly with the rest of Spain, the CCOO were protagonizing important strikes and 
conflicts -such as those of 1972. Besides workers, students at the University of 
Santiago were also organizing against francoism. In these early conflicts the relevance 
and prestige of the PCE (now PCG) acquired from the years of the guerrilla resistance 
was very important (Prada, no date). Moreover, these years were also marked by 
bitter agrarian conflicts, often between entire villages (such as Castrelo de Mino in 
1965) which were threatened in their communal viability by powerful industrial 
interests. These conflicts galvanized Galician public opinion and attracted all round 
(oppositional) political support.
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Nationalist activities in the interior of Galicia had nevertheless declined and retreated 
decades earlier, under the regime's repression54, to a cultural policy (Balfour, 1988; 
Nunez Seixas, 1988; 1994). This strategy transmuted the nationalist party (Partido 
Galeguista) o f the 1930s into the Galaxia publishing house in 1950. Moreover, under 
the auspices of intellectual Ramon Pineiro, the nationalist strategy shifted to a 
culturalist essentialism and a desire to 'galicianize' the Galician political spectrum -i.e. 
imbuing all parties with a diffuse sentiment of Galicianness (Nunez Seixas, 2007; 
Beramendi, 2007).
However, there was now a generation of politically mobilized Galicians, even if only a 
minority, fully immersed in the culture and practice of resistance to francoism. They 
were located at the crossroads of the student and youth movements, to a lesser extent 
to worker and peasant struggle and generally, in the context of clandestine radical 
politics in Galicia. They often had direct experience of European liberties and the 
philosophical and radical currents of anticolonialism and Marxism through migration. 
Some were part of the PCG and other local branches of state wide radical parties -  
Movimiento Comunista, PTE, etc. Others had a closer but ambiguous relation to the 
former nationalism. Ambiguity existed due to there being scant memory of nationalism 
outside the restricted, elitist circles of 'culturalism', but also because Pineiro's 
strategies were rejected as dated and inappropriate. These strategies nevertheless 
managed to provide the source of narrative, symbolic and some organizational 
resources of pre and post-war nationalism for some Galician youth. The result was that 
most of these newly mobilized recruits did not look up to the 'nationalist elders' -  
Pineiro's 'coffee table' exerted both attraction and rejection55. They were, 
nevertheless, familiar with pre-civil war nationalist narratives.
Hence, none of the new parties trying to articulate the national question actually took 
up Pineiro and Gal£xia's project. Instead, they mostly performed a hybridization of 
international anti-colonialist, Marxist and local /  nationalist symbolic resources in the 
context of anti-francoist conflict. This took the form of the Union do Pobo Galego 
(UPG) in 1964 . A year earlier, much closer to socialist and federalist tradition and to
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'elder* nationalists, the Partido Socialista Galego (PSG) was founded. The UPG was 
highly active in clandestine opposition and organized and controlled a plurality of 
organizations all over the country: myriad cultural associations, trade unions (for 
workers, teachers, students and peasants) or the slightly more pluralist ('inter-classist') 
assembly Asamblea Nacional-Popular Galega (AN-PG). Still illegal in 1977, the UPG 
and AN-PG formed the BN-PG in order to be able to legally participate in the elections.
The UPG and PSG coexisted with other radical parties (MCG, PTE, ORT) in their critique 
of the PCE/PCG and PSOE and disputed the same political space. The PCG never 
managed to fully adapt to the Galician situation, even though it had assumed (as did 
the PSOE) a great deal o f the cultural and political demands of nationalism. Hence, the 
Galician democratic opposition did not manage to organize a unitary platform for the 
defence of autonomy at the state level. The UPG rejected autonomy as insufficient and 
organized the Consello de Forzas Politicos de Galicia -together with the PSG, Partido 
Carlista, Movimiento Comunista de Galicia, and Partido Galego Social-Democrata- 
demanding a federal pact. Meanwhile, the PCG, PSOE and the key trade unions 
eventually organized in the Taboa Democratica de Galicia supporting autonomy for 
Galicia.
3.3. Conclusion
To sum up, as they were located at the vortex of political and cultural communities of 
resistance to francoism, Spanish narratives of Marxism and nationalism flourished. This 
confluence of nationalism and Marxism -in  the diverse forms of anti-colonialism, 
Leninism, Maoism-- had international as well as national roots in the form of the 
International anti-colonialism movements and decolonization of third world. During 
this period, the left in Europe is also awash with Maoism and Leninism. It is the 'red 
decade', 'ushered in by the fourfold circumstances of national liberation struggles [...]
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the world-wide student and youth movement, the factory revolts, and the Cultural 
revolution in China' (Badiou, 2010:1). Many peripheral nationalisms in Europe at that 
time were considered to have been colonized by their respective states. Nationally, 
from the early days of the dictatorship the only opposition to Franco came from the 
Spanish communist party, the PCE. This role gave their language and activities a 
prestige among those discontented with the dictatorship which no other narrative 
possessed. Subsequently, social and national struggles erupted citing the same norms 
and frameworks. Hence, doing resistance credibly meant relying on the language of 
anti-colonialism, Leninism and nation.
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4A new Attila in Galicia: the myth of loss 
4.1. Introduction.
This chapter presents two clearly differentiated parts. First, I examine issues of 
authorship, production and circulation of the narratives of colonialism. Then, I examine 
the first episode of the story-line through the reading of the small tales which 
(re)narrativize the country's fall from grace.
4. 2. The new Attila: narrative economy and strategy
Who narrates?
This section focuses on the production and circulation of the narratives, answering the 
when, where and who questions of the new discursive formation and discussing issues 
of narrative authorship. The story-lines and discourses on colonialism were a new 
performance of nationhood which surfaced at the beginning of the 1970s. This is not 
to say that the idea of using 'colonialism' to make sense of the political and economic 
situation of the country was entirely new. The term 'co lon/ had been used to describe 
and qualify Galicia before, in the works of nineteenth-century nationalist romantic 
poets and historians and emerging on-and-off in the early texts of contemporary 
nationalist groups. For instance, Risco had said in 1930:
"And the people which does not progress, which does not obtain a basis for economic 
independence, will necessarily become a victim of others. Pacifism is preached, the war against 
war, with weapons; the emancipation of the working classes is preached; their dictatorship is even 
admitted; but the principle of economic imperialism persists, the exploitation of some peoples by 
others, in the name of colonization or political dependence. What is forgotten is that, even if the
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proletariat as a class is emancipated, there still are and will be exploited peoples and exploiter 
ones" (Risco, 1930; quoted in Beramendi, 2007: 493 )
Risco relies here on the Leninist distinction between peoples as colonizers and 
colonized -a  distinction amplified by the Lausanne Conference of 1916- in a way that 
seems to allude to Galicia, as a people without economic or political independence. 
However, the crucial difference between earlier nationalist discourses and those of the 
1970s was in the structuring role that 'colonialism7 as a metaphor for the nation would 
come to play. The formative time when the new story-line was emerging took place in 
the early years of the 1970s. It was during the dislocation resulting from the transition 
to democracy in Spain, that the story-line of colonialism crystallized and achieved 
primacy within the discourse of nationalism. Indeed, hardly any text written during the 
transition years by the UPG fails to be inscribed within the plot of colonization, though 
the same cannot be said of the PSG.
The new story-lines of 'colonialism7 in Galicia sprung up in different sites and forms 
within the Galician movement in the early 1970s. They initially appeared mainly as 
economic, scientific narratives. One of these key sites where the narrative first 
appeared fully articulated was in Xose Manuel Beiras7s treatise on the Galician 
economy 'O atraso economico da Galiza' ('The economic backwardness of Galiza7; 
henceforth, AEdG), published in 1972. It is around this time that we can start talking of 
a discourse of colonialism in Galician nationalism. Beiras was a professor of economics 
at the University of Santiago with close personal ties to the Galaxia people. He was 
leader of the Partido Socialista Galego (Galician Socialist Party; henceforth PSG) a new 
socialist and nationalist party created in 1963 under the wing of old 'galeguistas' of 
Galaxia. With around six hundred affiliates (in 'its better moments7 notes Beramendi) 
the PSG was a cadre party, originally meant to be a social-democratic strategy for 
Galicia in the accomplishment of Pinerio7s vision (2007:1086). In AEdG he constructed 
an economic narrative which enjoyed almost instant success amongst the nationalist 
community, offering a particular production of the story-line of the process of 
colonization of Galicia. Besides being a scholarly book on economics, AEdG is clearly a 
political intervention in the debates of the time, a performance that is even couched in
80
narrative/dramaturgical terms. However, this narrative, which was reflected in the 
party's new 'declaration of principles', radically cut the PSG off from the Galaxia 
design.
Simultaneously, and in a dialogue with the AEdG56, other productions of the story-line 
were developed at the Union do Pobo Galego. The UPG, however, was formed in an 
antagonistic relationship with the post-war galeguista tradition. Organized as a 'guide' 
party in the Leninist tradition, its membership was nevertheless mainly drawn from the 
intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie57. Its relations with the PSG were unstable and 
varied from fairly close collaboration at times to opposition. During the 1970s the UPG 
and its organic intellectuals (among them Mendez Ferrrn, Ramon Lopez-Suevos or 
Francisco Rodriguez) contributed to an enormous textual production in the form of 
scholarly and literary interventions. However, the key sites of the discourse were 
mainly the party periodical 'Terra e Tempo' ('Land and Time'; henceforth T&T), the 
congressual texts and their innumerable political pamphlets.
Some texts in this prolific production became 'canonical texts', narrating Galicia in 
terms which would become, as Beiras himself noted, 'the pillars for all the creation and 
practices of Galician nationalism in the next decades' (Fernan Velio and Pillado Maior, 
1989). Hence, these authors are what Foucault calls the 'founders of discursivity7 
(Foucault, 1984:114). That is, the figures characterized not only for having produced 
their own work, but also because they created the conditions for the production of 
other texts and for the formation of certain rules which guided discussion, debate and 
the sense of the propositions.
Their narrative production was disseminated mainly at times to coincide with 
collective action, whose repertoire of protest was acquiring bolder and new forms in 
the late 1970s. These forms ranged from the distribution of pamphlets to graffiti, 
which served during the worse times of the dictatorship to spread alternative 
messages; from the selling or giving away of periodicals in demonstrations and street 
actions to chants and talks in 'lock ups', 'stops' to work and academic activity and 
social and political concentrations. The self-financing periodicals, T&T and Galicia
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Socialista, were key instruments (as were the congressual texts). The readers were the 
various party memberships, the wider circles involved in radical politics in Galicia and 
generally those implicated in any in the organizations of the movement. This 
movement was able through the implications inherent in a variety of popular struggles 
and local-based social movements in the 1970s, such as As Encrobas, to connect with 
wider civil society and citizenship58. Nationalist narratives were also spread from their 
literary, scientific production and teaching in the context of the university of Santiago, 
as well as in the common 'formation' seminars for members organized by the parties. 
What these narratives lacked was mass press support -until 1980 when the UPG 
organized the 'A Nosa Terra' weekly, which was unable, however, to compete with 
dailies such as 'La Voz de Galicia'.
Problematising collective authorship
If these were the authors and sites producing the discourse of colonialism, there is 
nevertheless a need to think critically about the complex issues of 'authorial function' 
(Foucault, 1984). The story-lines of colonialism are not, as Hajer remarks, 'glued' to 
specific actors (Hajer, 1995). Instead they are better seen as inherent to and enmeshed 
in certain social practices in which certain actors would be creatively involved at 
particular times (ibid.). We will see how the discourse of colonialism and the story­
lines (re)producing it were displaced over time from the centre of nationalist discourse 
in Galicia to its margins. Hence, even today colonialism lives on as a discourse framing 
an understanding of the nation. It has survived and been sustained, although modified, 
both in the productions of fringe independence groups and other radical nationalisms 
outside the BNG since the late 1980s and within the margins of the BNG itself.
Moreover, specific collective actors have not necessarily been 'monopolized' by one 
discursive formation alone. Despite being the main locations producing the discourse 
of colonialism, neither the PSG nor the UPG were at any point unitary, homogeneous 
or monolithic discursive sites. It has often been remarked that the PSG was a split 
party, that is, it was notably heterogeneous or inhabited by distinct tendencies 
(Beramendi, 2008; Fernandez Baz, 2003). For Baz, although clearly socialists, there
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were differences within the PSG as regards the issue of nationhood, with one faction 
clearly being nationalists and another merely 'g a le g u is ta subscribing to Pineiro's idea 
of 'galicianizing' the state-wide parties. For Beramendi the divergences were also along 
the left-right divide, with the party split between a 'Marxist-nationalist' wing and a 
'social-democrat' one. I do not intend to resolve the character of the PSG's split and 
identity here, merely to stress that it was a site producing and drawing on different 
and contradictory discourses, one of them being that of the nation as a colony.
But not even the UPG, despite their own rhetoric of unity and homogeneity, was ever 
such a homogeneous actor. In spite of their own 'vanguard' practices, the explicit 
prohibition of factions and the ethos of 'identification' of the membership with the 
leaders, the UPG was always a site of different discourses. Although colonialism gained 
and sustained the upper hand in the play of power/knowledge within the party for a 
long time, there were other important differences as to how to narrate this plot as well 
as other subplots relating to the party. It was the impossibility of resolving or admitting 
these tensions within a party organized by 'democratic centralism' which led to the 
common practice, which lasts to this day, of expelling from the party the minority 
positions -ones which did not carry the weight of the central committee at any given 
time. Thus, the party suffered numerous crises over time, many of them over the 
transition period when key party 'routes' and policies in the context of major political 
and social dislocation were being fought over and established. Only in 1977, the year 
of the first general elections after Franco's death, did nationalist and communist 
groups whose understanding of class and nation was very different -such as the new 
UPG(l-p) (UPG proletarian-line) as well as the POG (Galician Workers Party, henceforth 
POG)— emerged from the same UPG matrix .
My point of departure here, therefore, is an understanding of Galician nationalism as a 
particular field of forces and forms of knowledge, of which the discourse of colonialism 
became hegemonic from 1972 until the early 1980s. These forms of knowledge and 
story-lines were inhabited, narrated, reproduced in and by a multiplicity of 
organizational sites, themselves the product and producers of these discourses: the 
PSG, UPG, AN-PG, trade unions, cultural associations, even the PCG and other non­
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nationalist sites participated in the narrative of colonization. These sites drew upon a 
variety of metanarratives and often proffered contradictory political strategies, 
contributing their 'unique' or particularistic productions to the story-lines. Nationalism 
in Galicia during the late 1970s and early 1980s was an extremely complex and fluid 
field in which new groups were constantly emerging and disappearing in the form of 
new parties, a plurality of party dependent sectorial trade unions, cultural 
associations, an so on. It realised a multiplicity of precarious alliances whose purposes 
crossed, forming and dissolving: from the 'Common Text' to the 'Consello' and the 
'Bases Constitutional's', from these to the AN-PG and BN-PG, from the 'Consello' to the 
socialist federation and 'Unidade Galega', from all these to the BNG, and so on. Thus, it 
is more fruitful to explore nationalism by focusing upon the different discourses and 
story-lines as opposed to individual party organizations as agents of point of 
departure.
The field of nationalism and some sites in particular, to paraphrase Foucault, acted as 
'specially dense transfer points for relations of power7 (1979: 103). The UPG is one 
such point where relations of power were played out: between us vis-a-vis them, 
friend versus enemy, 'Galician people' versus 'Spanish imperialist state', 'nationalism' 
versus 'spanishism' and 'pseudo-nationalism', vanguard versus followers, workers 
versus peasants, central committee versus membership, men versus women, to 
mention just a few.
The literary studies distinction between 'sjuzet' (or narrative discourse) and 'story' or 
'plot' helps clarify thinking of the nationalist story-lines. Sjuzet is commonly defined as 
'the arrangement of incidents' or 'the ordering from a certain point of view' of the 
story, the latter being the material, incidents or events presented which are inferred 
from the presentation (Prince, 2003; Culler, 1997). This basic concept of presentation 
or narrative discourse in the language of literary theory resembles that of story-lines. 
The story-lines formed at different nationalist sites contributed different productions 
or versions of the same 'plot', part of the discourse of colonialism, in a similar way in 
which there might be two stage versions of Hamlet or two films relying on a Cinderella 
plot.
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There is, nevertheless, as Culler remarks, always a tension between the conception of 
discourse (in the sense of narrative presentation) 'as a representation of events which 
must be thought of as independent' of the story, and understanding that the 'so-called 
events' (the story) 'are thought of as the particular postulates or products of a 
discourse' (2000:108). In other words, as much as a story or the 'reality' of events 
needs to be seen as independent and present in a variety of narrative presentations, it 
is always also determined by a particular presentation. Thus, although the 'common' 
remainder or plot is a constitutive element of a discursive formation, it is difficult to 
summarize the 'plot' o f colonization without falling into one or another version of it, 
one or another discursive sub-group. The UPG or PSG's story-lines contributed to a 
'plot', in the abstract, o f colonialism, but constructed the discourse of colonialism not 
as a unity, but as 'regularities in dispersion' (Foucault, 1969). In Volosinov's terms, the 
plot of colonialism was differently accentuated.
4.3. Myth debunking
The story-lines of colonialism were epic, romantic stories or even tragedies in 
nationalistic representations of the nation. They narrated the lack of political and 
economic development o f Galicia, locating events in the xv century as the mythical 
origin of all evils. This overarching narrative of Galicia was constructed in an 
argumentative struggle with Spanish narratives of the nation, buttressed once again in 
the dominant discourses of democracy and reform (Nunez Seixas, 2007; Bastida 
Freixedo, 2007). Nationalism's first step in their reinvention of Galicia was to oppose 
the traditional negative stereotypes and representations of the Galician people and 
fight the 'syndrome of the self-colonized'59 (Fanon, 1963; Memmi, 1990). These 
negative representations had been expounded by many of those who longed for the 
'progress' of Galicia (such as the 'provincialistas' in the nineteenth century) by the 
peasants themselves, as well as by powerful outsiders to Galicia. Typically, stereotypes 
consisted of essentialised images of a passive and individualistic people: culturally
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marginalised, degraded and disadvantaged. Even though Bauer's interpretation of the 
images of self-denigration on the part of peasant communities as a strategic 
manipulation in their unwanted relations with state authorities -a  view considerably 
more nuanced than the nationalist— he still acknowledges the endurance of negative 
self-portraits and the fact that these both reflected and fed back on higher ranking 
Spaniards appraisals of Galicians as 'uncivilized' and living in 'primitive environments' 
(1990:571). All 'inner', psychological character traits supposedly explained social and 
economic backwardness (Beramendi, 2007:128). That is, Galicians were made solely 
and collectively responsible of their own misfortunes partly through symbolic violence.
As a result, in true 'anti-colonial' form, the nationalist narrative was often explicitly 
orientated to the 'debunking' of assumed myths of Galicianness. 'Myth debunking' is a 
crucial strategy to undermine a pre-existing story, Ken Plummer notes, and a necessary 
step for the new story to take root (Plummer, 1995:67). Plummer found this strategy 
as the first to take place in the feminist movement's construction in the 1970s of the 
story of rape (ibid.). Equally, Galician nationalists in late Francoism needed a major 
rhetorical ploy to destabilize received, oppressive forms of knowledge. Typically the 
Galician movement now claimed:
Extracts 4.1. On 'myth debunking'.
[A] 'Our party was born [...] as a product of the ideological struggle with the dominant 
crust of 'spanishism'. [...] In this colonial situation it is not strange that the combat had to 
be initiated precisely by showing that our reality had a different set of coordinates from 
the rest of the state, and thus, a different political dynamic'
(The ideological combat' in I Congress, UPG, 1977)
[B] "Things are exactly the other way round, whatever they say. A premature social 
frustration, a secular exodus, bourgeois rickets, lack of institutional solidarity, financial 
colonization: these are, perhaps, the key issues explaining the present economic 
backwardness of Galicia. The agrarianism, smallholding, ignorance, individualism, the state 
of communications [infrastructure], and so many other phenomena of relevance at first 
sight, are, if anything, symptoms of backward state, not its causes."
(EBoG, X.M. Beiras, 1972)
In these extracts we can see how nationalists opposed the stereotypes which were 
part of the regime of representation of Galicianness that was available in the wider 
ideological domain inside and outside Galicia. In extract 4.1.a the origin of the party is
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explicitly constructed as a consequence of the struggle against "Spanishim". This is 
placed at the level of ideology, the second part of a key binary opposition in Galician 
nationalism, reality vs. ideology which works to discredit the "other". Moreover, 
Galicia"s situation is already being represented as colonial, making it necessary (we are 
told) for the new party to undertake a pedagogical task: "the combat had to be 
initiated precisely by showing that our reality had a different set o f coordinates from  
the rest o f the state*. That is, their first "weapon" against Spanishness was to tell a new 
story of Galicia.
Plummer explains that myth debunking often takes the form of a rhetorical inversion, 
whereby a reversal of the elements of the old tale provides the key elements for the 
new story (1995:68). We can see a version of this rhetorical stratagem in extract 4.1.b, 
where inversion takes the form of a transformation of "causes" of backwardness into 
"symptoms" of colonialism. Inversion and struggle are made explicit here: "things are 
exactly the other way round, whatever they say'. Then, in a contrasting structure the 
"real" reasons or 'causes' of underdevelopment are opposed to the elements of the 
stereotype (agrarianism, individualism, etc) or mere "symptoms" of a deeper 
problematic. This dichotomy between symptoms/causes implicitly positions others, 
again, as unable to see the "reality" of backwardness -i.e. colonization. That is, it 
frames others" diagnostic of the situation of the country as being, at best, the result of 
a "false consciousness". This kind of "myth debunking" is ubiquitously accomplished 
throughout the early texts of the story-line of colonialism.
Thus, the story-line of colonialism was a counter-narrative of the nation (Andrews, 
2002) which forcefully opposed Spanish nationalism and the reform process. This story 
(together with other material practices) brought into being and validated an 
alternative history and political community for Galicia.
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4.4. A First Episode: Galicia's fall from grace
The story-lines of colonialism tell us, to summarize the plot, how Galicia lost its 
economic and political autonomy to the Castilian monarchs, who set up the first 
policies that led to a process of colonization which has lasted to our day albeit in 
different forms: from feudalism to capitalism. Now, 'objectively7 colonized and 
exploited, the Galician popular classes ( i.e., workers, peasants and seamen) should 
follow the (vanguard /  socialist) party and fight the colonial power, in either its fascist 
or bourgeois-democratic form, to achieve national liberation and a socialist or 
communist society -w e are told. The narrative the nationalists constructed is, 
therefore, an incomplete narrative cycle (Todorov, 1990). It starts in medias res with 
the problem or situation which is already in some way deficient (the loss of freedom 
and of development) and narrates a prolonged state of 'disequilibrium' (five hundred 
years of colonialism, with a focus on the most recent decades) which ends with a 
political exhortation to the re-establishment of the implicit initial equilibrium of 
'freedom' through a 'national-popular' struggle. Thus, as with most political narratives, 
the story-line does not have an end but proposes and projects alternative endings in 
the future depending on whether collective action is taken, even though there are 
preferred endings (Polletta, 1998; Shenhav, 2005). If stories, as Jerome Bruner claims, 
are told because they have to 'render the exceptional comprehensible' (Bruner, 1991) 
and by the same token establishing a norm, the 'exceptional' situations which the 
story-line of colonialism tries to make sense of are the backward economic situation of 
Galicia and its lack o f political sovereignty.
It is important, nevertheless, to note an ambiguity in the status of these stories. On the 
one hand, the narrative space allocated to this episode is fairly small. This is significant. 
As Jeremy Tambling notes, an event's importance within a narrative is partly defined 
by the printed space given to it. That is, 'the narration assumes it knows what the 
important events are' (Tambling, 1991:14). We might deduce that the historiographic 
construction of national origins was not a major preoccupation for the movement at
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this time. To a great extent, in fact, this work had already been accomplished by their 
predecessors, despite their ambivalent relation to it. On the other hand, Galician 
nationalists still grounded the origin of the economic condition and political situation 
of present-day Galicia (colonialism) on a series of events taking place in the fifteenth 
century, using history to legitimise their aims. Moreover, despite the few actual 
instances of telling, this story is typically evoked in nationalist discourse as a 
constituent part of the story-line of colonialism as well as often being metonymically 
invoked in many other nationalist narratives and stories60 (Polletta, 2006). It has 
become, as Barthes suggested of myths, a statement of fact (Barthes, 1957/2000). 
Thus, through a myriad of intertextual connections and citations this mythic moment 
of origin became "the bedrock for explanation' of colonialism and the nation in Galician 
nationalism (Currie, 1998).
Inventing traditions
It has been often remarked that nationalism encourages the production of a set of 
pedagogical practices, invented traditions and historical accounts whose purpose is to 
establish continuity with a 'suitable historical past' of 'the nation' (Bhabha, 1990; 
Balibar, 1988; Calhoun, 1997; Chatterjee, 1993; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). As 
Etienne Balibar says, historical accounts are usually presented 'in the form of a 
narrative which attributes to [nations] the continuities of a subject' (1988:80). 
Although such perception is fictive, that does not undermine the power of myths of 
national origin to interpellate and mobilize audiences as 'nationals' (ibid.). These myths 
are the particular stories that tell us about the 'founding event' of the nation and its 
people, locating it either in much earlier 'mythic' times (the Galician Celts) or, 
alternatively, in recent 'traditions' that may correspond to 'breaks' with the past -the  
French Revolution (Hall, 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). This kind of storytelling, 
Hobsbawm and Ranger noted, 'help disenfranchised peoples to conceive and express 
their resentment and its contents in intelligible terms' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
1983:1). However, the underlying problem is not simply the 'instrumental' tendency of
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nationalism to write 'Whig' histories but, as Hayden White noted, that any historical 
narrative is in fact a Verbal fiction' whose contents are as much invented as found, 
ordered and moralised through emplotment (White, 1987, 1973). That is, all 
productions of knowledge involve a politics of representation and interpretation, are 
enmeshed in power relations -what Foucault called 'power-knowledge'— and 
nationalisms do so in specific ways (Hall, 2001; Campbell, 1998; Foucault, 1976/1998).
The first episode in the story-line of colonialism was a social practice that attempted to 
found a new story for the nation. It is a paradigmatic example of the narrative mode of 
knowing, in Jerome Bruner's words, in that it organizes experience with the help of a 
scheme assuming the intentionality of action, whether human or otherwise, and that it 
is especially viable for the negotiation of meanings (Bruner, 1986). This new story 
becomes a first step in the constitution of a new, alternative knowledge of Galicia, 
which was the main object of discourse. It established, in contrast to Spanish 
narratives, Galicia as the political community of reference. It represented the nation 
favourably, if tragically at points, understanding it within the productive tension of the 
negotiation of two ideological codes: Marxist and nationalist.
The myth(s) o f loss
There are different renditions of the myth of origins in 1970s Galicia. I will examine 
here the UPG's 'Galiza as a colonized nation' in the first congress (FC), comparing it to 
the Common Text for Galicia signed by UPG and PSG in 1973, and to X. M. Beiras's tale 
of 'A premature social frustration' in AEdG as paradigmatic.
Extract 4.2. Myth o f loss.
"G a l ic ia  as  a  c o l o n iz e d  n a t io n
The process of domination of Galicia by Spain was initiated very early and was 
consummated, mainly, when the Catholic monarchs began the construction of what will 
become the modern Spanish state; imperialist, and therefore, of a strongly authoritarian 
character. In an alliance with part of the Galician feudal nobility, which had to confront the 
social movement to supersede feudalism in our country (formed by the peasants that 
claimed the property of the land they worked, which was possessed by the lords; as well as 
by the embryonic urban commercial bourgeoisie strengthened by the pilgrimage route to
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Santiago, and by the small rural landlords), they [the Catholic monarchs] consummated 
the Taming and castration of the Kingdom of Galicia'.
Once the popular movement -the Irmandinos- was defeated, the Castilian monarchs 
decapitated Galicia politically forcing the Galician nobility to 'delegate' power to them. The 
nobility played their last card by supporting 'the Beltraneja' against Isabel the Catholic, in 
an alliance with the Portuguese nobility, but they lost61. Ever since then any possibility of 
normal internal development from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production was 
shattered. This was because the normal ascendance of the bourgeoisie was brought to a 
halt as well as the [possibility] of an internally self-centred political process within Galician 
society, which remained politically dominated by Castile. A long colonization of our people 
begun. Peasants and fishermen had to suffer feudal taxes, taxes imposed by the 
monarchy, famines, fight corsairs [...]. Colonial domination modified its form with the 
establishment of the capitalist mode of production in the Spanish State from the late 19th 
century, and it became worse during the last 20 years, with the acceleration of the process 
of capitalist accumulation and the rise of the state's monopolist capital." (UPG, The UPG 
and the interpretive lines of Galician reality' in First Congress, 1977)
The FC of 1977 recounted this tale which is a clear renarrativization of older stories of 
the nation. Benito Vicetto, novelist and historian, had rediscovered the (real) historical 
event of the Irmandinos revolts in the nineteenth century, and storied it as "la 
epopeya mas grande y admirable" as well as a myth of the great Galician historical 
defeat. If the origin and essence of the nation was Celtic, the old narratives located the 
crux of the country's decline in three interconnected events which allegedly occurred 
in the fifteenth century: the Irmandinos revolt, the decapitation of the 
'independentist' noble count Pardo de Cela (absent in the first congress, CT and AEdG 
tales) and the final 'taming and castration' of the country by the Catholic monarchs. 
The Irmandinos revolt was often the background of the binary struggle between the 
Galician forces, represented by the nobility, and the Catholic monarchs in the latter's 
desire to dominate the country.
The FC story, parts of which reproduce the earlier CT word by word, is a clear example 
of nationalism's conservative nostalgia and pedagogical practices. Nationalism, 
Anderson notes, plays with memory (Anderson: 1983). National narratives involve a 
dialectic of remembering and forgetting historical events within the trope of 'family' 
affairs as a desired frame of intelligibility (1983:203). That is, inside the nation-state's 
past societal cracks and conflicts are represented as 'reassuringly fratricidal', deaths 
which occurred centuries ago seen as 'our own' (ibid.). In the tale above, we catch a 
glimpse of this remembering and forgetting strategy. However, being not a state but 
an oppositional movement they needed to perform a double pedagogical task. The
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foundational violence had to be narrated as 'reassuringly foreign' first, and only then 
as 'reassuringly fratricidal'.
Indeed, the story's main characters and events ('Isabel la Catolica', the 'Irmandinos' or 
'the Beltraneja') would have been 'remembered' by some, mainly educated Galicians, 
as heroes and villains in the stories of Spanish nationhood thanks to Spanish 
nationalizing efforts. For the old Galician nationalist narratives had been buried under 
pressure from the dictatorship. But these memories had to be subverted again, its 
events re-plotted, for nationalism to make its case. Unable to rely on a state apparatus 
to put a pedagogical industry to work -indeed functioning against one and in the 
other's stead—, the tale invokes rather than narrates the events, focusing instead on 
providing a very explicit evaluation and moral world in order to educate new readers 
on who the national heroes and villains really were.
The FC tale, as well as the CT and AEdG, presents violence as 'reassuringly foreign'. In 
all productions it was 'Spain' which (mainly) caused the trouble. All contemporary 
representations of this first episode present a remarkable narrowness and similarity of 
plot (re)telling only two events: the 'Irmandinos' revolt and the Castilian war of 
succession in the fifteenth century. However, there is dissimilarity in how these events 
are plotted. Whereas the FC equalizes them -roughly the same space is allocated to 
both— other tales such as CT and particularly AEdG, give more importance to the 
Irmandinos revolt and mention the Castilian war of succession almost in passing. This 
difference is not irrelevant. It is directly related to the different attributions of agency, 
praise and blame, which stories perform in spite of their overall externalization of 
responsibility.
FC makes the clearest delineation of heroes and villains similar to the mature 
Murgufa's structure of blaming. The FC insists on pointing to Spain /  Castile /  Catholic 
monarchy as deus ex machina causing almost single-handedly all the problems of the 
country. Depicted in a highly agentic manner, the Spanish monarchs seem to be in full 
control: 'they consummated the process of domination', '[they] decapitated Galicia 
politically', the monarchy 'castrated and tamed' Galicians. FC quotes here the
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masculinist representation of the nation in old narratives. The modern Spanish state is 
labelled 'imperialist' and 'authoritarian'. It is the sum of these acts which has 
destroyed 'ever since any possibility of internal development'. These epithets implicitly 
link a monarchy in fifteenth century Castile with their present situation of dictatorship, 
and connects the present of the nation with its past in a linear sequence, or 'destiny', 
which constructs the nation as that 'solid community moving steadily down (or up) 
history' (Anderson, 1983:26). Simultaneously, it essentialises the enemy, the 
authoritarian Spanish character, which remains the same despite historical changes 
over the 500 years in question. Thus, the tale in one stroke squarely blames Spain and 
displaces responsibility for the situation of backwardness away from Galicia(ns) -  
therefore externalizing the enemy— and eternalizes the consequences. In this 
eternalization FC is not alone: the AEdG tale insists that 'four fifths of present Galician 
society live in the dead waters of the barren stage of our history opened five centuries 
ago' when 'historical time stopped'.
By giving so much weight to the war of succession the FC finds itself in a quandary. It 
must account for the feudal nobility's liminal, ambiguous role and their responsibility 
for the loss of self-rule. Their alliance with the monarchs against the popular 
movement and their 'delegation' of power is simply carefully sidelined. Moreover, the 
nobility, it seems, redeemed itself historically by siding with the Portuguese pretender 
to the throne in the nationalist tales.
But this Manichean view of history, which correlates with a focus on the 'external' 
event of succession in Castile, is not rehearsed in all the narratives. While still blaming 
Castile/Spain for the present situation of the country, neither the AEdG nor the CT 
present such a stark black and white moral world. Crucially, they soften the 
responsibility of the Spanish monarchs. After narrating in detail the Irmandina revolt, 
AEdG in its final moral simply states:
Extract 4.3. On blame
[a ] "The frustration of the second Irmandifia revolt, followed by the defeat of the nobility 
which had taken sides with the Beltraneja, and by the consolidation of the absolutist 
monarchic Spanish state involved altogether the failure of a transition from feudalism as
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well as the political death of Galicia, carefully embellished by the Catholic monarchy. Too 
many concatenated key events occurred to enable the recovery of the country [Galicia]"
(AEdG, 1972)
[b] "The new Spanish monarchy found itself free in Galicia as, then, two decisive historical 
events have just happened." (CT, UPG&PSG, 1973).
In that only mention of the Castilian war of succession AEdG established a temporal 
contiguity between several complex factors which, taken together, explain the present 
situation of the country. The monarchy is represented as one more element in a 
fatalistic 'concatenation of events', even though responsible for 'embellishing' and 
taking advantage of the country's 'frustration' and 'failure'. So does the CT present the 
monarchs as finding an already weakened country, which they then exploit, as we see 
in extract 4.3. These productions of the tale then present a view of events 
characterized by complexity and fatalism, whilst the FC's tale established a more 
radical and simplistic duality and antagonism between Galicia and Castile /  Spain. The 
overall significance of these two events, all the narratives unanimously conclude, is 
that taken together they mark the beginning of a colonization of Galicia which is said 
to continue up to the present day: 'a long colonization of our people begun'.
The attribution of blame to Spain which firstly marks violence as 'foreign' also works to 
implicitly perform the violence in the episode of the 'Irmandades' as Anderson's 
'reassuring fratricide'. The two events are made sense of by embedding two different 
ideological codes: Marxist and nationalist. Classical Marxism provided a systematic 
account of history which had at its core the narrative whose plot is given by the 'laws 
of development of production'. At its core, this narrative relates different epochs of 
history ordered in terms of consecutive dominant modes of production -slavery, 
feudalism, capitalism. The change from one mode to the next happens when the 
material forces of production in a society come into conflict with the existing relations 
of production, and the social classes -the main characters of the narrative— struggle 
to achieve revolution (Himmelweit, 1991; Kiernan, 1991). The discourse of nationalism 
instead explains nationhood through a narrative whose plot typically attributes to the 
nation human characteristics and relates in different episodes its birth, golden age, 
period of recess or 'somnolence' and the coming of an 'awakening' hero who ends the
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period of decadence (Ozkirimli, 2000; Calhoun, 1997; Gellner, 1997). This neatly 
corresponds to the narration of Galician nationhood by Murgui'a and earlier 
'galeguistos': a Celtic origin, Swevian kingdom, its decline with arrival of the Catholic 
monarchs in Castile, and the period of 'somnolence' all the way up to the nineteenth 
century62.
Whilst the war of succession is mostly told within a nationalist code, the Irmandinos 
revolt is often depicted within a clear Marxist narrative. It was an (inevitable) class 
struggle and within a theory of history as development of modes of production in 
Galicia. The FC normalizes the internal conflict by explicitly talking of a 'normal internal 
evolution' and 'the normal ascendancy of the bourgeoisie' even if only to remark on 
their failure. Indeed, it presents almost an 'idyllic' portrayal of Galicia. Idyllic because 
of the 'norm alc/ it (implicitly) represents in the 'original' situation: an early example of 
a social movement in a thriving country, trying to supersede feudalism and making an 
early capitalist start. This mythologized golden age points to an alternative (national) 
history of Galicia, one in which it would have developed successfully, possibly into a 
socialist society and a nation-state, betraying an underlying teleology of history.
It is AEdG which attributes greater relevance to this event. It also normalizes it when 
describing it as 'a European phenomena of class struggle in the process of social 
transformation since the end of the Middle ages'. CT confirms: 'it was a struggle of the 
popular classes'. The AEdG dwells on the Irmandinos as a revolt at the expense of 
national antagonism. This was a struggle of 'all the Galician social classes' and of 'the 
people' against the 'nobility'.
This presents the stories with the problem of defining who the nation is. Several 
contenders emerge: the 'Galician feudal nob ilit/, 'peasants', the 'small rural nobility' 
and the 'commercial urban bourgeoisie'. Galicia is not internally homogeneous but 
divided into social classes. This social division, however, is overcome in the FC by a 
common antagonism and in AEdG by fatalistic coincidence. Unlike the Spanish 
monarchy, none of these characters are represented as particularly active agents. The 
peasants and bourgeoisie are often portrayed as reluctant agents -'th e  popular classes 
felt forced to unity in order to combat the dominant class' (TC, UPG&PSG,
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seem to be performing as an early attempt at a popular front: forming an "interclasist" 
alliance. Nevertheless all of them are defeated and an ominous fate will await them for 
five hundred years: "peasants and fishermen had to suffer feudal taxes, monarchy 
taxes, famines, fight the corsairs../. As a result, the foundational myth of the Galician 
movement in the 1970s paradoxically constructed Galicia as a centuries-long victim, 
forming a connection with the former nationalist theme of "aldraxe" or affront 
(Beramendi, 2007).
But if social groups were immersed in class struggle then, was there any form of 
national unity? The answer is yes. Drawing on old nationalist narratives of nationhood, 
a differentiated Galician identity is simply assumed rather than explained in the 
stories. Galicia as a political unit predates social conflict, in what seems to be a implicit 
and unacknowledged reliance on Murgui'a's narrative of the primordial origins of 
Galician nationhood. The banal nationalist rhetoric of "us" and "them" and "here" and 
"there", as Billig remarked, is notoriously present throughout the tale, extract 4.2 (Billig, 
1995). Invoking "Galicia", "our country" or "Spain" brings these units into being as if they 
where already in the fifteenth century two fully formed "nations", distinct political 
units, coextensive with present day Spain and Galicia. As explained above, the stories 
represent Galicia as on the brink of social success. However, the smooth meandering 
of (class-) history is broken when the trouble ensues in the form of foreign conquest, 
and from then on the tale constructs a different Galician family history.
4.5. Generic implications
Jerome Bruner counted canonicity and genericness among the key features of any 
narrative (Bruner, 1991:11). Genres are recognizable kinds of narrative which provide 
readers and writers with a "conventional model for limiting the hermeneutic task of 
making sense of human "happenings" (ibid:14). The first congress of the UPG in 1977 
mythologizes origins in one of these common plot forms: romance. Romance is a genre 
which has typically been deployed with a social, ideological function, Northrop Frye
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described romance as marked by persistent nostalgia and a search for a golden era 
(Frye, 1957:186), which here takes the form of Galicia as a successful social formation 
in the middle ages. In romance the trouble that starts the action is attributed to a 
villain or outside force (i.e. the Castilian monarchs, Spanish capitalism). The heroes are 
separated from some object of desire (liberation, socialism) and characters are usually 
presented as starkly good or evil. The plot then typically unfolds as an adventure, in 
the form of the quest of the hero -  in this case the popular classes, the party— in a 
sequence of a perilous journey followed by a crucial struggle leading to the final 
exaltation of the hero (Frye, 1957:187). The romance of the Galician nation is peculiar 
in that it starts in medias res, with the trouble: represented in the myth of loss, the 
time it all went wrong. Then, it rushes through five hundred years of history (or history 
simply stops) to bring us to a contemporary setting for the second episode. Even if this 
myth is allocated little overall space in the story world of these groups, it nevertheless 
underpins their sense of (collective) self, contemporary grievances and justifies the 
present day quest for liberation.
The romantic dualistic scheme of struggle of 'essential virtue against a virulent vice' is 
nevertheless ultimately transitory (White, 1973:150). For inscribed in all romance 
there is a salvational perspective, what Jameson calls a 'utopian longing' (Jameson, 
1983). Jameson notes that Marxism provides a redemptive perspective of some secure 
future (Jameson, 1983:90). Romance, he continues, 'seems to offer the possibility of 
sensing other historical rhythms, and of demonic or utopian transformations of the 
real now unshakably in place' (1983:91). As with Marxism, nationalist visions of history 
encoded in the tale share this salvational plot structure. This salvational perspective 
will be inscribed in the next episode which, we will see, focuses on the present day's 
crucial battle: the one which the movement and the country are carrying out against 
the Spanish Imperialist/centralist state for rupture and liberation.
Nevertheless, not all stories were romances. The AEdG's plot more closely resembles a 
tragedy where the story begins with a problem significant to society originating in a 
'tragic flaw7 of the hero. This flaw is intimate and integral to our human identity and 
not sublimated in an external force. The action then, consists of discovering the truth
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behind the problem, to absorb its consequences and restore justice. The Galician 
people' Beiras remarks in relation to mass migration in another episode in the story of 
colonization, 'is a biblical people: all the curses of the old testament seem to have 
fallen upon it' (Beiras, 1972:39).
These kind of generic implications are important because, as literary institutions— 
social contracts between a writer and a specific public (Jameson, 1983:92)— genres 
are forms that add something to the content they carry. The convey a certain 
expectation. The force of convention, the deeply carved patterns of reading in 
collective memory, might limit what can be credibly told. Conversely, as in stories of 
underdogs, canonicity might be socially and politically enabling. Francesca Polletta has 
seized on this idea of a salvational perspective to suggest that some stories offer 
'fortifying myths' (Polletta, 1998). That is, they allow social movements to stir 
allegiances and hold on to the idea of future success in the face of defeat. The 
romance, as it suggests a happy ending for the country, functions this way.
4.6. Conclusion
These representations of the first episode in Galician nationalism construct a shared 
narrative for nationalism, but also bear different interpretations of the political. 
Whereas the FC constructs a centuries old colonization of the country through a clear 
antagonistic political frontier with Spain, the other stories, which cannot be simply 
traced back to particular actors, present a more nuanced policy of blaming63.
The stories here already posses a mythical quality, as Barthes explained. They are a 
metalanguage or meta-story, a myth, with the intention of teaching us that there was 
an anomaly, an original loss of some precious possessions (freedom and class 
struggle), which created our problems today and, therefore, point already to their 
solution in a 'pedagogical' way -in  their straightforward and explicit, even Manichean 
political and moral conclusions. They rely on signifiers (the Irmandinos revolt, the war
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of succession), in Barthes's sense of the word, which occurred five centuries ago to put 
forward a concept, in this case colonialism (Barthes, 1972). These stories construct, as 
Barthes put it, 'a certain knowledge of reality' (1972:119). That is, they are not 
arbitrary but 'motivated'; there is always some fragmentary analogy between meaning 
and form, the events and the myth. The myth of colonialism is a story both true and 
unreal.
This first episode that does not focus on the origins of the nation, narrates the origin o f 
the colonization of Galicia by Spain. It is a tale o f loss. It tells the double failure of the 
implicit, ideal freedom of the 'Kingdom of Galicia' and of the 'normal' [economic] 
developmental evolution of the nation. This failure is accounted for in terms of foreign 
and fratricidal violence. This is a story about how Galicia became a colonized country: 
'colonialism' is the plot and serves to make sense of the significance of the different 
events. Rather than founding nationness, nationalists founded a 'lack'. Simultaneously, 
by remarking the moment of loss, nationalists were implicitly remarking both the 
antiquity and past success of Galicia as a people in class terms and as a nation. As Mark 
Currie notes, stories of origin underpin moments of purity and presence (1998:83). The 
myth of loss narrates this point of purity and presence as the idyllic situation of class 
struggle in the frame of the nation, two discursive moments which signal the success 
of Galicia as a 'social formation'. What comes afterwards, the consequences of the 
events narrated, we are told, are the country's complete fall from grace.
If the stories historicize the country by relying on elements of old nationalist 
narratives, they also meant as a radical shift of attention away from the stories of 
origins accomplished by nineteenth century historians in the form of myths of racial 
difference such as 'Celtism'. Ethnicity, whether in the form of race, volk, language or 
land, was the key element of old nationalisms (Cabrera Varela, 1992; Maiz, 2000; 
Beramendi, 2007; Patterson, 2006). Yet it is absent as an element of the stories of loss 
written in the 1970s in spite of these stories' essentialism. Contemporary nationalism 
was not preoccupied with founding the nation. Instead, it narrated the origin o f the 
loss of nationhood, the events that led to it, in a moment mythically located in 
fifteenth century battles which, in their story-world, marked the beginning of the end 
of history for Galicia.
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The differences between earlier and present narratives of Galicia are not negligible: 
the old nationalism had founded an ethnic nation which was asleep, in need of being 
reawakened. This trope of "awakening from sleep" was common to European 
nationalisms of the nineteenth century. It suited diverse intelligentsias as it opened up, 
in Anderson's words, an "immense antiquity behind that epochal sleep" and it served to 
justify and legitimize the connection between statehood and vernacular languages 
which was absent in polyglot empires (1983:196). Contemporary nationalism's 
narratives found, instead, a nation oppressed, the object/subject of domination and 
exploitation, in need of liberation. These narratives called for a different type of 
politics: whilst former forms of nationalism had demanded a statute of autonomy, in 
the 1970s the radical movement which demanded rupture with the system of 
oppression was mired with ambivalence as to their ultimate goals.
Framed within the narrative of colonialism, economic backwardness and political 
conservatism ceased to be seen in terms of "traits of Galician character" or culture -  
part of the dominant archetype of Galicianness. Instead, they became a structural 
problem where Galicia and its (popular) classes were victims of Spain or the Spanish 
oppressors even if to varying extents. Victimization is, nevertheless, a double edged 
sword. It stems from the shifting of blame and is used as a rhetorical device for 
mobilization and struggle: as such it is empowering. However, it also implies a long 
lasting passivity and surrender of agency, which may work for contrary purposes. 
Colonialism calls, therefore, for a different type of collective action than 
"backwardness". It is a veritable call to arms, as it is difficult to imagine any society 
passively acquiescing to its own colonization.
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5The new Attila (II): the modern colonization of the nation
5.1. Introduction.
My aim in this chapter is to present the main story-lines and discursive strategies -  
i.e. the particular themes, theories and devices through which knowledge about 
Galicia was developed and subjects constituted (Foucault, 1969)- employed by 
Galician nationalists during the years 1972-1980.1 focus mainly, but not only, on the 
narrative practices of the UPG -the main discursive subsystem— and its small and 
big stories of 'the colonization today7. I argue that the entire discursive formation 
drew systematically on alternative and competing versions of Marxist master- 
narratives as well as on local narratives of nationhood to negotiate hybrid and 
ambivalent 'Galician Marxist', 'patriotic communist' or 'nationalist and socialist' 
identities. However, these plots produced tensions and contradictions hardly 
contained in their narratives and practices. At the same time, they were forced to 
reckon with 'others' which posed clear limits to the level of their identification.
Contemporary narratives of Galicia were ordered and organized around the 
ideological themes of 'colonialism'. These themes in fact displaced 'nation' as the 
key discursive object and plot of the narratives. Colonialism as such became what 
Ernesto Laclau calls a nodal point: the referent which binds together a diffuse set of 
themes, strategies and styles (Laclau, 2005). Colonialism functioned as a metaphor 
for the nation -as noted in chapter four- and it came to embody the movement's 
liminal, 'in-between' and mimic goal of national and social liberation. The 
consequence of this 'in-betweenness' was an unsolvable ambiguity, aporia, and 
constant tension between the issues of class versus national struggle in the 
discursive practices of the nation.
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The key discursive strategy by which the discourse of colonialism was established 
was the constitution of a fierce antagonistic relationship with Spain and 
'espanolismo'. Then, it relied on notions of class to narrate the 'people'. To solve 
problematic tensions and paradoxes the radical movement further developed 
complex discursive strategies involved in the drawing of political boundaries, such as 
the complex interlinking of Marxist masternarratives -the plot of the inexorable 
development of the modes of production and the anti-colonial plot— and the twin 
strategies of narrativization and identification of the paradox between nation and 
class (Czarniawska, 1997). These were common techniques utilised to talk about and 
represent the nation and the movement. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that not all story-lines of colonialism necessarily employ all of the above mentioned 
strategies.
5.2. Second Episode: The New Colonization.
I examine in this section the discursive constitution of colonialism as an 'object' of 
knowledge, in Foucault's words 'all that was said in all the statements', the stories, 
'that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it' (Foucault, 1972:32). 
However, it is important to note that objects of discourse are not stable, formed 
once and for all, but are subject to continuous transformations. It is noticeable how 
the idea of colonialism changed from story to story, in time, from site to site: all 
textual productions inflicting subtly different overdeterminations, responding to 
diverse local contexts, performing colonialism differently. I deal with the main 
themes and concepts that persist in constituting Galicia as a colony, discussing them 
as they appear embodied in particular texts and stories which became 'beacons' for 
the movement: were referred to, invoked, invested with canonical status and with 
normative power.
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The colonialism story-lines
During the 1970s in Galicia 'colonialism' formed that 'quilting point' or 'knot of 
meanings' whose name brought about the unity of a new discursive formation 
resignifying Galician nationhood. It was the name which retroactively produced the 
Galician nation (Laclau, 2005:103). 'Colonialism' became the name which condensed 
everything that was wrong with Galicia at the time. It was the 'stand in' for the 
universal 'liberation' which had 'national and social' components. This connection 
was brought about by the new narrativization of the country, whose moral was that 
being a colony caused all the countries' troubles and what was needed was 
liberation. As we will see, this rallying point eventually proved to be flawed. During 
the dislocatory time of the transition to democracy in Spain, the sites formed part of 
the new discourse which had as their first political task the telling of a new story of 
nation and exploitation. What was needed was a new terrain for action. Thus, in the 
discourse of colonialism Galicia was re-imagined as a colony.
The new story-lines comprised mainly two episodes: the original loss (examined in 
chapter 4) and the modern capitalist exploitation. This second episode's plot 
revolved around the effects of capitalist oppression in a country already located 
under 'foreign' political domination. In the movement's story-world, the arrival of 
the capitalist mode of production had changed the situation of Galicia for the worse. 
Colonial domination remains, but it is transformed from pre-capitalist relations of 
domination to a capitalist version of the same thing. Galicia was often portrayed as a 
nation rich in natural resources (i.e. with a clear economic potential) which was poor 
because it had been inserted into the international capitalist system as a provider of 
raw materials for Spain. All story-lines of colonialism correspond in these broad 
strokes but differ in some dimensions of the tale64. Both UPG and PSG's productions 
offer alternative endings: either ameliorative collective action is undertaken 
('national and social liberation' understood either as rupture and the program of the
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'Bases Constitutionals' or as a planned and democratically controlled socialist 
economy) or colonization will remain.
Extracts. 5.1. Colonialism as quilting point
"[A] A long colonization of our people has begun. [...] Colonial domination modified its 
form with the beginning of the capitalist mode of production in the Spanish State from 
the end of the XIX century, and this worsened over the last 20 years, with the 
acceleration of the process of capitalist accumulation and the ascendancy of the state's 
monopoly capital." (UPG, The UPG and the interpretive lines of Galician reality' in First 
Congress, 1977)
[b] "It is vital to distinguish national oppression from colonialism: colonialism is a form of 
national oppression but the inverse might not be true. [...] National subjugation on top 
of economic underdevelopment is already something qualitatively different: it is 
colonialism. The Galician problem is that of simultaneous national, economic, social and 
cultural subjugation and solving it rests on the decolonization of the country" (Lopez- 
Suevos, Of Colonial Capitalism, 1979)
[c] "The backward economic state, the emigration, cultural negation, etc are 
phenomena that need to be considered globally, because they are the logical 
consequences of the colonial subjugation in which Imperialism keeps the working 
people of Galicia through the oppressive action of the Spanish state ('A party, for what?' 
Christmas 1977, PSG)
All these texts illustrate this re-inscription of Galicia as a colony. 'Colon/ and 
'colonialism' became recurring terms in the stories, forming a new semantic field to 
make sense of the country. There was a clear textual 'over-w ord ingGalicia was in 
big and small tales represented as 'chained' (aferroilada), 'dependent', 
'subordinated', 'exploited', 'annexed', 'alienated', 'frustrated' among other similar 
terms. 'The problem is colonial, its solution political' became the litany of the 
movement. But this formula needs to be unpacked. For, as extract 5.1. b shows, 
what colonialism meant as regards the situation in Galicia was far from obvious. 
What did it mean to be a colony?
In the late 1960s and the 1970s many studies from Latin American dependency 
theories to European theorists -Lafont, Hetchter, etc- developed and adapted the 
theme of colonization to intranational circumstances in different ways. Sociologist 
Gonzalez Casanova, discussed the nature of a colony and argued that 'internal 
colonialism' was a new analytical category useful for the study of development, and 
he specifically applied it to the situation of the Indian population within the Mexican
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nation-state (Casanova, 1965). For him, internal colonialism 'corresponds to a 
structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally 
heterogeneous, distinct groups' (1965:33). The Indians in Mexico were dominated 
and exploited by a structure modelled on relations of colonization. Typically, they 
suffered a distorted economic development accommodated to the needs of the 
'metropolis'; economic dependence on one single sector and product; the 
exploitation of (Indian) cheap labour; minimum wages and repression. Compounding 
this image was a racial and cultural discrimination. Taking up this theme, Robert 
Lafont wrote his influential 'The regionalist revolution' where he transposed the idea 
of colonization to the situation of the French regions. 'Interior* colonialism 
happened, he argued, even though the oppressed population had full civic rights. 
Nevertheless, compared with Casanova's 'internal'  colonialism, this was a narrower 
category. It referred purely to a series of capitalist economic processes which 
resulted in 'regional underdevelopment'. For Lafont, the 'regional man' was without 
doubt already a Frenchman: that is, unlike with Casanova, cultural differences were 
not relevant in his analysis (Lafont, 1971:120).
Equally, 'colonization' was qualified in all Galician foundational narratives at some 
point. It was 'internal', 'central' -as opposed to taking place at the periphery of the 
capitalist system—, happening 'between societies with different economic systems' 
or 'of fact, but not form'. Anti-colonialism was a powerful symbolic resource, but 
adjustments were needed. For there were also obvious differences between some 
markers of the Galician social experience -o f  underdevelopment, migration, diglossia 
and symbolic violence but within the boundaries of the same state, cultural and 
social proximity, and absence of civic rights discrimination- and the raw and 
variegated experiences of alien territorial invasion and colonization in third world 
countries as Lafont had also argued. Nevertheless, it was generally argued that 
despite the gap between the experience of Galicia and third world countries, 
'colonialism' understood in its strongest terms still applied as the key category to 
make sense of Galician reality65. Myriad complex economic and cultural phenomena 
fell, in these story-lines, under a single global name as GS notes or Lopez-Suevos 
explains in extracts 5.1.b and c. T& T made this point more explicitly: "the
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mechanisms of imperialist exploitation are the same in a colony of [the] so-called 
'third world7 than in a colony denominated internal to the capitalist and imperialist 
states7. (T&T, n 38,1976).
Although cultural discrimination was part of the colonial experience, 'colonialism7 in 
these narratives was generally spoken of in economic and political terms. Indeed, it 
was commonly represented as a double system of oppression: not simply political 
domination of the nation, as happened, we are told, in Catalonia and the Basque 
country, and not merely economic or class exploitation as could be found in 
Andalusia. Instead, it is the combination and enmeshing of both which gives the 
phenomena of colonialism its defining traits (extract 5.1.b). Together, these also 
bring about the cultural, mainly linguistic, demise of the nation.
If the oppression to which Galicia was being subjected to was a multifarious one -  
'backward economic estate, emigration, cultural negation, etc ...need to be 
considered globally' (extract 5.1.c) — the grievances narrated by the movement 
were overwhelmingly economic. Drawing on recurring binary oppositions, such as 
'real vs. apparent7 'rational vs. irrational7, drawn from theories of development, 
growth and development were said to be absent. The movement decried mainly the 
'irrational industrialization7 of the country: the location in the country of 'enclave7 
industries such as paper factories, opencast mining and power stations which were 
not designed to satisfy the material necessities of its inhabitants, polluted the 
environment and created few jobs. These industries were said to bring about 
'mirroring7 growth instead of 'real7 development66. Capitalism was destroying the 
(pre-capitalist) peasant economy and 'natural7 Galician way of life without providing 
much needed agricultural reform. Moreover, emigration was forced upon citizens of 
the nation as a result of all o f the above. These injustices, which were the main 
grievances narrated in all the story-lines, were used to make explicit the link 
between economic backwardness and 'colonization7. A series of very real economic 
problems and state economic policies were signifiers transformed, through ordering 
them into a narration, into irrefutable symptoms of colonization. The consequence 
of this focus and vocabulary was that culture and ethnicity issues -the basis of
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nationhood in the 1930s— were relegated to a secondary position in the concerns of 
the Galician radical movement at this time67.
The main troubles and miseries faced by the country were 'colonial' according to the 
movement's pedagogy. These mainly economic evils were attributed, however, to a 
political source. The responsibility for the underdevelopment of Galicia laid on its 
lack of 'decision-making powers' or 'self-determination' rather than on economic 
processes like capitalist concentration and exploitation.
Extract 5.2. On the political solution to colonialism.
[a ] "The Galician popular classes need political sovereignty in order to undertake 
agrarian and fishing reforms; to take on a rational industrialization of the country; to 
invest in Galicia the savings of our immigrants; to end emigration once and for all; to 
make Galician the sole official language in Galicia; to build a democracy without 
monopolies. Only a democratic and popular Galician state would be able to carry on 
these measures, necessary to start the material and cultural reconstruction of the 
country and to improve substantially the living conditions of our people..." ('What is the 
UPG?" ( T&T, UPG, 1977)
[b] "These problems will only be solved when the Galician people can decide their own 
destiny by themselves, when we have collective ownership of the means of production, 
when the workers achieve a democratically constituted power. That is, in a free and 
socialist Galicia." ('A party, for what?' Christmas 1977, PSG)
The story-lines of colonialism had the double goal of obtaining the 'national and 
popular liberation' and 'a free and socialist Galicia'. Liberation is a liminal, 
ambivalent signifier in-between radical nationalism and Marxism. This in­
betweenness is here emphasized by qualifying as simultaneously national and social, 
even though, as we will see below, this seeming paradox will often be solved by a 
postpotment into the future o f social liberation. Thus, although often conflated, as 
Young remarks, the emancipatory demand for 'national liberation' is different from 
nationalism as such68 (2001:171). As a result of this radical indeterminacy at the core 
of the movement's aims, the proposed political solutions are also posed in imprecise 
terms -  when the Galician people can decide their own destiny bythemselves'- from 
federation to independence. Sovereignty is sometimes narrated as the solution to 
the country's woes as it will enable it 'to undertake agrarian and fishing reforms, to 
take on a rational industrialization o f the country, to invest in Galicia the savings of
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our immigrants Most claimed 'self-determination' was paramount - in  a Lenin 
inspired, sought for indeterminacy which was criticized by the 'left-wing7 splits of the 
UPG— some a 'Galician government7 or even a 'Galician state7. Although in all cases 
a federation with other nations of the Spanish state and Portugal was considered an 
appropriate political arrangement. This has been particularly true for the PSG which 
clearly sees a federation as the solution to Galicia's colonial problems.
The 7Spanish crust': constituting antagonism with Spain
Nationalism is an ideology of the third person plural. (National) identities are 
relational, systems of differences between self and other. In other words, the 
construction of the national 'we7 is always done in relation to an 'Other7. The 
constitution of identity is achieved through discursive work, the inscription of 
symbolic boundaries and production of 'frontier-effects7 which serve to distinguish 
an 'inside7 from an 'outside7, a 'self from an 'Other7, a 'domestic7 from a 'foreign7 
(Campbell, 1992; Hall, 1996a). Hence, identities are the result of the institution of 
political frontiers created through processes of ordering, othering and exclusion and, 
precisely because of always leaving something outside them -'an overdetermination 
or lack, never a proper f it7, Hall remarked of processes of identification (Hall, 
1996a:3)— they are always unstable, subject to  possible rearticulations and change. 
This frontier-making process both requires that the 'Other7 which is left outside 
constitute itself and it constitutes this 'Other7 simultaneously, in a relationship which 
has been defined as one of 'degrees of antagonism'69 (Thomassen, 2005:290). It is in 
this sense that the orders created are political: they are always based on different 
kinds of exclusions, instituted through power (ibid.). Stories and narratives of the 
nation are some of these ordering and boundary-drawing practices and they 
iteratively perform and instantiate the identities in whose name they operate.
The story-lines of colonialism told repeatedly through the years between 1972 and 
1981 represented the nation, 'we7 being the Galician popular classes, as colonized by 
Spain: it is difficult to imagine a clearer antagonism and threat to the nation's
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existence. This enemy -which signifies a pure negativity and anti-community, being 
the 'anti-Galicia'— was nevertheless represented in multiple, overlapping but 
ultimately also different ways in the story-lines which formed the discourse of 
colonialism. Whereas the anti-Galicia was represented by the 'Spanish colonial 
state', 'spanishism', 'Spanish imperialist oligarchy' in the UPG's tales, the PSG's 
narratives represented it as the 'centralist state'. This different, if intersecting and 
related, representation of the enemy entails very different political consequences for 
nationalist groups similarly located within the discursive formation of colonialism. 
The main consequence is that it allows divergent and eventually conflicting political 
frontiers 'friend' vs. 'enem / to be constructed. That is, the varied conceptualization 
of the enemy brings about a different system of social classification and political 
order. In fact, the incumbency of the very category 'nationalism' was vigorously 
fought over and the lines demarcating 'us' /  'nationalists' from 'them' /  'Spanishists' 
and 'pseudo-nationalists' were variously drawn and re-drawn -some, as we will see 
in the UPG's narratives, in exceedingly exclusionary ways.
The UPG and linked sites
The construction of an antagonistic relation with Spain was the main discursive and 
narrative strategy to be found in the diverse productions of the discourse of 
colonialism. This was often explicitly posed in the narratives of the nation and the 
movement by the UPG:
Extracts 5.3. On antagonisms.
[A] "In countries like ours the first duty ...is the identification of the principal enemy.
This principal enemy is the monopolist Spanish oligarchy, and its fundamental 
repressive means, at the service of its class interests, is the Spanish Imperialist State." 
('Justification of the formation of the Galician national-popular bloc', I Congress, UPG,
1977)
[B] "Our party was born [...] as a product of the ideological struggle with the dominant 
crust of 'spanishism' [espafiolismo]70. Ideological 'spanishism' which was contaminating 
all the social sectors of the country, even the most politicized and concerned about 
their own reality'. (The ideological combat', I Congress, UPG, 1977).
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The UPG's production of colonialism (as extract 5.3.a. shows) points in Maoist 
rhetoric to so-called 'principal enemies' of the Galician nation. This 'principal enem / 
is said to be 'the portion of the enemy which, if defeated, would bring about a 
qualitative change favourable to the interests of the people' (AN-PG, Boletm n3, 
March 1976). The nationalists used, often interchangeably, a series of signifiers such 
as 'monopolist Spanish oligarch/, 'Spanish monopoly bourgeoisie', 'Spanish 
Imperialist State', 'colonial state', 'monopoly capitalism', 'world imperialism' as the 
names of the enemy. Two features can be noted here. First, the dominant leitmotiv 
of the UPG's and AN-PG's story-line is twofold: to situate the evils of Galician society 
mainly in relations inherent to an enmeshment of the economic system and the 
(inter)national system. Thus, this hybrid enemy is delineated by its exploitative and 
oppressive role in the relations of production and exchange, which prevent a 'real' 
development of the Galician social formation. The country is here imagined as 
dependent and exploited by a (foreign) class. Secondly, the stress lays not on 
'imperialism' as an international system, even though it is present, but on Spain and 
the Spanish character of the exploitation and domination of Galicia. The enemy, 
even though posed at a 'world-system' level, remained at this time decidedly local.
But extracts 5.3 also manifest a series of slippages and tensions as regards the form 
that this antagonism 'us' /  'them', Galicia vis-a-vis Spain, takes in the UPG's story- 
world. Whereas in the narratives of the nation -which abound in the text of the first 
congress and in the T&T magazine over the period 1976-1979— this antagonism is 
constructed repeatedly as one between the 'Galician popular classes' vs. 'Spanish 
imperialist state' or between 'the people' vs. 'the oligarchy' (extract 5.2.a), in the 
tales narrating the life story of the Galician national movement -appearing in the 
same texts— the antagonism is routinely represented as 'nationalism' vs. 
'spanishism' (extract 5.2.b). By the time of the UPG's II congress in 1979, even 
though the former contradiction was present, the 'contradiction' nationalism vs. 
spanishism was already all pervasive throughout the text71. In fact, both can be said 
to be 'the' main contradiction.
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But 'the SIS' and 'spanishism' are by no means synonymous. On the one hand, by 
means of the first antagonistic formula, the main source of oppression and 
domination is represented as a series of economic forces originating at the level of 
international society but acting in and through Spain. This representation draws on a 
typical Marxist topographical metaphor by appearing to see the enemy as 
constituted at the 'base' o f the social system: capitalism, colonialism, private and 
public companies or oligarchies are all related to the sphere of production or the 
name of an economic system. This economic oppression is sustained by the 
workings of a political system: Francoism and the new 'repressive' liberal democracy 
in the making. Thus, the 'SIS' was often very crudely constructed -  in an economism 
typical of the orthodox narratives of Marxism— as a mere 'instrument' of capitalism 
and class domination (extract 5.2.a). These instrumental institutional positions were 
occupied institutionally by a variety of archetypes in the tales: the Spanish central 
government, the Galician local major and town council, the official trade union in 
Galicia, the police and even the authorities o f local sporting clubs.
On the other hand, narratives of the movement and party construct the enemy as 
'spanishism'. This is defined as a purely ideological form or 'superstructural' in terms 
of Marxist metaphor. The first congress defines it as 'the ideological aspect of the 
struggle popular classes /  imperialism in our country' (UPG, I Congress, 1977). 
Hence, the antagonism that was constructed in the narratives of the nation between 
the 'Galician popular classes' vis-a-vis 'Spanish imperialism' was often re-narrativized 
under a second antagonism: 'nationalism' vs. 'spanishism'. Such re-narrativization 
was not inconsequential. From claiming that monopoly capitalism and its state 
'instruments' were responsible for the frustration of the development and freedom 
of Galicia -a  claim which carries with it the de-nationalization of the Galician 
bourgeoisie and much of the political class—, the nationalists proceeded to affirm 
that it was, in fact, a particular ideology and those who held it were responsible for 
'sustaining' the workings of 'colonialism' in the country. Hence, the bearers of 
'spanishist' thought were made responsible for the deficient situation in the country 
as a whole.
I l l
This slippage from 'SIS' to  'spanishism' functioned, then, to expand the category of 
the enemy -and consequently to restrict that of 'friends'. Crucially, these enemies 
were not defined in class terms now as were the former 'oligarchy' and 'monopoly 
companies', but in national terms: as those 'who sanctify the unitary structure of the 
Spanish State' (I Congress, UPG, 1977). Who are these 'those'? What does 
'sanctifying' the unitary structure of Spain mean?
Extract 5. 4. On spanishism
"The spanishism, in its right or left wing forms, is the ideological-political expression of 
imperialism; manifested either under colonial, neo-colonial or pseudo-liberatory forms.
As much as they proclaim themselves democrats, socialists or even communists, the 
spanishists are objectively counter-revolutionary, for they do not assume the colonial 
oppression of Galicia with all its consequences* ('The self-organization of the Galician 
popular classes in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives', I congress, UPG,
1977;
As seen In extract 5.4, the category of 'spanishism' was actually endowed with 
ample indeterminacy: it could be left or right wing, colonial or neo-colonial. 
Moreover, the enemy could also present itself disguised under 'pseudo-liberatory' 
forms. However, whatever they said, these forces 'would be objectively counter­
revolutionary' for 'they do not assume the colonial oppression of Galicia with ail its 
consequences'. Being 'spanishists' seems in fact to hinge around this vague 
expression:'with all its consequences'. It does not clarify much. In fact, in principle it 
allows that virtually anyone, even those nationalists who think Galicia as a colony 
and pursue its liberation, might be denationalized if they do not follow this tenuous 
prescription. Thus, voicing the 'incorrect' viewpoint or pursuing the 'wrong' policy 
will potentially render anyone non-national (as the PSG soon discovered) and 'real' 
nationalism should ever remain watchful.
This shift of antagonism represented a major strategy of the 'othering' of the left in 
Galicia. In the UPG's narrative world these enemy groups were mainly constructed 
as the left-wing state-wide parties -'democrats, socialists or even communists'— 
and othered by positioning them as 'spanishists' and 'branchists'72 ('sucursalistas'). 
The othering of left-wing state wide parties was helped by another slippage: the
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equation o f 'popular classes' with 'nationalism'. That is, popular classes in these 
narratives become not the nation as such, but a particular political movement. This 
slippage collapsed the relation of representation that was being constructed -  
nationalism fighting for the interests of the Galician popular classes— for the 
representatives were said to be the represented. Now, membership of 'nationalism' 
was also being fought over and policed. Critically, the enemy could now at times be 
personified by Galician nationalist parties (such as the PSG or POG) who were 
othered as 'pseudo-nationalists'.
Nevertheless, there is a clear tension in the shift from excluding the 'monopoly 
oligarch/ from any concept of the people to the exclusion of left-wing, radical 
Spanish forces and other socialist Galician nationalist parties, such as the PSG, PCG, 
MCE, etc. In terms of the UPG's own narratives the shift was quite unwarranted. For 
it is difficult to  see how the membership o f Spanish-wide trade unions or the 
communist parties in Galicia, native workers and peasants themselves, had 
'colonised' the country. They were certainly not the forces benefiting from unequal 
trade relations or exploitation at the level of production: colonization as narrated by 
the UPG. It was equally contentious to affirm that 'defeating' them would achieve 
that qualitative change so favourable to the Galician people, such as the defeat of 
the 'principal enem / would supposedly do. At worst, these groups could be accused 
-in  a move typical of anti-colonial struggles— of being 'self-colonized' or entrapped 
by a false consciousness and named as a problem. As we will see below, that is more 
or less the PSG's own attitude to many of these groups: othered as 'branchist' often, 
they nevertheless inhabited a liminal space for they were not radically excluded as 
enemies. For the PSG they could be attracted to  the movement.
The displacement of one antagonism for another, thus, created tensions and 
contradictions. This shift implied an overdetermination and reduction of the social 
(class based) to the national. The overlapping of the frontier-effects of class and 
'proper nationalism' meant a more restricted rule of belonging and nationhood. 
Class and nationhood principles stood in uneasy tension. This slippage of 
antagonisms was to have practical consequences for the movement, for it turned
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their attention towards an inward, both intra-movement and intra-left, 'logic of self- 
assertion' (Howarth, 2000). It established the UPG's own practice of nationalism or 
populism as the norm to be followed; norms which could change as the party's 
practice changed. Thus, this norm would create paradoxes such as denationalizing 
those who had been their partners at different times -such as the PSG when writing 
the 'Common text' (1973) and forming the 'Consello de Forzas Politicos Galegas' 
(1976)- and directing major efforts to fighting the political left at the height of the 
transition process when it was the former Francoist elites in the form of the Suarez 
government that were still in power and directing the process of reform.
Hence, the UPG had embarked on a fierce, and highly visible, 'normalizing' narrative 
judgement (Foucault, 1975) of the field of Galician politics. Story-lines and 
discourses for Foucault have normalizing roles and regulatory outcomes (Foucault, 
1979). We can see how these narratives explicitly convey messages about 
appropriate 'nationalism'. They 'qualify, classify and punish', they order and 'other' 
groups according to an underlying norm, which they also establish, of 'correct 
nationalism': the right national behaviour which was the true being of the popular 
classes. This norm, however, was effectively embodied by the party itself by -  the 
tautological— virtue of its 'scientific' and vanguard character
How was this shift accomplished? How was the antagonism of 'popular classes' 
versus 'Spanish imperialism' in the narratives of the nation made to coincide with 
that of 'nationalism' versus 'spanishism'? By virtue, I argue, of another key discursive 
strategy in the story-line o f colonialism produced by the UPG, which I look into more 
in depth below: the narrativisation of the paradox nation-class. In other words, 
narrativisation was the strategy of classic anti-colonialism. It consisted on the 
doctrine that national struggle took precedence in time, for movements to then 
undertake social struggle (Abdel-Malek, 1981). This strategy brought about a 
concomitant prioritization of the realm of politics -understood narrowly as 
participation in the new electoral processes and to refrain from the use of violence -  
opened up since 1978.
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The PSG and weak antagonisms
Whilst being possible to  think of it as a location producing the discourse of 
colonialism, the PSG7s story-line and its effects were very different from those of the 
UPG. The PSG7s narratives articulated around the same term of 'colonialism7 the 
same grievances decried by the UPG -the  end of emigration, rational 
industrialization, defence of agriculture— with very different political demands -  
socialism, federalism and decentralization. Colonialism was then an unstable quilting 
point, whose meaning was being struggled over from within and remained 
indeterminate. Its flipside, 'liberation7, was being articulated among distinct (often 
rival, at times allied) political projects and discursive subgroups.
Extract 5. 5. On the enemy.
'However, the unitary Spanish state constitutes in itself the negation of the Galician 
national reality. The existence of a unitary Spanish state constitutes the antithesis of the 
existence of Galicia. Galicia won't be able to realise itself politically while it remains 
prisoner of the unitary structure of a Spanish state, whether it be totalitarian or not...' 
('Position of the PSG in support of the Galician political alternative of the Consello 
before the unitary platforms of the Spanish state', GS, n.l, 1976)
As can be seen from this extract, typical of the PSG7s statements at the time, their 
key discursive strategy is also an antagonism us /  them. However, their central 
opposition 'Galicia7 vis-a-vis the 'unitary state7, despite similarities, is ultimately 
quite different from other productions of the discourse of colonialism. The discourse 
on 'Galicia7 is similarly told in terms of 'popular classes7 and 'working classes7. But GS 
narrated the enemy in narrower terms: 'the unitary Spanish state7, 'centralist state7 
or 'centralism7 were the quilting points of a chain of equivalences which also 
included 'imperialism7 'dominant classes of the Spanish state7, 'government7 or the 
'capitalist system7. Although thoroughly resignified, it is possible to see the 
connections with the 'xeracion nos'  narrative of the nation where centralism 
occupied an important position in the blame structure73. This antagonism brought 
about frontiers not as clear-cut and inflexible as the UPG7s, as extract 5.5 illustrates:
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Extract 5.6. On alliances and frontiers.
"The dynamic impressed into the whole by the nationalist forces at the nuclei of the 
nationalist front -socialist and communist left-wing forces- should progressively occupy 
the terrain of the forces located in their external circle; it should attract and not repel; it 
should take them one after another into the realm of a Galician national politics...until 
exhausting the spectrum of forces that are able to enter into this process—leaving 
outside only those which are not assimilable to the strategy. Some of those will 
incarnate the irreducible class and national enemy." (The problems of the Galician 
national front at this hour: a proposal for unity", GS, nl, 1976)
Having narrated centralism as their enemy, the narratives allowed wider room for 
manoeuvre to build political alliances, for many left political forces inside and 
outside Galicia shared that enemy. Hence, their main antagonistic political frontier 
was criss-crossed by another co-opting strategy. Contrary to the UPG, the PSG tried, 
in their storytelling practices and at different points in time during the period 1975- 
1982, to articulate hegemonizing links between diverse radical groups in Galicia. The 
political 'dynamic' to be followed 'should take them one after another into the realm 
of a Galician national politics', they noted. 'Them' were a series of 'others' often 
called 'branchists'. This was a liminal position, external as yet to nationalism but of 
the country, not the enemy. Although the PSG also constructed hierarchies and 
policed nationalism -fo r  it is the 'socialist and communist forces', i.e. the PSG and 
UPG, who are located at the 'inner circle' of nationalism and should hegemonize it— 
these 'others' can and should be taken in, co-opted in order to constitute a fairly 
inclusive 'us' against what they termed the final 'irreducible class and national 
enem /. This expansive internal strategy was not the only one implemented at this 
time by the party. Ambiguously, the PSG was also performing a strategy of 
difference around a different quilting point: not colonialism and nationalism, but 
socialism. These were not contradictory strategies for the party, for they were 
proposing a federalist alliance of nationalist groups.
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Narrativization and Identity: negotiating plots
The story-lines of colonialism produce an illusion of unity and coherence in spite of 
weaving different masternarratives. Here I explore how this illusion of unity is 
achieved and the contradictions embedded within it. The story-lines of colonialism, 
as we have seen in the myth of loss, mobilised two particular ways of thinking the 
world and the nation, Marxism and nationalism, in order to make a political case. 
Thus, both a Tree nation' and communism or socialism are narrated as the desired 
goals of the movement -th e  absent fullness o f Galician society. These goals were 
epitomized in the floating signifier of 'liberation' and the classic slogans of 'Free 
Galicia, Popular Power' or 'Free and Socialist Galicia' which ritually closed a great 
many of the narratives, stories and many other nationalist practices such as 
demonstrations -and constitute an example of the citational, iterative and 
performative quality o f the national-popular (Butler, 1993).
Despite the unity and order achieved in the story-lines, calling upon these discourses 
does create difficulties and tensions for the movement. The masternarratives of class 
and nation construct differently, even in opposing ways, the political community. 
They establish contradictory norms of thinkable political subjectivities -vanguard 
party and workers versus interclassist party and peasants— and bring to the fore 
different elements to be articulated in projects -land, language and ethnicity versus 
class, domination or exploitation for instance. This is what Qadri Ismail defined as 
'sitting uneasily together at the political plane' because, she briefly explains, 
'Marxism makes enemies of social groups that nationalism would rather see as allies, 
if not friends' (Ismail, 2000: 247). Thus, whereas nationalism imagines a 
homogeneous people unified by a common ancestry, ethnicity, language or civic 
culture, Lenin -bu t also Stalin, Mao and others— had conceptualised the nation as 
fundamentally split and criss-crossed by class identities.
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For Lenin, there were always not one but two national cultures: proletarian and 
bourgeois, in developed 'nations' (Lenin, 1920 /  1975; Nimni, 1991). Thus, in the 
framework of a Marxist theory of the social 'who is the nation?' becomes the 
question to ask par excellence74. This way Marxism problematises the homogeneity 
of the people, as opposed to  Renan's famous query 'what is the nation?' which 
works instead to naturalise and reify the community (Young, 2001). Story-tellers, the 
UPG and PSG, narrated the nation by drawing on communist and socialist discourses 
and, as a result, positioned themselves in ways -such as the 'patriotic communist 
p a r t /— which did not sit easily within dominant narratives of neither the nation or 
of socialism. They had to devise a range of discursive and narrative strategies that 
functioned to solve the paradoxes arising in their discourse; and to render dominant 
political norms of 'struggle' or 'communist' /  'socialist' identity problematic, in order 
to validate their hybrid production of the collective self. These strategies were 
mainly addressed to their 'communists' or 'socialists' counterparts in the hegemonic 
nation. They kept their conversations and vocabularies o f motives within the radical 
or national left.
The question that arises is, then, how did nationalists actually argue and 'do' 
nationalism and socialism without being paralysed by contradiction or without even 
seeing the paradox? To a great extent the answer lies in Lenin's theory of 
imperialism and the availability of tricontinental discourses of resistance to colonial 
powers as a symbolic resource, characterized from their early stages by a 
combination and hybridization of Marxism and nationalism (Young, 2001). However, 
not all anti-colonial discourses articulated the same discursive elements in similar 
order, and tricontinental narratives were not the only masternarratives of struggle at 
the disposal of Galician nationalisms. Classic Marxism, early Galician nationalism and 
the 'hyper'-Leninism that was strong in the Spanish State among the radical-left 
were all available resources and limits to what nationalists could legitimately claim 
to be. Thus, available symbolic resources of resistance and present day institutional 
and political practices -whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic- influenced what 
could be said and thought within Galician nationalisms.
118
It is important to note, however, that contrary themes, paradoxes or inconsistencies 
-what Billig calls 'ideological dilemmas'- are not errors to be rectified, but common 
features of lived ideologies despite the unity and closure which texts and projects 
strive to present (Billig, 1987; Hall, 1996). They allow the flexibility necessary to deal 
with a variety of social and political situations. This does not mean, as Czarniawska 
found, that there is not 'an urge' to dissolve paradoxes. The reason for this urge is 
not simply 'the aesthetic unpleasantness of a logical error' but the feeling that 
paradoxes 'may paralyze us' (Czarniawska 1997:174). They can constrain action. 
Therefore, typically conflicting elements are separated either in time or in space so 
that contradiction is dissolved. This is what Gilbert and Mulkay found as well in their 
study of scientists' talk. The tensions arising from scientists' intimately combined use 
of potentially contradictory repertoires was managed through the structure of their 
accounts, where each repertoire consistently applies to a particular type of action. 
Also, by what they called the 'truth will out' device: the resource to temporality in 
order to establish the primacy of an empiricist account of science over the 
contingent one (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). By disassociating the conflicting 
elements, such as nation and class or national and social liberation, from one 
another the conflict is left to be resolved in the future or in a different place.
Disassociation in time, what Czarniawska also calls 'temporization', refers to the re­
ordering in time of conflicting elements. That is, articulating elements in a narrative 
form. A decoupling of class and national struggle in time is the main discursive 
strategy to be found in the story-lines of colonialism; but also in space, for there was 
a clear division of labour postulated between the party, as the site responsible for 
pushing for social liberation, and the front organizations in charge of the interclassist 
national struggle. Calling upon the metanarratives of anti-colonialism, the UPG's 
production of the story-line thus ubiquitously argued the need to achieve national 
liberation first as an initial stage, to them accomplishing social liberation.
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Extract 5.7. On narrativization
[a ] 'The UPG knows that the proletarian revolution in Galicia and the construction of 
socialism, in this historical stage of global imperialism, has as its previous objective 
achieving the national liberation of our country." (The UPG's alternative: the national- 
popular struggle as a necessary step in the construction of socialism', I Congress, 1977,
UPG)
[b] "The UPG knows very well that the first phase of the socialist revolution in Galicia is 
the national-popular revolution, because the colonial oppression to which [Galicia] is 
subjected by the Spanish oligarchy -the dominant class in the state- situates the 
contradiction as that between the popular classes and imperialism. The national- 
popular revolution would mean the rupture with the unitary state; the destruction of 
colonialism; and the recovery of our political and economic sovereignty which would 
open the way to the construction of a socialist society in our Land." ('Consolidation of 
the MNPG', II Congress, 1979, UPG)
After narrating the story o f colonization of Galicia and the antagonisms faced by the 
people the text of the first congress progressed to propose the UPG's solution to the 
colonization of the country, their 'alternative' was 'the national-popular revolution 
as a necessary step for the construction of socialism'. Thus, in the title, their key 
strategy of narrativization was already delineated. The narrativization strategy was, 
nevertheless, ubiquitous in the canonical texts of the congresses in 1977 and 1979 
and also in articles of T&T during this time. Extracts 5.7 [a] and [b] present the 
common structure of the story. Firstly, the 'first narrative' of development of modes 
of production is assumed, often in a highly explicit manner which involves various 
formulae such as the 'struggle for socialism' or the 'Marxist-Leninist scientific 
analysis of concrete reality'. Secondly, an initial recourse to temporality situates the 
story in the historical time of colonialism and imperialism: 'in this historical stage of 
global imperialism', 'the colonial oppression to which [Galicia] is subjected', 'the 
actual historical circumstances', etc. Then, as a result of the particular circumstances 
imposed by colonialism, the socialist revolution becomes a journey split into two 
phases: firstly national struggle, and once that has been achieved, the end or 
strategic objective is social struggle.
What allows this split of struggles in time is the Maoist concept of the 'principal 
contradiction', invoked to assert the primacy in time of the antagonism between
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'the popular classes and imperialism' within the story of colonialism and Leninist 
theory of imperialism (extract 5.7 b). The 'principal contradiction' was defined as 
'the antagonism which in a given moment determines the evolution of all other 
contradictions present in a complex phenomenon' (Lopez-Suevos, 1979:39). Hence 
narrativity deferred the communist identity of the party in time and allowed the 
nation to be privileged.
However, unlike Gilbert and Mulkay who found that de-paradoxifying devices clearly 
served to sustain the primacy of the taken for granted, empiricist account, I argue 
that the narrativization of the paradox nation /  class does not serve a primary 
purpose of legitimizing the first narrative -the one taken for granted— by invoking 
the nation. Instead, they legitimize the national struggle by bringing it firmly into line 
with the classic Marxist narrative. This is what Jerome Bruner referred to as the 
stories' capacity to negotiate meanings (Bruner, 1991). The following story, typical of 
this time, illustrates this point:
Extract 5.8. On negotiating nation and class.
"As a workers' party, the UPG fights for socialism, for the suppression of private 
property of means of production and against the exploitation of man by man, in the 
path towards a socialist society.
However, the proletariat is not the only exploited class, as colonial capitalism is suffered 
by all the Galician popular classes; this determines an objective convergence of 
interests in the struggle for the national and social liberation of our people. This is why 
the national-popular revolution is a necessary step in the path to socialism in Galicia; 
and why, in order to become a reality, it needs an ample interclasist front integrated by 
all the classes that assume the principal contradiction present today in Galicia: that 
which opposes the popular classes to the monopolist bourgeoisie of the Spanish State.
[...] For all the above mentioned [factors], in the actual phase the UPG advocates the 
struggle for national and social liberation of Galicia, as a necessary step for the 
construction of socialism... " ('What is the UPG?', T&T, UPG, 1977)
The story in extract 5.8 is a typical example of the narrativization strategy. What is 
relevant for this discussion of the story concerned is that while it explicitly asserts 
the canonical story of Marxism ('os a workers' party', 'figh ts fo r socialism, fo r the 
suppression o f the private property o f the means o f production and against the 
exploitation o f man by man in the path towards a socialist society'), the moral of the 
tale is, in fact, the need for 'a democratic and popular Galician state'. In other
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words, the moral Is suggested by a breach of the canonical Marxist tale which 
warrants the story's tellability (Bruner, 1991): 'however, the proletariat is not the 
only exploited class but colonial capitalism is suffered by all the Galician popular 
classes'. The point is the need for national liberation. Here the story negotiates 
nation and class. While it reinforces the norm of the classic Marxist masternarrative 
which confers legitimacy to  the story, it also legitimizes the exception, the anomaly 
or trouble -the  nationalist task— which is given temporal primacy. This way the UPG 
is able to forcefully argue both for national and social liberation as a floating signifier 
bypassing contradiction.
Hence, while, as mentioned above, stories of the national-popular revolution tend to 
assert explicitly their Marxist character -the language of class is at its strongest then, 
including the only reference to a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in the texts— the 
need of this first stage of national liberation is also forcefully put. This is said to be 
the, 'unavoidable', 'indispensable', 'necessary7, the 'best guarantee' of a social 
revolution which would 'only be achieved' as a journey. However, narrativization's 
deferral in time of the communist identity for the party brought about a certain 
anxiety. Thus, the strategy of narrativization appeared in tension with an opposing 
way of conceptualising the relation nation-class, namely the identification of both 
struggles.
Extract 5.9. On identity
[a ] "In these cases the struggle for national liberation and for class emancipation 
coincide"
(Class antagonism, UPG, I congress, 1977)
[ b] "In the present historical situation class struggle and national liberation are one and 
indissoluble“ (UPG, I congress, 1977)
[c] 'The national liberation struggle of oppressed peoples is an expression of the 
combat of the proletariat for the world socialist revolution" (UPG, II Congress, 1979, my 
cursive)
The identification of class and nation, even though not as common as narrativization, 
still appeared profusely in the first congress. Although I am only quoting here short
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illustrative examples (extracts 5.9), this identification almost always appeared 
intimately combined with passages of narrativization. Identification is a story which 
relies also on the first two steps of the narrativization story: the assumption of the 
first narrative and the anomaly, the situation in the time of colonialism. However, 
then, imperialism was said to have transformed class struggle in such a way to make 
it synonymous with national struggle. Thus, as seen in the extracts above, both 
struggles 'coincide', often 'objective!/, 'are one and indissoluble', are an 'expression' 
of one another, etc. The temporal split brought about by narrativization is here 
collapsed. This strategy (popular since Sultan-Galiev's formula of oppressed nations 
being proletarian nations), I argue, serves to counteract the possible de­
legitimization which the deferral in time of a communist identity achieved through 
narrativization could potentially have brought about in radical circles to a party 
which was struggling to become 'the' communist party of Galicia.
Narrating class, popular and national identities
Nationalism, says Michael Billig, 'is above all an ideology of the first person plural': it 
constructs a collective identity, the national 'we', partly through the mobilization and 
ordering of a set of categories, systems of classification and clusters of meanings 
(Billig, 1995). These categories are often organised (in time and morally) through 
story-lines, tales and narratives (Davies and Harre, 1999). One of the key functions of 
story-lines and tales is the provision and iterative (re)elaboration of subject positions 
(or characters) which attempt to interpellate audiences (Davies and Harre, 1999, 
1990; Hajer, 1995). Within the Galician movement's story-lines these positions are 
fraught with tensions and ambivalence: between posing identities as politically 
articulated or as given and natural, constructing national identity in terms of class 
and territory, attributing primacy to workers or peasants, or constructing a 
heterogeneous and homogeneous national subjectivity, as we will see.
There is an idea that the main characters described in any narrative of the nation are 
necessarily 'us', the nationals and protagonists of national narratives; but this begs
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the questions: who are these characters? who 'is' the nation?. Theories of narrative 
have not asked this question often, but rather 'what is the nation?' has been 
commonly posed (Ozkirimli, 2005; Young, 2001; Renan, 1990) which already gives us 
a sense of an important tra it o f nationhood: its unitary character by definitional fiat. 
As Benedict Anderson notes, the 'imagined political community' is a 'deep, 
horizontal comradeship' (Anderson, 1983:6-7). Even if the political-cultural 
community called nation might be imagined in highly diverse styles, it has been 
overwhelmingly signified as creating a unitary social identity: a 'Volk'. Such unity is 
itself variously posed as cultural, territorial, ethnic or civic bonds between nationals 
holding supreme -o r  constituting them as such— as the literature on nationalism has 
often noticed (Gellner, 1997; Smith, 1979,1981).
Indeed, from Murgui'a to  the later 'xeracion nos'  and the Partido Galeguista, 
nationalists had argued that Galician identity was sustained by a Celtic racial descent 
aided by language and a strong sense of place, described by Patterson as 'a blurring 
of man and nature', a love and devotion for land and landscape (Beramendi, 2007; 
Patterson 2006: 48; Maiz, 1984). Race and land, land and language had established 
that 'comradeship' and had made Galicians out o f the inhabitants of the region. In 
contrast, in the new stories o f nation, race was absent, culture and language were 
peripheral and territory, although still important, was very differently signified -as 
we will see in the next chapter.
Extracts 5.10. On class and nationhood
(a ) "We use the term nationalism in the sense of a movement of the popular classes of 
a dominated country in pursuit of their national, and thus, social liberation. [...].Our 
concept of nation, relates to certain objective factors of an empirical character which 
are those that appear in Stalin's definition, but adding that, at this moment of the 
evolution of capitalism, the popular classes are the nation because the nation acquires 
revolutionary status against the bourgeois power; n o t  a ll  t h e  classes a r e  t h e  n a t io n , o n l y  
t h o s e  t h a t  a s s u m e  t h e  n a t io n a l  l ib e r a t io n  s t r u g g l e , which in the present circumstances, is 
a social liberation struggle. Thus, ours is not an essentialist or culturalist but a classist 
concept of the nation. [...] We, as nationalists, do not reject the primacy of the class 
concept against any other historical category..." (The nationalist movements', T&T, n37,
1976)
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[b ] "[...], it is evident that the category of nation is not for us marginal to class content; 
moreover, the nation is not an a-historic category, defined exclusively by empirical 
sensuous characters (language, culture, geography)." (The class antagonism in this 
colonial situation', I Congress, UPG, 1977)
(c) "In these arguments the state is always confused with nation. If it is true that 
modern European states were created by the bourgeoisie, it is not less true that many 
nations were smothered by the imperialist expansionism of others" (The nationalist 
movements', T&T, n37,1976)
Instead, as the above extracts illustrate, it is mainly class and economic categories -  
in an uncomfortable relation with an organicist and perennialist construction— 
which would become key to  imagining the nation, delimiting 'us' and externalizing 
'others'. The weight o f class can be sensed in the extracts. Nationalism is said to be 
the movement o f the 'popular classes'; in fact, the nation are the popular classes. 
These are commonly represented in the triad ‘obreiros, labregos e marineiros' 
throughout the texts. Thus, nationalism's 'old stories' are present in the UPG's, and 
in contemporary nationalism generally, reworking of the 'xeracion Nos' romantic 
idea of the Galician people. The 'pobo labrego e mariheiro' was now re-narrativized 
as the 'obreiros, labregos and marineiros'. But not all popular classes are the nation: 
in a voluntaristic and reductionist move the text affirms that only those 'assuming 
the national liberation struggle' are nationals. The process of attributing primacy to 
class-based categories began in the early years o f the 1970s. However, this primacy 
wavered in the first half o f the decade, and even though the UPG and PSG's Common 
Text written in 1973 did narrate the country in terms of class, this was less clearly so 
in other texts from early in the decade75. As has been amply discussed in the 
literature, these were the years, particularly after the shipbuilding strikes of 1972, in 
which the UPG first defined itself as a communist party and X.M. Beiras started to 
turn the PSG on a more clearly socialist -i.e. Marxist- path (Beramendi and Nunez 
Seixas, 1995; Rubiralta Casas, 1998).
Ambiguously, the stress on class did not result in national-popular story-lines 
rejecting the essentialist narration o f nation: extracts 5.10 a and b show how 
objective traits - sensuous characters— are not an 'exclusive' definitional element, 
but a nation is still given objectively. As happened in the myth of loss -where the 
perennial vision of the nation was implicitly assumed side by side with the
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development o f the mode o f production narrative— the radical movement invokes 
Stalin's a-historical and normative definition of nation whilst emphasising its class 
character. Alfonso R. Castelao, a key figure in Galician nationalism for over three 
decades, had already applied that definition to Galicia in 'Sempre en Galiza': the 
mythical text o f Galician nationalism finished in 1947. By invoking the Soviet leader 
the movement is also implicitly connecting itself w ith his earlier nationalist 
narratives. Stalin drew upon Otto Bauer's theory o f cultural autonomy to elaborate 
an essentialist definition o f nation as 'a historically constituted community o f people, 
formed on the basis o f a common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make up manifested in a common culture' (Stalin, 1913). Nationalism 
in Galicia historically had defined nationhood objectively, and independently of the 
will o f the people, for it could count on little popular support. At the time of the 
popular front alliance in the Second Republic, Castelao (a progressive element of the 
PG) had found Stalin's definition useful. It is, nevertheless, not irrelevant that it is 
Stalin and not Castelao, who is explicitly invoked as an authority to provide a 
normative definition o f nation which accounts for typical elements o f nationalist 
narratives such as territory or language. The national-popular's implicit audience -  
the radical movement in Galicia where they were trying to assert themselves as the 
'communist patriotic' party— would hardly have listened otherwise.
In spite o f this, such a 'classist conception o f nation' is rooted only in a 'non- 
essentialist' concept of the state -which is clearly identified as historically 
constructed—but it rests on an implicit perennialist concept of the nation -as the 
myth of loss had established. Thus, the communist /  nationalist narrator is able to 
affirm that 'many nations were smothered by others' in their process of state- 
building (extract 5.10.c). The existence of the nation before and as the basis of any 
state is thus implied. Nations, once again, are assumed and as are bourgeoisies, as 
part o f such nations before statehood.
Nevertheless, class profoundly troubled the kind o f 'horizontal comradeships' typical 
of national narratives by introducing a measure of 'verticality' and a great dose of 
heterogeneity to the nation, even though not w ithout homogenising tensions. Now,
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not every inhabitant o f the dystopia called Galicia (the colony) would be 'national'. 
The first congress of the UPG, the UPG and PSG's CT, as well as many stories from 
both T&T and GS state that explicitly: the 'national' subjects are 'Galician classes' or 
'popular classes' ('closes populares', 'camadas populaces') in antagonism with 
'exploiter classes', 'monopolist and intermediary bourgeoisies'. Only those 
pertaining to the worker, peasant or seamen classes -th e  national triad par 
excellence, although a liminal space is also occupied in the stories by the 'petty 
bourgeoisie'— are nationals in the story-world of the UPG and PSG. Thus, one of the 
consequences of prioritizing the vocabulary of class is the implicit de- 
territorialization of nationhood and nationality. Groups traditionally seen as part of 
the nation, by reason of their birth, territory, language or culture, are now othered. 
Hence, the nation was significantly shrunk narratively. This 'shrinking' is the result of 
the nationalists drawing on anti-colonial and popular front inspired narratives.
Heterogeneity and peoplehood
If these social classes are the Galician nation, what kinds of bonds bind them 
'fra terna ll/?  How are they constituted? In fact, there is no one answer to this. The 
concept o f 'the people' is constituted both in terms of a rhetoric o f heterogeneity, 
and simultaneously with a rhetoric of homogeneity, betraying a tension as they 
simultaneously draw upon Marxist, classic and Popular Front narratives.
Extract 5. 11 On heterogeneity in the making of the nation.
[a ] 'This exploitation is suffered b y  all Galician classes. Thus, the surmounting of the 
weaknesses of the Galician workers' movement, and their transformation in strength, 
depends on the union of all the Galician popular classes in the struggle to overthrow 
common exploitation." (CT, PSG & UPG, 1973).
[b ] "All the Galician people, [...], means the union in a compact bloc of workers, 
peasants, seamen and those petty-bourgeois (small merchants and industrialists who 
barely use any waged labour, liberal professionals, etc) who could become aware of 
their identity of interests with the popular classes and renounce, thus, their mimetic 
and suicidal identification with the bourgeois and anti-national culture that Spanish 
colonization imposes upon us. However, in any case, the proletariat has the historic 
duty and the mission of assuming the vanguard and direction of the national-popular 
revolution, as it is the most dynamic social class and it is objectively interested in
127
building socialism." (The justification of the policy of forming the national-popular 
bloc', I Congress, UPG, 1977)
The texts of nationalism accounted for the Galician 'nation' and its subjects by using 
a variety o f categories and positions such as 'all the Galician popular classes', 'all the 
Galician people', the 'working classes', the 'bloc o f workers, peasants, seamen and 
those petty-bourgeois..', 'those objectively interested in finishing with the colonial 
state', and as 'those that assume the national liberation struggle'. They constructed 
a heterogeneous category o f 'the people' drawing on narratives of anti-colonialism 
and 'Popular Front' politics. Heterogeneity and the category of the people derive 
from the discourse of the Popular Front and the limits the narrative of development 
of modes of production met in practice. In a nutshell, classic Marxism narrated that, 
after the bourgeoisie succeeded in its struggle for political and economic liberty 
against feudalism, it would develop capitalism's productive forces and relations of 
production, proletarianizing society as a result. Then, the newly formed working 
class, whose identity is constituted in the relations of production, would struggle 
against the bourgeoisie to  supersede capitalism and democracy and form a socialist 
society. Bourgeoisie and proletariat were seen as the fundamental historical agents 
to which particular tasks were attributed. However, historical and contextual 
circumstances often meant that a class could not carry out the tasks assigned to 
them in the plot. At times they were too weak: for instance during the rise of fascism 
bourgeoisies recoiled, in backward and colonized social formations the proletariat 
was a small fraction o f the population. Then, the broadest possible unity of 
democratic forces was needed. The Popular Front strategy contingently enshrined 
'the people' as the key political subjectivity in an attempt to break away from 
burdensome 'task' constraints76 (Beverley, 1999). For Dimitrov 'the people' 
designated the possible unity among different constituent parts (peasantry, artisans, 
(un)organized labour, the churches, the intelligentsia, etc), in a common identity 
(Beverley, 1999:89). From Dimitrov to Mao (through Connolly, Fanon or Cabral), 'the 
people' became the key revolutionary subject. It was a heterogeneous ensemble 
where peasants were often given a leading role. This people were conceived 
negatively against an 'other': fascism, colonizers, capitalists and landlords.
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In keeping with this schema, all productions of colonialism took pains in 
differentiating social classes (as illustrated in extract S .ll.b ) and narrativizing the 
particular reasons that each had in opposing capitalism -even though they did so 
differently. These reasons or 'objective interests' allowed the narrative formation of 
equivalences between the classes discursively articulated around the metaphor of 
colonialism and its goal o f national and social liberation. Thus, the CT narrates a tale 
of forever oppressed peasants who are newly colonized by capitalism and 
threatened now with disappearance; of a weak and fragmented working class 
because of a lack o f 'rational industrialization', and of a Galician bourgeoisie 
incapable o f and uninterested in developing the country. The basic unifying theme in 
the stories is the common positioning of all the classes against the modern 
colonization o f the country by capitalist forces. The moral is that of the need of 
workers and peasants to  unite. This is clearly expressed in the evaluation o f the tale 
of the working class as illustrated in extract 5.11.a and the union and 'compact bloc'. 
These stories are retold in the I congress (UPG), where several pages are devoted to 
describing and storying the subject positions deemed national. However, there is 
now a re-plotting o f the earlier stories to give a clear primacy and 'leadership' to the 
working class (extract 5.11.b), which was absent in the CT.
In order for these heterogeneous groups to unite a Maoist rhetoric of (lack of) 
'contradictions' among the people is a prominently used resource, despite Mao 
himself being mostly absent as a figure o f authority in the UPG texts, at least since 
1970:
Extracts. 5.12. On lack o f contradictions.
[a ] "In general terms, the principal contradiction opposes the poor, medium and well- 
off peasants to monopolistic capitalism, 'cacique' elements and to the S.I.S." ('Galicia as 
a colonized nation', I congress, UPG, 1977)
[b] "The absence of contradictions among the popular classes, in this historical moment, 
is, thus, determined by the colonial function and dependent development of our 
economy. A political project is viable which integrates popular struggle in common 
objectives." ('Class antagonism in this colonial situation', I congress, UPG, 1977)
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The unity of the people in popular front conceptions, Beverley explains, Vests 
precisely on the recognition and tolerance of difference and incommensurability" 
(Beverley, 2001: 90). This is why Mao talked of "contradictions among the people" 
whereas classic Marxism would think of the revolutionary agent as homogeneous: 
the workers whose life in factories provided them with similar interests, experiences 
and culture. Thus, this popular identity does not totally erase the fraternal bonding 
of the nation, even though it dissolves its unitary character, but bases it in a common 
experience of oppression.
The moment of unity o f the nation /  people, the revolutionary subject's unity, is 
displaced from the economic or racial /  ethnic element to  the political level. The 
main problem with this conception of the nation is that, if the external enemy or the 
principle which inflicts oppression disappears, so would the nation. This would be 
one of the problems that nationalists had during the transition, for the most obvious 
markers of oppression and main grievances in their discourse were being rapidly 
transformed. Besides, the class rule of membership o f the nation seems ambivalent. 
Nationalists affirm both that membership is a matter o f the different classes" 
"objective interests" and a voluntaristic "national consciousness". Thus, they noted 
both that "those who are objectively interested in finishing with the colonial State 
form the nation" and that "the nation are [...] only those that assume the national 
liberation struggle". This combination of objective and subjective criteria is also 
reminiscent of Maoism.
Homogenising the people: the 'symbiotic worker'
The particularization practices and the "incommensurability" of the people were, 
nevertheless, in tension and precariously balanced with another key rhetorical 
strategy as regards the notion o f a "Galician people": the tendential identification and 
homogenization of class categories. If the nationalists were clearly drawing on the 
symbolic resources of anti-colonial narratives to discursively construct their 
opposition to Spain, there was also another plot, the Marxist "first narrative",
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present. This orthodox masternarrative predicted a gradual simplification of the 
social landscape due to  the development of productive forces. Here, homogeneous 
society (in Bataille's terms) would be reduced to a struggle between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat. All forces would converge towards one or the other and social 
classes like peasants would be condemned to disappear through proletarianization. 
In fact, the construction o f 'the people' as an alliance of 'oppressed classes' in anti­
colonial discourse came as an strategy to  bridge the gap and neutralize the paradox 
between the reality of societies where the industrial proletariat hardly existed and 
the first narrative which posited this proletariat as the privileged political 
subjectivity. Nevertheless, this unitary subject tendentially resurfaces, in a similar 
(structural) location, but not identical form, in the creation of new discursive figures 
which would come to characterize the story-lines of colonialism in the canonical 
texts: the 'symbiotic-peasant' or 'proletarian-proprietor'.
Extracts 5.13. On the new unitary figure
[a ] "The big majority of the Galician proletariat is spread in small and medium size 
companies and to a great extent it continues to be personal proprietor in the primary 
sector, of the land, [situation which] originates the generalized and graphic 
denomination of 'proletarian-proprietor", corresponding humanly to the peasant who 
works extra hours..." (I congress, UPG, 1977)
[ b ] "the role of the peasant class is not secondary but primary: because they represent 
more than 50% of the active population in our Land; because of the exploitation they 
suffer inflicted by monopolist capital which extracts added value from them in the same 
way that it does from the working class [..]; because many peasants are at the same 
time industrial workers; because all peasant families have migrants in the factories [...]
For all this factors [...] the identification of peasant-worker relations is obvious and their 
struggle is very close..." ('MAG', T&T, February, 1976)
[c] "This incipient proletariat, [which is] in a period of formation, acquires progressively 
more relevance in our countryside due to the colonial-capitalist penetration. [...] these 
are peasants on the way to proletarianization, who still have the country as the axis of 
their lives, and still posses an agrarian community conscience' [...]" (T&T, n35,1976)
The 'peasant' as narrated in classical Marxism is the point of departure and the 
'proletariat' a foreseeable point o f arrival but, in this story, Galicians have been 
caught in medias res, somewhere 'in-between' these figures. The nationalist texts 
effect a constant slippage of the liminal categories 'symbiotic-peasants', 'peasant- 
proletarians' or 'worker-proprietors' which lead us to see them as a single
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phenomenon. By labelling peasants as "workers o f the land" the UPG invokes a 
commonality o f life-experiences between peasants and workers. By being positioned 
as "incipient proletarians", peasants were narrated either as a class in transition 
{'they are peasants on the way to proletarianization') or as being already a 'sector of 
our proletariat" who peculiarly still lives in the countryside and keeps strong ties with 
peasant life. Conversely, the "majority or workers" are positioned as being also 
owners ("proletarios-proprietarios') who work in factories but own and work the 
land. They have not been fully proletarianized and therefore their class 
consciousness is weak. We are then instructed to  see the categories as tendentially 
homogeneous: ""the proletarian-proprietor" is said to "corresponding humanely to 
the peasant"; the peasants "are industrial workers at the same time" (extracts 5.13. a 
and b).
Hence, the UPG tried to  dissolve the gulf between their class identities. Classic 
Marxism, instead, had distinguished workers from peasants: "free" waged labour 
with no ownership o f the means o f production as opposed to owners o f land. Within 
the peasantry wage labourers and capitalist farmers could be distinguished, but their 
ownership o f land and means of production -whether or not they also sold their 
labour power to others- would mark them as peasantry or maybe "poor peasantry" 
(Byres, 1991:413). Through a series o f rhetorical strategies an identity between 
Galician peasants and workers is established. The many -'workers, peasants and 
fishermen'- are constituted, once again, as one, or in Homi Bhabha's words as "the 
spatial expression of a unitary people" (1990:294). These figures are said to 
correspond to "the majority o f the workers" and the peasant in Galicia.
Extract 5.14. On hybridity
"Symbiosis makes an atypical proletariat, but so it makes an atypical peasant; thus, the 
old consideration of peasants as owners needs to be qualified." ('Peripheral capitalism, 
symbiosis and super-exploitation: the Galician case', Ldpez-Suevos, 1975)
However, being neither fully peasants nor "traditional" or "pure" proletarians these 
are new, "atypical" or hybrid positions, a result o f the recent direct influence of the
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new capitalist colonization of the country. The identities of "symbiotic workers" are 
something "in-between". These are liminal subject positions, where peasants really 
resemble /  are workers: in the making, in transition, sharing conditions; and where 
workers are not "pure" but "correspond" to  peasants. Hence, the new unitary subject 
o f Galician politics is not the idealised peasantry, repository of "Galician values and 
identity" as the literary and political tradition o f Galician nationalism had established 
since Murguia and Rosalia; neither does it correspond to the Marxist proletarian. 
However, it does reinscribe within the story-lines of colonization a unitary 
revolutionary identity and a binary logic o f antagonism. The need for which derives 
precisely from assuming a conception of history and development from those classic 
stories -n o t the "alliance" "inter classist front" or "popular bloc" o f anti-colonial 
narratives.
The figure of the "symbiotic worker" effectively worked to erode the privileging of 
workers established, paradoxically, through the heterogeneization of the people. 
Thus, one of the conclusions o f the predominance o f the "symbiotic worker" over any 
other position in the country is that the "industrial proletariat is not enough to force 
change" (Lopez-Suevos, 1979). The production o f a new subjectivity which erodes the 
leadership of the working class was typical o f anti-colonial narratives. Mao attributed 
a major role to  peasants and Fanon claimed a decisive one for the lumpen- 
proletariat (Schram, 1989; Fanon, 1967). However, Galician nationalism's solution is 
different. Its discourse continuously oscillates between attributing leadership to the 
proletariat within recognition o f plurality, and recognising the key status of symbiotic 
workers in narrowing down heterogeneity. This is not a "reclaiming" strategy: the 
attribution of further tasks and attributes to already clearly constituted 
subjectivities, but rather, it is a hybrid. This newly reconstituted peasant-worker is a 
fusion o f the older nationalist tales" position of peasants as repositories of the nation 
and the Marxist worker as the unitary, privileged subject of struggle.
The heterogeneity of the nation, in stories o f "blocs" and the unity of groups, co­
existed with this homogenising strategy. The people were, then, both pluralized and 
simplified in the narratives produced at this time. By relying on class as the rule of
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membership, 'the people' were reduced from being all the inhabitants of the 
territory to (mainly) the 'popular classes', a distinction which expelled the 
bourgeoisie but left in a liminal remainder in the form of the 'petty bourgoise'. 
Simultaneously, it was heterogenised in Popular Front style narratives. Then, in 
tension with this move, the popular classes that had been carefully described, 
divided and hierarchized were simultaneously identified and homogenised as 
'symbiotic workers'. Although this hybrid identity was said to be the very product 
that the workings of colonialism in the country had created, paradoxically it reduced 
the heterogeneity o f the anti-colonial 'people' and mimicked both the unitary 
subject o f the classic Marxist narrative, the proletariat, and the idealized peasant of 
nationalist classic tales.
5. 3. Counter-narratives of Galician nationhood
But nationalism was not a homogeneous movement. Instead it was plural, complex 
and itself pervaded by antagonisms, what some would call the narcissism of minor 
differences. It was also heterogeneous, even though hegemonized by the discourse 
and story-line o f colonialism, a hegemonic discourse which nevertheless did not 
itself suppress internal differences (it has been seen how different stories and 
strategies reveal a different conception of the political, even within the story-line of 
colonialism; discourses as regularities in dispersion). Moreover, there were other, 
alternative, story-lines of the Galician nation 'countering' colonialism, alive in sites 
such as the PSG (which was split between colonialism and those other stories) and 
the POG, a splinter group of the UPG -which was created as a reaction to the 
colonialism story-line. In these other narratives democracy becomes a nodal point, 
there is no myth of loss; autonomy is not rejected but worked upon.
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5.4. Paradox & the disputed communist space: a discussion.
For Laclau and Mouffe, in the Leninist conception "hegemonic relations supplement 
class relations" (1985:51). That is, the popular front narrative of alliances between 
classes and the hegemonization by one class (the proletariat) of the task proper of 
another (the bourgeoisie) which lies at the core of anti-colonialism is secondary, and 
serves to buttress that other classic narrative of the development o f the laws of 
history and production which is the foundation of the discourse. Lenin relies on two 
plots, but one is, for Laclau and Mouffe, clearly supplementary to the other. This is 
because, they say, 1. "the order o f appearance o f the characters is not altered by the 
second narrative" (the bourgeoisie appears first, even if its incapable of achieving its 
duty), 2. "the class nature o f the task is not altered by the fact that it is assumed by 
another class", 3. "the very identity of the social agents is determined by their 
position in the first narrative". There is then, an unequal position between the 
narratives - in  favour of the first narrative". The same theme is brought up by Quadri 
Ismail: in the interlocking o f class and nation in a social movement the only solution 
would be for one to take primacy over the other (Ismail, 2001)
However, it is quite difficult to  see a clear narrative privilege among the Marxist plots 
interweaved by the Galician nationalists over this period 1972-1981. Even between 
the plots of Marxism and nationalism it is quite difficult to position either as a 
supplement, or "add on", unless we attend to Derrida"s problematization of the idea 
of the supplement as secondary. A supplement is something that, allegedly 
secondarily, comes to serve as an aid to something "original" or "natural". For Derrida, 
in Of Grammatology, however, the status of the supplement itself is questioned, 
becoming a site of undecidability: an ambiguity that ensures that what is 
supplementary can always be interpreted in one of two ways: as accretion or as 
substitution (Royle, 2003). That is, which element, the "original" or the "add on", is 
primary becomes undecidable. Instead of a privileged narrative, the movement 
carefully crafted balances, contrasting dis-equilibriums and spreading imbalances,
135
they segregated and juxtaposed contradictions, so that the discourse of colonialism 
shifted its allegiances over time and space: local writing/written contexts. The 
narratives predominated in different spaces. The story-lines of colonialism both 
juxtaposed and segregated the following propositions:
•  class defines "the people7, but territory buttresses "the nation" (I will explore 
this point in the next chapter).
•  the nation has temporal primacy, but socialism is the end point.
•  nation and class struggle/socialism are the same struggle.
•  workers are the privileged subjectivity, but they really are peasants
•  peasants really are a peculiar form of proletariat.
•  capitalism is the principal enemy, but so is "spanishism"
•  "the working classes" are the nation and then it will be "nationalism"
The stories were rife w ith paradox. This is not surprising as the movement was living 
by different plots, as it was contested, operating in paradoxical and uncertain times. 
Because of the quest to  occupy the central political space in which they originated -  
the radical le ft— whilst becoming the real option of the "Galician people" they were 
interpellating they had to meet and deal with diverse and outright conflicting aims 
and norms of intelligibility. The "nationalist" space had been a vacuum relatively easy 
to fill and with no competition from old established parties and organizations, in 
spite o f the tensions between some of the sites immersed in the colonialism story­
lines as well as others stemming from them. But there were strong, well established 
and respected organizations on the radical left and in the anti-francoist space: 
mainly the PCE.
The UPG has been, nevertheless, represented as a Maoist party or an exponent of 
Maoism within the literature (Beramendi and Seixas, 1995, Rubiralta Casas, 1998). 
For Rubiralta Casas, from 1970 the UPG started to develop "openly" Thirdworldist 
and Maoist thought, characterized by explicit references to Mao and to the fourth 
classes, colonialism, use o f violence, etc. This presence of Mao in the UPG is certainly 
visible, mainly during those initial years o f the discourse of colonization, being
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explicitly invoked in documents such as 'Galicia is a co lon / (1973) or in Lopez- 
Suevos' writings such as in 'Encol do colonialismo', 1975. However, this 'Maoism' 
needs to be qualified. The overt references tend to disappear. In fact, apart from the 
above mentioned article, there is no T&T article or congress which mentions Mao. 
And there is uneasiness in the UPG about the label Maoism in spite of their obvious 
use o f some Maoist formulae. Thus, whereas Lenin, Leninism or Marxism-Leninism 
was invoked sixteen times in the first congress of 1977 and is enshrined in article 2 of 
its statutes: 'the UPG founds its theory and guide fo r  action in Marxism-Leninism, 
applying historical materialism to the specific circumstances o f Galicia'; Mao is not 
mentioned at all.
The question that arises here, continuing the idea of undecidability between 
narratives, is: why would such an important narrative influence be occluded? For 
Rubiralta Casas the answer lies in the mood of 'hyperleninism', in vogue after the 
antiauthoritarian critique o f May 1968. However, as such this is an unsatisfactory 
answer, for there was also a mood of anti-colonialism in Spain throughout the 
decade -th e  Spanish 'radical' parties conceptualising Spain as a colony of US, ETA 
thinking o f the Basque country as a colony o f Spain and the UPG itself being the main 
site of Galician discourse o f colonialism.
The answer could lay in the UPG's need to establish authority over a political space. 
The fact that Mao's thought was heretical for 'classic' European Marxism (Schram, 
1989:6) did not help in that pursuit. The paradox here is that, while anti-colonialism 
provided the key metaphor and vocabulary to conceptualise Galicia and make sense 
of the social markers o f underdevelopment, migration, etc, the intellectuals of anti­
colonialism did not serve so well the purpose o f establishing authority that the UPG 
was relentlessly pursuing vis-a-vis the PCE. The mood of 'hyperleninism' in Spain, 
noted also by Laiz, could itself be the result, not of May 68, but of 'Euro-communism' 
and what was seen as the abandonment of traditional revolutionary Marxism by the 
main communist parties throughout Europe (Laiz, 1995). The UPG was trying to 
establish its authority as communist, a move which was strongly objectionable since 
it also invoked the ideas o f 'nation' and 'national liberation'. And it was doing this
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vis-a-vis a party which traditionally had embodied 'communism', the norm of 'being 
a communist p a r t/  -fo llow ing the Soviet Union, democratic centralism, etc— but 
who was, crucially, abandoning that norm. The retreat of the PCE from the norm of 
'real communism' was the reason why so many small parties in Spain stressed their 
Leninism at that time. For Leninism still functioned as the normative, authoritative 
framework for 'being revolutionary7.
The UPG resorted to  Lenin because his name carried weight and authority on the 
Spanish radical left, their audience all along. Even if this radical left was the site of a 
thoroughly hybrid anti-colonial discourse, such a discourse is, in inception, also 
derived from Lenin. This is not Maoism, but 'Leninism applied to Galician 
circumstances'. Performing a communist identity in Galicia was viewed as coming 
very close to identification w ith the authority figure o f Lenin.
Hence, during the 1970s the sites producing the discourse of colonialism cannot 
unreservedly be called 'nationalist'. For most of the scholarship however, this issue is 
not even questioned and the nature of the movement as 'nationalist' remains firmly 
grounded77. X. Beramendi assures us that the 'core tenets' of nationalism were still 
preserved. This is in spite o f the movement having undergone, he notes, 'an 
ideological mutation w ithout precedents' and being 'hybridized' (2007: 1087). But 
surely, if the movement was a 'hybrid' then it cannot simply be concluded that is was 
'nationalist', unless its Marxist metanarratives are taken as being supplementary in 
the sense of secondary. However, in this chapter this has been shown not to be the 
case. Hybridity, Bakhtin noted, 'is the mixing, within a single concrete utterance, of 
any two or more linguistic consciousness, often widely separated in time and space' 
(Bakhtin, 1981:429). This 'double-voicedness', pervasive throughout the narratives of 
colonialism, is for Bakhtin, crucially, not meant to be resolved.
There are pervasive marks o f tension between class and nation in the discourse of 
nationalism as a result o f the relevance of archetypal class positions as the primary 
subjectivities or by not unambiguously having 'nation' as a nodal point, but class 
instead. There always remained a certain eliding o f signifiers: class, people, nation,
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country. Nevertheless, this eliding did not merge or collapse them. Instead, there 
was a strong tendency to rely upon compound categorization78: 'the popular 
classes', 'the national-popular' struggles, the 'communist patriotic p a r t/  and 
symptomatically in the naming of many political organizations created during this 
time, such as the 'national-popular' Assembly, Bloc and so on. The stubborn use of 
the rhetoric o f 'class and people'79, and of 'nation and people' in the story-lines 
speaks volumes of the ambivalence and undecidability of the discourse, its refusal to 
choose between these categories. Colonialism was a hyphenated story-line, its 
rallying point a signifier drawn from a narrative (anti-colonialism) which precariously 
articulated class and national conflicts. The relevance of this point o f a hybridity of 
the voices in the narratives is that the demands and political struggles fought over 
during the decade can only be made sense of if we take this ambivalence seriously. 
Thus, the claim for a Galician government and the rejection of the autonomic 
process as the (political) solution to the (economic) grievances of 'irrational 
industrialization', 'emigration' and 'lack of agricultural re fo rm '.
5.5 Conclusion
Naming one thing in terms o f another thing produces a metaphor, a rhetorical trope 
key to understanding ideologies. This trope has two main characteristics: it 
systematically structure our ways of thinking, illuminating aspects of a situation or 
concept80. As a result o f this, it also systematically occlude others features. That is, 
nationalists were strongly arguing that Galicia's situation was best understood in 
terms of another experience, namely that of the third world and Latin American 
countries, as the result of their encounters with imperialism and colonization. The 
metaphor highlighted commonalities and occluded differences between these 
countries' experiences and the Galician situation.
By naming Galicia a colony the nationalists were not simply claiming to be a nation in 
the traditional nationalist sense -and demanding all political entitlements presumed 
to follow from that— they were claiming a specific way of being within the world of
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nations (Billig, 1995). They were discursively performing the country as a nation 
suffering oppression and subjugation exercised by an alien power as part of an 
imperialist system. The story-lines were an accusation and levelled blame against the 
Spanish state for the economic situation in Galicia. The meaning of 'co lon / was 
indeed loaded with connotations of violence and aggression. Hence, it also 
established an implicit cultural difference with Spain, out of mainly economic 
grievances.
In addition, they were constructing Galicia as another element in a chain of 
liberation struggles that had been taking place around the world, and therefore 
demanding the same legitimacy and solidarity from other left-wing parties inside and 
outside Spain. That communists were against all forms of oppression, and by 
necessity had to be against colonial domination, was the taken for granted tenet of 
Leninism which nationalists were invoking. Thus, Galicia was constructed as a victim 
(as seen in the myth of loss) but one which fights back.
Narratives of colonialism served the vigorous struggle against the images and stories 
of the integral territorial unity o f Spain defended, implicitly or explicitly, by the 
hegemonic discourses o f democracy and reform. Narrating colonialism was an 
utterly political practice (as important as, and totally inseparable from, the founding 
of parties and unions, the establishing of alliances or the drafting of bills which were 
to follow) directed at intervening and radically challenging the politics of reform and 
consensus during the transition in order to achieve particular goals. Colonization 
story-lines called for collective political action different from earlier nationalist 
narratives which founded the nation on ethnic /  racial grounds.
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6Space and 'self-organization': heterotopias and the 'national-popular'
Apart from fomenting antagonism with Spain and explicitly hybridizing class and 
nation as the true markers o f Galician identity, nationalists also mobilized a sense of 
place. Their construction o f the Galician nation relies on the citation and iteration of 
stories and concomitant discursive practices. These stories overwhelmingly 
represented the national space as dystopia (i.e. the colony) and intra-national (local) 
spaces as real counter-sites, spaces of resistance to colonization and of freedom or 
'heterotopias' (Foucault, 1967 /  1984). Villages, city neighbourhoods and 
demonstrations were linked in an equivalence to form a web-like, micro spatial 
narration o f the nation which worked against strict class boundaries. This linkage 
was performed in a narrative subplot o f struggling localities prominent in the years 
of the transition Here the spatial representations of nationhood as a narrative 
strategy made the political boundaries which were built up insisting on a social 
categorization of the nation more flexible.
For nationalism, after all, is never beyond geography (Billig, 1995). But its geography 
is never a mere physical setting, rather 'the national place has to be imagined, just as 
much as the national community does' (1995:74). That is, space is not natural but 
socially produced (Soja, 1996; Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1990). Indeed, 'nations' are 
often imagined not only as social categories marking boundaries of belonging and 
exclusion among people, but as places: physical entities whose historical factuality 
'exceeds human membership' (Wallwork and Dixon, 2004:22). The relevance of the 
social construction of space in narratives generally and in stories of the nation in 
particular has been, therefore, duly acknowledged in a variety o f fields (Baynham 
and De Fina, 2005; Wallwork and Dixon, 2004; Deshpande, 2000; Soja, 1996; Billig, 
1995; de Certeau, 1984). I examine in this chapter another key narrative strategy in
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the construction of belonging: the narration of Galicia as a dystopia, the colony, and 
the construction of new heterotopias. Then, I discuss the social function of the 
narrative space of the nation created.
6.1. Introduction: the localities and local struggles.
As already explained, the transition was characterized by formative efforts to 
rearticulate new discourses and make sense of the situation. These took place in 
every social setting: from the core power nexus of Madrid to village-centred local 
capillaries. The local landscapes o f Galicia in the 1970s were undergoing notable 
changes as well as continuities. Populated by a variety of subjectivities with 
extremely diverse life circumstances, worldviews and resources, all of them were 
subjected to the redrawing o f political boundaries and power relations: pursuing, 
resisting, stirring and widening them.
Galician rural communities were on the wane. Socio-economic changes which 
diminished their relative weight in terms of the total population, less than half the 
total now for the first time in the century, also modified their physical space. As a 
result o f practices of migration villages were suffering a distortion in their age, 
gender81 and occupational structures. It meant a disruption o f communities' 
temporal and spatial patterns and life rhythms. Younger adults particularly were 
further increasing a direct and enduring involvement outside their local communities 
and with other sectors o f Galician and Spanish society (Bauer, 1990:580). This 
involvement came through education, work mobility and participation in the new 
dialogues concerning their status within Spain -such as the story-lines of 
colonialism— exacerbated by provincial and state press as well as by direct 
intervention in village issues by new political associations. They were 'redefining 
their interests, hopes and obligations largely in terms of Spanish society as a whole' 
(Bauer, 1992:583). Hence, by the mid 1970s, there were some rural localities still 
close knit and strong: particularly those which due to  specific local circumstances 
could still sustain their group solidarity w ith agricultural labour. However, a
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considerable number o f communities were now losing their traditionally solid 
interpersonal ties, and becoming places where a multiplicity o f cultures and 
worldviews coexisted.
This does not mean that rural communities had ever been static or politically 
acquiescent. Contrary to  the widely supposed idea that peasant communities were 
spaces o f passive submission, recent research on Galician social history -as well as 
not so recent anthropological studies- has established that there was a tradition of 
resistances against francoism since the 1940s (Cabana Iglesias, 2006, 2010; Bauer, 
1992). Communities often held the dictatorship responsible for the marked 
worsening of their material situation -such as the expropriation of villagers' common 
forest land— but also fo r what they perceived as intolerable ruptures o f the 
community's moral codes and worldview82 (Cabanas Iglesia, 2006). Small rural 
communities undertook myriad public and covert practices of active and passive 
subaltern resistance against francoist policies: from judicial processes and writing 
letters o f complaint to gossip83.
By the 1970s, then, there had been profound socio-economic changes affecting 
communities with a long established , if often muted, tradition of struggle in defence 
of their perceived rights and moral values. These did not remain marginal in the 
wave of social protest during late francoism (Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas, 
2008). Between the years 1960 and 1977 socio-economic struggles against agrarian 
taxes, for higher prices for milk and beef production and over the domination and 
control o f space: i.e. against the expropriation o f communal or privately owned land­
proliferated. The issues that dominated these years were the battles against the 
francoist agrarian social security ('cuota social agraria'84), and against the building of 
dams and mines in search of diverse energy sources in multiple small localities.
As explained in chapter 3, incidences of local collective resistance for social/life 
improvement were unavoidably overdetermined by wider political struggles. New 
radical political subjectivities, such as radical Marxist, PCG or the national-popular 
movement, were going to  tap into these traditions and intervene in the conflicts
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with direct tactics and new representations of the country. The key sites for this 
intervention were the agrarian trade unions organized by the "national-popular" 
movement. These were the plural CALL organized by the PSG and the UPG. 
Eventually, the UPG created what would become the more active and stronger 
union: the Comisidns Labregas ("peasant commissions", henceforth called the CCLL). 
These were organized mainly by people of urban origin, who were connected with 
the countryside through their professional activities, such as rural school teachers, 
agricultural technicians and some rural priests, and who connected with young rural 
inhabitants (Lanero Taboas, 2008). Organically dependent on the UPG and overtly 
political, they tried to "slowly sow rebelliousness, politization and nationalist ideas in 
the countryside" (Maiz Vazquez and Alonso, 2003:38). Often outsiders to 
communities, their relations and alliances were precarious. Nevertheless, the CCLL 
fought fo r "agrarian reform" and focused their activities on concrete problems 
affecting the rural population, specifically articulating those within the colonialism 
discursive formation. These unions were themselves a product and producer of that 
story-line.
Continuity w ith old political practices at the local level was nevertheless strongly 
guaranteed by the reorganization o f francoist, mainly rural, elites. These did so 
successfully: they maintained strong positions o f power and patronage structures 
well into the 1990s85 (Marquez Cruz, 1993). These elites, mainly designated mayors 
or councillors o f small towns and villages, were co-opted on the basis o f direct 
personal relations by the provincial intermediaries o f Madrid's francoist elites which 
had been themselves co-opted on a similar personal basis (Lagares Diez, 1999). In 
1976, intermediary provincial elites often opted for grouping in a multiplicity of 
political "parties" and "associations", synonyms for old clientelistic networks with a 
local "notable" for leader, such as MeilSn Gil"s Partido Gallego Independiente, in 
order to  form a power base and negotiate a better position within the new 
conservative party structures in the making. From such positions of power, provincial 
elites and their "families" coalesced around two conservative political options which 
made possible a continuity w ith the values o f the regime: Union de Centro 
Democratico under president Adolfo Suarez and Alianza Popular (later Partido
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Popular) founded by ex-francoist minister Manuel Fraga86 (Marquez Cruz, 1993; 
Lagares Diez, 1999). Of the two parties it was the UCD, more widely identified with 
the political centre, which initially succeeded in organizing a local elite base in 
Galicia.
These parties were organised vertically, from Madrid decisions were handed down 
to the local leaders in the provinces, and lacked necessary horizontal coordination. 
Thus, their policies were subjected to constant reproach by nationalism. Their key 
territoria l unit was, in fact, the province, not Galicia as a whole87 (Lagares Diez, 
1999). This made their organization fit in w ith francoist institutional structures and 
crucially w ith the new electoral circumscriptions, which gave them a clear electoral 
advantage -through the mobilization of local clientele networks as well as through 
covering most o f the territory88. Both parties together, the AP and the UCD with 
Suarez commanding the process o f political reform, obtained in the first democratic 
elections o f 1977 68% o f the vote (Beramendi, 2007). The conservative dominance, 
and the continuity of old faces and systems o f distribution of resources in the 
localities, was outstanding. Conservative elites were often to act as brokers between 
the rural communities and institutions and business in conflicts. Still part of the 
francoist machinery o f state, they were not impartial. Mainly they worked to 
minimize business' losses in any conflicts while satisfying, minimally, local 
demands89.
If the countryside was alive so were the cities. As explained in chapter 3, the Galician 
incipient working class, particularly in Vigo and Ferrol, were also protagonizing 
labour conflicts. Although industrial unrest had started as early as 1946, it was 
during the 1960s that it clearly recrudesced - in  1959 there were strikes in the 
Tranvias Etectricos Company and in the shipbuilding enterprises of Barreras, both in 
Vigo, followed by conflicts in Vigo and A Corufia in 1962. In 1966, Comisiones 
Obreras was formed in Ferrol. The illegal CCOO led many conflicts: in 1970 alone 
there were more than one thousand six hundred strikes in Galicia (Maiz Vazquez and 
Alonso, 2003:19). More dramatic were the strikes in shipbuilding at Bazan in Ferrol in 
1972: a state of exception was declared, the factory was closed and militarized for
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ten days and two workers were killed (ibid). The latter deaths were the trigger for 
the involvement of the national-popular movement in workers' conflicts with the 
formation of the Sindicato Obreiro Galego (the Galician workers' union, henceforth 
called the SOG).
6.2. Buttressing the nation through place
Foucault presented the concepts o f utopia and heterotopia in his scattered thinking 
about spatiality (Soja, 1996). These concepts offer insights for theorising the national 
imagination o f place, the discursive practices that link abstract spaces -the  'nation'— 
to concrete places in politically productive ways. For Foucault 'we do not live in an 
empty or homogeneous space', rather in a heterogeneous one, 'inside a set o f 
relations that delineate sites which are irreducible to one another' (Foucault 1986 
quoted in Soja, 1996). These 'curious sites' might be unreal places or utopias -'sites 
with no real place which present society itself in a perfected form '- or more real 
heterotopias: 'counter-sites, a kind o f effectively enacted utopia, real places that 
contain all other places, represented, contested, inverted' (Soja, 1996:157-8; 
Foucault, 1967 /  1984). As Deshpande suggests, heterotopias reconcile utopias with 
subjects by enabling 'people to  see themselves reflected in some utopia' 
(Deshpande, 2000:171). This construction o f utopias and heterotopias -the  junctions 
of abstract, imagined and concrete, lived spaces— was achieved through narrative 
practices, ways of storying spaces which are not merely additional and ancillary to 
'real' spatial practices such as walking in demonstrations from here to there. Stories 
do not simply transmute 'real' spatial practices 'into the field of language' as de 
Certeau notes (de Certeau, 1988:116). Instead, he contends, stories organize spatial 
practices: 'they make the journey before or during the time the feet perform it' 
(ibid.). Stories work to transform the abstract place into concrete space and vice 
versa.
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The nation as dystopia
The Galician nation was spatially fully re-imagined and re-narrativized by 
contemporary nationalists in ways that differed most starkly from the romanticised 
rural landscapes and fusion o f man and nature o f older stories of the nation (Lopez- 
Sandez, 2008; Patterson, 2006; Maiz, 2000). In the canonical narratives and small 
tales o f nationhood there are no sentimental approximations to landscape: no 
verdant and blossoming mellow hills, running waters or general affirmations of the 
beauty o f Galicia as in Rosalia (Lopez Sandez, 2008); no lyrical descriptions of 
seasonal orders, agricultural activities or the 'goodness of the labrego families' as in 
Otero (Patterson, 2006:50-52); nor is the land seen as the permanent nursery of 
nationality as in Castelao (Maiz, 2000). Instead, contemporary story-lines of 
colonialism re-articulate the signifier 'land' ('a terra') from being a crucial discursive 
moment constructing an essential, history-less Galician nationhood in Risco, Otero or 
Castelao's writings, into a much narrower economic category. Land in the story-lines 
of colonialism most often denotes material and concrete spaces to be owned, 
worked, distributed and defended:
Extract 6.1 On the construction o f the land as economic space
[a ] '...In 1550 only 10 per cent of the land was cultivated. Most of it was in the hands of 
the church or the nobility. The population increase, after the prosperous years at the 
beginning of the XVI century, made those lands insufficient to sustain the inhabitants of 
Galicia..." (CT, PSG &UPG, 1973)
[ b ] '...When the felow men of CSstrelo de Mifio defend their lands from the arbitrary 
expropriation in 1965, all the popular sectors support their fight' (CT, PSG &UPG, 1973)
[c] 'But economic penetration in the countryside is part of the sphere of relations of 
exploitation that our people suffer; these companies extract the raw materials at low 
prices, send it outside Galicia to be transformed, usurp lands from peasants -their 
means of livelihood nowadays- .." (The alliance of the working and peasant classes', 
T&T, n35, Marzal 1976)
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The extracts above are typical examples of the way "land" and "lands' are talked 
about in the Galician movement at the time under review. Whether viewed from a 
historical narrative perspective or dissecting the problems of the nation today, lands 
are mostly seen in relation to  peasant penuries and livelihoods, as scarce and fought 
for economic resources or as potential instruments for development. Lands are 
cultivated, possessed and expropriated, productive or unproductive, rather than 
represented as nourishing idyllic ways of live. Nevertheless, the story-lines do make 
frequent use of the formula o f 'a nosa Terra' ("our Land') which draws upon the old 
nationalist master-narrative, where it is constituted as a synonym for the 'the 
nation' in an elision of territoria l and social categories. The maternal metaphor fa  
Terra Nai'), the old stories' 'shibboleth' in the words of Patterson, is in contrast now 
practically absent (Patterson, 2006:49).
Galicia, instead, became primarily represented in the story-lines of the nationalism 
of the time not as rural idyll or utopia but as dystopia: the colony -a  reversal, dream 
turned nightmare, a real/unreal site which presented an imperfect and immoral 
state o f society. In the main spatial strategy of the story-lines Galicia was narrated as 
an economic space and the 'polluting, enclave and irrational industries' such as 
paper factories or open cast mines -sites o f underdevelopment and exploitation— 
were its storied places par excellence. The story-lines, then, invited readers to see 
themselves mainly as 'exploited workers' and 'peasants expropriated of their lands'. 
To a great extent, as a result, the dystopia reinforced the class-based view of 
membership to  the nation. These classes inhabited a territory under attack, 
economically and inhumanely bled by alien economic interests. That is, the dystopia 
interpellated readers to see themselves reflected in the mirror o f 'colonization'.
Nationalism's other spaces
However, there were also new nationalist heterotopias. These were constructed 
mainly in small stories (Georgakopoulou, 2006), as part o f a subplot o f 'national-
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popular revolts' embedded within the wider narrative of colonialism. Although there 
are well structured tales, some stories barely qualify as such: there were meta­
stories with no clear action, others resemble chronicles o f events with a simple 
sentence as the moral at the beginning or end, quite often they relied on a simple 
mimesis, picturing a particular scene, for their point. Their key ideological theme is 
'struggle and resistance' and this is linked to a claim for 'self-organization' and 
mobilization. The moral is often the people's opposition to colonization and their 
support for the national popular movement.
However, it is these small stories' construction of space which is most relevant. 
Struggles and resistant subjectivities are intimately linked to public, male dominated 
places. This construction is achieved through their content and own spatial location 
within nationalism's textual production. The tales occupied an important and 
constant space in the periodicals T&T and GS, in which they would appear 
juxtaposed to one another90. Even a cursory look into these tales shows that they 
deal with a variety o f local spaces, as a sample of typical story titles reveals: 'As 
Encrobas: the struggle fo r the land', 'Monforte, the will to victory' or simply 'Cangas', 
'Vigo', Teis'. The overall effect was the construction of a portrait of a struggling 
nation, reflected in counter-spaces of resistance to the dystopia. The tales 
represented at least two distinct kinds of heterotopias: those centred on places o f 
exploitation and routes o f struggle (adapted from Deshpande, 2000). The strategy 
based on these heterotopias was to be accomplished in tales of defensive and 
offensive struggles which promoted the 'self-organization' of the people -a  key 
ideological principle for the movement.
Places o f exploitation I: villages
This strategy involved mainly the narration of the resolute resistance of small villages 
against exploitation by economic capitalist forces or repressive state apparatuses. 
Typical locations in these stories of exploitation -such as tales of the conflict o f 'As 
Encrobas'— are country villages, where the peasant population defend their lands 
against abusive expropriation by a 'monopoly capitalist' company in a David against
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Goliath plot. These villages are standardized: the tales being generic narratives91, 
and the stories lack detailed descriptions of their unique features, people and 
customs. For what is remarkable for the national-popular movement is what all of 
them have in common: exploitation of their resources and resistance to this 
injustice. Hence, each village's struggle is articulated in metaphorical equivalence 
with another: 'Castrelo de Miho, Campobecerros, Xove, Loho.. Selo (Baixo Mino)'. 
Each one of them stands metonymically for 'the nation' and 'the people' who 
heroically resist the aggression and might even succeed. Colonialism in these tales is 
resignified as the forceful expropriation of a neighbour's lands. The stories delineate 
the geography of nationhood as a network of small places involved in active 
resistance against colonialism.
The small tales o f As Encrobas, representing the emblematic rural struggle of these 
years for nationalism, are a key part of this enunciative strategy. The conflict had 
started in 1974, at the height o f the world-wide oil and energy crisis, when the 
Spanish electric company Fenosa bought the rights to exploit an open cast lignite 
mine from a local brick factory owner in As Encrobas, a small village in the parish of 
Cerceda, in A Coruna. The coal was meant to feed the neighbouring thermal power 
station at Meirama, which was yet to be built. Soon, the francoist government 
declared the mine a 'public utility ' and 'preferential interest'. As a result, Fenosa's 
sister company, Lignitos de Meirama, was allowed to expropriate by force as an 
urgent procedure the terrain necessary for its exploitation. It was part of an attempt 
by the regime to move from a situation of external energy dependence to one of an 
internal reliance on energy sources outlined in the "Concierto de la minerfa del 
Carbon" (Decreto 2485/74), which encouraged key energy companies to modernize 
in exchange for fiscal benefits (Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas, 2008). The mining 
company planned, and achieved, the physical occupation of the entire valley of As 
Encrobas, all 2,199.24 acres. This policy laid at the heart o f one of the strongest 
popular revolts in Galicia during the 1970s.
The conflict arose, not because of villagers' resistance to their expropriation tout 
court -which would have been unimaginable for these communities even during late
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Francoism— but due to  the perceived low prices which the company offered to pay 
in compensation for the land92. This perception, and the speed of events, created a 
strong sense of injustice and grievance among the villagers whose situations differed 
markedly: there were absent, emigrant, or well to do landowners, small proprietors 
working their own land as well as the poor peasantry who were renting. They 
forcefully resisted the physical occupation of their lands four times, confronting the 
company and the guardia civil (the rural police). There were demonstrations and 
hundreds of declarations of support and solidarity. These episodes were marked also 
by police violence and detentions93 which fed back more support for 'As Encrobas'. 
Finally, after considering different solutions, such as moving all the inhabitants to 
alternative terrains, settlements were reached in 1977. For those renting land, a 
solution came earlier, consisting o f a commitment by the company to provide them 
with alternative houses and plots (El Pais, 22/02/1977). For small proprietors, 
agreement came later, consisting of considerablely higher prices than originally 
offered for the lands, pensions for elderly peasants and jobs for younger ones94.
During its unfolding the conflict galvanized Galician civil society. The UPG, ANPG, 
CCLL, SO, the PSG, the nationalist student union ERGA as well as non-nationalist 
organizations such as CCOO, Movimiento Comunista de Galicia (MCG), Organizacion 
Revoiucionaria de Trabajadores (ORT), and myriad neighbour and cultural 
associations, housewife associations and university colleges -many linked to 
nationalism- played a key role in the articulation of a Galician wide social movement 
of support for As Encrobas. Among them, it was undoubtedly the national-popular 
movement which was more deeply implicated in solidarity with the villagers, mainly 
the small rural proprietors. The CCLL worked with neighbours in the everyday 
management o f the conflict. It was a very public affair where all implicated agents, 
as well as secondary ones, used the daily press, demonstrations and concentrations 
to voice their positions, stretching further the realm of legitimate political 
interventions at the end of francoism.
The villagers' quarrel with the company on a concrete material level in relation to 
the price of the land was indistinguishable from a more abstract power struggle to
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suture the meaning of their conflict in which many other sites where implicated. The 
government and the company told the story of the 'social need' for electricity. The 
Spanish left, in turn, told a tale of an instance of 'social injustice' -perpetrated by a 
company too used to the ways of a dictatorship that were increasingly becoming 
socially unacceptable95. Neither o f them problematised the nature of the community 
or the spatial meaning o f the affair. The UPG instead told the story of a small 
Galician locality resisting by all possible means the colonial exploitation of the nation 
by a monopoly capitalist enterprise, illustrating (and illuminating) their story-line of 
colonialism. In effect, it brought about a resisting community through ideological 
identification with their tales -and everyday involvement in the conflict. Nationalists 
wrote several stories narrating the struggle and their involvement in their own 
periodicals. The following tale, an example of one of these, was written early in the 
conflict:
Extract 6.2. The villages: As Encrobas
"As Encrobas. The people united against capital.
'We demand the movement of the population but with equal conditions. We want the 
same quality and quantity of land, same climate, same language, culture and traditions. 
We would accept anywhere in Galicia, as long as it has these characteristics'.
This is the demand of the neighbours of As Encrobas in the face of the meddling of 
Fenosa, which tries to expropriate their land and houses with the aim of exploiting a 
lignite mine to feed a thermal power station to be located there.
The neighbours of Encrobas, in spite of dividing manoeuvres, are willing to do anything 
to defend their interests. Thus, on the 29 August a demonstration was organized in A 
Corufta and 8000 people attended, among them the neighbours of As Encrobas, 
peasants from other areas of Galicia, as well as the Galician people in general, conscious 
that only the people united -and without caciques- can be victorious.
Shouting: 'Our land is ours, not Fenosa's', 'agrarian trade union', 'Galician agrarian 
reform', 'Free Galicia without emigration', 'CCLL in every village'. 'Free Galicia, popular 
power' as well as the demand to move the population, all this [taking place] under the 
national flags with the five-pointed star, [the demonstration] affirmed the national- 
popular character of the anti-monopolistic demands. This meaning was not only 
understood by the participants but also by the governmental authority which ordered 
[the police] to charge against [the demonstration] when the Galician hymn started.
Days later the neighbours of Encrobas stopped the occupation of their lands, forcing the 
representatives of Lignitos de Meirama to negotiate directly with them.
The peasants of Encrobas have already said: 'We want a pacific, negotiated solution to 
the problem, but if we are forced we are ready for anything...'
In Encrobas, as in Castrelo de Mifio, Ponteceso, Quiroga, Xove...the peasants say: 'No to 
monopolist capital!!! Galician agrarian reform!! 1 
(UPG, T&T, n 40 Autumn, 1976)
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The tale narrates the willingness of 'the neighbours' o f As Encrobas to fight the 
unjust expropriation o f their homes and lands and to force an unruly big company to 
negotiate with them. This 'David against Goliath' plot was typical of stories of places 
of exploitation. It assembles heterogeneous places and voices, delineating a 
geography of exploitation and resistance with its associated subjectivities: the village 
and the lands expropriated; the city of A Coruna where a demonstration takes place; 
other villages which suffer similarly and, implicitly, the nation, Galicia. These spaces 
appear populated by stereotypical collective characters: 'neighbours', 'peasants', the 
'people in general' and by the 'national-popular' who are active in defence of the 
land /  nation. Although sometimes interpellated as peasants -particularly in other 
tales- in a compound o f class and spatial categories which are elided, often the main 
characters here seem to  be simply the 'inhabitants' o f As Encrobas. This 
interpellation produces the impression that everybody in that village was equally 
affected and effectively glosses over their internal class differences. The only enemy 
is the Spanish company and the local elites which represent them: 'the people united 
without caciques'.
The tale begins by seemingly reporting directly the voice of 'the villagers' with whom 
the CCLL worked closely and who made public demands: 'we demand the movement 
of the population but with equal conditions'. However, the tale actually works to blur 
the voices of the peasants and that of the national-popular. Discerning who they 
were was, in fact, difficult in the episode as a whole -contrary to Lanero Taboas, who 
tends to draw lines between the pre-formed 'interests' and identity of the 
'com m unit/ and that o f nationalists96 (2008). In the story, reported speech is always 
constructed speech, inflicted with different meanings and intentions, as its context 
has been modified (VoloSinov, 1973; Tannen, 2007). The tale plays on this polyphony 
by juxtaposing ambiguous quotes and voices with others which should be more 
clearly attributed to particular subjectivities. In the chant in the demonstration of 
'our land is ours, not Fenosa's' its ambivalent collective identity 'our' could be read 
both as the voice of the 'neighbours' o f As Encrobas claiming their village's lands and 
as that o f 'the people' railing against colonization and 'irrational industrialization' of 
the nation. Indeed, both are fused. These are then juxtaposed with claims for the
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expansion o f the nationalist trade union ['CCLL in every village'); and with demands 
born out of the story-line of colonialism ('free Galicia without emigration') which 
could be seen more as a demand of nationalism per se than necessarily that of the 
expropriated neighbours. This blurring is the point of the mimesis in the 
representation of the demonstration scene as the tale explicitly notes: not only do 
the narrators perceive the 'national-popular* character of the participant's 
complaints (marked by the presence of five-pointed flags) but even the authorities 
noted it. Later on, the story represents the peasants of a plurality of villages 
experiencing conflicts: 'in Encrobas, as in Castreio de Miho, Ponteceso, Quiroga, 
Xove..' as similarly making general claims about 'the nation' (Wo to monopolist 
capital!!! Galician agrarian reform!!!'). Here, the tale 'colonizes' the voices of 'the 
peasants', making them a chorus of ventriloquists mouthing the movement's 
grievances and demands. That is, the story strongly suggests that 'the villagers' 
adopted the national-popular representation of the conflict as 'colonial'.
However, the villagers would not move just anywhere, the tale continued: 'we want 
the same quality and quantity o f land, same climate, same language, culture and 
traditions'. For longer than a year the dispute took many twists and turns around 
negotiations to move the community in its entirety to new alternative lands. Land 
here is a complex construction, both as a material resource which can be measured, 
compared and attributed economic value ['the same quantity and quality') and, also, 
as site supporting and allowing certain immaterial conditions which define a 
community: 'same language and traditions'. This representation of land establishes 
geographical and communitarian boundaries inside /  outside Galicia, as they must be 
looked for 'anywhere in Galicia'. And yet, not all Galician' lands are a priori 
equivalent. Land would be fine 'as long as it has these characteristics' in a tension 
which betrays an uneasiness regarding moving, and the neighbours' own intimate 
connection with their locality as different from other, however close or similar, 
localities. If a communitarian boundary is territorially created in a distinction in/out 
of Galicia as its qualification, this would imply that not all Galician lands would be 
equally suitable for the community of As Encrobas to thrive. Then it is unclear that 
this community can be thought o f as a national one. This trace of peasant voices
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effectively undermines the tale implicit claim that peasants shared a colonial 
narrative.
The struggle for the lands was primarily defensive in nature: the company's desire to 
acquire them threatened small owners' properties, means and ways of life. This 
struggle takes place inside and outside of the village though: inside when stopping 
the physical occupation of lands; outside, in the city, A Coruna, a space temporarily 
taken by the 'people in general', 'neighbours' and 'other peasants. Curiously, the 
story does not provide a description of the village, the valley, nor of the likely 
confrontation between neighbours and the Guardia Civil at the very site in dispute. 
This is briefly noted as 'days later the neighbours o f Encrobas stopped the occupation 
o f their lands'. The weight o f the action, in the form of mimesis, instead falls on the 
construction of the scene o f the demonstration in A Coruna, where the nationalist 
organizations where heavily implicated and their presence likely to be more 
important than at the occupied lands themselves. We can deduct that the implicit 
readers o f the tale were nationalists themselves, as this foregrounds nationalist 
participation over peasant action.
Finally, the events o f As Encrobas are metaphorically condensed to diverse conflicts 
taking place in other localities: 'In Encrobas, as in Castrelo de Miho, Ponteceso, 
Quiroga, Xove...the peasants s a /, and the affected positioned similarly as peasants 
with one single voice. Through this abstraction of the unique features and 
characteristics of diverse concrete situations in quite distinct Galician villages, and 
the blurring of the voices o f neighbours and nationalism, the national-popular 
movement builds alternative, real /  unreal places where localities and subjectivities 
are reconciled with nationhood, represented as a geography of resistance and 
struggle against 'colonialism', mapping out the nation.
Places o f exploitation II: neighbourhoods
Although the small peasant villages are the characteristic locations in the narratives 
of places o f exploitation there are other, less familiar and typical tales based on sites
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of resistance that perform a key function: they construct a Galician identity based on 
territory for non class-based groups. Mainly, these tales are centred on 
neighbourhoods. The following small story illustrates this:
Extract 6.3. The neighbourhoods: Teis.
"TEIS
Whilst millions and millions are spent in building work like the 'scalestri' -which go 
against the popular interest, to facilitate the drain of our money, our resources and our 
fellow countrymen to emigration, and to guarantee the colonial dependence of our 
people- any small investment in [solving] problems, that year after year the people of 
Vigo and particularly the neighbours of Teis vindicate, are denied. That is: traffic lights, 
pavements, puffin crossings, speed limits, covering pot holes, barriers in train crossings, 
affordable housing, schools, etc. All this is what the people ask for and it is ignored by 
Mr Picher and co.
The neighbours of Teis [we] are tired of passively watching the deaths of our 
neighbours -30  in less than two years-; the last one that of the Bernardez Freaza's and 
their 14 year old child Nando, while the younger brother Miguel, 7, fights for his life.
The run overs continue, and if yesterday was this family's turn in the level crossing of 
Animas, today was the turn of the three year old child Manoliho Saraman Martinez, in 
the Avenida de Galicia.
Enough of legal killings.
Enough of the clientelistic and imperialist politics of Picher and company.
Enough of enduring the institutions imposed by the Spanish Imperialist State. In its own 
benefit and against popular interests.
The people are willing to fight until victory. As we have shown in the demonstrations to 
denounce, reject and condemn which we have been protagonizing in these last few 
days.
Against colonial oppression.
The struggle continues!!!
The people will prevail!!!
('Cangas-Vigo-Teis', T&T, n 37,1976)
These stories, which construct neighbourhoods as sites of struggle, differ from the 
village-places in their focus on everyday life and low-key issues as well as on 'attacks' 
by big capitalist enterprises. In this tale o f Teis' in extract 6.3, a neighbourhood in 
the city of Vigo, the administration's interest in a major construction project (the 
'scalestri') was contrasted to  the 'real' needs of neighbours. The 'scalestri' was an 
elevated motorway entrance /  exit planned to connect the city with the other main 
city in Galicia (A Corufta) through the 'Atlantic motorway7 which was being built at 
the time. It penetrated deep into the town centre, and its pillars and lanes plunged 
streets in the heart o f town into darkness. The use of the 'scalestri' highlights the 
contrast between the interests o f a powerful inimical administration -w ho spends
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'millions and millions' in 'building work...contrary to  the popular interest'- and those 
of 'the people'. This contrast serves to demarcate the boundaries of the city, 
creating a space inside /  outside which, through a reference to 'fellow countrymen', 
'emigration' and 'colonial dependence', comes to stand for the nation as a whole: 
i.e. drained 'o f our money, o f our resources and our fellow countrymen to 
emigration and to guarantee the colonial dependence of our people'.
The spatial demarcation is then focused on the more intimate, yet public, space of 
the neighbourhood (The people o f Vigo and particularly the neighbours o f Teis', 'the 
neighbours o f Teis we are tired o f witnessing the death o f our neighbours./), and its 
everyday urban and safety needs: traffic lights, pedestrian crossings, train track 
crossings, pavements, schools, etc. The point of the story is to build a polarised 
confrontation between the 'reasonable' and 'just' needs of neighbours and the 
'colonial' interests o f an 'imposed' and 'imperialist' local administration. The story 
repeatedly interpellates the people as 'neighbours' - a spatially based category 
which glosses over their possible class differences— and incites them to rebel 
against the 'colonial' situation: 'it is enough'. Thus, the neighbourhood is resignified 
as a site o f oppression and colonialism, as the lack of fulfilment of local urban 
grievances and everyday demands. In these stories, the abstract processes of 
'colonial oppression' are embedded in concrete, local sites. Although low-key, the 
stories try to accomplish unrelenting ideological work orientated to the immediacy 
of local spaces and vicinities.
Routes o f struggle
The heterotopias centred on 'routes of struggle' differ from the 'places of 
exploitation' in the way they construct struggles that are primarily offensive in 
nature and they construct 'the people' territorially and without, or with minimal, 
recourse to class categories. The typical route stories are those narrating 
demonstrations organised by nationalist organizations. Some heterotopias, Foucault 
suggested, are intersections of space and time achieved by either 'indefinitely 
accumulating time' -such as museums and libraries— or are, instead, 'fleeting,
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transitory, precarious spaces of time' (Soja, 1996:160). The stories of routes of 
struggle, centred on public demonstrations where nationalists and 'the people' 
reclaim and regain transitory control of spaces in a dynamic way belong to the latter, 
fleeting heterochronies.
The narrated demonstrations in these stories operated on a city and town-wide scale 
and sometimes they took the form of journeys between localities, where streets, 
squares and roads become a theatre for the performance of nationhood. Routes in 
cities are often chosen for their geographical and symbolic centrality -the  choice of 
Santiago and the Quintana square, an emblem for nationalism since the rallies held 
there by the PG in the 1930s, in the ritual demonstrations of the 'national d a /— and 
inter-village journeys are often fused with places of exploitation. Violence is 
sometimes involved in the form o f 'repression' of the demonstrators as the result of 
the defiant attitude o f the people who stand their ground against the 'repressive 
forces'. For permission had to  be asked of the francoist authorities to demonstrate 
and it was often denied, making the demonstrations illegal, and thus ideal as sites to 
display political courage and strength of resistance. In the following story, embedded 
with several other stories, it is as a protest against political events, police killings in 
the Basque Country and the trial against Captain Fortes and army cadres belonging 
to the Army Union for Democracy which triggers the demonstration.
Extract 6.4 On routes o f struggle
"SOUDARIDADE CO CAPITAN FORTES
The killings perpetrated by the Fraga police in Victoria and the trial against 9 members 
of the military, accused of belonging to the UMD and of inciting sedition, provoked a 
strong solidarity movement in all of Galicia.
PONTEVEDRA
On the 8 of March in response to the call made by the UPG and the ANPG, together 
with other political forces, the Galician people demonstrated their solidarity with 
Captain Fortes and his colleagues at the time of the trial in the streets.
Although the demonstration called for 8 in the evening in Ferreira square did not take 
place there, at 8.30 pm 400 people carrying national flags and banners concentrated in 
Benito Corbal street. The GALICIAN HYMN was sung and there were chants of "VIVA 
GALICIA FREE AND SOCIALIST", "FORTES, OUR FRIEND, THE PEOPLE ARE WITH YOU", 
"GENERAL AMNISTY".
Shortly after the police charged, and the demonstrators in commands continued to 
shout their chants all over the city.
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Of course, the repression [a represibn) acted strongly and the result were people hurt, 
bruised, and a demonstrator was detained by the Guardia Civil, which kept him until 1 
pm the next afternoon when he declared before the judge.
SANTIAGO (...) LUGO (...) VIGO (...) AS PONTES (...) A CRUfiA [...)"
('Solidarity with the Basque People', T&T, n35,1976)
What is noticeable about this story is that the drama of the nation is performed 
through the equivalence o f struggles in different localities ('in all o f Galicia'). In one 
of the Galician cities, Pontevedra, the urban landscape of streets and squares 
becomes momentarily a space of loud and visible dissent and confrontation with the 
francoist regime. Also, those demonstrating, are interpellated directly as 'the 
Galician people', '400 people', 'the demonstrators', again without recourse to 
economic or class based categories.
6.3. Space, struggle and the political.
The nationalists' imagination of place depicted in the small stories of 'national- 
popular struggles' overflowed the limits o f class-based nationhood set up in 
canonical texts and small stories and stood in an uneasy tension with them. Whereas 
the canonical texts of nation and class had shrunk the nation narratively, these 
stories came to  be a supplement: a spatial imagination of the nation. This imagining 
is nothing like the nationalists' old narratives. The national-popular sites performed a 
space-bound national membership where 'the people' is a struggling subjectivity 
allowing for a more inclusive rule o f belonging to the nation, as they often 
interpellated a 'people' based on inhabitation rather than class. This resignification 
of the 'people' was enabled by particular sites and routes: villages mainly, but also 
towns, neighbourhoods, streets and public squares. Public, spaces of struggle are 
condensed in equivalential chains which implicitly bring about a nation-space. Yet 
the heterotopias were also the everyday realization of the antagonistic frontier 
effects of the discourse of colonialism as explained in chapter 5. Therefore, the tales 
allow us to have a glimpse o f the implicit nationalist 'utopia' of the nation: a network
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of localities forming a territory up in arms, fighting and struggling against national 
and social oppression.
The heterotopias created in the stories and the strategies of localities were politically 
very productive. They produced a struggling nation for the communities of 
nationalism utilising the plurality of local conflicts as raw materials. Indeed, a text 
written as late as April 1977 claimed that 'a t present, we believe that it is particularly 
important to strengthen the organizational and ideological mass line, as the political 
struggle moves to  a first plane' (What is the UPG?, T&T, UPG,1977). The 'mass line' 
translated mainly into the reinforcement o f 'self-organization' within 'an anti- 
colonial' perspective through sectorial organizations, strategies and struggles. That 
is, the refusal to  engage in alliances or be a part of organizations which were 
susceptible to  being seen as 'Spanishist' or part o f the 'Spanish Imperialist State' and 
thus the corresponding need to  create nationalisms very own sites. Hence, during its 
key years -between 1974 and 1978— the UPG created the Sindicato Obreiro Galego, 
the Comisions Labregas, the ERGA and myriad neighbourhood associations and put 
in place a 'cultural front' through a network o f local cultural associations. These new 
organizational sites embodied and reproduced the stories and strategies of local 
resistances and nationhood.
These narratives and practices constituted one o f the euphoric political periods for 
the nationalist forces. They were attempting, w ith mixed success but with high 
visibility, to articulate their demands - fo r  rational industries, an end to migration, 
agrarian reform— in relation to ongoing local grievances. Constructing these local 
struggles as an implicit utopia, they storied specific problems in somewhat less 
theoretical vocabularies. These tales resonated emotionally more widely, even 
though they still pointed to a 'vanguard' and elitist position in which the movement 
knew what 'the Galician people' fe lt and wanted.
The discursive efforts o f the movement to 'self-organize' locally, embedding 
themselves in local problems, laid the basis for a considerable capacity for 
mobilization and a territorial expansion of their sites. This social growth has been
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widely remarked upon in the literature (Nunez Seixas, 2001b, Beramendi, 2007; 
Prada, no date). By the time of the first municipal elections in 1979 the Bloque 
Nacional-Popular Galego -BNPG, the electoral brand of the UPG and ANPG- was 
able to put forward candidates in one hundred and sixty four of the total three 
hundred and twelve municipalities (i.e. in 52.5% of the territory) and had 262 
counsellors elected (Marquez Cruz, 1993; Vilas Nogueira and Fernandez Baz, 2004). 
By comparison, the PSOE, with much greater economic resources -b u t a slim local 
base- was able to present candidates in 55.1% of Galician municipalities. The 
electoral results achieved by nationalist candidates were slightly better in rural 
localities where they had been present in conflicts, and their trade unions 
progressively acquired a considerable representation -b y  1980 the workers' union 
accounted for 17.48% of union reps. The discourse of colonialism's social presence 
and sturdiness was becoming, as a result, quite relevant despite what their scant 
electoral success would suggest.
However, if these narratives of success were productive they also hardened the 
national-popular stance towards change. The political context of the transition was 
fast moving. By March 1976 the PCE had already joined the PSOE to coordinate their 
pro-democracy efforts in the 'platajunta', which signalled the PCE's willingness to 
negotiate with francoist elites. When Adolfo Suarez came to power -July 1976- the 
nationalists' option for rupture was already looking like an illusion. Suarez's political 
initiatives pushed the reform of the system from within and the discourse of 
democracy quickly gathered momentum. The approval in the referendum for 
political reform in December 1976 gave legitimacy to  this project. This was further 
corroborated by the clear UCD victory in the first legislative elections of June 1977.
In spite of this rapid transformation of the political environment -and contrary to 
the volte face of many o f the Spanish radical parties which had since 1976 already 
started to make efforts to  adjust their discourse to the reform process (Laiz, 
1995:214)— the national-popular movement did not waver in their support for 
rupture. The UPG did not take any notice' says Beramendi, of the transformations 
nor of their rather unimpressive results in these elections of 6% of the Galician vote
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all together (2007:1098). The citation and iteration of stories of success, of counter­
spaces to  the colonized nation, which required strong material and emotional 
investments, worked to reassure (part of) the Galician movement of the need to 
continue pursuing political rupture and to resist any other alternative.
Although, in fact, they had taken notice of change, and it had caused serious internal 
disputes, the official response was not a strategical u-turn but a tempered 
measurement of the new circumstances inserted within the framework of 
intelligibility of their colonialism and self-organization narratives. The movement's 
spatial narratives constituted a supplementary plot which justified the need for a 
'mass line' strategy in the face of the diminishing chances of a democratic break 
option: 'the people', notes a typical tale's moral point, 'gave their answer and 
showed that every instant its conscience and organization grows' (T&T, n40, 1976). 
As a matter of fact, the social reality of local conflicts sustaining nationalism's 
heterotopias were at their height during the years between 1975 and 1978, as it was 
with the heated political debate over 'rupture' versus 'reform'. Thus, when the 
nationalist parties decided to  try  to influence the process of Transition they refused 
to participate in the state wide pro-democracy platforms and devised their own 
platform which originated from the premise of the 'self-organization' of Galician 
forces -the  Consello de Forzas Politicos Galegas, in January 1976, which redacted the 
Bases Constitucionais: a program for rupture and opposition to the autonomy 
process. The Consello eventually imploded in November 1976, when the tight 
frontiers of us/them were pressurized by the PSG's contacts with the Spanish wide 
Federacidn de Partidos Socialistas and the attempt to integrate the Movemento 
Comunista de Galicia, also a Galician branch of a Spanish wide movement.
But even if the movement had taken notice o f the change in the political climate, this 
change was represented as being merely formal. As explained previously, democracy 
and the autonomy process were explained away as 'tricks' to deceive and discredited 
as a mere continuation of the dictatorship by other means. When the party assured 
its membership that now 'the political struggle' had moved to 'a first plane' and that 
there was a need to strengthen the electoral 'field of action', it was alluding to the
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relegation of the brief and failed attempt at armed struggle97 whilst asserting that 
politics should still be seen in terms of mobilization. Politics was not 
straightforwardly and univocally associated to  elections and party relations as the 
new democracy-in-the-making was trying to impel. Instead, political action, 
structured by a 'politics is war* metaphor, was broadly seen as centred on local 
popular mobilization: 'from Castrelos to Encrobas; from  the Galician Patria's day to 
the recent construction strike in Lugo" ('What is the UPG?', T&T Abril 1977). 'Formal 
parliamentary struggle' was just one more side of a successful 'global political 
struggle', even though an important one as a 'weapon of denunciation and 
mobilization' (The UPG and the struggle for legalization', T&T, April 1977).
The poor results obtained by the parties of nationalism in the 1977 elections were 
not enough to cause a shift away from this understanding as yet, even though it 
eventually led to internal fractures98. The results were also read and evaluated in 
terms of popular mobilization rather than in terms of votes. Moreover, when looking 
at votes these were qualitatively, rather than quantitatively interpreted99. Certainly, 
not long after the elections the UPG demanded to be legalized for being a party 'of 
acknowledged popular support' (T&T, n50, December 1977). Hence, on the 4th of 
December, when every other Galician force supported a pro-statute demonstration 
in Vigo -caused by the dilettante manoeuvres of the Suarez government as regards 
the Galician norm— the 'national-popular' ignored this, and called an alternative 
demonstration against the agrarian tax.
Nevertheless, this 'official' continuity was not unanimously accepted. Internal 
tensions and struggles clearly surfaced within the heterogeneous UPG. The 
relevance of the heterotopias representing the principle of 'self-organization' and its 
tension with class-based belonging had been productive, but also alienated the 
party's base. These strategies came under criticism as 'nationalist' or 'petty- 
bourgeois' -de-linking, in practice, national from class objectives— by sections of its 
membership100. Those who left or were expelled formed, in 1977, two organizations: 
the UPG-liha proletaria and the Partido Obreiro Galego (POG). These new entities, 
which were very different but opposed equally to the national-popular strategies,
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rejected what they saw as a lack of worker centred politics, pluralist trade union 
policy and (inflexibility of) the UPG's exclusionary political frontiers of us /  them. For 
the UPG-lp alliances and a popular bloc had to be maintained, and they counted on 
the PSG and others in spite of their nationalist vacillations. For the POG, the idea of 
'progressive control' o f the institutions was necessary, opening the way to support 
the autonomic process and reform.
6.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the rural -and urban- unrest exemplified by a 
plurality o f conflicts such as As Encrobas formed the conditions of possibility and 
symbolic resources which allowed the narration of heterotopias as marrying 
concrete localities to abstract nationhood. These heterotopias were the hinge 
between 'inhabitants' or national subjects and a moral identity struggling against 
colonialism. Nationalism storied, that is, organized, and tapped into well worn 
practices of resistance for the control of space. These specific localities were 
narratively condensed and stood for the nation as a whole, as an implicit utopia.
These stories had the virtue of making class based definitions of the nation more 
flexible and re-territorializing the nation -resignifying who we are— whilst remaining 
firm ly located within the zone of the clear antagonism with Spain narrated in the 
stories o f colonialism. The national-popular discursive successes provided an 
argument to continue pursuing a politics of rupture and to refuse the transition to 
democracy as it took place, even after the first signs of defeat and possible 
irrelevance surfaced. After all, if the country was struggling, how could the 
movement surrender? Hence, whilst being productive these successes also caused 
internal fractures and inflexibility towards change.
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Epilogue part II: 'os do non'.
Up to this point it has been argued that in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Spain, 
Marxism, especially anti-colonial Marxism, was the language par excellence, the 
regime of representation, to talk about and perform resistance and opposition to 
oppressive regimes. The conditions for such oppression in Spain were undoubtedly 
present under Franco's dictatorship. The PCE had been for decades the referent of 
(radical) opposition to the regime -sublimated, paradoxically, by the dictatorship's 
own regime o f representation where communism was the ultimate enemy- from the 
post-war guerrilla resistance to  the Comisiones Obreras in a way in which peripheral 
nationalisms, despite sharing oppositional space, never were—perhaps with the 
exception of the Basques. Hence, these factors contributed to opposition in the late 
1960s and 1970s adopting this vocabulary of motives (Wright Mills, 1940): class 
struggle, oppressed nations, national-popular, colonialism, etc. This vocabulary gave 
a new inflection, rearticulated and resignified the nation within new parameters, 
even though without completely obliterating its traditional masternarratives, 
positioning nationalists in antagonistic opposition to the dominant economic and 
political powers.
The discourse of colonialism (re)produced in a plurality of party, trade union and 
cultural sites during the 1970s hybridized the Marxist narratives of modes of 
development with a National Front type of narrative and a perennialist 'national' 
theme. It constructed a new story o f the country through an often implicit 
foundational myth (the loss) which heavily drew upon, whilst profoundly 
resignifying, Murguia's blueprint. Then, they articulated a narrative o f the country 
'nowadays' as a colony. This was achieved through two key discursive strategies. 
Firstly, the strategy of antagonism with Spain performed in the compound and plural 
forms of 'Spanish imperialism', 'unitary state' or 'Spanishism'. Secondly, the strategy 
of identification of a heterogeneous 'people' constructed as the 'popular classes' and 
their collapse in the key figure of colonialism narratives: the 'symbiotic worker'. 
Along with the class re-narrativization of the people, we can find in the narratives of
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colonialism a preoccupation with place - in  the important subplot of "national- 
popular revolts"— which supplements and undermines the class rule o f belonging it 
delimited. The new story-lines and practices were tremendously productive: a 
myriad of political and social organizations, sectorial trade unions, demonstrations, 
magazines, books, stories and forms of knowledge of the nation were developed.
As a practice of resistance the story-lines of colonialism were, nevertheless, also 
restrictive, highly conflictual and inflexible. The movement supposedly interpellated 
the popular classes, but in practice its key audience was located in the small space of 
radical opposition to Francoism. However, as David Howarth noted in respect to the 
Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa: "there is nothing particularly 
exceptional about the fact that radicalized and relatively disconnected students and 
intellectuals dominated [the BCM]; many collective social imaginaries are established 
from these ignoble origins"(Howarth, 2000:173). If ignoble origins are, a priori, not an 
impediment to  constituting successful imaginaries, then we must question why the 
discourse of colonialism hardly managed to transcend the limitations o f its origins. In 
spite of its major efforts at re-narrativizing the nation it did not manage to become 
the surface of inscription o f popular demands.
Several reasons internal to  the discursive structure of colonialism help account for its 
failure to gel. Firstly, "colonialism" was always a "floating" rallying point. That is, its 
meaning and frontier effects were always plural and there were many points of 
dissension between story-lines. Moreover, even from within each o f the different 
discursive subsystems "colonialism" was a hybrid. Its ambivalence and ambiguities 
were therefore ubiquitous. The identities it produced were fitted onto different and 
even contradictory plots which prescribed different norms of being and acting 
politically. As a consequence, they were a breeding ground for internal dissent, 
exacerbated in some sites by authoritarian practices typical both of being 
clandestine and of Leninist "democracy". Thus, within the discourse of colonialism 
not only sites as different as the UPG and PSG coexisted -even though they 
performed and policed very different lines o f inclusion and exclusion in relation to 
the people with important implications for the conduct of resistance politics- but
166
each were subjected to  'le ft' and 'rightwing' splits. The POG, located outside the 
discourse of colonialism, and UPG-linha proletaria, a more radical workerist 
reworking of colonialism, arising out of the UPG in 1977 being just one example.
Besides, there are good reasons why the 'national-popular* movement could not 
have attracted the social groups it tried to represent. For the discontents which the 
movement addressed were often only marginally, if at all, related to those of 'real' 
peasants and workers. The language and vocabularies mobilized by the radical 
movement to interpellate their audiences were on most occasions far too abstract, 
theoretical and remote from the everyday world and woes of peasants and workers. 
Often the movement seemed to be talking to itself. If grieving for the 'lack of 
agrarian reform', the location in Galicia of 'irrational industries' and 'emigration' 
were actual points o f readability in the story-lines -and we should remember that, as 
Michael Keating noted 'there is much here', in Galician social conditions, 'that is 
consistent with dependency theory or 'internal colonialism' (Keating, 2001) — this 
was so mainly from an 'enlightened', centralist position characteristic of vanguards 
and intelligentsias. The movements' campaigns against industry and the like required 
considerable pedagogical efforts: 'perhaps this country has never been nationalist' is 
a thought voiced years later. They tended not to address sectorial and specific social 
and economic interests o f these groups. Workers lived off the factory system 
however 'irrational', many Galicians saw emigration as a positive personal 
opportunity for upward social mobility. Nevertheless, through the constructions of 
heterotopias and 'self-organization', the movement did, at some point, tap into real 
demands.
Lastly, the movement presented its audience and membership with a profoundly 
negative, even victimizing, mythology, constructing a dystopia and dwelling on the 
wrongs inflicted on the country much more overtly than it presented utopian 
longings or addressed political desires for democracy and social betterment. This 
negative myth had as an effect - in  some of the story-lines more than others— of 
building exclusionary borders which left outside the category of 'the people' virtually 
everyone: from fellow colonialist to the Spanish-wide left wing organizations in
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Galicia, as well as the political right. Besides, the utopia of liberation would not be 
met by an autonomy which seemed a positive step to much of the political class and 
inhabitants of the country. The movement's relentless protests won them the 
pejorative nickname o f 'os do non': those who say no- which framed them as unfit 
for cooperation.
Moreover, at the conjunctural level, not only was colonialism struggling against a 
much more powerful imaginary of democracy in Spain which was implementing a 
strategy of co-optation of forces and groups; but the conditions making colonialism 
narratives possible (Francoism and the 'red decade') became the very conditions of 
its impossibility. The grievances and demands of the movement which had 
crystallized in the early 1970s had all but disappeared by the end of the decade. 
International economic crisis and the political transition to democracy soon ended 
the construction of new industries: its main effect being the actual 
deindustrialization of Galicia or 'reconversion'. The EEC brought about considerable, 
if highly undesired, agrarian reforms. Moreover, emigration to Europe had been 
mostly a memory since the very beginning of the decade and the new democracy 
and autonomy brought about the promise of freedom, devolution, cultural renewal 
and linguistic co-officiality. In these new conditions plotting Galicia as a 'co lon/ 
became increasingly difficult and so did portraying 'Spanish imperialism' or 
centralism as an evil source o f oppression. As a totalising critique which promoted 
national and social liberation as a minimum, the story-lines of colonialism were ill 
equipped to deal with the multifarious changes brought about by the transition, the 
1978 Spanish constitution and the international crisis. Hence, the discourse of 
colonialism strongly opposed the dictatorship but, paradoxically, its narratives, 
demands, grievances and political strategies were made possible by the dictatorship 
itself. They were a reverse mirror image, a twisted effect of Francoism.
Once Francoism disappeared the state rapidly transformed and, whether they 
wanted to or not, the forces that made up the radical movement could not remain 
static. They did not acknowledge this in 1978, but rather in 1981: when the new 
institutional system started to develop and it looked and felt real. At this stage,
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popular nationalism's own marginal status became painfully clear after the first 
elections. However, the Galician movement's fate was not to be that of other 
'radical-left' groups during the Spanish transition as Consuelo Laiz noted. For, if the 
vocabulary of colonialism was in its originary form ill equipped to deal with change, it 
was also a hybrid. Colonialism was sustained also by a perennialist narrative of 
nation realised in the myth of loss, heterotopias, temporal primacy of national 
struggle. Nationhood turned out to be the demand that the State more strongly 
resisted to symbolically co-opt. Symbolically because in spite of the creation of the 
Autonomic system -which gave more powers to Spanish regions then than Wales or 
Scotland have today in the UK— this was seen as an attempt at devolving power 
without attributing it significant symbolic recognition. Thus, the way was open to a 
shift in and substitution of the actual content of the discourse, after bitter and 
painful internal conflict signalled in several crises and expulsions.
Colonialism, a discourse which demanded the investment of strong emotions, was to 
be slowly and quietly displaced. As Laclau suggests 'the people' did not disintegrate 
because there was another power which could still play the totalising role of the 
enemy: the Spanish constitution (Laclau, 2005:92). More weight started to be given 
to the 'nation' plot and language at the expense of other plots and the actual 
content of the discourse of nationalism was thus progressively substituted. As a 
result, its more radical language and contours could always be replayed if necessary. 
Moreover, these came to encapsulate the identity of the UPG, and so modifying 
them would suppose a real crisis for the organization as we will see in part III.
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7Narrating Sovereignty (I): colonialism in the world-system tales
7.1. Introduction: heteroglot terrains (I )101
In the preceding chapters I showed the myriad tensions, contradictions and 
paradoxes that 'living by' Marxist and nationalist plots brought upon Galician 
'nationalism' during the 1970s and how they dealt with them, examining the 
different stories and strategies which constructed a hybrid of 'national-popular' or 
'socialist and national' identities. Now the focus of this and the following chapters 
will shift to other plots o f nationalism, mainly those in which nationalism has been 
most commonly understood: liberal and republican narratives of 'the people'. This, 
of course, is due to a discursive and narrative shift in the movement and the political 
conjuncture. The constitution and appearance of 'the nation', Qadri Ismail remarks, 
'changes from conjuncture to conjuncture' and therefore it needs to be read 
dynamically and situationally (Ismail, 2000:215-16). Dynamically, because the nation 
is that entity which nationalism defines, addresses and mobilizes. As the goals of 
nationalism change, so does the nation. Situationally, because this conjunctural 
constitution of nation responds to 'overdetermined contradictions' (ibid.). 
Nationalism, nevertheless, not only acts in and is limited by each conjuncture, but 
constructs the political terrains in which it operates itself.
The beginning of the new conjuncture and narrative shift in Galician nationalism can 
be situated symptomatically in the serious crisis of identity and the dilemma of 
'adaptation' suffered by the UPG in 1981. This crisis was 'won' over by a particular 
narrative of the nation, the party and the 'unity o f nationalism' conceived as a 
'reconstituted' front politics represented by the electoral coalition BNPG-PSG, which
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a year later crystallized into the BNG. That is, for Galician nationalism the 
conjuncture of the transition did not end, and 'democracy" itself did not start, as 
some scholarly accounts suggest, with the promulgation o f the Constitution in 1978. 
It was only after 1981, after the first steps towards autonomy had taken place, 
Colonel Tejero's failed coup in 1981 and the landslide victory of the PSOE in the 
Spanish general elections of 1982, that a new conjuncture was narrated and a 
discursive shift away from colonialism began.
Here I read the texts, the story-lines and tales, produced in key nationalists sites 
between the years 1982 to  1987. These sites are now mainly from the UPG and the 
newly created BNG, between which correspond distinct but interlocking voices. The 
Riazor assembly of 1982 in A Coruna performed the coming together o f the UPG, the 
PSG -fo r  a year, after which the party splits and only a fraction, the 'colectivo 
socialista', remains in the fron t—; individual affiliates; ex-members of the extinct 
AN-PG; and a few sectorial and small local associations (Fernandez Baz 2003:149). 
Thus, attention needs to be paid to three issues. Firstly, despite being part of the 
BNG, I am examining the UPG"s own narrative production in its vertical and 
horizontal intertextual relations, but not that of other members, as the UPG 
remained the only party, the most distinctive voice and the most "dense transfer 
point" for, centripetal and centrifugal, relations of power (Foucault, 1979:103) within 
the front subsequently for many years102. The UPG fiercely retained its own 
distinctive identity vis-a-vis the unitary organization which sheltered it and whose 
building it had contributed to.
Secondly, the texts examined mark crucial moments of internal struggle and turning 
points in the life-story of contemporary nationalism103. The key texts I examine in 
this chapter are the UPG"s III congress (1982) and the BNG"s Riazor assembly (1982). 
These lay out the strategies and stories that will dominate the representation of the 
self and the nation over this period as well as (co)constituting the framework of 
intelligibility of all the other political practices of the movement104. However, 
produced at a time of crisis, these strategies and stories themselves are a result of 
struggles for hegemony and are marks of power within nationalism. Moreover, these
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struggles are also noticeable in loud silences and in intertextual relations with 
following texts, which amount to a series of narrative reversals -even though all 
(are) immersed in the same problematic and discourse o f sovereignty. Thus, by 1983 
a IV UPG congress will already follow and the BNG's II assembly soon after that in
1984. Furthermore, two extraordinary meetings came about the next year: in 
December 1985 for the BNG and an extraordinary 'national conference', also in
1985, for the UPG. In the space of four years six 'constituent' texts were written. This 
textual proliferation can be understood by recognising the dilemmas that the 
political conjuncture presented to the hard-won identity of the movement, 
epitomized in the 'parliamentarians' affair'. The UPG's V congress (1986), and the 
BNG's Carballino assembly (1987), mark the beginning of the end of the crisis and 
the transition period to  a new story-line which would be in place by 1989.
Although these are times of instability which demand a fair amount of narrative 
production the conjuncture is, simultaneously, one made by silences and by gearing 
narrative production towards the inside. In fact, since Pierre Machere/s work in this 
area, texts are generally seen as incomplete and contradictory in their meanings 
instead of as rounded and coherent wholes. Text are often brimming with gaps and 
silences despite efforts to  present seamless unities. Significant silences are 
ideologically relevant in that they reveal the things a text is 'forbidden' to say 
(Eagleton, 1976/2002; Macherey 1966/2006; Martin, 1990). In trying to tell the truth 
in their way, popular nationalism is forced to reveal the limits of their ideology.
But if gaps and silences are generally to be found in texts, those produced by 
nationalist organisations were, however, strikingly forceful during these years. There 
is almost an entire year o f total silence in T&T publications between issues 84 and 
85. This gap occurred at the height of the UPG's internal crisis105. This crisis was 
brought about by a loss o f verisimilitude and readability in the story-line of 
colonialism. It began with the renunciation of the UPG's secretary general Pedro 
Luaces, the expulsion of at least ten members from the central committee in 1981 
(UPG, III congress) and the abandonment o f the party by, in some estimates, almost 
40% of its membership106 (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:145). It did not come to an end until
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the BNG's Carballino Congress in 1987 and the formation and expulsion of the new 
UPG split Partido Comunista de Liberation National -the  National Liberation 
Communist Party, henceforth the PCLN— from the BNG later in 1987 into the field of 
those belonging to the 'heterogeneous' society (Stallybrass, 1990; Laclau, 2005; 
Thomassen, 2005). The UPG's head, its central committee, was torn asunder and 
found itself without its characteristic united, authoritative voice in these early 
moments of the crisis. There was nothing to say as its own existence and identity 
were at stake. Hence, these were not years o f popular mobilization, but times of 
retreat and self-fortification. After 1982, the T&T magazine's output diminished 
considerably: from appearing monthly to barely being published three items a 
year107. Overall, the period 1981-1988 was governed by an inner-looking and self- 
assertive logic. It was a time of conflictive re-narrativizations in order to rebuild the 
identity o f the movement and the nation in what was represented by this 
nationalism as a highly hostile political conjuncture
Thirdly, the BNG -the 'unitary organization o f nationalism' as it represented itself— 
did not by any means constitute the only form of nationalism in Galicia. In fact, the 
very form of the BNG signified a particular vision of unity which made impossible 
'national' membership for many nationalist options. Hence, it needs to be noted that 
this 'u n it /  was fictitious. Other nationalist organizations existed, such as Esquerda 
Gaiega, Coalition Galega, etc, which were being forcefully 'othered' as 'pseudo­
nationalist' and excluded from representation by the BNG and UPG by virtue of their 
acceptance of the autonomic settlement. Acquiescing to the new autonomy was a 
flagrant trespass of the latter parties' key political frontier.
Thus, contrary to what has been said by some commentators who see little 
ideological change at this time because 'maximalism' was maintained (Beramendi, 
2007; Maiz, 1996, 2001), and to others who have argued that change had started 
already by 1975 (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:141) I argue that a new story-line and 
discourse of 'sovereignt/ distinct from 'colonialism' appeared in, and constructed, 
this new conjuncture. The new narratives, nevertheless, did not mean that the story­
lines and discursive strategies of colonialism simply vanished in the wake of 1981. In
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fact, there was an overlap and continuity for some time between some of these 
stories and strategies. This is a time of (re)construction of the political programme of 
nationalism without seemingly being so. Complex balances were crafted in the mist 
of strong internal and external resistances and struggles: between the necessary 
coherence of identity, continuity and normative authority and the needed 
transformations to adapt to the constitutional and autonomic system.
7.2. ‘These adverse circumstances': the new democracy
If the 1970s had been dubbed "the red decade7 (Badiou, 2010), the 1980s should be 
thought of as the time of the new right. The dominance of a certain left wing and 
social-democrat consensus had given way, via a serious international crisis, to the 
international primacy of neoliberal and monetarist discourses. As David Harvey 
notes, the years 1978-80 might be seen as 'a revolutionary turning-point in the 
world's social and economic history7 (Harvey, 2005:1). Sweeping through the West 
was a neoliberal discourse that proposed that 'human well being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms7 within an institutional 
framework with strong property rights, free market, free trade and a small state 
(ibid., 2). Hence, in the UK Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister with a 
mandate to curb trade union power and end inflationary stagnation. The tandem 
Volcker at the FED and Ronald Reagan in the presidency of the US started to 
'liberate7 finance. Social democrat governments, such as the French socialist party, 
were forced into abrupt policy changes. In the East, Den Xiaoping's China began the 
liberalization o f the Chinese socialist economy. The contrast could not have been 
starker: the power and euphoria of decolonization and socialism had past.
By 1982, most of the Spanish parties of the radical left had disappeared. For most 
parties, adjusting their programmes and adapting to the constitution and the new 
democratic system -renouncing the revolutionary edge of their ideology— meant 
losing their specificity and difference vis-a-vis the hegemonic forces of the left (Laiz,
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1995). This eventually meant their complete dissolution and often their integration 
with the PSOE and PCE. Those who refused to make this adjustment either 
disappeared as independent parties and integrated with new social movements or 
fell into a spiral of violence with ever shrinking public support. Thus, Laiz identifies 
this period for the radical left as one of political 'bankruptcy* (1995:311). None of the 
groups obtained parliamentary representation after the 1979 general elections. This 
sketch of the evolution of the radical left exemplifies the manifold and extreme risks 
posed by identity related dilemmas for all radical, anti constitution parties in the new 
conjuncture.
This conjuncture congealed a new societal closure or new dispositif08, where, 
Balfour and Quiroga note, 'the margins for departing from the basic principles o f the 
new democracy were narrow* (F oucault, 1977; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007:47). This 
new hegemony had at its centre the constitution of 1978, as the particularity which 
incarnated the democratic universal. The democratic suturing crystallizing at that 
time was based on a series o f events and issues articulated very differently in the 
story-lines of right and left wing Spanish parties: parliamentary monarchy, 
commitment to a market economy, entry into NATO and the EEC, historical amnesia, 
the Spanish nation, (initial) political and social consensus, recognition of individual 
rights and liberties and a devolved territorial structure (Preston, 1986:204). Although 
peripheral nationalisms were still the 'other*, not all of them were 'enemies*: the 
main political frontier was the acceptance of the Constitution and the autonomic 
system.
Indeed, the constitution of 1978, as Nunez Seixas, Bastida Freixedo and others have 
noted, would become, in time, the solid centre of a new Spanish nationalism (Balfour 
and Quiroga, 2007; Bastida Freixedo, 2007; Resina, 2002; Nunez Seixas, 2007, 2001). 
After debate and confrontation, article 2 of the constitution declared the unity, 
indivisibility and indissolubility o f the Spanish nation109. As Bastida notes, when the 
Constitution -the  centre piece of the juridical and democratic system— is made to 
rest on the 'indissoluble unity o f the Spanish nation', then the text itself presents the 
fiction of a 'Spanish nation* founding democracy and the political community
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(2007:124). Civic and liberal versions of nationalism would reverse this relation. The 
constitutional text was premised on an organic, essentialist concept of a Spanish 
nation pre-dating and pre-empting any popular w ill110 (Bastida, 2007; Balfour and 
Quiroga, 2007). This indivisibility of Spain was, moreover, buttressed with force in 
article 8. This declared that las Fuerzas Armadas, constituidas por el Ejercito de 
Tierra la Armada y el Ejercito del Aire, tienen como mision garantizar la soberania e 
independencia de Espana, defender su integridad territorial y el ordenamiento 
constitucional'. This article was mainly interpreted as a defence of 'territorial 
in te g rit/ from any possible internal secession than from an external attack.
The constitution acquired this relevance as traditional Spanish nationalism and its 
narratives had to go underground during the transition (Nunez Seixas, 2001; 2007). 
The reason was the substantial delegitimization it had suffered as a result of its close 
association with the Francoist dictatorship -when their form was that of Francoist 
nacional-catolicismo. There was reluctance in the Spanish progressive parties to 
brand their narratives of the nation and the state as nationalism at all111. Instead, 
they labelled themselves 'patriotic' (ibid.). The resignification of Spanish national 
narratives encountered one major difficulty: their legitimacy could not be based 
upon a condemnation of the dictatorship as a common foundational myth, for 
roughly half of Spanish nationalism (the UCD, Alianza Popular) was an unrepentant 
heir to it. As Lacasta-Zabalza has explained, there was a need to forget the civil war 
and Francoism in order to renarrativize the Spanish nation (Lacasta-Zabalza, 1998). 
The most pervasive version of Spanish nationalism that these conditions allowed 
developed as a 'Constitutional patriotism' (Bastida Freixedo, 2007; Nunez Seixas, 
2001; 2007). This discourse was mainly promoted by the Gonzalez socialist 
government after 1982. As Nunez Seixas explains, this 'incorporated postulates such 
an appeal to  modernity, interregional solidarity, and a strong desire for integration in 
the European common project' (2001:736). The core of this discourse is the 
dichotomy 'political versus cultural' nation. This distinction allowed Spain to be 'a 
nation of nations' where sovereignty and political legitimacy resided firmly in the 
Spanish nation. History, nevertheless, in the form of a supposedly Spanish nation 
which can be traced back to the pre-modern past still underpins this narrative112.
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The 'constitution' became the very name for democracy in Spain. Having acquired an 
overwhelming centrality, it displaced other understandings of democracy and a 
'democratic-track record' which had dominated the deployment of the term and its 
discourses until then such as 'peripheral nationalism', 'opposition to the francoist 
regime' or 'defence /  struggle for rights and liberties'. In fact, Bastida Freixedo 
explains, 'the connection between nationalism and democracy [had been] so strong 
that at the beginning and during the constituent period [the state wide left-wing 
parties] proposed as one of their demands the quasi federal structuration of the 
state' (2007: 119). These connections and meanings were the basis of the 
impeccable democratic credentials of the left and peripheral nationalist parties113. 
However, democracy now hinged mainly on 'allegiance to the constitution', and the 
constitution, as we have seen, was premised on an essentialist Spanish nation. This 
subtle shifting was an act premised, by way of a pact, on a 'tabula rasa' approach: a 
'wilful amnesia', in Lacasta-Zabalza's words, regarding the penal and political 
responsibilities of the Francoist elite.
Democracy was tangibly materialized, then, in a newly constructed text, a political 
artefact which, by this originary act of wilful forgetfulness and de-contextualization, 
spread democratic credentials to any willing to participate. However, its foundations 
were already the result of a struggle to define the very limits o f the political 
community in which the 'Spanish nation' was victorious whilst others defeated. 
Democracy was not simply a set of procedural rights and liberties or the rule of law, 
but meant, at its core, the unity of the Spanish nation. This underlying, implicit 
principle which underpinned democracy allowed for the forgiveness of the sins of 
the dictatorship: for it kept the nation united as its principle of rationality -  after all 
the civil war had been a nationalistic war (Saz Campos, 2003).
Yet, despite its Spanish essentialism, the constitution also recognized a plurality of 
'nationalities' within Spain and projected a regional devolution -the  system of 
autonomous communities— in an attempt to negotiate and articulate the demands 
of Basque and Catalan nationalisms. Spain became a nation of nationalities and
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regions (Bastida, 2007; Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). 'Nationalities' -a  deliberately 
ambiguous term— and autonomous communities were accepted by the right-wing 
forces of Alianza Popular, UCD, and crucially, the military so long as they were devoid 
of symbolic recognition. Sovereignty and symbolic legitimacy, clearly, were held only 
by the Spanish nation (Nunez Seixas, 2001). However, the decentralization process 
then initiated also led to an extensive asymmetrical devolution of powers, with the 
creation of units with different levels of self-government, which has over time 
sparked a debate over the federal nature of the Spanish polity (Maiz et al, 2010).
Galicia was included among the 'nationalities' by virtue of having approved a statute 
of autonomy in 1936, and it aspired to obtain a statute with the same powers as 
Catalonia114 (Beramendi, 2007:1105). However, the process of devolution proceeded 
in an atmosphere of tension and hostility. The Suarez government tried, by 1979, to 
restrict the capacity of self-government for most autonomies and Galicia was the 
first to suffer: its first approved version in the Spanish parliament limited its powers 
severely (ibid). The conflict and protests that ensued throughout Galicia did not 
come to an end until September o f 1980 when a new statute was passed which 
satisfied the original aspirations and defined Galicia as a 'historic nationalit/. These 
protests, nevertheless, did not prevent the statute being approved with a 71.73% 
abstention rate, if with a majority among those who voted, in the referendum of 
December 1980115. An abstention rate which Galician 'popular' nationalism, opposed 
to the statute, welcomed.
Moreover, there was an attempted coup by a section of the Spanish military on the 
23rd of February 1981; allegedly the response of the military to the devolution 
process and ETA's actions. Its aftermath, despite being narrated by Spanish forces at 
the time as the redemption of Spanish democracy, brought with it tangible 
'harmonizing' measures agreed by all Spanish parties (Leon Solis, 2007). These were 
measures to erode territorial claims to difference which curtailed the process of 
devolution. Thus, peripheral nationalisms narrated the events instead as the 
derailment of democracy, where the Tejerazo' triumphed in its political 
consequences, stopping short and denaturalizing the devolution of powers (ibid,
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2007:212). The most polemic 'harmonization' law, the LOAPA, a third of which would 
eventually be declared unconstitutional, was aimed at limiting and homogenising the 
competences of the different statutes in a policy of equalization of the regions and 
to 'stabilize and consolidate' the structure of the state (Ruiz Miguel, 1997).
The identitary dilemma
The constitution and new societal order, therefore, posed a dilemma for Galician 
nationalists: they were torn between the Scylla of retaining a narrative of colonialism 
or the Charybdis of 'adapting' to the new situation. On the one hand, the conditions 
which made nationalism's narratives of a colony possible -on  whose readability 
nationalism's success as a movement depended- had all but melted and by 1982 it 
was hard to ignore. The overwhelming elite political consensus was establishing new 
social and political conditions based on a parliamentary democracy, a plural party 
system, civil liberties, territorial decentralization and devolution of powers which, 
what is more, actually coincided with the space of the nation. Besides, the social 
experiences of migration of the Galician population which had so strongly been 
present in the storytelling practices of nationalism had, in fact, been declining since 
the early 1970s and by 1980s were almost completely non-existent. In addition, the 
Francoist economic policy which gave rise to  the 'irrational industries' which 
nationalism so strongly denounced had also come to an end. In its place the 
international economic crisis and entry into the EEC was bringing about a new policy 
of 'reconversion'. Nationalists' totalising critique of an evil system of colonial 
domination had the dictatorship as its condition of possibility, whether they 
acknowledged it or not. However, whereas it was plausible to elide Francoism with 
such an 'imperialist state' and hold it responsible for the lack of freedoms, territorial 
inequalities and migration, it became much harder to mobilize people to hold the 
new Constitution responsible for social ills which were also being profoundly 
transformed. Hence, the nationalists' narratives of colonialism were being severely 
undermined: both the symptoms and causes of grievances narratively articulated
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were disappearing. By trying to maintain the colonialism story-line they risked 
becoming a political anachronism.
On the other hand, giving up the narratives of colonialism in order to adapt to  the 
new conjuncture risked shaking the foundations of their identity and untangling the 
national and social project. The signifier 'colonialism' had solidified as the myth of 
the movement: the hegemonizing project which constructed a 'national-popular' 
space of representation and objectivity, the colony. This was so in spite of the fact 
that this myth had certainly not succeeded in becoming a viable collective imaginary 
in Galicia. This myth had mobilised radical attachments and defined the very identity 
and self-understanding of the movement. 'Colonialism' embodied a narrative 
accrual: it made the myth of loss, the tales of national-popular struggles, stories of 
economic exploitation, tales o f self-organization, and many others, into a complex 
discursive whole (Bruner, 1991). It sustained an ideological corpus in the form of 
interrelated and shared stories which in the early 1980s had just begun to crystallize 
while, simultaneously, unravelling.
Narrative accruals, Jerome Bruner reminds us, once shared culturally -w ithin the 
movement's culture— and achieving exteriority they also boast a power to constrain 
identity and future narrative practices (Bruner, 1991:18-19). Through the citation of 
stories and the cluster of terms which metonymically embodied them the identity of 
the movement and of the country was performed. In their repetition, iteration and 
ritualization in connection to other practices, the movement's norms, boundaries 
and claims to authority were re-instantiated (Butler, 1990). Repetition and citational 
practices provided continuity and coherence to the movement and constrained it 
externally.
The new situation presented a dilemma for nationalism: retaining an identity they 
had fought for and risk becoming irrelevant, or surrendering their story-line and 
goals and risk disappearance. In spite of this, and unlike for the Spanish radical left, 
survival was easier for Galician radical nationalism. The reason for this was that 
national grievances and demands -hybridized with Marxism in the colonialism
i
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tales— were those which the Spanish state found more difficult to co-opt and 
provide with symbolic recognition. As explained above, the Constitution of 1978, in 
spite of the construction of the autonomic state -which signified the end of the 
dictatorship and had ample legitimacy— made very few symbolic concessions to the 
distinct territories, essentialised a Spanish nation and was being 'harmonized'. Thus, 
the way was open for nationalism to instigate -through bitter internal conflict— a 
shift of stress, displacement and substitution of the key signifiers and plots of the 
discourse. However, 'the people' did not collapse; continuity of identity could be 
achieved, because there was still a power which could fulfil 'the totalising'/absolute 
role of the enemy: 'the Spanish unitary state' and, chiefly, 'the Spanish constitution'. 
More weight was given from the early 1980s on to  'nationhood' as plot and 
vocabularies at the expense of the Marxist plots and class language: although 
colonialism was never explicitly disavowed, and never truly absent, the discourse of 
national sovereignty and anti-imperialism was progressively substituted for 
colonialism, even though in an uneven manner, which betrays internal conflicts and 
struggles over identity. Neither fully present nor totally absent, colonialism was now 
to become a ghost.
7.3. Invoking and displacing colonialism: the world- system tales
In his archaeological work Foucault noted that 'there is no statement that does not 
presuppose others.[...] If one can speak of a statement it is because a sentence (a 
proposition) figures at a definite point, with a specific position, in an enunciative 
network that extends beyond it' (Foucault, 1969/1989:112). It is the transformation 
of the specific position, or the transposition, of the key statement o f nationalism and 
its enunciative network that I examine here. 'Galicia is a co lon / was the major 
'statement' and quilting point knotting a whole fabric of stories and practices 
produced by nationalist sites for at least a decade. Its specific position in 
nationalism's ideological tapestry will be conspicuously modified from 1982 
onwards. Colonialism as a nodal point was displaced to the periphery o f nationalist
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discourse. It became cited as ground and metonymically displaced by 'imperialism' -a  
signifier contiguous to it  in the story-world— and relegated to the new narratives 
and plots o f a new space: the 'world-system'. It was, therefore, also segregated with 
a particular type of story now produced in the nationalist sites: the tales of the 
world-system. However, it needs to be borne in mind that this displacement does 
not mean that the old discursive formation had vanished and, as Foucault remarked, 
'that a whole world o f absolutely new objects, enunciations, concepts and 
theoretical choices emerges fully armed' (1969/1989:191). Instead, concepts and 
enunciations were often repeated and returned to within new discursive and 
narrative orders. The function and meaning of colonialism and these narratives 
became highly ambivalent as a result of being intersected by different political 
conjunctures (Bakhtin, 1981). They underpinned the movement's new story-line of 
'national sovereignty' and were peripheral to it. Present and occluded, they signified 
continuity and renewal.
Colonialism as a ground.
Maarten Hajer suggests that narrative accruals function metonymically: story-lines 
need not be recounted in full. Thus, 'by uttering a specific element', one which is 
contiguous or part o f the story, 'one effectively reinvokes the story-line as a whole' 
(Hajer, 1995:62). Metonymy is a rhetorical figure of speech in which one word is 
invoked for another on the basis o f a relationship of contiguity and association 
between them. Metonymy was to be doubly at work in nationalist narratives. Firstly, 
as story-lines are themselves made of an interwoven fabric of embedded narratives 
and tales, writing 'colonialism' already metonymically invoked the entire bundle of 
interconnected plots and subplots to the knowledgeable reader or activist. Secondly, 
the narrative impasse and identity dilemma brought about by the changing 
conjuncture was to be overcome through two main narrative strategies: the 
ambivalent citing and metonymic displacement o f colonialism by the idea of 
imperialism.
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'Imperialism' had been a key element of the story-line o f colonialism: source and site 
o f antagonism and the archenemy of the country in its 'local' form of a 'Spanish 
imperialist state'. There, imperialism had been transposed from available Leninist 
narratives o f the international system. In Lenin's blueprint, from which nationalism 
drew upon, imperialism was narrated as the highest stage of capitalist development 
and it explained the capitalist states' impetus for colonization (Lenin, 1997; Larrain, 
1989). Thus, an intimate connection and symbolic association between colonialism 
and imperialism was well established within and outside the movement's discourse 
(Young, 2001).
Although the signifier 'colonialism' appeared relatively sparsely in the narratives 
now, compared to  those w ritten between 1975-1980, it was still being cited. As late 
as 1982 nationalist sites were still arguing:
Extract 7.1. On citing and invoking colonialism
[AJ "The UPG considers that Galicia is a colony of the Spanish State. This markedly 
colonial function from an economic perspective, acquires a specific character vis-ci-vis 
classic colonialism due to the cultural, historic and geo-political context in which the life 
of our country developed. The present bourgeois-democratic conditions reaffirm the 
characteristics of this context." (The colonial function of Galicia in the Spanish State 
and aspects of our political line', UPG, III congress, 1982)
[B] "GALICIA AND THE COLONIALISM: Taking the fact that Galicia is subjected to 
relations of colonial dependence as a point of departure, political activity will be 
directed to breaking that dependence." ('Ideological and Political Principles', Alternative 
of BNG, 1982)
[Cj "(BNG aspires to) socio-economic development able to break the colonial 
dependence of the Galician economy and to qualitatively change the life and working 
conditions and promote the welfare of all the people; returning to them decision­
making powers over their own resources and their own economic activity, eliminating 
unemployment, and assuring them a dignified quality of life in their own land, with the 
recovery of emigrants" ('Ideological and Political Principles', Alternative of BNG, 1982)
As these extracts show colonialism is named -invoked, referred to— rather than fully 
narrativized again116. The UPG text begins by stating they 'consider that Galicia is a 
colony o f the Spanish State' (7.1.a). The BNG's founding text deals very briefly with 
the issue of colonialism in its core ideological points of nationalism, in what is overall
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a short programmatic text staging what was seen as the minimal demands for a 
union o f nationalism117. It presents colonialism 'as a fact' (7.1.6), an objective reality, 
which becomes not the main plot o f their narratives but a starting point for new 
narrations: 'a point o f departure'. Later on (7.1.c) the BNG text argues for 
development capable of ending 'the colonial dependence of Galician econom /. 
Colonialism and the cluster o f meanings and tales associated with it, became a 
presupposition: reified, taken for granted and established as given. Colonialism 
ceased to be an object of discourse and became simply a ground118.
However, this invoking, which citates the norms, authority and legitimacy of the 
colonialism story-line, simultaneously transformed it. Colonialism is clearly qualified: 
'it acquires a specific character vis-a-vis classic colonialism'. In these extracts 
'colonialism' becomes re-narrativized by being re-articulated to 'national 
sovereignty, markedly present in the first principle constituting the BNG's project: 
'Galicia is a nation, and thus it has a right to political self-determination concretized 
in a national sovereignty alternative...'. It is also transformed into a regional 
category, subtly narrated as an economic issue, as opposed to the former complex 
political and economic understanding of the term. Hence, in these early examples it 
appears already represented as 'the colonial dependence of the Galician economy', 
'this function markedly colonial from an economic perspective'. The repetition of the 
term in the new political and narrative context resulted, then, in its continuity with, 
yet difference from, colonialism as originally narrated.
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'War and Peace': metonymic displacement and the world-system tales.
Colonialism and its cluster o f meanings, however, were more often called upon and 
performed through another metonymic strategy: its displacement and segregation in 
favour of the new narratives o f the 'world-system'. In the section above it was seen 
how the signifier 'colonialism' itself was cited to metonymically invoke and 
simultaneously transform the norms and identity of the movement. Here, we 
examine the working of another metonymy: how the dilemma of nationalism's 
identity was tackled by replacing colonialism with 'imperialism', a secondary object -  
less charged, but equally well established— contiguous to it in the story-line.
The will to  narrate the world has been a distinctive tra it of nationalists' storied 
production since 1982 which distinguishes the new story-line of sovereignty from the 
movement's recent past. Nationalists produced new success tales and stories which 
connected events happening in distant locations around the world: Latin America, 
Africa, Eastern and Western Europe being the new privileged narrative spaces. This 
world is represented as a system where geographically remote political 
developments are interrelated. Thus, they are said to have a bearing on the nation. 
Nationalists recounted in their congresses and magazines mainly three types of 
'world-story': tales of 'imperialism and the world-system' mapping the state of world 
and national resistances to imperialism; stories o f 'NATO and the EEC' linking both 
organizations as 'two sides o f the imperialist coin', and 'monographic' stories 
detailing the vicissitudes of struggle of any particular national liberation movement -  
Salvador, Corsica— or socialist country. These stories were plotted as an antagonistic 
battle between the forces of imperialism and those of sovereignty, where this are 
ultimately successful in their endeavours. It is important to note that, even though 
the story-line of colonialism had always assumed an international level of 
'imperialist' forces and relations, its stories had nevertheless been overwhelmingly 
focused on the national and intra-national (local) spaces. The villages, city 
neighbourhoods, factories and demonstrations: these had been the equivalently
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Extract 7.3. On the new story world: the world-system
"The present international situation is characterized by a sharp economic and 
ideological crisis in capitalist states of the imperialist camp, which brings about 
militaristic and aggressive programmes and practices against progressive countries and 
ideologies, which defend national sovereignty and the betterment of the popular 
classes. The threat to international [distension] became more obvious with the 
intensification of cold war mechanisms and the real possibilities of a generalized 
international conflict. Thus, it can be said that the major enemy of the peoples is 
imperialism, with the US as its head.
The aim of achieving independence from imperialism, and the strengthening of 
revolutionary processes with this predicament, is achieving real conquests which 
weaken the hold of imperial domination in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Iran, 
Nicaragua, R.D. Sahara, Chad, Afghanistan...). Imperialism's answer, particularly the US, 
is the continuous aggression, in different guises, against peoples and regimes that 
defend their [own] dignity, national independence and internationalist solidarity (Libya,
Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Salvador, Nicaragua...). Moreover, [imperialism] prepares 
and participates in military and repressive coup d'etats, and [it is] anti-democratic and 
pro-occidental (Guinea Equatorial, Turkey...).
[...]" ('the international political situation', UPG, III Congress, 1982)
This fragment of a narrative, appearing in 1982 in the text of the UPG's III congress, 
is a typical example o f the stories of the 'world-system'. There is an explicit 
ideological theme which plots these stories: 'war and peace' or the representation of 
the world as a (single) place immersed in a multiplicity o f head-on struggles between 
the aggressive forces o f imperialism /  US and the peace-seeking forces of 
'sovereignty embodied by peoples and socialist countries. The narratives construct 
the US, NATO, the EEC and 'social-democrac/ as equivalent to evil 'imperialism'. 
These countries and political forces are said to represent the 'anti-people' in the 
world-space119. Hence, one o f the most prominent features of the stories is the 
continuity with the logic o f antagonism which had characterized the discourse of 
colonialism. The tale effects an explicit division of the world-space into two starkly 
antagonistic camps accomplished through the 'war and peace' theme: 'capitalist 
states of the imperialist camp', 'the imperialism, with the US as its head' on the one 
hand, against 'peoples' or 'progressive countries and ideologies which defend 
national sovereignty and the betterment o f the popular classes' (Extract 7.3) on the 
other hand. The orientation o f another world-story narrated in the next congress 
neatly summarizes this ideological theme and the political and moral frontier it 
effects: 'The question o f war and peace, which nowadays affects the destiny o f the
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peoples, is one o f the most important dividing lines between the reactionary and 
progressive forces'. ('International', IV congress, UPG, 1983)
However, a re-narrativization is also effected. Although the stories still interweave 
Marxism and nationhood plots, they do not constitute a radical hybridity such as 
that in the colonialism story-line. 'National sovereignty7 rather than 'liberation' 
becomes the empty signifier which overdetermines the stories. Thus, national 
sovereignty is progressively constructed as the goal which all peoples /  progressive 
forces naturally pursue (as narrated in extracts 7.2 and 7.3 ), in the moral 
evaluations of world-system stories:
Extract 7.4. On sovereignty as nodal point
[A] "Distension, neutrality, non alignment, the struggle for world peace, demand this 
conduct from us [opposition to NATO], as a communist party which has its immediate 
reason d'etre in the dismantling of imperialism, essential to achieving our objective of 
national sovereignty for Galicia" (The international political situation', UPG, III 
Congress, 1982)
[B] T o  say that the BNG positions itself in favour of international solidarity, and that it 
appropriates the principles of militant anti-imperialism, is no more than underlining a 
fundamental facet of an organization which proclaims for Galiza the right of self- 
determination." (BNG, II assembly, 1984)
[C] "It is, thus, this adventurous and furious policy of the enemies of peace...which has 
brusquely increased the present danger of war ...and which tries to smother the 
aspirations of the peoples to peace, freedom, justice and, in sum, to sovereignty" 
('Insurrection against the bellicose threat!!', T&T, n89,1983)
The extracts 7.4. a, b and c illustrate how 'sovereignty7 became the empty signifier, 
naming the 'fullness of the communit(ies)' which was blocked by the forces of 
imperialism. 'Sovereignty7 condensed, in the world-space, a variety of ideas:
'distension, neutrality, non-alignment and world peace', 'peace, freedom, justice', 
the 'right to self-determination' , 'opposition to NATO and EEC' and 'democratic 
conquests and rights', becoming what Laclau calls 'the signifier of the pure 
cancellation o f all difference' (1996b:38). That is, its specificity was that it signalled a 
pure opposition to imperialism. This empty signifier was embodied by 'the peoples', 
the quilting point of the stories. Thus, as illustrated in the story extracts above 'the 
peoples' /  sovereignty became the name of one o f the two camps in which the world 
space is now split up: ' i t  can be said that the major enemy o f the peoples is
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imperialism' (7.3) '(the BNG] supports all the struggles o f the peoples o f the state 
and o f the W orld ...' (7.2) or ' the aspirations o f the peoples... to sovereignty' (7.4.c).
The category of 'the peoples' is elided in the tales to  the 'progressive countries and 
ideologies', 'peoples and regimes which defend dignity and national independence 
and internationalist solidarity', 'the revolutionary processes' (in Extract 7.3), 
'liberation movements' or 'socialist countries'. Thus, a symbolic equivalence is 
established between them which is condensed around 'the peoples' as the name of 
sovereignty and solidarity. In the world-system tales, then, resonates the identity 
effected in the colonialism story-line between 'nationalism' /  'the people' and 
'progressive forces'. But this 'reactionary' versus 'progressive' divide is not neatly 
equivalent to a left-right divide. In fact, it is overdetermined by the plot of 'national 
sovereignty': 'reactionary' are the forces against sovereignty and peace. This is how 
socialist countries might now also be categorized as part o f Imperialism -  the 
Chinese policy in the area perfectly coincides, nonetheless, with the objectives o f the 
imperialist' (International, IV congress, UPG, 1983). Here, the stories contrast with 
the colonialism story-line where 'nation' and 'class' categories were never fully 
elided but hybridized in a 'national-popular' identity.
'War and peace' is, nevertheless, itself an ambiguous theme. It implicitly cites 
colonialism -in  a metonymic displacement which mobilizes its categories, strong 
political frontiers, plots— while re-signifying it by linking it to 'sovereignty. It knots 
the new 'democracy and rights' and 'old' imperialism masternarratives which the 
movement draws upon. Indeed, the theme o f imperialism as a political phenomenon 
and its ideology of aggression was a well known claim of 'classic' theories of 
imperialism as narrated by Bukharin, Luxembourg, Lenin or Hilferding (Larrain, 
1989). Classic narratives described imperialism as a complex political, economic and 
ideological phenomenon. However, they weighted these aspects differently: while 
Lenin stressed its economic nature -th e  concentration of capital w ith the rise of 
finance capital and its export through monopolies which eventually produces 
territorial plunder—, Luxembourg and Bukharin highlighted its political nature 
instead. In the latter accounts, imperialism is conceived mainly as a political process.
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It is a struggle for territories with a racist and belligerent ideology, contrary to the 
liberal ideology of early capitalism (ibid.): "competition is becoming increasingly a 
political power struggle...The ideal now is to secure for one's nation the dominance 
of the world...'(Hilferding; quoted in Larrain, 1989:64).
The latter account pervades the nationalist stories of the world-system, where the 
economic is relegated to a secondary place in favour of an understanding of 
imperialism as the struggle for control and domination; this time not just of 
"territories' or "em pt/ spaces (i.e. non-capitalist) but against the political principle of 
sovereignty represented by "the people'. Thus, both the "imperialism' and the 
"sovereignty /  rights' masternarratives are embodied in the "war and peace' theme. 
In the tale quoted in Extract 7.3, imperialism is positioned as a repressive political 
force: "bring[ing] about militaristic and aggressive programmes and practices against 
the progressive countries and ideologies, which defend national sovereignty...', "the 
continuous aggression, in different guises, against the peoples and regimes...' as well 
as preparing and participating "in military and repressive coup d'etats' and being 
'anti-democratic' (Extract 7.3)120.
The representation of imperialism, then, mainly as a political, even geo-strategical, 
force comes to the fore in another world-story: "the wars...waged by imperialism, 
which have as an objective the appropriation of alien territories, the distribution of 
spheres of influence, etc' ("The struggle for peace. Our objectives', in IV congress, 
UPG, 1983). In fact, this overdetermination -and simplification- of "imperialism' by 
the "sovereignt/ narrative121, results in some of these tales portraying "imperialism' 
simply as an irrational force:
Extract 7.5. On Imperialism as irrational political force.
[A] "[...] Three are the main characteristics of Washington's world policy, which it 
imposes to their allies: 1) the struggle against peace; 2) the simplistic and troglodyte 
[cavernaria] vision of international conflict and 3) the manic obsession of imposing their 
will on other states and peoples. [...]" ('Insurrection against the bellicose threat!!', T&T, 
n 89,1983)
[B] "(the crisis is the circumstance which] characterizes the erosion and decomposition 
of the system; deprived of perspective, more and more based upon the pillars of
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aggression, intimidation, xenophobia, racism ...where anti-progressiveness, a-criticism, 
anti-communism and pathological hate substitute ethical principles" ('Politic-ideological 
crisis and belligerence', International, IV congress, UPG, 1983)
With any economic understanding pushed towards the margins, the policies of 
Imperialism and the US are portrayed as irrationally and ^discriminatingly 
aggressive. This irrationality is, moreover, constructed through a psychologizing and 
pathologizing vocabulary exemplified in the expressions: 'manic obsession', 
'pathological hate' (7.5a and b), 'mania to blame socialist countries', 'frenetic arms 
escalation', 'virulent anti-communism', etc ('The anti-war struggle', T&T, UPG, 1982). 
The stories represented the enemy and its policies -the  danger to  the self- as 
affected by mental or 'viral' disease. This irrationality is a regulative strategy which 
names danger -imperialism, the US, the 'anti-people'— as aberrant or deviant from 
the inter-national norm of sovereignty which is said to be the pacific coexistence of 
(formally) equal political communities. This strategy also serves to remind us of the 
need for 'order' or sanitary measures122 (Douglas, 1966; Campbell, 1992). As 
Campbell notes of the use o f medical metaphors, 'in such discourse, there are no 
grey areas, no complexities, no historicized understandings, no doubts about the 
self, and no qualms about the nature of the response' (1992:97). However, medical 
metaphors had often been used to  justify and legitimize the use of force against 
perceived internal or external threats, in this case nationalists' vocabulary is part o f 
a mimicing strategy -adapting Homi Bhabha's notion of colonial mimicry: '[a subject 
of] a difference which is almost the same but not quite' (1994:96). 'Almost the same' 
for these stories indeed worked to reinforce the extreme binary division o f the 
world. 'But not quite' for, despite o f the radical language of struggle, nationalists are 
certainly not calling to arms but to belonging -th e ir aim of sovereignty is in fact 
made equivalent to peace. The construction of a world space divided into two camps 
of imperialism and sovereignty -peoples, socialist countries and liberation 
movements— works to secure the identity of the Galician movement as a 'people' 
and 'movement' fighting for liberation among others, precisely at the time when the 
nationalist story-line o f colonialism was being silently sidelined, internal struggles 
had all but disappeared and the movement was in crisis and retreat123.
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From hybrid tales to dependency plots
The definition o f imperialism as a political phenomenon stems not only from the 
overdetermination o f the stories by the 'sovereignty" nodal point and the 
modulation o f Marxist narratives of imperialism to the theme of aggression. It was 
also achieved through the transmutation of these classic narratives of economic 
exploitation at the level o f production to  that o f "dependency" and "unequal 
exchange". The movement's story-lines in the past represented "colonization" as a 
political and economic complex torn between stressing direct exploitation of Galician 
(symbiotic) workers at the level o f production (the enclave industries) and unequal 
market exchanges (of raw materials and labour power). In contrast, the tales of the 
world-system tend to streamline this theme to simple "dependency". Unequal 
exchange or dependency narratives -as formulated since the 1960s by Baran, 
Sweezy, Frank or Emmanuel— refurbished the classic theme of the Marxist theory of 
imperialism o f extraction o f raw materials and cheap labour from the periphery and 
narrated a world-system characterized by an inherent duality, a centre /  periphery 
dichotomy, which determines two radically different developmental possibilities. 
These different potentialities are caused by transfers of resources by mechanisms of 
unequal exchange in the international market. The core tenet of dependency 
became the assumption that backwardness was the product o f the workings of 
capitalism: some countries develop because others underdevelop (Larrain, 1989). 
The theme o f economic oppression as dependency is echoed throughout the tales:
Extract 7.6. On dependency
(A) "The unjust unequal exchange that presently exist between [underdeveloped] and 
developed countries becomes even worse because of [the crisis]; the [underdeveloped 
counties'] enormous external debt increases, their economic possibilities decrease, and 
their own already weak economic structures deepens its orientation towards the 
satisfaction of the needs of the monopolies of advanced countries..." ('The unequal 
incidence of the economic crisis', IV congress, UPG, 1983)
IB] "In Latin America...where the extreme conditions of exploitation and dependency 
provoked the insurgency of the peoples of the area against the minority dominant 
economic groups and their external backers (the foreign monopolies) (International, III 
congress, UPG, 1983)
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However, whilst dependency becomes the norm and substitutes for economic 
exploitation in the tales, this plot is segregated in the texts of nationalism to the 
world-system stories. Juxtaposed to this, a narrative thread of democracy and rights 
looms large in all other tales -form ing the majority of the storied production of the 
movement in the 1980s; w ith the exception o f the UPG's IV congress. The binary 
opposition of developed /  underdeveloped countries is elided into the tales main 
political division of imperialism /  sovereignty, aggression /  peace. The 'peoples' are 
underdeveloped as a result o f the 'unjust unequal exchange' posited, which 
provokes the suffering of 'the extreme conditions of exploitation and dependenc/ 
(Extract 7.6.a and b). This suffering is, nevertheless, not based on class exploitation 
but constructed as national: external debt, an evil 'external orientation' of the 
(implicitly) national economy, decrease of economic capabilities (7.6.a). Thus, this 
dependency theme takes the nation /  state as the primary subject and equates 
relations between countries w ith class relations - in  a manner reminiscent of Sultan- 
Galiev's dictum. Dependency theories were, in fact, often criticised for such 
assumptions by Marxist theorists, as within the dependency paradigm there is no 
clear understanding o f capitalism. It ceases to  be conceptualised as a mode of 
production with particular relations o f production to be seen simply as a 'system of 
production for the market' (Larrain, 1989; Laclau 1971). Dependency paradigms 
assume instead that economic struggle happens between nations, leaving class 
relations and struggle subordinated to nationalist politics and policies. Hence, the 
reliance on the theme o f dependency contributes, if implicitly, to further 
strengthening 'the nation' as the centre o f the political discourse of 'popular 
nationalism' and to push surreptitiously to  the margins formerly relevant in Marxist 
masterplots.
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'Hotspots o f the planet': displacement o f (national) heterotopias
Temporally located in the present, the world-system tales are characterized by a 
simultaneous world-time. These are simultaneous narratives (Genette, 1980) as 
events or actions are seemingly taking place at the point o f narration. However, their 
use of the present tense is often marked by a sense of temporal indefiniteness -i.e. 
as well as using present tense, gerunds, and many expressions conveying 
synchronicity the tales are full o f infinitives, passive and other temporal forms that 
convey an imprecise temporality. Thus, the stories ambiguously express a sense of 
simultaneity but also a certain constancy, a permanency of duration, and a 'facticity' 
or 'out-there-ness' in the account (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996). Although 
produced in different sites and times, the tales present slices of a depthless present. 
Hence, the 'real' time in between stories seems akin to what Bakhtin, in a reference 
to the Greek adventure novel, called 'an extratemporal hiatus between (...) adjacent 
moments o f real time sequence' (Bakhtin, 1981:111). Some stories explicitly remark 
on this hiatus - in  a kind o f inverted coda located at the beginning of the tales— 
noting that 'nothing much' happened in between their bi-annual productions: 'there 
is nothing new to  add to the analysis made in past congresses as regards the struggle 
for peace and disarmament' ('Struggle for peace' UPG, V congress, 1986).
The effects o f this a-temporality, unflinching present, are twofold. Firstly, it conveys 
a sense of the urgency and immediacy of the battles -they are going on now— and a 
transparency which perpetuates the myth of objectivity and works to encourage a 
more radical approach to the 'internal' policy making and politics of the movement -  
as we will see, these tales work as 'fortifying myths' (Polletta, 1998). Secondly, even 
though it is located in historical time it suppresses historicity, and therefore, 
contributes to naturalizing the duality imperialism /  peoples and the represented 
state of affairs.
Time is intimately linked to  space as the story world narrates 'an event', i.e. 
resistance, taking place simultaneously in a multiplicity of places which constitute
194
the narrative action: liberation movements, peoples and dependent countries are 
fighting imperialism at the same time in each country /  nation. This synchronic 
multiplicity conveys unicity: they are all part o f the same struggle for sovereignty, in 
different locations around the world. Moreover, the constant simultaneity of time -  
the freezing o f time— and the correlative proliferation of struggles work to 'map out' 
the world, representing it in clear cut terms as a stable, knowable and narratable 
place. This map marks a fractured political space, as 'there is no spatiality', De 
Certeau notes, 'that is not organized by the determination of frontiers' (1984:123). It 
is made up of places o f aggressive imperialism, those of peoples /  socialist countries 
/  progressive forces which suffer the action of imperialism and the knots /  'spots' o f 
confrontation between them. The world is a landscape scarred by highly asymmetric 
relations of power, political domination and economic exploitation o f (nations) by 
other nations /  states: a space of force relations and aggression, but also of dogged 
resistances.
This storied 'map' of the world in which places are 'located' -as 'a formal ensemble 
of abstract places' (De Certeau, 1984:120)— is, then, (faintly) brought to life and 
equivalently inhabited through the narration o f the 'hot spots' of struggle. These 
'hot spots' are the movement's new heterotopias. They signify a displacement of the 
inner spaces of nationhood -neighbourhood, factory, demonstration— narrated in 
the colonialism story-line:
Extract 7. 7. On new heterotopias: the 'hot-spots o f the planet'.
"In the sphere of the international conjuncture, particular relevance is acquired by the 
so-called 'areas of strategic interest' or 'hot spots' of the planet. [These hotspots] 
become dangerous detoNATOrs of a global nuclear conflict by the action of imperialism.
[They are] located in regions rich in natural resources -a t the cross points of the main 
transport routes linking economically countries and continents, or in important strategic 
spots. In them the contradictions between the will of the peoples (orientated towards 
national liberation) and the aspirations of imperialism reach a climax point. Imperialism 
tries to exercise total control over the sovereignty of these [peoples] and their countries 
in the name of 'vital interests'" ('The zones of strategic interest', The international 
situation, IV congress, UPG, 1983)
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Here the IV congress explicitly demarcates new heterotopias o f struggle: the 'hot 
spots' of the planet. These are the counter-sites, the real places, in Foucault's words, 
'which do exist ...in which all other real sites...are simultaneously represented, 
contested, inverted' (1986:25). The 'areas of strategic interest' or 'hot spots' are 
located in 'regions rich in natural resources', 'cross points' of transport routes which 
'link economically countries and continents' or 'important strategic spots'. Thus, 
these are economic and political spaces which embody the 'contradictions' and 
antagonism between 'the will o f the peoples' for liberation and sovereignty and the 
will of the enemy, 'imperialism', for a nebulous 'vital interests'. These real places -  
often named as 'countries o f socialist communities', 'Occidental European peoples', 
'Centre America' and 'the Arab countries of Middle East', 'Lebanon'— substitute the 
network of places o f exploitation and routes o f struggle narrated in the discourse of 
colonialism. The subplot represents these as successful sites, the spaces for victories 
of the peoples and progressive forces and of defeats for imperialism: where 'there is 
a recovery, in spite o f repression, o f the combativeness of the masses', 'heroic 
peoples such as Salvador and Guatemala are mobilized' or 'anti-imperialist popular 
processes' are developed which defeat the aggressions of imperialist forces.
The crucial point about these myths and new heterotopias is that now nationalists 
are not re-articulating the link between the imagined community and its own 
territorial domain -th e  implicit utopia in the colonialism narratives being a 'nation up 
in arms'— but they establish a link between the community and the world-space. 
They are displacing the 'national' utopia to the international sphere: imagining the 
world as 'up in arms'. The remoteness and geographical distance is a necessary 
attribute of these places to become heterotopias, in the story-line of sovereignty, in 
which nationalism can now see itself reflected. For this distance allows interpellation 
of nationalism /  nation as 'struggling movement' among others, as nation with a 
right of self-determination, securing the narrators identity without necessarily much 
consequences in terms of every-day politics (for every struggling people has its own 
ways). These are what Foucault calls heterotopias of 'compensation' (1986), in this 
case, for the 'defeat' and retreat suffered by the 'national' collective self after the 
transition to democracy. Thus, the world-system tales function as a sort of storied
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fetishism: the struggling world 'mirrors', projects the image of the movement as a 
struggling one too, fighting imperialism. They are fortifying myths securing a 
continuity of identity, keeping the flame of struggle alive at times of difficulty and 
defeat -where struggle still constitutes nationalism's understanding of the political 
(Polletta, 1998). The tales o f world-system and the spaces constructed then cite the 
political ethos of the colonialism story-line, while thoroughly re-signifying it.
Linking EEC to NATO: internationalising the dystopia
In addition to  the tales o f 'Imperialism and the world-system', the most common 
world-stories were the stories o f 'NATO and the EEC'. These are the starting point of 
a theme and character which will become progressively central to nationalism. 
Namely, this theme is the relation with the European Communities, which by 1989 
will become the anti-community. The relation between Galician nationalism and the 
European integration process has not been thoroughly studied -Portas, 2003; Elias, 
2009:13. There is, nevertheless, a well established reading of the nationalist attitude 
towards Europe which stresses their rejection to the integration process. Within the 
rejection thesis there are variations. The first and most pervasive claims that 
nationalist's rejection o f the European integration process was due to the perceived 
economic damages that it would cause to the key sectors of Galician economy. This 
is the 'commonsense' reading reflected, often merely in passing, in an amalgam of 
key scholarly writings on nationalism (Beramendi, 2007; Beramendi and Seixas,1995; 
Barreiro Rivas, 2003; Maiz, 1996; 2001). This reading coincides with the nationalist 
interpretation -  what I dub the Cassandra myth— whereby Galician nationalism had 
always predicted and warned the country of the perils of integration ahead but was 
ignored (FernSn-Vello and Pillado, 1989). Secondly, Elias voices a slightly different 
thesis o f this reading. She argues that Galician nationalisms' issued a totalizing 
critique of the integration process until 1998 on the basis of an amalgam of 
economic, but also moral and political reasons124 (Elias, 2009: 82-85).
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Yet, even if nationalism's rejection of the integration process for many years is 
undoubted, how and why this was the case needs to be rethought and 
contextualized. I argue that it is necessary to  understand nationalist positioning as 
regards the EEC in the light o f their overall storytelling practices over the years 1980 
to 1985. More particularly, the narrations of the EEC are a subplot of the 'world- 
system' tales. Hence, during the period between 1980 to 1985 /  1987, nationalism 
rejected membership only ambiguously on economic grounds. Particularly, it did not 
reject membership through a narrative o f 'defence of productive sectors' 
preoccupied with the everyday consequences of membership and spatially located in 
the nation, as has been overwhelmingly understood. Instead, popular nationalism 
constructed an alternative narrative strategy which linked the EEC to NATO as the 
economic side in a 'tw in s tra teg / devised by the forces of 'imperialism'. Hence, if the 
language of economic threat was there, it was squarely located within their own plot 
of imperialism, where imperialism was portrayed mainly as a political force of 
aggression o f some countries over others. The EEC was located as part of the world- 
system story-world, made intelligible through the key antagonism sovereignty vs. 
imperialism. Thus, the 'economic' understanding and critique of the EEC is abstract 
and undermined by the story-line it cites.
This plot is presented in a nutshell in the BNG's 'anti-imperialism principle' in their 
first assembly (extract 7.2), where the EEC and Nato are portrayed as 'organizations 
which, on an economic and political-military level, represent the interests of the big 
monopolies and of European and American imperialism'. Despite later protests to 
the contrary, this 'principle' became the key form of emplotting the stories on those 
organizations from then on. It is overwhelmingly present in the stories written 
against Nato in nationalists' public texts and appears, even though often in a more 
implicit form -conveyed through the imperialism metonymy— in the tales dealing 
with the EEC. Besides, in other kinds of non-storied narratives this strategy is also 
present. For instance, in its second assembly the BNG stated explicitly that 'the links 
between the Atlantic m ilitary organization with the European Economic Community 
have been the axis o f the analysis made by the BNG as regards this problem ' (BNG, II 
assembly, 1984). The early rejection of the integration process was, then, mainly
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couched on a vocabulary o f political motives, even when an alternative economic 
plot of 'damages to our productive sectors' coexisted, often embedded, with this -  
'the evidence that entrance in the European Community will represent a catastrophic 
ruin fo r  our productive sectors' (ibid.)— and progressively substituted the latter as 
the dominant emplotment -i.e . from 1986.
On NATO and EEC as strategies o f Imperialism
In 1978 the Union de Centro Democratico's (UCD) transition government in Spain 
started to negotiate full accession into the European communities. Three years later, 
right after the 23F attempted coup, the Calvo-Sotelo government and the UCD 
hastily sought accession to  NATO in order to appease the military (Preston, 1986). If 
accession to the EEC was generally supported and sustained in Spain's opposition 
parties by the desire to  become a modern European democracy, these parties 
(mainly the PSOE) did contest NATO membership. Nonetheless, having reached 
government in 1982, the socialist policy performed an u-turn. A referendum for 
'permanence' in NATO was scheduled by the socialists for 1986 and, despite the 
popular pacifist campaign against the Alliance, the socialist majority threw its weight 
on achieving a positive result. Simultaneously, the lengthy negotiations and stringent 
economic conditions imposed for accession into the European Communities were 
bearing fru it w ith a proposed date for accession set for 1986125.
Consequently, popular nationalism was facing the need to respond to  both events 
simultaneously. In an international conjuncture which they were discursively 
constructing as a struggle between war and peace where imperialism was the 
enemy, linking NATO and EEC as international dystopias (i.e. places and processes of 
Imperialism) made sense for nationalism. It became an important sub-plot o f the 
world-system tales. 'Popular' nationalism was involved in the organization of anti- 
Nato campaigns and demonstrations in Galicia during those early years of the 1980s. 
They portrayed their anti-Nato efforts as the Galician contribution to the peace 
movement gathering force all over Spain at the time. Indeed, the stories against 
permanence in Nato are as numerous and prominent between 1981-85 as the anti-
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EEC tales -which only start to peak in the years 1985/86126. Nonetheless, it is 
important to bear in mind that the narrative space allocated to the world-system 
tales, and within it, to  the 'Nato and EEC' stories in popular nationalisms' overall 
production these years is relatively small and rather marginal in their internal textual 
hierarchy, occupying, for instance, closing articles rather than editorials. Hence, 
against their own 'Cassandra myth', it is easy to conclude as Elias and others do, that 
the integration process was at the time not one of nationalism's priorities (Elias 
2009, Barreiro Rivas, 2003).
Linking the EEC to Nato was nationalism's main narrative strategy as regards the EEC 
until at least 1985 -w ha t they called the 'strategic basis' for rejection (II assembly, 
BNG, 1984). This strategy served to represent NATO and the EEC typically as the 
'tw in ' instruments o f 'imperialism'. The main ideological theme, then, was narrating 
the EEC as representing imperialism and the power of monopolies.
Extract 7.8 On NATO.
[A] "Opposition to NATO can not be separated ...from opposition to the EEC, which is its 
political and economic support" ('For peace and against NATO', PSG, GS, 4 xeira, 
Autumn 1981)
[B] "In the context of so much confusion around the propagandists phenomenon of the 
referendum called for by the PSOE and supported by the Spanish leftism (PCE, EE), we 
must re-examine the relations between that organization (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) and this (the European Communities), and how each of them, on their 
own terrain, are no more than different expressions, different facets, of a same system: 
the imperialist system. The convergence of interests of monopoly capitalism at a global 
level reached such a degree that, in the issues of vital relevance for the system, the 
differences and clashes that might exist between the EEC and the US disappear: the 
defence of imperialist interests in the Third World, the agreements to support an 
international monetary system in crisis [...). There is no room, then, to split, isolate 
Europe from NATO, the EEC from NATO, unless to participate in the manoeuvres to 
confuse that the leftist Spanishism shares with the pseudo-nationalism acting in Galiza" 
('Nato-EEC', T&T, n96,1986)
These extracts exemplify the most common way o f narrativizing Nato and the EEC. It 
appears in almost all stories compounded as 'NATO and the EEC' in an attempt to 
construct them as being 'the same', establishing a natural bond between them. 
Thus, for instance, extract 7.8 b is taken from a tale written soon before the
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referendum for the permanence in Nato which, in order to justify the nationalist 
policy o f rejection of the Atlantic alliance invokes the common history o f NATO and 
the EEC as historically and organically part of Imperialism. The equivalence between 
the organizations is clearly established as 'each of them, on their own terrain, are no 
more than different expressions, different facets, o f a same system: the imperialist 
system'. The difference between NATO and the EEC is thus, one of field of action, not 
of nature. Here CEE is narrativized as a necessity o f the monopolist capitalist system, 
as a 'fellow traveller' for the US, both product o f that imperialism -the  evil force of 
nationalisms' world-system tales. Thus, their interests are remarkably similar, we are 
told, in 'all vital issues': the 'defence of imperialist interests in the Third World', 
'support to the monetary system', etc. Moreover, these tales are clearly located at 
the 'global level', told from an external, objective and detached point of view. In 
that, they are similar to the world-system tales. Hence, in the narrativization of the 
EEC as the economic agent o f imperialism, popular nationalism is repeating the same 
narrative displacements and iterations they have performed in the world-system 
tales. As a result, the nation -and the impact of EEC membership upon it— is simply 
absent in most o f the tales. Even the few tales located not in the world-system but in 
the nation, and dealing seemingly with the internal consequences of membership 
recurred to  the imperialism plots and displacements. This tended to construct the 
Spanish state as the evil agentic force bringing the destruction of productive sectors 
through a policy o f 'reconversion industrial', whilst the EEC is given the rather distant 
role of a lurking, dangerous setting in the background.
The economic critique of the EEC was nevertheless not completely absent in texts. It 
appeared as early as 1982 in a story by the PSG. However, these stories were, as yet, 
only fragmentary and peripheral -quantitatively and qualitatively marginal— to 
nationalism's main way of thinking o f and talking about the EEC. This way of talking 
about Europe was still firm ly structured around plots of imperialism and the word- 
system, o f war and peace. The 'Cassandra myth' -nationalist's reflection upon the 
own incessant and 'futile ' warning to a country celebrating a union with Europe, of 
the perils ahead- became, nevertheless, itself a narrative device in many stories. 
These warnings came about as part o f the congressual 'reports' which told short
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stories o f party, front and country in between congresses, or as part of tales on 
agrarian trade unions. These narratives which begin to  emplot EEC membership in 
different terms and start slowly to make the EEC the main enemy of the country, are 
nevertheless a small minority between 1982 and 1985. Those are formative years of 
what would become a new story-line. It is really only from 1986 onwards that this 
plot takes precedence and starts quilting the diverse discursive elements of 
nationalism. This is not to  say that at some point nationalists did not oppose the EEC. 
They were always opposed to  it. But this opposition was differently emplotted: from 
'imperialist oppression' to  the 'economic damages to the country7 and the narrative 
shift that takes place in these stories.
7.4. Conclusion
I have argued so far that the 'triumph' of the discourse of democracy was to be the 
starting point of a new conjuncture and discourse for the 'national and popular /  
social' movement. Confronted with a new, 'highly hostile' situation they were posed 
with a poignant identitary dilemma: they could maintain the tales and practices 
which gave them force, voice and identity but risk anachronism or they could try to 
adapt but risk disappearance.
This chapter explored in depth one narrative strategy, the citing, metonymic 
displacement and disavowing o f colonialism, which served to shift the content o f the 
discourse. This displacement was a key step in de-ambiguating the discourse and 
moving it firm ly towards the nation -together, as we will see in chapter 8, with the 
ventriloquisation of discourses of democracy in Spain. Both worked towards 
maintaining, in spite o f the shift in content, the strong antagonisms inherited from 
the narratives of colonialism.
Colonialism, for a decade the movement's rallying point now became cited, invoked 
as a ground whilst being metonymically displaced by 'imperialism'. This displacement
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was effected within a new subplot: the "world system" (success) stories. Colonialism 
and even "imperialism" were now segregated to  these tales away from, but 
juxtaposed to, the canonical narrative production at this time: the story-lines of 
sovereignty -which will be examined in the next chapter. Imperialism became the 
flipside of "sovereignty". It was in these stories the key enemy of the "peoples", 
equivalentially linked to the US, NATO, EEC and to social-democracy. These stories 
were plotted within a "war and peace" ideological theme which performed a world- 
system divided into two antagonistic camps, scarred by the struggles of peaceful 
"peoples" in defence of their sovereignty which imperialism was trying to take away 
from them. "Imperialism", contrary to "colonialism", was then narrated as a purely 
political phenomenon, even as an irrational force of aggression, and all traces of 
economic grievances where subsumed into "dependency" plots. The hotspots o f the 
planet substituted former places of exploitation and routes of struggle for 
heterotopias. Besides, at this time, the force which from 1989 onwards would 
become the name for the "anti-community", the EEC, was still firm ly located within 
the imperialism plot.
Whilst thoroughly shifting the content o f the discourse of colonialism, the tales of 
the world system maintained their highly exclusionary frontiers and antagonisms 
which had formerly given rise to very radical and isolationist politics in the 
movement. These tales, nevertheless, performed certain mimicry of antagonism. 
They displaced the implicit utopia towards the international sphere, allowing in this 
way the movement to secure their identity as "struggling", mobilized and successful 
in their pursuits, precisely at a time in which peasant, neighbour and worker 
mobilization in Galicia had all but halted. They worked as a fortifying myth.
To sum up, the function of colonialism and the narratives of the world-system is 
highly ambivalent. Still iterated, cited, metonymically invoked whilst also disavowed, 
re-narrativized, transposed and reduced, colonialism and its storied accrual 
underpinned the movements new story-line o f "national sovereignty" and was 
simultaneously peripheral to  it. Present and occluded, it signified both continuity and 
renewal of the movement's identity.
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8Narrating 'sovereignty' (il): ventriloquism, equivocation and democracy 
8.1 Introduction.
Chapter 7 explained how popular nationalism's narrative practices since 1981 have 
worked to  place their former main story-line and ideological theme of 'colonialism' 
toward the margins of the ir discourse by metonymically substituting imperialism for 
the colony. They did this through the telling and retelling of a new type of tale, the 
world-system story, which has effectively transformed and contained their former 
radical Marxist plots to the world-story sphere. This new sphere o f representation 
has allowed popular nationalism to retain antagonistic political frontiers and their 
identity as a struggling movement against the forces of imperialism.
Hence, the displacement o f colonialism was one of the key narrative and discursive 
strategies of the popular movement at this time in the transformation of their 
master signifier from 'national and social liberation' to 'national sovereignty7. 
However, the metonymy was only one step in the process of the de-ambiguizing of 
the discourse of colonialism and moving it firm ly towards nationhood. At a time of 
political defeat and retreat, nationalism's main step in re-narrativizing the nation and 
the movement was to shift the contents o f their antagonistic frontier with Spain 
from 'nationalism vs. spanishism' to 'sovereignty vs. Constitution'. This was achieved 
mainly through the ventriloquizing o f the Spanish hegemonic discourses of 
democracy (Bakhtin, 1981). The metaphor o f ventriloquism in Mikhail Bakhtin's work 
is useful to explain the narrative strategy o f popular nationalism in the early 
1980s127.
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Ventriloquizing another's voice, for Bakhtin, refers to the moment when a writer 
instead of speaking in a particular language 'speaks, as it were, through language, a 
language that has somehow more or less materialized, become objectified' (Bakhtin, 
1981:299). The writer uses such a language 'w ithout wholly giving himself up to it' 
(ibid.). This is not a way o f posing an instrumental user but, rather, of noting the 
necessary transposition and ideological re-accentuation which this new use, citation 
and articulation will perform in a language already inhabited by other accents and 
intentions. Thus, ventriloquated discourse means resignified discourse refracting a 
plurality o f authorial intentions, even 'exhibiting' reified functions and meanings. In 
Bakhtin's words: 'the writer makes use o f words which are already populated with 
the social intentions o f others and compels them to serve his own new intentions, to 
serve a second master' (ibid: 300). This writing is therefore multiply accentuated and 
heteroglot.
I read ventriloquism and ventriloquating strategies in terms of what Michel Foucault 
calls 'reverse discourse' (Foucault, 1976/1998) and Judith Butler re-constructs and 
explains as questions o f appropriation and subversion in the context of 
performativity (Butler, 1990; 1993). Among the discourses existing at a given time 
and space, Foucault stresses in his later writings, there are not binary distinctions 
between dominant and excluded discourse. Discourses are, on the contrary, 
discontinuous and their 'tactical functions' changeable. Hence, any one political 
strategy might mobilise a multiplicity of discursive elements (Foucault, 1976 /  
1998:100). That is, there can be 'different or even contradictory discourses within 
the same stra teg / and, conversely, the same discourse can be used, cited and put to 
work by different power strategies (ibid.:102). Any discourse might function as an 
instrument of hegemonic power but also as a site of resistance and of collective 
contestations. In Bakhtin's sense, discourses can serve different masters or political 
agencies.
Judith Butler discusses this polyvalence in terms of performativity (Butler, 1993). 
Performativity she defines as reiterative and citational practice -and not, then, 
simply as a singular or deliberate act— by which discourse produces the effects that
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it  names (Butler, 1993:2). If the dominant discourses /  vocabularies of motives are 
used with the purpose of resisting and opposing hegemonic strategies, this is what 
Foucault calls 'reverse discourse', Butler, on the other hand, problematises this 
notion. She notes that performativity does not need to be a 'reverse-discourse'. That 
is, a practice in which defiant affirmation of an abjected identity 'dialecticall/ 
reinforces the very norm it resists (Butler, 1993:21). Political practices of resistance 
do not need to be 'pure opposition' or transcendence to hegemonic discourses /  
languages /  politics. Instead, Butler sees performativity as always already implicated 
in that which one opposes (ibid.:241). In her essay 'Critically queer7, she describes 
agentic practices o f resistance as practices of discursive resignification, the 
transposition and rearticulation of signifying practices through a repetition and 
iteration which is never the same128.
If discourses might be put to  work for different purposes by various strategies, if any 
language might be cited and resignified, re-appropriated in the process, then the 
role of the dominant normalizing strategies and hegemonic discourses of democracy 
in Spain to bring to life, shape and reproduce the phenomenon they tried to curb 
(Butler, 1993) -the  strength o f peripheral national identifications within Spain— 
needs to be noted. Hegemonic interpellations, both of a liberal democracy and a 
unitary Spain, created more than they ever meant to. Conversely, the inter­
implication of resistance with that resisted needs to be problematised. Popular 
nationalism, at a time of difficulty, seized this very language, the same vocabulary 
and categories of democracy, rights and liberties used to discredit and marginalize it 
and 'reversed' it. In their narrative practices, nationalism ventriloquated the 
discourse of democracy, citing and resignifying the hegemonic categories for their 
own subversive purposes. Simultaneously, and as a result of this, their very identity 
and purposes were being transformed. That is, from the struggle to the 'national and 
popular liberation' o f the hyphenated 'national-popular' movement, they became 
'popular nationalism' in the pursuit o f 'national sovereignty7 for Galicia.
In this chapter I primarily examine part of what I have dubbed 'tales of sovereignty'. 
These are mainly 'big stories' o f the country narrated in a series o f constituent
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texts129. Among these, it was mainly the earlier texts, such as the III Congress of the 
UPG and I and II Assemblies o f the BNG, which laid out the strategies and narratives 
which dominated the representation of the self and nation over this period. They 
(co)constituted the framework of intelligibility o f all practices in the movement at 
this time. Hence, I look into these in more depth. Besides the constituent texts of 
popular nationalism, I also read these tales as they appear in the now considerably 
diminished production o f party magazines: the T&T and GS issues and gaps between 
1981 and 1987. These tales deal with the present situation of the nation.
Although there are a variety o f storytelling themes, mainly three types of stories are 
typically told -excluding those of the 'world-system7 already examined. These are 
the distinctive stories o f the 'cardboard parliament' and related debates around the 
location of nationalism in the new system, the 'tales of sovereignty7 and the 'tales of 
unity7. The latter I will attend to in depth in the next chapter, as they form the key 
textual trace of a new strategy of difference -the  war of position in Gramsci's terms- 
initiated by the movement at this time.
8.2. Heteroglot terrains (II): autonomy and the 'cardboard parliament'.
During the 1980s not only had the international situation considerably changed with 
the rise of neoliberalism but, crucially, Spain had already become a democratic and 
unitary nation-state with which peripheral nationalisms had to grapple. The 
Constitution of 1978 became, as explained in chapter 7, the very measure of 
democracy. This was almost physically materialized in this political text-artefact 
which essentialised a Spanish nation whilst recognising the existence of ambiguous 
'historic nationalities7 and an extensive regional devolution programme. The Spanish 
right-wing aestheticization o f its Other in the demonized form of the 'chaos7 in the 
streets of the (Spanish) nation, has often been blamed on this programme of 
devolution of powers as well as on the violence of ETA, GRAPO and other radical
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groups (Preston, 1986). These fears culminated in Colonel Tejero's attempted coup 
in February 1981. The failed coup gave further impetus to a homogenizing strategy 
as regards regional devolution.
In the periphery nationalisms reacted differently to these events. Catalan 
nationalists gave priority to  the re-establishment of democracy over the issues of 
territory and self-determination and pragmatically welcomed autonomy (Nunez- 
Seixas, 2001; Muro and Quiroga, 2004). However, the Basque abertzales130 and the 
Christian democrat Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) did not support the 
Constitution nor the Basque Statute of Autonomy131. It has since become the 
cornerstone of political conflict in the Basque country (Mata, 2005). In 1980, the 
response of Galician nationalism to the Galician statute was twofold (Maiz, 1996; 
Beramendi, 2007; Quintana Garrido, 2008). On the one hand, some sites, such as the 
POG and the centre-right forces which did not participate in the colonialism story­
line, narrated the Statute as an opportunity and tried to exploit its ambiguities. On 
the other hand, popular nationalism strongly and inflexibly opposed it, running a 
campaign against it.
What Galicians obtained was a statute132 which put forward an idea of the Galician 
political community. Elaborated through the 'fast track' procedure it was ratified in 
December 1980, after considerable controversy and homogenizing pressure from 
the central state. It constructed Galicia ambiguously as a 'historic nationality' which 
'constitutes itself into an autonomous com m unit/ (AC) similarly to Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. However, the community's powers were derived from the 
Constitution, instead of emanating from the 'Galician people'. The Galician Statute of 
1980 says:
" Article 1:
1. Galicia, historic nationality, constitutes herself in an Autonomous Community in 
order to access her self-government, in conformity with the Spanish Constitution 
and the present Statute, which is her basic institutional norm.
2. The Autonomous Community, through democratic institutions, assumes as its 
principal duty the defence of the identity of Galicia and of her interests, and the 
promotion of solidarity among all those who form the Galician people.
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3. The powers of the Autonomous Community of Galicia emanate from the 
Constitution, from the present Statute and from the People."
"Article 3:
1. To the effects of the present Statute, they enjoy the political condition of Galician 
the Spanish citizens who, in accordance with the general laws of the State, have 
administrative neighbourhood in any of the councils in Galicia"
(Preliminary Title, Statute of Autonomy, 1980)
The AC is an ambiguous community. On the one hand, the statute implicitly creates 
a boundary between 'us' the 'Galician people', among whom a bond of solidarity 
should be fostered, and others. Thus, it constructs a Galician community naming it 'a 
people' and 'historic nationality'. On the other hand, this community named as a 
people does not derive its power from the traditional sources such as history or a 
'volonte g e n e ra te an autonomous political will. Instead, Galicia is allowed to 
become an AC first by the Spanish constitution, by the Statute itself - in  a 
quintessential performative act- and, ambiguously from 'the People' -where it is 
unclear who this 'people' are. Moreover, if there is such thing as a 'Galician people' 
there is no Galician citizenship, there are only Spanish citizens-as explained in article 
three. Galicia or 'the Galician people' may form a community but this is not, strictly 
speaking, a political community. 'Being Galician' -pa rt of a people— is in the Statute 
a 'political condition' founded on an administrative decision. It is a condition 
potentially open to all Spanish citizens as long as their place of residence is the 
territory of Galicia. Here, culture, language, history, birth or class considerations are 
indifferent, only habitation matters. Conversely, inhabitants of the territory of 
Galicia are declared Spanish citizens, members of the Spanish political community /  
nation first, from which they derive their condition of being Galician - ' in accord with 
the general laws o f the State'- by virtue of residence.
The tensions inscribed in the text allowed some nationalists to see the statute as a 
viable first step towards self-determination -th is was the case of the POG and those 
sites not inhabited by colonialism narratives. However, this community brought 
about by the statute fell short o f those created in old narratives of nationhood and 
of cotemporary nationalisms. In old nationalist narratives either race, ethnie, 
culture, territory-understood almost as communion with land, not as administrative
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place of residence— sustained the imagining of the Galician people /  nation. The 
discourse of colonialism had established unstable class boundaries. But their nation 
was imagined as different from Spain, not a contiguous part of it. The statute could 
not meet the claims for recognition and self-government demanded by radical 
nationalists in their story-lines and the Bases Constitucionais -the  text-icon and 
demand for the sites of the colonialism story-lines. Hence, in the late 1970s national- 
popular groups had refused to participate and have a voice in the design of the 
architecture of the democratic political system. By 1981, the key issue was not 
anymore whether to participate, which was seen as unavoidable, but how, in whose 
terms, and fo r  what ends should they participate in the new institutional life of 
Galicia.
The issue of how to be both inside and outside the new system soon became the 
emblematic issue in popular nationalist sites for almost a decade. It was often told 
as how not to leave empty fields in the democratic-bourgeois context' whilst 'being 
in open contradiction with the values of the Constitution'. Popular nationalism was 
soon made aware that they would not be able to impose their own terms. Early on, 
between July and December of 1982, the 'parliamentary affair' took place. This was 
the (self inflicted) silencing, via internal regulation, of the voice of the three BNPG- 
PSG elected parliamentarians in the Galician assembly after they refused to swear 
allegiance to the Spanish Constitution. The refusal became the key event which 
gripped the imagination, affected the identity o f and provoked action on the part of 
popular nationalisms in one way or another until at least 1988133.
A run-down of the most important moments in this controversy would start in the 
year 1981, when popular nationalism was whirling in a process of re-narrativization 
of the self and struggling with an identitary dilemma -as narrated in the previous 
chapter134. Whilst the new 'unity of nationalism' was precariously being built135 
nationalist sites were immersed in a bitter struggle for the narrativization of the 
nation and its self-organization. Again, two story-lines were (trans)forming and 
competing for hegemony within nationalisms' main sites. The received story accrual 
of Galicia as a colony of Spain to be defended in a national-popular front now faced
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an alternative discourse of Galicia as an European, "complex' social formation in 
need, as a consequence, o f a mass democratic party136. This crisis reached a height 
in different sites at different times. In the UPG the critical point was reached 
between July and October 1981 when the Secretary General Luaces, ten other 
member of the central committee and a considerable part of the membership of the 
party who had sustained the alternative narrative to  colonialism were expelled. This 
group, called the Lugo Group, formed the Grupo de Nacionalistas de Esquerda and 
many of them joined Esquerda Galega (EG) later on -the  new project of the POG 
(Fernandez Baz, 2003: 127). The other key nationalist site, the PSG, was also 
narratively split and suffered membership losses when it broke its alliance with the 
coalition Unidade Galega in 1980 in order to join the UPG in the Mesa de Forzas 
Politicos Galegas (MFPG) project137. Unidade Galega had been formed by the POG 
and the PG and was until then the main site o f the European nation story-line.
Simultaneously, in October 1981, the first elections to the Galician Parliament took 
place. All nationalist parties achieved poor results: three seats for popular 
nationalism -the  BNPG-PSG coalition hegemonized by radical narratives— and just 
one for the EG138. The Galician vote was hegemonized by conservative, Spanish-wide 
parties: the UCD and Alianza Popular, followed by the socialist PSOE with 26, 24 and 
16 seats respectively (Maiz, 1996). To make matters worse, this parliamentary 
majority passed by July 1982, in a display of force, an internal regulation which 
demanded the swearing o f loyalty to  the Constitution in order to take possession of 
seats. The regulation was part o f myriad normalizing power strategies carried out by 
the hegemonic discourse o f democracy after the failed coup. Lois Dieguez, Claudio 
Lopez Garrido and Bautista Alvarez -th e  Bloque-PSG MPs— resisted, on 14 July of 
1982, this normalizing step by refusing to swear allegiance. Instead, they performed 
a speech act: "I do not swear nor promise [to abide by the Constitution and Statute], 
because I am a democrat and I defend the national sovereignty of Galicia'. They 
repeated this recitation in November when given another chance to swear loyalty.
This intervention was part o f a failed effort to reorganize the conjuncture. The 
statement tried to work towards reclaiming democracy for the marginal position of
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popular nationalism139 - in  a struggle with the dominant discourses which labelled 
them as radical, irresponsible and antidemocratic. However, even though the three 
MPs were, as elected representatives of the people, located in a position of 
authority and accorded a right to  speak, this singular oppositional speech act carried 
no citational nor institutional authority but rather interrupted it. The consequence 
of their resistance and opposition was the stripping of the right to voice and vote 
and to even have a physical presence140 in the Galician parliament of those 
nationalists involved. This event was constructed and presented by nationalists and 
(part of) the press alike as the 'expelling* of nationalists from Parliament (El Pais, 
1982).
What followed were myriad protests, press conferences, open letters, 
demonstrations, claims in tribunals all through the year 1982 in the masculinist 
politics o f 'aldraxe' and pride141. The successful re-narrativization of colonialism into 
a sovereignty and imperialism discourse in the UPG and PSG sites, as well as the 
banishing of the alternative narrative of Galicia which allowed for a reading of the 
Statute as an opportunity to  take advantage o f to EG, authorised and legitimised -  
indeed, it demanded— this turn o f affairs. However, this decision located popular 
nationalism outside the new key political institution of the country -as they 
themselves reflected in spite o f and in tension with their conception of politics as 
'war* and mass mobilization. Popular nationalism from this moment wrestled in their 
identity-related dilemma between 'struggling for the democratic premises, for not 
giving legitimacy to a Regime which is a fraud against the nations ...and [our] right to 
existence' (T&T, May 1982), which translated into a need to remain outside 
Parliament, and their increasing perception of their own marginalization and 
possible disappearance unless they continued to participate in the established 
institutions.
This situation lasted until the autonomic elections of 24th November 1985, when the 
BNG elected MP, XM Beiras was finally -a fte r plenty of dissent- allowed by the sites 
to swear allegiance. This shift was the result o f a frantic decision-making process
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marked by an extraordinary meeting of the UPG*s central committee and 
extraordinary BNG assembly. The tight majority for the decision to swear allegiance 
brought about a new split in the UPG, the Partido Comunista de Liberacion Nacional 
headed by the, until then, UPG secretary general Mariano Abalo (PCLN).
Meanwhile, the story-lines o f Galicia as a 'complex European society* which would 
benefit from the autonomic settlement enjoyed some success. Leaving the EG MP 
Camilo Nogueira as the only nationalist in parliament, bore this site some rewards. 
These were reaped in the form of a more successful electoral result in the next 
autonomic elections of 1985, when the 'autonomist* nationalist options -the  PSG-EG 
and the centre right Coalicion Galega- obtained 14 seats (3 and 11 respectively).
The affair marked and helped narrate the conjuncture for nationalism: its stages 
punctuated major identity-related decisions and discursive -political and strategical- 
shifts. It was a 'power* effect o f the hegemonic discourse of democracy which came 
about precisely at the moment when popular nationalist sites were submerged in a 
deep crisis questioning the verisimilitude and effectiveness of their own discursive 
strategies and frontier effects. It signalled and contributed to the reinforcement and 
preservation of clear-cut antagonisms. This event was a symptom of, as well as a 
strengthening of, the prevalence of the stark rhetoric and antagonism 'us* /  'them*. 
Its demise, by the end o f the decade, coincided with -and was accomplished 
through- further re-narrativizations and shiftings of those antagonisms. The 
antagonistic frontier weakened and became more remote, moving upwards and 
forward to the EEC pushed by the movement's expansive strategy of unity, which 
grew progressively, weakening antagonisms and articulating elements previously 
othered.
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8.3. Re-plotting the nation: Sovereignty and ventriloquisation
The re-narrativization o f the story-lines of colonialism which eradicated their 
ambiguity in relation to  nationalism at this time, paradoxically brought about the 
blurring of the nation's contours. As colonialism was qualified, cited but disavowed, 
its temporal orders and depths -th e  myth of loss, the achievement o f liberation and 
then socialism— also became destabilized. At this point the movement barely 
looked, let alone narrated, into the past or into the future. The temporal orders lived 
by for more than a decade were pushed to the margins and storytelling took root 
deeply in the present. It was an implicit rupture with the romance form.
What came across was a concern with narrating the present moment, as remarked 
of the world-system stories. As a consequence, the nation is not storied per se. In 
comparison with the story-lines and small tales o f colonialism which were explicitly 
bent on constructing a narrative of the nation, the main subplots interweaved at 
this time -the  'swearing plot', 'world-system' tales and stories of 'autonom / and 
those of 'u n i t /— only implicitly build a national myth. Of course, implicitly they 
considerably resignify the nation. This implicitness did not happen by chance. Firstly, 
the (hi)story o f the nation had already been told -as the story-lines of colonialism 
were never squarely rejected. Then, as the myth of colonialism crumbled in the new 
conjuncture, the nation (hi)stories simply went underground. There develops instead 
an urgency to narrate the present political situation. As the forces of nationalism 
struggle to preserve the(ir) collective self and to transform without unravelling, bold 
statements and overt re-narrativizations of the nation were avoided. In fact, when 
they were attempted -i.e . Luaces and the Lugo Group— they brought about 
probably the worst crisis o f popular nationalism so far (as explained above).
'Sovereignt/ emerged clearly after 1981 as the main object of Galician nationalism's 
discourse replacing the 'colony'. However, it is important to bear in mind that this is 
not to say that a concern with 'sovereignt/, 'democrac/ or 'rights' was absent in the 
story-lines o f colonialism. For instance, the 'Bases Constitutionals' was said to
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project a blueprint that would be "the only real democracy" in Galicia. But this 
"democracy", articulated in relation to colonialism and the popular front, had entirely 
different connotations. Besides, whilst democracy per se was present, it was
nevertheless relatively peripheral to the priorities of the movement and
overdetermined by other goals. Indeed, it was precisely during the Transition that 
the "national-popular" movement did not struggle to resignify and fix the meaning of 
democracy. They were not interested in delimiting the internal frontiers in Spanish 
society. Instead, nationalism presented an altogether alternative project for the 
creation o f a political community. National-popular nationalism was trying to 
redefine the limits o f its community, to establish a different one. Democracy then,
was mainly elided to "bourgeoisie", "Spain", "monopolies" and "capital" and
constructed as a "repressive regime" (UPG, II Congress, 1979). In the context o f the 
movement the democratic ideal was discussed mostly in terms of "centralist 
democracy" -as part o f internal organization o f the party— or less often as "popular 
democracy". Similarly the vindication of civic rights was almost absent from the texts.
Yet democracy was an element o f Leninist narratives of self-determination was 
drawn upon by nationalists. However, it was an element which, in the re- 
narrativization of Galician nationalists, would simply arrive, almost as a matter of 
course, to an already liberated Galicia under the leadership of the "national-popular" 
movement. As the extract below shows, in which the UPG speculates about the form 
and organization o f a Galician state, it is not (popular) democracy which secures the 
superseding of national oppression as Lenin had argued, but the other way round. In 
the nationalists" tales, an already liberated Galicia would organize as a popular 
democracy and only then could socialist measures for the working classes follow142. 
Hence, Galician nationalists had reversed the primacy which Lenin conceded to 
democracy and democratization over national liberation:
"A foundation -a  socialist production- is essential for the abolition of national 
oppression, but this foundation must carry a democratically organised state, a 
democratic army, etc. By transforming capitalism into socialism the proletariat creates 
the possibility of abolishing national oppression; the possibility becomes reality 'only" -  
only!- with the establishment of full democracy in all spheres, including the delimitation 
of state frontiers in accordance with the 'sympathies' of the population, including 
complete freedom to secede.' (Lenin, 1908; quoted in Nimni 1991:81)
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"The political form of the national-popular state organization would respond to the 
exercise of democracy by the working classes... Therefore, only within the framework of 
popular democracy in Galicia will it be possible to undertake agrarian and fisheries 
reforms with the participation of the workers and peasants and at the service of their 
interests..." (UPG, I congress, 1977)
Political liberation and power (statehood) must come first, democratic and social 
measures would follow. The discursive strategy of narrativization discussed in earlier 
chapters worked to naturalize this order o f things. The relative disinterest, or 
straightforward opposition, o f the movement to  'democracy'143 precisely at the time 
in which it is being defined at the Spanish level and their more offensive strategies 
and struggles of direct political action show the extent o f their optimism -optimism 
of the will perhaps— as regards the possibilities o f political rupture. Thus, the UPG 
and many others, though not the PSG, had refused to participate in the Spanish wide 
platforms which were negotiating a Spanish transition and Constitution and all, with 
the exception of the POG /  EG, refused to be part o f the process of drafting a statute 
of autonomy for Galicia. For an important part o f Galician nationalism up until at 
least 1981 'liberation', not 'sovereignt/ nor 'democrac/, was the universal value 
worth fighting for. With the progressive narrative centring of the signifier 
'sovereignt/ the process of de-ambiguation started.
Narratives o f sovereignty:'Galicia nacion fronte a Constitucion'
The main discursive strategy of popular nationalism at this time was the construction 
of an antagonism with 'unitary Spain' and its Constitution. This strategy was 
produced by a shift in emphasis o f the language of colonialism and a different 
modulation of its themes. The voice of popular nationalism shifted from performing 
a hybrid Marxist-nationalist people towards a liberal, organic people /  nation. Hence, 
in their 'them' and 'us' rhetoric, there was an idea of their own community now 
articulated more straightforwardly with the signifier 'nation' and with a newly 
centred universal value, 'sovereignt/: a new rallying point of the narratives and 
practices of the movement.
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The centring of "sovereignty" (and of the liberal plots of nation which sustained it), 
was achieved, then, through a double movement: the ventriloquisation of the 
Spanish discourse of democracy and the simultaneous iteration and disavowal of 
colonialism. The "authorities of delimitation" of this transformation were the UPG 
and the PSG, and crucially the newly formed BNG (Foucault, 1969/1989). These are 
the steps which begin undoing the hybridity o f the "colonialism" story while fully 
preserving its ambiguity -shifting the "problematic" o f all nationalism, in Chatterjee"s 
sense144, for years to come (Chatterjee, 1986). However, as we will see, if the nation 
alone becomes the object of the discourse of "sovereignty, it also tends to become 
obscured in the narratives.
This shift in modulation brings about major differences in the narrative production of 
the movement after 1981. Contrary to the story-lines of colonialism, there is a 
startling absence of class language and plots in the quantitatively and qualitatively 
dominant stories of national sovereignty145 -th e  tales of autonomy, the 
parliamentary affair, or the stories o f unity. The discursive strategies of 
narrativization -the  temporal narrative split between national and social liberation— 
and the strategy of identity in tension with this seemed to have vanished. Along with 
these went also the main national categories and figures of discourse told in the 
colonialism story-lines: there is now hardly any mention of the "symbiotic worker", 
the national triad par excellence, "the workers, peasants and fishermen" and "the 
emigrants". Instead, the story-line of sovereignty transformed the old themes into 
others more attuned to the conjuncture.
The enemy is a clear example, instead of 'spanishism' or "the imperialist Spanish 
state" this position is linked now to "the unitary state" -in  fact, the enemy as narrated 
by the PSG for some tim e— and mainly to "the Constitution of 1978". The centrality 
of the Constitution as the enemy o f the nation is overwhelming in all the texts of 
popular nationalism, as the following extracts illustrate:
Extract 8.1. On antagonism & constitutional text as the anti-community.
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[a ] "The Spanish constitutional text is not a simple formulation of formal and abstract 
liberties but an enunciate with threatening and interdictory intentions as regards the 
popular desires. To defend democratic liberties does not mean defending a text which 
allows their whimsical and interested restriction." ('Party Thesis', UPG, III congress, 
1982)
[b] "Galician nationalism stands for the rupture with the present political Regime as it 
represents the explicit and aggressive negation of [our] principles and it gravely 
attempts against the fundamental liberties of the citizens and the Nations which 
integrate the Spanish State. [...] The Spanish constitution is the legal materialization of 
the negation of our national sovereignty and it also makes possible the restriction of the 
exercise of democratic liberties; for that we do not accept it." (The Political 
framework', I Assembly, BNG, 1982)
[c] "We should not be mistaken: the Spanish constitution and the statutes of autonomy 
derived from it are the source of this bunch of repressive legislation and attitudes, as 
these are two belligerently anti-national, imperialist and anti-popular texts; moreover 
[they are ridden] with grave ambiguities or difficulties as regards the exercise of the 
bare minimum of democratic liberties. Hence the reason why is so important for us not 
to legitimize such texts. They deny our right to existence; they restrict our everyday life. 
They have to disappear for the national and popular desires to go forward." ('BNG's 
position before the autonomic elections', II Assembly, BNG, 1984)
[ d ] 'The present Spanish constitution denies our existence, the multinational character 
of the state and the right of self-determination of the nations. We have to continue a 
political battle which will not be realised nor won by deepening the autonomic 
alternative, but superseding and contradicting this alternative as a real opposition" 
('Unity of nationalism against the Constitution', T&T, n. 86,1982)
As the extracts above show, which are typical o f the rhetoric o f this time, the 
constitution was singled out as the name of anti-community in the textual 
production of popular nationalism. The constitution is said to 'deny our right to 
existence', that is, it is accused of quashing the anticipated community as well as of 
quashing nationalism. Thus, the political text setting the terms of a compromise 
democratic settlement in the state at large had become the archenemy of 
nationalism. For it is said to  block the achievement of 'sovereignty' and bar the 
fulfilment o f national desires. This move has to be seen in the context o f the 
essentializing of the 'Spanish nation' by the text. It is, moreover, an 'aggiornamento' 
of nationalist thought to the conjuncture they are living in and trying to constitute, 
without, nevertheless, actually toning down their antagonistic political stance.
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Ventriloquising democracy and rights.
One of the most striking features of the story-lines of sovereignty is that the quilting 
point of 'sovereignty" goes hand in hand with the theme of "democracy". This 
connection is relentless in the representation of the Spanish constitution as 
nationalism's antagonist (as seen in the above extracts 8.1). This linkage was 
sustained not by a Marxist narrative of "rights of nations to self determination" or 
anti-colonialism, but by liberal and nationalist plots in its stead. The clearest 
illustration may be the declaration of ideological principles by the BNG"s Riazor 
assembly text:
Extract 8.2: Sovereignty & Democracy os key principles
"GALICIA IS A NATION, and as such it has a right of political self-determination which, in 
order to be real, must be specified in an alternative of national sovereignty [...] . 
DEMOCRACY: the democratic principle is fundamental as [it is] inherent to the exercise 
of power by the people, within conditions of real, and not just formal, equality and 
freedom' ('Politico-ideological principles', BNG, I Assembly, 1982).
This makes clear that nationalism argued its case for sovereignty in a language of 
defence of democracy, rights and freedoms. In fact, the conjuncture which the III 
congress of the UPG in 1982 and the first and second assemblies of the BNG in 1982 
and 1984 -b u t also a plurality of other texts o f popular nationalism— were trying to 
build was one in which democracy and Galician nationalism were made equivalent. 
As T&T explicitly remarked: 'moreover; there is a perfect correlation between the 
defence o f the democratic liberties and the defence o f nationalist principles" ('Unity 
of nationalism against the Constitution', T&T, n. 86,1982). Here, if clarification is still 
needed, the category 'nationalism' applied to 'peripheral' or minority claims -  
Catalan, Basque or Galician or those 'peoples' seeking freedom— and excluded 
Spanish, state-wide, nationalism. This is a construction of the term carried forward 
from the old tales of colonialism, where it was taken, in turn, from Lenin. The 
colonialism story-lines, as seen earlier, labelled state nationalism as 'chauvinism', i.e.
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inherently regressive and oppressive, while 'nationalism' was constructed as 
inevitably progressive.
Moreover, extracts 8.1 a, b, and c above presented clear examples of the linkage 
between the stark rejection of the Spanish constitution in favour o f a defence of 
democracy. The constitution is, nationalists explicitly affirm (as seen in extracts 8.1.a 
and b), the enunciative force, not only because of its 'threatening and interdictory 
intentions as regards the popular desires' but also because it 'gravely attempts 
against the fundamental liberties o f the citizens and the Nations which integrate the 
Spanish State'. The constant coordination of clauses points to a similar valorization 
of both issues as regards the language of rights and freedoms is fused to the tales of 
sovereignty.
Liberal narratives of (Spanish) nationhood -explicitly drawing upon German theorists 
such as Meinecke and Habermas— and the equation of democracy to the 
acceptance of the Constitution of 1978 had been some of the narrative weapons 
marshalled by the hegemonic narratives of the transition to democracy. The 
hegemonic discourses of Spanish nationalism after the transition, particularly those 
coming from left-wing sites, narrated their own rendering of 'constitutional 
patriotism'. Relying on a transposition of Habermas's universalist foundation of 
political community based on democracy and human rights, they hybridized it with 
historicist claims of pre-modern Spanish nationhood (Bastida Freixedo, 2007, Nunez 
Seixas, 2007). The new narratives of Spanish nationalism frequently storied a 
multicultural state and 'a nation of nations'-i.e. one political nation composed of 
several 'cultural nations'146— and tried to interpellate the population to identify with 
the new political order and the constitutional principles. These principles and 
metonymically the text itself which enshrines them became synonymous with 
'political pluralism', 'living together' or 'tolerance' (Bastida Freixedo, 2007). In short, 
there was a fetishization o f the Constitution, which metonymically stood, and still 
stands, for democracy.
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Now, for the first time since the end of the dictatorship, popular nationalism 
endeavours to  deconstruct the "biased" universalism of Spanish "democracy" -bu ilt 
on the particular contents of constitutional settlement, the politics of consensus, 
autonomic system, parliamentary capitalism and membership of the EEC and Nato— 
which they claim, negates Galician popular desires. They were engaging with 
"democracy" as opposed to simply ignoring it while proposing an altogether separate 
political arrangement. Popular nationalist narratives started to build their own 
universalism where democracy became another name for sovereignty and for, as will 
be seen later, nationalism.
In order to do this, nationalist texts at this time begin by questioning the assumption 
that "to be a democrat" means necessarily to support the Spanish constitution. They 
rejected the so-called "consecration" o f the juridical text which embodied 
democracy. This questioning can be clearly seen in extract 8.1.a, where the III 
congress declares that 'to defend democratic liberties does not mean defending a 
text which allows their whimsical and interested restriction' or in T&T"s affirmation 
that 'we are not willing to collaborate with the politics o f confusion [o confusionismo] 
nor to make believe that the defence o f the democratic tenets requires today the 
denial o f our nationalist politics' (T&T, n84, 1981). In fact, this myth-debunking 
strategy is a reverse-discourse in which the Spanish political system is portrayed as 
profoundly undemocratic:
Extract 8.3. Myth-debunking & reverse-discourse: undemocratic democracy
[a ] 'In the name of a defence of 'democrac/ and 'liberty' laws are passed -such as 
those of the defence of the Constitution or the harmonization of the autonomies- which 
on top of the anti-terrorist laws make all traces of democratic purity in the Spanish state 
fade away" ('Political framework in the national day', T&T, n 84,1981)
[b ] "There is no doubt that this is a Regime lacking in democratic purity, which in 
feverish fascist manners promulgates laws aggressive to the minimal rights o f citizens 
(anti-terrorist laws, law of defence of the constitution, Lohapa..). [...] One more among 
this is the requirement of subordination to a text such as the constitution, which 
represents: a) A particular political character: anti-nationalism, monarchism, market 
economy, privatization of public services...!..]"
('The Spanish democracy and the siege of the nationalist opposition', T&T, n 85,1982)
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The Constitution is not "pure" in its democracy, instead it is represented as 'feverish' 
and 'fasc ist'- i.e. lacking in freedom, rationality and self-restraint— and its intentions 
are therefore repressive. The 'spurious' particularities to which the false 
universalism of the democracy embodied by the Constitution is attached -its  
'particular political character'— are denounced as representing biased and 
oppressive interests: 'anti-nationalism, monarchism, market economy, privatization 
o f public services'. Although by 1982 the socialist party had already come to power -  
the story was published in June—nationalists construct continuity with the Francoist 
regime in the new democratic settlement with this reference to fascism. Besides, this 
reverse discourse needs to  be understood in the context of the parliamentary affair 
- t h e  requirement o f subordination to a text such as the Constitution' refers to the 
pledge— when all state-wide parties coalesced to pass a norm which would 
eventually take popular nationalism out of the Galician parliament. The victims of all 
this repression are 'citizens' -as opposed to peoples, nations or popular classes— 
who, as we will see later, are the typical national subjectivity at this time.
However, even if Spanish democracy is denounced as 'false' or biased, democracy's 
central place as universal to materialize is not questioned. In this text, as in the 
congresses and assemblies of the UPG and BNG, it is not 'social and national 
liberation' that is needed anymore, but democracy. A democracy equated to 
sovereignty in its content. Or rather, the other way round, what Galicia needs is 
sovereignty, which means essentially an unblemished democracy. As noted above, a 
'perfect correlation' was established between these two universal notions. By a 
sleight of hand, then, the quilting point of popular discourse -the notions of self- 
determination and sovereignty— was made synonymous with the universal 
'democracy' which the movement enthrones at this point.
In this way, nationalists started to ventriloquise the hegemonic language of the 
Transition in order to justify and legitimize their own goals. They introduced a new 
voice, that of liberal democratic narratives on rights, as the most prominent 
justification for their goals in their story-line of 'sovereignt/. There was an 
ineradicable ambiguity as regards popular nationalism's goal, as sovereignty and
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democracy were often interchanged. This liberal voice, and these tales, of course, 
are accentuated in a very different way from nationalism's other voice -the  Marxist 
and dependency narratives. This accent was also very different from that of the 
Spanish narratives on democracy.
It is possible to isolate two connected steps in this narrative strategy of 
ventriloquism of democracy. These comprise the construction o f an opposition 
between 'real' and 'repressive' democracy and the 'smuggling' in o f collective among 
individual rights. In fact, sovereignty was narrated as the exercise o f the 'essential 
democratic right' of self-determination.
Extract 8.4. On ventriloquisation o f democracy: 1. opposition real /  repressive
[a ] "Hence these are repressive, anti-democratic trices obsessed with the 'unity of the 
homeland' and with the principles of capitalist economy [...] These trices justify the 
discretional, whimsical attacks of the executive power -that is policial- to persecute and 
do away with dissidents [...] The elemental principles of a democratic regime are put in 
question, freedom of expression, of demonstration, association, reunion or the 
right to strike" (Marco politico do dia da patria, T&T, n84,1981)
[b ] "In sum, they try to create a system where surveillance and control are assured, and 
then proceed to the repression of the citizens and the peoples. We do not live in a state 
whose principal preoccupation is to ensure the rights and liberties of citizens. On the 
contrary, one of its fundamental objectives is to know what every individual is doing at 
every moment [...] In the name of 'citizen's securit/ they are justifying all their 
repressive and aggressive actions against the rights of citizens and peoples, and there is 
no intention of guaranteeing their rights to men and women.." ('On rights', BNG, II 
Assembly, 1984)
[c] 'The defence of a programme of national sovereignty for the nations integrated [in 
Spain] is totally anti-constitutional, even though that programme is part of a 
fundamental democratic right, namely the right of self-determination. Our position 
against the content of the Spanish constitution stands in direct and proportional 
relation with the defence of a framework of real public liberties' ('The defence of a 
program of national sovereignty', III Congress, UPG, 1982)
The first step in the construction of the equivalence between sovereignty and 
democracy - in  the nationalist animation of their enemy's voice— was achieved 
through the delegitimisation of Spanish democracy accomplished in its construction 
as 'repressive'. The grievances which justify and legitimize the rejection of the 
constitutional text were formulated in terms of a need for 'democracy7 and for 
'fundamental rights and liberties'. As democratic systems are supposed to guarantee
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'the rights and liberties o f citizens' (as assumed in extract 8 .3), nationalists often 
protested the Violation of democratic rights', the 'attacks on citizens' freedoms' or 
the ensuing 'repressive legislation' of the Spanish system. These grievances were 
often elided with sovereignty and self-determination. Extract 8.3.c does exactly that 
with the claim that defending national sovereignty is to defend a 'fundamental 
democratic right'. Therefore, they position themselves as 'in direct and proportional 
relation with the defence o f a framework of real public liberties'. That is, to fight for 
sovereignty is to be a real democrat, whereas the constitution is an artefact which 
hinders democracy.
The ubiquitous ideological theme in the texts o f a 'repressive democrac/ was 
transposed from the narratives of colonialism mainly in the UPG's II congress, and 
relies on a strategy of equation o f the new democratic system inaugurated in 1978 
to the former Francoist dictatorship. Extract 8.2 above is an example of this 
equalization where democracy is said to  be 'fascist'. However, the intensification of 
this theme has to be understood in the context o f a series of key events —from the 
attempted coup of February 1981 and the deployment o f the army in the streets of 
the Basque country to the expulsion o f the BNPG-PSG parliamentarians.
The second interrelated step in ventriloquising plots of democracy and rights was 
the 'smuggling' in of collective rights among the individual democratic rights 
commonly enshrined by liberal narratives o f citizenship. Albeit there are a variety of 
versions of liberal narratives, from classic liberalism to its social and cultural 
versions, all of them tend to stress both the importance of a panoply of universalist 
values -such as human rights, democracy, a commitment to the market in one way 
or another— together with individualism as their bedrock (Vincent, 2002). Individual 
rights must come first, even when some brands of liberalism also recognize the 
value of collective welfare goals or the intrinsic 'worth' of different cultures. Popular 
nationalism's narratives o f sovereignty work to  legitimize their desire for national 
sovereignty by means o f constructing it as a 'fundamental right' and by naturalizing 
a link between the individual and social rights of citizens and the generally more 
dubious -w ith in  the liberal trad ition - collective rights. Furthermore, it is collective
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rights, or even social rights, which are emphasized at the expense of individual 
rights.
Extract 8.5. Ventriloquism II: the 'smuggling' in o f collective rights.
[a ] "...the attitude of the PSOE Government as regards to the rights and liberties of the 
citizens and the peoples, brings to the fore the fight to avoid their further restriction.
The actions which [...] are reaching scandalous levels are: the total contempt for the 
rights of the peoples and for the rights which the state should secure for its society. The 
right of self-determination went from being a tactical slogan contained in the 
programmes of the first years of post-Francoism to be almost indefensible and its 
defence persecuted in practice. The right to a job as a fundamental premise in order to 
be able to talk about any other right is today an unachievable illusion for rising numbers 
of citizens. [...]. The rights to health, education, to decent social services, to a dignified 
home are vetoed for many popular sectors.. ('On rights', BNG, II assembly, 1984)
[b] "To sum up, nationalism is not compatible with a regime which, from the perspective 
of the defence of fundamental democratic liberties, is fraudulent (freedom of 
expression, conscience, opinion, demonstration, and respect for popular sovereignty)."
(A new phase for a communist party, T&T, n90,1984)
Linked to the theme of repression, the II assembly enumerates the 'rights and 
liberties of the citizens and the peoples' which were restricted (extract 8.5). Here, 
the main 'scandalous action' o f the social democrat government in Spain was 'its 
total contempt' for the 'rights o f the peoples' in the form of the absence of a right to 
self-determination. Accordingly, social rights - to  employment, health, education, 
etc— are listed as absent too. In the second extract, another enumeration of 
'fundamental democratic liberties' enumerates traditional liberal freedoms -o f 
expression, reunion, opinion, conscience- and 'popular sovereignty7 This 
enumeration is not an innocent operation. It involves displacements of meanings. 
Thus, although nationalism draws upon liberal narratives of citizenship and a 
vocabulary of rights to legitimize their position they construct 'citizens rights' as 
collective and social rights.
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The people and the citizens': retelling national subjectivities
Who is 'us', 'the people', in popular nationalism's discourse of sovereignty? What are 
the new moral and political orders locked up in the category 'the people'? As the 
contents o f the antagonistic frontiers o f the nation were modulated and 
transformed after 1981 so were the subjectivities which the narratives told as key 
elements o f discourse. A quick rerun over the different extracts of the narratives of 
sovereignty presented above shows this transformation in the new narration of the 
people. Extract 8.5 is quite revealing o f the kind o f categories and subjectivities 
typically mobilized by popular nationalism in this conjuncture. In a quite short 
paragraph we find 'the citizens and the peoples', 'the peoples', 'society', 'citizens', 
'people in the country, the mines, factories, in the service sectors', 'the people that 
work'. The paragraph, hence, displays what would be the typical compound figure in 
the story-lines of sovereignty -the  'citizen and the people' as well as the re- 
narrativization of the old Marxist class categories into a more sociological, if 
economic, understanding of groups as 'social sectors'.
This 'people' stands therefore in sharp contrast w ith that narrated in story-lines of 
colonialism which had boldly proclaimed the nation to  be 'the popular classes, 
because the nation acquires a revolutionary status against bourgeois power' (T81T, 
1976). The workers have not disappeared as a concern in the new story-lines, but the 
language of class has mostly gone. Now workers become a 'social sector' among 
others. If the people is still conceptualized in economic terms it is not collapsed to 
the Marxist privileged, chosen subjectivity. The former triad of social classes which 
formed the nation -'workers, peasants and seamen'— has been transformed into 
the less radical formula of 'people in the countryside, the sea, the mines, the 
factories and the service sector', 'people that work' or 'popular sectors'. Moreover, 
the 'symbiotic worker' and the 'emigrant' which were key objects in the colonialism 
story-line have now virtually disappeared.
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In the above extract, for example, 'workers' are constructed as 'people', implying 
that their economic position might not necessarily determine their identity as a 
whole. The radical sting o f the old categorization and construction of the nation 
based on class struggle and the denationalization of the powerful was being 
progressively phased out. If the people was now being represented as formed by a 
variety of economic 'sectors' this internal heterogeneity shuns antagonisms other 
than those with the Constitution and the Spanish unitary state. Instead, their 
compatibility is implicitly assumed. The 'people' was already becoming a diverse but 
organic whole, where all social sectors could find their role in 'Galician society'.
What is key to the understanding of these moves towards a more organic society is 
the new figure of discourse which now emerged and would come to define this 
period: 'the citizen', always linked to and complemented by 'the people'. The trouble 
with the composite category o f 'the citizen and the people' lied in the tensions it 
inscribed in the narratives as a result of the dialogue and ventriloquisation of 
hegemonic discourses of democracy. The tensions show ventriloquism to be a 
doubled-edge sword. For if there are citizens in Spain -o r  rather in the Spanish 
state— these have been summoned up by the Constitution which nationalists 
insistently reject. This can be seen in the 'political framework' constructed by the 
BNG's I assembly: 'Galician nationalism stands fo r  the rupture with the present 
political Regime as it  represents the explicit and aggressive negation o f [our] 
principles and it  gravely attempts to oppose the fundamental liberties o f the citizens 
and the Nations which integrate the Spanish State'. If the constitution is the anti­
community -i.e. it denies and forbids the existence of Galician nationhood—, it also 
brings about a setting for nationalism's space of representation, the site of 
citizenship. Nationalists are not Spanish nationals: but are they Spanish citizens? In 
their reliance on the category of 'citizens' popular nationalisms inscribed themselves 
in that which they rejected and which supposedly denies their existence. In spite of 
the anti-constitutional furore worsened by their ousting from the Galician 
parliament, nationalist narrative practices are profoundly enmeshed in the new 
constitutional order. Nationalists fiercely reject the new system while simultaneously 
subtlety undermining their own opposition to it.
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Collective subjectivity and equivocation: performing the 'democratic self.
The pertinent context for understanding the narration of the BNG and popular 
nationalism as the embodiment of democracy was the parliamentary affair explained 
above. In the BNPG-PSG myth this event signified 'the most shameless violation of 
the popular will and sovereignty" ('Letter from the BNPG-PSG parliamentarians to 
the public opinion', T&T, November 1982). Whilst the short-circuit sovereignty- 
democracy-nationalism predated this event, (the III congress had started to perform 
it) the affair certainly strengthened the connection:'denouncing the violation about 
to be consummated does not only compete the parliamentarians directly affected by 
it. Not does it  correspond exclusively to the sectors identified with the ideological 
programme represented by those parliamentarians. It is an exigency o f the most 
elemental democratic principles. [...]. No democrat [..] is legitimated to inhibit himself 
from  a rejection o f the attack on popular sovereignty about to be 
consummated'{\b\di.). Popular nationalism interpellated not just their supporters, but 
'democrats' as a whole. In fact, it demanded from 'democrats' active support for 
their cause in the very name of democracy. The expulsions bodily fused the 
nationalists to universal 'democracy': the attack on them was an attack on all, an 
attack on democracy itself.
From the event of the expulsion of the parliamentarians followed a display of 
narrative anxiety in nationalist sites and texts around their principles, conditions of 
participation -and exclusion- in the new system which was not fully resolved until 
almost 1987. Whilst the III congress had opted for a 'political w a / of conducting 
their political practice -meaning an implicit renunciation of violence— and 
negotiated their oppositional identity to the point of narrating their participation in 
the new institutional system as non contradictory with their principles -in  spite of 
the Constitution being their arch-enemy- a line was traced, a clear frontier, between 
actual participation and the symbolic legitimisation of the system. The 
honorableness and integrity o f the movement was not perceived as compromised by
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participation itself -the  alternative being 'isolation' and 'irrelevance'— but the 
formula of swearing loyalty: 'acatar y guardar fidelidad a la Constitution y al 
Estatuto de Galicia' was represented as an intolerable humiliation.
The anxiety that ensued from their absence from Parliament further exacerbated a 
tendency already in place in nationalist sites: the double-voicedness and ambiguity 
in the narratives where 'nos' ('us') stood ambiguously for 'the p a rt/, 'the nation' and 
even for 'democrac/. Nationalism constructed itself as the true democratic self. The 
stories of the parliamentary affair and of democracy are brimming with ambiguous 
language, elision and slippage of meanings. The II assembly of the BNG 
paradigmatically displays these elisions:
Extract 8 . 6 : On nationalism as democratic-self
"It is necessary to clarify and reaffirm within our social base and the people in general 
that, in the present political circumstances, the defence of the right to self- 
determination is a key objective of the BNG. It is NOT that the Regime [should] 
recognize a particular 'alternative' to lead in practice this [right] in each of the nations 
of the state; but that [the regime] should be forced to admit the legal existence, 
without repression or persecution, of the political forces who defend this right. This 
way our struggle is just a defence of the minimal democratic principles, of the rights of 
the peoples -violated constantly in practice and in the 'constitutional' legislation of the 
present Regime (Anti-terrorist law, Plan Zen, Local government law, electoral law). We 
should not be deceived: the Spanish constitution and its statutes of autonomy are the 
source from which all these bundles of repressive legislation and attitudes stem; as they 
are belligerently anti-national, imperialist and anti-popular texts; moreover [these are 
texts] pervaded with great ambiguities and limits as regards the exercise of minimal 
democratic liberties. This is the reason why it is so important for us not to legitimize 
nor accept those texts. They deny our right to existence; they condition out everyday 
life. They must disappear for the popular desire to be advanced." ('BNG's position 
before the autonomic elections", BNG, II Assembly, December 1984)
This passage shows the typical themes of nationalism during the conjuncture. The 
text reaffirms the BNG's goal, 'in the present political circumstances', of a 
'consistent' [consequent] political defence of the right of self-determination. Here 
the 'circumstances' and the 'consistent' refer, as explained above, to the 
parliamentary affair and their decision to refuse swearing loyalty to the Constitution. 
The aim is peculiar: not just that 'the regime' should 'recognise a specific alternative 
that conducts it  in each nation of the state' but that the 'regime' should be forced to
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'admit the legal existence...of [we] political forces that defend this right'. The 
grammar and syntax are cumbersome. What the passage means by 'alternative' is 
unclear but, in the light o f the second part of the sentence we could imagine they 
refer to some kind of legal disposition for example, as opposed to 'alternative' 
meaning a political party. For these parties are precisely what the text claims are not 
recognised 'w ithout repression and persecution' -and the grievance hinges heavily 
upon this qualification for these forces were in fact already legal. This recognition -  
the recognition of popular nationalism's positioning- is the very aim of the BNG.
This awkward expression might have stemmed as a response to the reasoning of the 
Constitutional Tribunal (henceforth TC) which had in January of 1984 sentenced 
against nationalism. Nationalism had argued to the TC that simply swearing to obey 
or 'acatar' was not an issue, but performing an oath of fidelity impinged on matters 
of conscience and ideological liberty. The tribunal responded that swearing 'fidelity' 
was to be interpreted as synonymous to swearing to comply with the authority of 
the Constitution -i.e. the negative obligation o f not acting against it and the positive 
obligation of acting according to it. Moreover, the TC continued, swearing allegiance 
to the Constitution did not impinge in matters o f conscience because the 
Constitution itself enshrined ideological freedom, political plurality and a procedure 
to be legally changed (TC 122/1983). Galician popular nationalism disagreed, and so 
decided not to so swear and risk the consequences.
Extract 8.6 above seems to be implicitly in a dialogue with the TC, rejecting its 
arguments. The freedoms and legal procedures enshrined by the Constitution were 
not conducive to the right of self-determination. Instead, the route to realising self- 
determination should have been more specific: 'admitir a existencia legal, sen 
represions nen persecutions, das forzas politicos que estamos na defensa deste 
direito" . In short, to allow the BNG's MPs back into parliament without swearing the 
fidelity oath. 'This way our struggle is simply a defence of the minimal democratic 
principles, o f the rights of the people.' continues the passage above. The connection 
was hereby made: a defence of self-determination is equivalent to a recognition of 
the BNG's postulates and this is in turn made equivalent to defending 'the minimal
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democratic principles' and to 'the rights of the people'. This short circuit establishes, 
then, the defence of BNG mps' position not to swear fidelity to the constitution as 
the embodiment o f 'minimal democracy' and rights of peoples. The BNG has, by a 
sleight of hand, become the particularity which stands in for the universals of 
democracy and self-determination. The front, and its vicissitudes, has become the 
yardstick of democracy.
The Constitution and autonomy were, on the other hand, the source of all repressive 
legislation and attitudes because they were, nationalists claimed, 'anti-nationalist', 
'anti-popular7, 'imperialist' and they erected barriers to liberties and freedoms. This 
was the argument that explicitly justified nationalism's choice not to swear 
allegiance: 'the reason why it is so important for us not to legitimize nor accept these 
texts'. These reasons were th a t ' they deny our right to existence; they condition our 
everyday life. They must disappear for the national desires to be advanced'. 
Although 'us' in the text clearly refered to the BNG -those who have not sworn- it is 
vague who is implied by 'our7 in the next sentence: is it the front or the people /  
nation who are denied a right to existence? Whose everyday life is conditioned by 
the constitution and the autonomy? The last sentence gives us a clue on how to read 
the passage: 'they must disappear fo r the national desires to be advanced'. Hence, 
'us' is equivocally a reference to 'us' the front -whose everyday political life has 
clearly been affected by the texts— and 'us' the 'popular desires or nation. But if the 
'popular desires' are the wishes of 'the people' as opposed to nationalisms' wishes, 
then this passage overall actually works to equivocate the front to democracy and 
even to 'the people'.
The trouble with these articulations and equivocations is not a question of faulty 
logic, but of their sheer irrelevance for a majority o f the Galician people at the time. 
Therefore, the problem was the political consequences this sliding of terms brought 
upon nationalism. If political struggles are struggles to fix the particular content 
which would come to define a relevant universal concept -i.e. achieving a 
hegemony— then, As Slavoj 2izek argues, 'it is at the level of which particular 
content [of a universal notion] counts as typical that ideological battles are won or
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lost' (1999: 205). This (contingent) link between a 'typical' particular content -i.e. 
the epitome of a conjuncture— and an absent universal -sovereignty, democracy— 
was accomplished by popular nationalism through this counter-narrative of 
sovereignty which ventriloquises the Spanish hegemonic discourses of democracy 
and rights. But the typicality of the concrete, particular content of this counter- 
hegemonic democracy was more than questionable. A narrative of the decision to 
reject the oath and remain absent from parliament of a small party -which 
commanded then a tiny percentage of the vote even though it had a fairly wide 
mobilization capacity— may seem farfetched. It was particularly so in the context of 
the parliamentary conservative majority in Santiago and the euphoria reigning in the 
country's progressive base as a result of the first socialist landslide in Madrid. And 
yet, this was what popular nationalism narrated.
Extracts 8.7: On policy choices
[a ] "The expelling of the nationalist MPs will be the central axis of the struggle for 
democracy, in Galicia and the state, at least while the situation is normalized. We can 
assure that the final result in the battle for the democratization and sovereignty of 
Galicia depends to a great extent on the re-establishment of the rights which, by 
popular mandate, correspond to us in the institutions" ('Protest actions against the 
expelling of the nationalist parliamentarians', T&T, n88,1983)
[b] "Our objective would be to convince the people that [nationalism's] stance is 
essential if we want to, at least, achieve a minimal democratization of the political life 
of the institutions in the electoral struggle; and to force the Regime to accept our 
political existence (struggle for the right of self determination)." ('BNG's position before 
the autonomic elections', BNG, II Assembly, December 1984)
These passages further illustrate how popular nationalism represented the issue of 
the expulsions as key for the movement. Extract 8.7.a presents 'the reestablishment 
of rights' as nationalism's central political battle and equates it to the struggle for 
'democratization and sovereignt/.
232
8.4. Narrative inversion: the IV congress and the struggle from within
The representation of the expulsions as the key issue for nationalism and the 
consensus around which the non-swearing policy was maintained was being 
progressively eroded. As the second autonomic election approached, the voices in 
the BNG which desired a reconsideration o f this position grew louder. The issue of 
not swearing allegiance had been narrated as a matter of life and death, where 'the 
reason o f our existence, the existence o f Galician nationalism, in the quest fo r  
national sovereignty, in a political path, is a t risk' and 'not to obey means the right 
to exist (T&T, n85, 1982). Yet, after 1985, survival was progressively narratively 
pinched on being able to participate in institutional life again. This shift was 
performed by the UPG as going back to their roots: that is, their need to truly comply 
with the mandate for political action and the policy o f 'no empty fields' sketched out 
in the III congress. It was, as well, constructed as 'partial defeat in the short term': 
swearing meant 'o step backwards in the positions we had conquered fo r power'. It 
became the story of a necessary evil, but not yet a willing acceptance of the 
constitutional order.
This shift, nevertheless, was the beginning o f an internal struggle and crisis within 
popular nationalism sites. There was no unanimity around using electoral 
participation as the primary way forward. Part o f this nationalism still considered 
popular mobilization to be the way to social and political conquests -and 
institutional participation simply one more tool. This 'necessary evil' tale was 
portrayed by some as the gateway to total surrender of the collective self. This 
sector -which eventually formed the 'Manifesto Politico 22 de Marzo' and soon after 
the 'Partido Comunista de Liberacion Nacional' (Communist Party for National 
Liberation, henceforth PCLN) — had partially hegemonized the UPG at the time of 
the IV congress.
The UPG's IV congress performed both a continuation of the conjuncture -relying on 
similar stories, ideological themes and antagonisms and fully part of the problematic
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of sovereignty- and simultaneously reversed and shifted its strategies. Contrary to 
textual strategies so far, which segregated the transposition of imperialism, the 'war 
and peace' theme, to the stories of the world-system and narrated most of their 
tales of the country and the state within the liberal plots of sovereignty, democracy 
and rights, the IV congress inverted this segregation. Here, the presence of the 
imperialism and the dependency plot was dominant throughout and liberal plots of 
democracy and rights were restricted to the tales of autonomy and the 
parliamentary affair. Thus, whilst dependency masternarratives still narrated a 
political enemy and equated relations between countries with class relations, these 
texts relied much more on class language and the transposition of colonialism. This 
reversion was to be undone, again, in the V congress.
The expulsion of the PCLN, and its joining with earlier expelled groups, from the BNG 
finally marked the end of the conjuncture of the 1980s for popular nationalism. It 
had split again into different story-lines and different fields o f statements. 
Progressively the more radical antagonistic tales are othered from the main 
nationalist sites. The V congress of the UPG is telling in this respect. As a site of 
struggle on the need for swearing allegiance, it narrates both the antagonism with 
the constitution and the need for participation. However, this antagonism with the 
constitution and autonomy is here considerably more diffuse, less stark.
8.5. Conclusion
The narratives and stories of the nation, autonomy and the movement, and the tales 
of the world system were juxtaposed in the texts in striking ways. The former relied 
on liberal and individualist ethos and vocabularies of democracy and rights, the 
latter on citing and performing /  transforming colonialism. These narratives, which 
were different, disjointed but adjacent, performed both continuity and change. They 
ensured the stability and continuity o f identity and normative authority of the groups 
in a time of crisis while thoroughly re-signifying the movement. In fact, it is not 
surprising that the ambiguity o f their positioning have led many scholars to suggest
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contradictory theses: either there was no change or change had been significantly 
achieved. After all, the country's forms were blurred -fo r citing and disavowing 
require lack of specification-, common themes were displaced but the radical 
antagonistic frontiers were kept.
However, if the existence in the common imaginary of a people of a shared 
antagonism is a requisite for the formation of a national community, then popular 
nationalism was seriously undermining itself during the 1980s. Although their 
antagonistic frontier responded to the new political terrain -th a t of the 
consolidation of the hegemony of democracy in Spain— it did so in a solipsistic 
fashion. Galicia's inhabitants could hardly recognize and identify with nationalism's 
demands or grievances as tru ly theirs. If the hyperbolic antagonism of the story-lines 
of colonialism had at root a kernel o f viability in the verisimilitude of its grievances 
('polluting industries' and 'emigration'); now the antagonism narrated becomes 
unfeasible as a social imaginary. The Spanish constitution of 1978 was simply not 
seen as an evil force blocking a desire for nationhood as nationalists insisted. 
'Sovereignt/ was not of widespread concern; it lacked resonance in the wider 
society.
Moreover, the particularity standing in for 'sovereignt/ was 'nationalism' itself. This 
only contributed to further isolate nationalism from the 'people' they were allegedly 
representing. This movement was only counterbalanced by their attempt to embody 
'democrac/ and the re-signification o f the liberal narratives of citizenship. However, 
as will be shown in the next chapter, the problematic constitution of antagonisms 
which are not shared remains in these years, for the images and plots inscribed in 
the textual practices of popular nationalism are not true universals or even 
generalizations, but respond, mainly, to an extension to the nation as whole of the 
specific, contextual and particularistic experiences of antagonism suffered by the 
movement itself.
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9Narrating 'self-organization': the myth of unity and the BNG
Popular nationalism in Galicia -a  fragmented field of Marxist and socialist sites which 
narrated Galicia as a colony o f Spain- was first and foremost formed in a struggle 
with and opposition to Spain. A relation of antagonism between the forces of 
nationalism and 'sovereignt/ against the Spanish constitution and the system of 
autonomous communities, which was said to simply regionalize the state, was the 
main discursive strategy o f the movement. It externalized the enemy /  other via the 
narrating of an equivalent political frontier. This antagonism was epitomized in the 
emblematic issue of these years (1981-1985), namely when three nationalist 
parliamentarians of the coalition BN-PG - PSG abandoned, or 'were expelled from', 
the Galician parliament in 1983 because o f their refusal to swear allegiance to the 
Spanish constitution.
However, here I am mainly concerned with another discursive strategy of the 
movement in the 'asphyxiating' political conjuncture of the consolidation of 
democracy in Spain: the myth of unity and the foundation of the BNG. So far 
subordinated to the former, this strategy was an attempt at constructing a unity 
internal to the highly fragmented field o f forces and forms of knowledge. Unity was 
to be achieved through the addition and combination of diverse sites and 
positionings in a single party /  front structure. It meant opening up the possibility of 
new articulations of nationalist political forces. That is, it becomes important to deal 
with the internal and organizational responses to the identity dilemma which the 
political conjuncture of consolidation of democracy posed for nationalism. This is a 
case study of the formulation of 'u n it / :  the tensions and paradoxes of the logic of 
equivalence and difference, openness and exclusionary tactics. This discursive 
strategy is more than a mere 'organizational' question. The organization reaches the
236
core of the ideological structure of the nationalist movement. Needless to say, both 
strategies, the strong antagonism towards the Constitution and the attempt at co­
opting nationalist forces in a unitary front, worked simultaneously and were deeply 
entangled.
9.1. Heteroglot terrains (III): the struggle over unity.
In September of 1982 a new nationalist site, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), 
was formed. It was a new, ambitious, but also ambiguous political structure which 
proclaimed achieving the unity of nationalism as its main concern and 
accomplishment in the 'difficult times' of early Spanish democracy. The background 
to the formation of the BNG were two years o f bitter struggles and in-fighting after 
the formation of the 'Mesa de Forzas Politicos Galegas'  in 1980 as regards the 
narration of the nation and, consequently, the most appropriate organization for 
nationalism. That is, the way of organizing came to stand for the very identity of the 
movement, and also embodied the conception of the nation.
The new democratic hegemony had brought an autonomy which was, as Beramendi 
says, 'perfectly able to function without nationalism' (Beramendi, 2007:1112). 
During the initial three years o f democracy three important electoral processes, 
which were a radical novelty for all the political actors involved, took place in Galicia: 
its statute of autonomy was voted on and approved in a referendum in December 
1980147; the first autonomic regional elections took place a year later (in October 
1981); and the Spanish general elections in October 1982. These brought very poor 
results for 'popular' nationalism. It had opposed the statute and lost despite 
contrary expectations (Fernandez Baz, 2003). It obtained scant 9.6% of the vote in 
the autonomic Parliament148 which became dominated by the Spanish-nationalist 
conservatives of Alianza Popular (30.5%). The general elections in 1982 castigated 
them further: they obtained fewer than 5% of the vote and no representation in the 
Spanish Congress -where the PSOE had gained an absolute majority.
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To make matters worse, their presence in the autonomic parliament soon run into 
trouble, as we saw in chapter 8, because in July 1982 the BN-PG-PSG, but not 
Esquerda Galega, refused to swear to abide by the Constitution -already narratively 
identified as their arch-enemy. As a result they were stripped of their rights to 
parliamentary initiative, only being allowed to keep the right to vote (Fernandez Baz, 
203:111). This episode was represented as proof of the 'repressive' character of the 
new democracy. Thus, after less than three years o f democracy, popular nationalism 
had managed to keep itself on the outside of all relevant institutions with the 
exception of local corporations -where they were also facing normalizing pressures.
Unsurprisingly, the Marxist nationalism of the BN-PG and PSG was acutely feeling 
homogenizing pressures to adapt and was perceived to be 'under attack'. The 
narrated attack on the country was also represented as an attack on them as they 
embodied the democratic and sovereignty universals. They were not the only ones. 
By 1982, most of the Spanish parties of the radical left had disappeared (Laiz, 1995). 
For most parties, adjusting their programmes and adapting to the constitution and 
the new democratic system149 -renouncing the revolutionary edge of their 
ideology— meant losing their specificity and difference vis-a-vis the hegemonic 
forces of the left. Even the PCE, which had been the major party in the opposition to 
Francoism for decades, was in deep crisis (Preston, 1986). This climate of 'retreat' 
and defeat -marked by their clear failure to obtain 'rupture' with the system and 
become a surface of inscription able to register the wider interests of the inhabitants 
of the region— caused a knotty dilemma regarding identity for the nationalist sites. 
They could retain their narratives of colonization in spite of their diminished 
readability and risk political marginalization, or they could adapt to the new 
democracy by loosening up their norms, boundaries and claims to authority and risk 
unravelling the movement150.
The nationalist response to this challenge was 'unity'. In June 1980, the 'Mesa de 
Forzas Politicos Galegas' crystallized. The 'Mesa' was a platform which coordinated 
action among the PSG, UPG and AN-PG. Its main agreement was to campaign against
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the statute and then to contest the autonomic elections of 1981 together under the 
electoral coalition BN-PG-PSG. Later, after some preliminary meetings and 
discussions among the sites which responded to the unitary call made by the PSG151, 
the Bloque Nacionalista G a lego, which was a "patriotic" front initially uniting several 
parties, social organizations and individuals, was formed.
Rereading unity
The birth o f the BNG is commonly narrated, by nationalism and scholars alike, as a 
milestone in the construction of "u n it/ (Beramendi, 2007; Baz, 2003; Fernan Velio 
and Pillado Mayor, 1989:225). In fact, the origins o f the BNG are often traced as far 
back as the 'Consello da Mocidade', a platform o f multiple nationalist sites created in 
1963. Thus, the almost twenty years of history where no such unity existed are 
effaced. Moreover, unity is plotted as an immediate success story by popular 
nationalism or, in scholarly accounts, as a "progressive" success story of the efforts 
and achievements of nationalism, dotted with disappointments, from the barren 
landscape of early 1960s to the present day. The main expounder of this thesis is 
Barreiro Rivas, who explicitly claims:
"Analyzed from today's prespective, from the vantage point of someone who knows the 
end of the tale, the recent history of nationalism is far from that feeling of swing and 
rectification which accompanied the successive creation of the Consello da Mocidade, 
the UPG, the Consello de Forzas Politicos Galegas (CFPG), the AN-PG, o BN-PG and the 
BNG. It appears, on the contrary, as a logical process with a high degree of internal 
coherence taking place around the UPG, which would be able not only of catalyzing and 
unifying left-wing nationalism [...] In this sense it would be an error of interpretation to 
think the Riazor assembly as a break with former ideological and organizational models 
[...]" (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:115)
Rivas teleologically narrativizes the history of nationalism. He transforms a complex, 
fragmented and contradictory set of processes, goals and organizations into the 
single story of the rather smooth development o f the UPG. That is, "with hindsight" a 
plot can be constructed where the end builds logical connections between episodes 
and sense is made of what, if looked at closely, seemed quite disparate events.
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Admittedly, other accounts are considerably more nuanced. However, even a 
judicious scholar such as J. Beramendi, in spite o f noting the 'early failure' o f the 
BNG, considers its foundation as a conscious turning point, 'the epiphanic moment' 
of nationalism (Beramendi, 2007). However, if an epiphany is a clear moment of 
revelation and insight, then it seems an overstatement to apply it to the highly 
tortuous first years of existence of the BNG which, as we will see, were fraught with 
exclusions.
These accounts tend to  erase from view the subordination of any idea of 'u n it /  to 
the strong antagonistic frontier with the Constitution which the popular movement 
was following at the time and which had its emblematic issue in the 'expelling' of the 
nationalist MPs from the Galician parliament, in spite of the original othering of a 
multitude o f political forces which this implied. Also, it is often occluded that 
important ideological shifts are needed to allow a serious consideration of a unified 
nationalist field. These shifts were in place only by 1989. From the early 1990s the 
BNG did start to grow both electorally and in terms of attracting nationalist parties 
to the front structure. Hence, it took almost a decade for the BNG to truly realize the 
'additive' project and internal logic which was in 1982 just barely present.
Besides, most accounts either ignore or downplay the identity dilemma and the crisis 
it provokes in nationalist sites. But this crisis was, in fact, the condition of possibility 
for 'unity' and the BNG. The crisis opened up alternative stories of the nation and 
ways of organizing from inside popular nationalism: a complex European small 
nation, a mass party. The formation of the BNG took place in the midst of and as a 
result of the most serious dissensions within the fading discourse of colonialism. The 
front was the organizational project at the heart of the nation 'under attack' story­
line, which demanded a continuity and (re)narrativization with the discourse of 
colonialism and the popular front, as explored in chapters 7 and 8. This story-line 
eventually won over others. However, nationalist explanations disassociate their 
internal struggles from the efforts to achieve 'u n it /  and reorganize the field. These 
are constructed often as nationalism's 'successful response to the attacks on the 
country'. Moreover, they lim it and individualize responsibility for their crisis. It
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becomes a problem to adapt, the result of 'a chilled and relaxed attitude before the 
hostility of the times', affecting some individuals who 'did not want to fight costly 
conflicts' or advocated an 'electoral possibilism which would destroy the UPG' (III 
congress, 1982). Some scholarly interpretations have followed suit. Fernandez Baz, 
who provides a detailed description of the formation of the BNG, nevertheless 
discusses the crisis as a somehow adjacent but separate development, i.e. posing no 
distinct consequences or effects, from the building of unity (Fernandez Baz, 2003)
Thus, I would like to argue for the necessary complexification of these explanations 
and against the historicist exercise of smoothing out the rough passages in the tale 
which severely underplay the heterogeneity, struggles and transformations that 
pervaded nationalism as a movement. The BNG was not the only and inevitable path 
for an articulation of nationalist forces at the time. Nor was 'u n it /  as a front the only 
possible direction, as it transpired. Although some of them were defeated and 
silenced, serious attempts were made at constructing a different nationalism in the 
early 1980s. Hence, on the one hand the POG -now  reconstituted as Esquerda 
Galega— the Partido Galeguista (PG) and Coalicion Galega remained outside the 
new platform, and gained considerable electoral support in the mid 1980s. On the 
other hand, as the Mesa de Forzas Politicas Galegas formed and decided to create 
another electoral brand for the regional elections in 1981 (the BN-PG-PSG electoral 
coalition) its constituent sites were already in deep turmoil and were unravelling. 
What was at stake was the very conception of the nation and nationalism, the core 
identity of the movement
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9.2. The front, unity & disorder: origins of a new strategy of difference.
Nationalist sites in the early 1980s were tentatively starting to modulate and shift 
their own old systems of classification and boundaries of us and them: nationalism 
vs. 'spanishism' and 'pseudo-nationalism'. In fact, barely mentioned anymore, some 
of these labels, particularly 'spanishism', were soon to disappear from these sites152. 
The contours o f nationalism were now being reorganized via changes of emphasis 
and metonymic displacements. Who is 'us' was therefore destabilized and became a 
little more uncertain in the context o f their profound identity crisis. However, the 
fluidity was soon closed down and a new definition emerged which attempted to be 
more expansive and inclusive. Popular nationalism was threading a new hegemonic 
centre and renewal o f their key oppositions: 'sovereignty vis-a-vis the constitution' 
progressively substituted 'liberation vis-a-vis the Spanish imperialist state'. 
Nevertheless, it was also initiating what would prove to be, in due time, a powerful 
discursive strategy and articulatory structure. On its own it was not based in 
oppositions, but in the building of alliances internal to the movement. That was the 
logic of difference through which the BNG originated.
Discursive formations are sustained by the effects o f the political frontiers inscribed 
in and (re)inscribing them (Norval, 2000:220). These normative boundaries work to 
organize social space, through division and combinations of social and political 
groups. In trying to achieve a societal hegemony, a political project may divide the 
social into friends and enemies or it may work to construct sets of alliances as amply 
as possible -o r  a combination of both. The latter strategy is what Laclau and Mouffe 
called a 'logic of difference', that is, is a political strategy which works to increase the 
number o f differential positionings or groups which 'can enter in combination and 
hence of continuity with one another' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 130). This strategy 
is similar to Gramsci's description of 'transformismo' . Transformism is the process of 
political cooptation which involves, Gramsci noted, a 'gradual but continuous 
absorption' and taming, 'o f the active elements produced by allied groups and even
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those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile' 
(Gramsci, 1971:59; Norval, 2000). Transformism tends to lessen antagonistic 
boundaries, or to blur ideological distinctions such as those between left and right, 
as it brings groups together. This strategy had been successfully put into practice by 
the discourse of democracy during the transition and its aftermath.
Stories o f unity: the transposition o f colonialism and the popular fron t
As a design, the 'patriotic front' -the  solution given by the majority faction of 
nationalism to the dilemma of how to act in the context of democracy in Spain— 
was the institutional fixation and 'material' embodiment of the re-narrativization 
strategies put in place after 1981. It was the institutional form which embedded this 
renarrativization of the movement, the nation and its social practices153. The identity 
crisis and the consequent process of the re-articulation o f forces which ended with 
the formation of the BNG in September 1982 was immersed in messianic tales of a 
seriously endangered country. This danger to the nation and the nationalist 
collective self justified a 'desperate' need for a nationalist un ity -'the  unity of those 
for whom the fatherland comes first' (GS, PSG, July 1982). The stories of 'unity' 
produced in different sites vary slightly but all share a basic but unfinished plot. This 
unfinished character of the tales, which is generally common to political stories, is 
the result of being caught in 'the process o f being made', of composing its powerful 
image (Bhabha, 1990: 3; Shenhav, 2005).
At a simple level, the common elements in the plot of the generic tales of 'unity' are 
the terrible situation o f attack and duress suffered by the country and its nationalist 
forces which is enforced by the constitution -th e  name of the enemy which 
condensed other grievances such as the devolution settlement, membership of the 
EEC and NATO, the economic crisis and so on. This situation is so dire that something 
must be done, the epiphanic moment as noted in the tales. What is to be done is the 
unity o f nationalism, necessary to 'organize the defence of the coun tr/. There are,
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however, variations o f the plot and different subplots in the tales told by different 
nationalist sites. Thus, the PSG's narratives have a salient subplot of the 'responsible 
p a r t/  which 'seeks to articulate u n it /  and the UPG's a subplot of an 'increasing 
repression of nationalism'.
Although these narratives are caught 'in medias res', unclear in terms of how the 
process ends, they dedicate considerable space to a re-narrativization of the nation 
which justifies the need for unity, characterized as these tales are by long descriptive 
settings and brief actions and exhortations to action (Labov and Waletzky, 1997). 
Not only plenty of narrative space in each tale is dedicated to descriptions of the 
present conjuncture, but between 1981 and 1982 sixteen stories of 'u n it /  appeared 
in the party periodicals GS and T&T. This is a considerable narrative production 
taking into account that the UPG's magazine was silent for 10 months at this time. 
Curiously enough, if the tales o f world-system and the narratives of sovereignty 
examined in chapters 7 and 8 implicitly reconstructed the representation of 
Galicia154, it is during the discussions and narrations on how to build a new unity 
where the imaginings of the nation really came to the fore. These narrative spaces 
are interesting because the nation's contours were at this juncture getting blurred: 
never directly told, one has to reconstruct them from the traces they leave in all 
tales woven at the time155.
Now, in the descriptions of the country and in the new conjunctures appearing as 
long orientations156 in the tales of unity, an iteration of colonialism and a 
resignification of the nation go hand in hand as constative claims. Such claims as 
these are always to some degree performative (Butler, 1993:11):
Extract 9.1. On citing 'colonialism' and re-signifying the nation.
"Galicia needs a platform of nationalist unity where we can all, [...], overcome the 
differences that separate us and where we can find a way for the construction of a 
sovereign Galicia. The political situation of our Nation demands this [unity] urgently. [...]
In Galicia, the penetration of the monopolies and the exploitation of our riches has 
increased ...The Spanish constitution consecrates this situation. The persistence of an 
iron central administration; the lack of statutory competences and of adequate 
institutions; the antidemocratic and even 'anti-constitutional' way in which the
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autonomous institutions are being implemented; the cultural and linguistic repression; 
the known hecatomb which Spanish membership of the EEC will mean for Galicia, 
characterize a dramatic situation before which the capacity of resistance of the Country 
has proved to be insufficient" ('Organize the resistance', GS, PSG, May 1982)
Extract 9.1. presents a powerful counter hegemonic account of the political and 
economic situation in Galicia. The tale -o f  which this is only an excerpt— is 
paradigmatic of the stories calling for unity. It enumerates the social and economic 
evils which Galicia faces and powerfully makes claims to truth through a series of 
non modalized, authoritative constative statements that provide an alternative to 
the hegemonic story. This dominant narrative was that of a successful democracy 
which had devolved power to  the regions and of economic difficulties offset by 
membership of the EEC and access to  its commerce, political stability and funds. By 
mentioning the increased presence of monopolies and the plunge in the country's 
wealth, GS instead implicitly draws on the colonialism story-line to represent Galicia. 
This is not an anti-colonialism tale, however. Relying on religious imagery, it strongly 
blames the constitution for being devoted to furthering these economic and political 
evils with zeal. The use of term 'consecrate' brings about images of sacrosanct, 
inviolable norms and deeds which are above criticism or change and which could 
mobilize extreme punitive powers. The evils described are an irrelevant autonomy, 
an 'antidemocratic' (in an ironic stance marked by the inverted commas in the text) 
institutionalization process, cultural and linguistic demise and, worst of all, a 
'hecatomb' in the form o f membership of the EEC. Again religious imagery works to 
present membership as the public sacrifice of the Galicians to the EEC.
This enumeration of terrible evils works to build a climate of emergency and to 
mobilize a response - 'to  organize resistance'— as the country, the story tells us, has 
proved as yet unable to do so. The enumeration justifies the moral of the tale 
presented at the very beginning: 'Galicia needs a platform of nationalist unity' and 
'the political situation o f our Nation claims for this [unity] urgently'. The story then, 
positions nationalists as the only saviours o f a defenceless nation under terrible 
attacks. It passivizes and feminizes the country as awaiting rescue, and seems to 
completely disregard the recent electoral results. However, this strong rhetoric can
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also be seen as an attempt to respond to and redress their electoral insignificance. 
In the context of the identity crisis it might have been directed to an internal 
nationalist audience in an effort to overcome what was seen as a crippling 
weakness: their divisions.
The meanings o f 'unity'
This re-signification of the nation brought about a need for 'unity' and hence also a 
need to (re)define it. In the story-line o f colonialism as told by the UPG, unity was an 
ideological theme intimately related to the organization of a successful 'national- 
popular' struggle for the national and social liberation of the popular classes. It was 
part of a vocabulary of motives constituting the Marxist -and hyper-masculinist— 
identity o f membership o f a party and o f the working and popular classes as actively 
struggling against their common enemy. Unity was articulated to ideas of hard and 
parsimonious work and an ethos and practice of unflinching resistance, 
combativeness and permanent mobilization. Moreover, it was achieved though 
identification with the party (UPG) and the front (AN-PG): it should be 'monolithic', 
'disciplined', 'unanimous', 'lacking in fissures', representing 'one will'. Unity was, 
then, constructed simply as an internal homogeneity and identification with the 
central committee of the party. Thus, it was a theme strongly contributing to non 
democratic practices, which sustained 'democratic centralism', stifled dissent, 
mocked assembly principles and furthered the fragmentation of the movement as a 
whole.
In contrast to this, 'unity' in these tales is a hegemonizing strategy which pertains to 
the actions of the nationalist parties and groups. Nationalism should overcome its 
divisions and build unity for the sake of the welfare of the country. However, the 
pending issue was how it was going to be realized.
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Extract 9. 2. Unity is a front, a party, an organization, plurality.
[a ] "In the questioning by some political forces of the necessity of a Patriotic Front in 
Galicia, it transpires not only their valorisation of the colonial reality, but also their 
position as regards the political process in the State, the constitutional framework and 
the Autonomy. In order to justify the lack of viability for a political front they argue that 
Galicia is located in Europe, that European societies are very 'complex' and have a 
degree of development which makes a front project, typical of third world countries, 
impossible. [...] It is true that Galicia is located in Europe...but the need for a patriotic 
front resides in the absence of national sovereignty and in the economic situation of 
many classes and social sectors that have an objective interest in breaking the 
colonization we suffer"
(The need for a patriotic front in Galicia', T&T, UPG, 85, May-June 1982)
[b] "It is not a matter of repeating alien historic experiences both in time as in their 
political reality, but of finding a formula for the political articulation of the diverse 
sectors and currents which make up the nationalist left. It is a matter of constituting, 
within respect for ideological and organic plurality, a common field for militancy in 
order to push together the cart of our liberation" ('Mulling over the nationalist unity',
PSG, GS, July 1982)
[c] "Due to the difficult situation of our country.Jt becomes necessary to create a new 
unitary organization of nationalists' ('Proposal for the definition of the unitary 
organization of nationalism' PSG, GS, July 1982)
[d] 'The concrete formulation of this unity must be materialized in the existence of a 
Patriotic Front. As a result of the conditionings signalled ... of our country as regards 
classic colonies, and of the experience amassed during the years in which we have been 
trying to promote a front alternative, it follows that the present organization must be 
reformulated. This reformulation [of the front] must be founded upon the following 
criteria:
-Achieving the widest possible unity in the Front.
-Formal recognition of the ideological, organizational and political existence of the 
diverse tendencies integrating it.
-Support for its democratic functioning within respect for its ideological principles.
-Defence of a programme of national sovereignty..."
(The policy of unity of nationalism', UPG, III Congress, January 1982)
The form eventually taken, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), was to a great 
extent a way of invoking and re-instantiating the story-line of colonialism which 
narrated the need for a 'popular front' as performed by the UPG in the AN-PG and 
BN-PG. Even the name, Bloque, had been maintained. However, the front had been 
a hotly contested option. It was one candidate among others: a mass socialist party 
and a more indeterminate 'unitary organization'. The option of a mass party was 
founded on an alternative story-line of the nation as a complex European society -  
which meant a denial o f the validity of the movement's identity to date. Extract
9.1.b, presents a rare glimpse of this struggle when T&T pejoratively argues against
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this alternative as being filo-constitutionalist. This narrative disappeared from 
popular nationalism when Pedro Luaces and many others were expelled from the 
UPG in the crisis o f 1981. The so called Lugo Group kept working towards 
constituting this party and eventually joined EG. However, even among the sites 
producing the hegemonic narrative of a country under attack a front solution was 
still contested. The PSG called instead for an ambivalent 'unitary organization' and 
never mentioned a front. They insisted that unity was 'not a matter of repeating 
alien historic experiences' in a hardly veiled allusion to the UPG sponsored AN-PG 
and BN-PG which were seen to be modelled upon third world anti-colonial front 
strategies. At stake were a rejection of the UPG's exclusionary practices and its 
understanding of unity as homogeneity.
These reservations were met by designing a new organization based on plurality157. 
The above extracts show clearly that the BNG's unity is predicated upon the 
recognition of heterogeneity ('the affirmation o f specific identities', the 'formal 
recognition' o f diversity) and on being ample (the 'widest possible'). Unity is 
narrated as the affirmation of the particularities to be integrated in the new 
organizational structure, on recognition o f the heterogeneity of the field of 
nationalism and the attempt at expanding the front to incorporate new groups as an 
'alternative for national sovereignty7. As such, this unity begins a 'logic of difference' 
or cooptation strategy (Laclau, 2005; Howarth, 2000).
This 'transformist' project, the BNG, aimed at expanding and strengthening the field 
of popular nationalism in Galicia and its institutional presence through improved 
electoral results. It involved the co-optation of parties, collectives, groups and 
individuals working, presently or in the past, in the field of nationalism into a 
common organization premised on a nationalist 'minimum common denominator' 
agreement and structured in a reconfigured 'patriotic front'. Unity translated first in 
the constitution of the Mesa de Forzas Politicas Galegas (MFPG, Table of Galician 
political forces), linking the UPG, AN-PG and PSG. The MFPG worked towards 
forming a new formal organization, the BNG. It joined the UPG, the 'independents' 
of the ANPG, the PSG, though only briefly, Galiza Ceive, Colectivo de Avance
248
Nacionalista, Asamblea de Nacionalistas Galegos, Colectivo Libertario Arco da Vella, 
and various other local associations and individuals who did not belong to any 
collective or party (Vilas and Baz, 2004).
However, a cautionary note is needed here. This expansionary and unitary logic was 
clearly guarded, limited and constrained by the imperative of hegemonizing the field 
of nationhood to fight against a divisive 'common' enemy: the Spanish constitution 
of 1978. 'U n it/ failed, unsurprisingly, to  unite nationalisms. Its aim to respect 
ideological plurality was overdetermined by the sovereignty strategy which imposed 
strong dividing lines and foundational exclusions - fo r  instance EG— and a strict 
policing of the 'nationalism' label. The heterogeneity internal to unity in fact only 
confirmed the equivalence o f ideologically rather homogeneous small groups: the 
elements pertaining to it confirmed the order established by the plot of a nation 
under attack, being economically colonized.
Rearticulation o f nationalism: originary exclusions
If the nation is, as Homi Bhabha has said, the structure of exclusion par excellence, 
popular nationalism has found in the 'patriotic front' a key exclusionary instrument 
(Bhabha, 1990) despite its advocacy of plurality, rhetoric o f openness, unity and calls 
for 'joining in for all' common to the tales. In a nation and society conceived as 
colonized, however qualified, suffering severe external attacks and experiencing the 
denial of its 'fundamental' right to sovereignty there was no room in the 
organization for those other nationalists who accepted the constitution and the 
autonomy. The front constituted a small space of internal heterogeneity and a 
homogeneous collective self. Contrary to an ecumenical spirit needed at a time 
when the field o f nationalism was criss-crossed by alternative stories, the minimal 
points in fact simply enshrined and normalized one particular narrative of nation to 
the exclusion of others. As Thomassen notes, in any particular symbolic space such 
as the one opened up by the tales o f unity among all other stories which contribute
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to producing the new story-line of sovereignty 'there will always be persons or 
groups whose points o f views cannot be represented within the space... opened up -  
but simultaneously closed- by the tendentially empty signified (Thomassen, 
2005:296).
These elements are what Ernesto Laclau, following Bataille, calls 'the 
heterogeneous' (Laclau, 2005), an idea similar to what sociologist Mary Douglas 
called 'matter out of place'(Douglas, 1966): those who are an excess, a surplus, who 
disrupt the orders being built, who bring disorder into the plot of 'unity7 and the 
front. This plot being the 'harmonious vision of society7 as 'us7 against 'them7, the 
forces of sovereignty against constitution and the Spanish forces in Galicia. If these 
groups can not be absorbed, then, they should be contained, firmly pushed to 
societal margins, banned from the spaces o f representation. Only now those who 
were self-propelled to the margins o f Galician society were the members of the 
BNG.
Tension between unity and antagonism
For Vilas and Baz, the BNG was 'an organization where the only commonality among 
its members was meant to be the defence of the national character of Galicia7 (Vilas 
Nogueira and F. Baz, 2004:205). However, what nationalists really claimed to have in 
common, as seen in the extracts above, was a 'defence of a programme of national 
sovereignty' (extracts 9.1.b and 9.2. b and c). 'National sovereignty7, as we have 
seen, metonymically stood for something different than a simple recognition of 
'national character7. It was the plot, the knot tying the new story-lines and tales of a 
nation under attack by the forces of the constitution, the autonomy and imperialism. 
It stood for 'real democracy7, 'right of self-determination7, 'integral development7, 
'world peace7, 'anti-Nato /  EEC7. When the groups associated in the MFPG, mainly 
the UPG and PSG, demanded the new organization to be based upon 'minimal7 but 
'perfectly defined7 core principles (BNG, first assembly, September 1982) they were 
putting in action a mechanism of 'othering7 which forcibly disavowed and silenced 
alternative stories of the nation and nationalist identity arising inside itself.
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Extract 9.3. Tension between logics of 'unity' and antagonism.
[a ] "Achieving the objective of national sovereignty involves the practical formulation of 
a policy of unity as wide as possible. This policy of unity hinges upon the following 
premises: own Galician political forces as participants; defence of the right of national 
self-organization at all levels; defence of the right of self-determination, specified in an 
alternative of national sovereignty. These axes mean not to accept neither the Spanish 
constitution nor the autonomic alternative. The practical formulation of this unity must 
be materialized in the existence of a Patriotic Front. (The policy of unity of nationalism',
UPG, III Congress, 1982)
[b] "...We agree that the organic formulation of the necessary unity should be achieved 
with respect for the ideological and political diversity which exists within real 
nationalism. Taking respect as the point of departure, a unity is possible which ...in 
order to be a useful instrument for our people, should be based upon minimal points, 
but perfectly defined and not to be renounced, without which we would be a political 
fraud." ('Political alternative of the BNG', BNG, First Assembly, September 1982)
The mechanisms of exclusion were written in the calls for unity. As the extracts 
above show, these calls for "u n it/ and the logic of attracting and adding up as many 
elements and sites as possible in the fragmented field of nationalism, were always 
limited by clear 'premises', 'minimal points' or 'politico-ideological principles'. These 
principles in turn were based on the antagonism now narrated by the UPG and PSG: 
the opposition to the constitution and, of course, the autonomous settlement. This 
was the real dividing line between a project o f 'national sovereignty7 and any other 
'pseudo-nationalism'. The BNG text illustrates the paradox: while unity required 
'respect for the real ideological and political diversity of nationalism' it nevertheless 
was to be 'based upon minimal points' which could not be surrendered. These 
minimal requirements for nationalism were precisely the issues of contention during 
the crisis. The core demand tying the different forces together was not any positive 
principle such as 'self organization' or 'nation' -claims to which many sites could 
have agreed upon— but the negative opposition to the anti-community, the 'evil' 
source of oppression of the nation embodied by the Spanish constitution of 1978. 
This unity, then, required the subordination of alternative projects to the rejection 
of the Constitution, the demand of 'sovereignty7 and the stories and practices which 
underlay it. Thus, clearly Esquerda Galega, a left-wing nationalist party which had 
not been part of the story-line of colonialism, not to mention other centre-right
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forces such as the Partido Nacionalista Galego or Coalicion Galega, would not and 
could not have become part of the new organization. In fact, these heavy "minimal 
points" even split the PSG in two, with the majority of the party abandoning the BNG 
as early as 1983. "Unity" simply brought together the UPG with a few small social 
organizations and individuals. It effectively amounted to another repression of 
difference and plurality in the front ab initio.
The front was premised on an antagonism sovereignty /  Constitution -the main 
discursive strategy o f popular nationalism during this political juncture. The 
condition of possibility for the formation of the Front was the narration of a nation 
under attack and deprived o f "sovereignty", the nodal point in popular nationalism 
designating the blocked fullness of society (Laclau, 2005). That is, if the tales of unity 
and the front signified the inauguration of a logic o f difference in the movement, the 
condition of any possibility o f this "unity" was, paradoxically, the antagonism which 
delimited the clear frontiers o f us /  them. Thus, the Front was rooted in an ambiguity 
and tension between the logics of difference and equivalence from the outset, 
where equivalence retained the upper hand at least up until 1988-89.
However, the sites othered by the narrative strategy of unity were bringing disorder 
to the plot of sovereignty and unity from the inside needed to be dealt with because 
of their insistence that a front was not an adequate strategy in a "complex European 
nation" and that the autonomous community and its devolved powers could be a 
usable first step towards sovereignty. The stories of unity, even though allowed for 
and re-inscribing an antagonism with Spain, focused on containing and policing the 
excess. "Unity" was premised on the expulsion from "nationalism" of this surplus:
Extract 9.4: On policing o f nationalism
"He does not have a right to call himself nationalist he who accepts legal texts which do 
not recognise him, not even symbolically. He does not have a right to name himself 
nationalist he who supports in practice, openly or with pharisaic ambiguity, the 
repressive, anti-democratic and anti-nationalist channels of the present Spanish regime, 
which sustains justifies and legitimates its policies on those legal texts (the Constitution 
and the statute of autonomy). We salute the unity of Galician nationalism, the
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reformulation of the patriotic front" ('Unity of nationalism. Galicia nation against the 
Constitution', n86, T&T, UPG, July-August 1982)
Thus, the sites which did not subordinate their practices and accounts to the new 
unity of nationalism were simply denationalized. As the extract above illustrates, 
they were stripped of "the right to call themselves nationalists'. Later on, when the 
BNG was formed in a precarious 'u n it /  of forces, the labelling of excess continues: 
they are 'sectarians', 'testimonial', 'disappearing', and bear a 'diffuse' galeguismo (II 
BNG assembly, 1984) -which applies even to the PSG now, the leading voice calling 
for unity in 1982. Popular nationalism -and here particularly the UPG— adopts a 
highly authoritarian and pedagogical position from which it can police and ensure 
the purity of nationalism - its  opposition to the Constitution— self-attributing the 
'right' to the term Galicianness.
Unequal assembly principle
In its organizational principles the Riazor assembly text stated:
"ASSEMBLY CHARACTER: The organization, which would be plural, open and 
participative, would base its working dynamics and political decision-making in the 
assembly formula. Representatives would be subjected to an imperative mandate, and 
so, they could be recalled by those who elected them" (BNG, I Assembly, 1982)
Furthermore, the internal structure of the organization was territorial and not 
sectorial, as this was deemed harmful to  the assembly principle. The BNG was 
initially composed of a 'National Assembly' (NA) made of the entire membership, a 
'National council' and a 'Permanent' version of the council at the national level. This 
structure, with the exception o f the 'permanent', was reproduced at the shire and 
local levels158.
It was the composition of the National council (NC)-the most important decision­
making body in the NA- which undid the implicit equality principle enshrined in the 
decision to organize as an assembly. For the BNG was made up of individuals, as 
represented in the National Assembly, which met only every two years, but also of 
political parties and other organizations. The recognition of this plurality meant that 
organizations were also recognized as actors with a voice and a vote within the
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organization. In order to accomplish this, the NC was made up of 20 representatives 
elected by the NA, two representatives of each party or political organization and 
1/3 of its total by comarcal representatives. Therefore, as J. Beramendi and others 
have remarked, there were in fact two kinds of militants: those affiliated to the BNG 
only, and those also affiliated to groups within it (Beramendi, 2007). The latter had 
considerably more weight as they had more opportunities to occupy positions of 
responsibility and influence decision-making. Vice-versa, the parties and 
organizations and their policies could be represented directly as organizations as 
well as through individual militants. This gave them a clear advantage when it came 
to occupying decision-making positions.
This arrangement clearly favoured the UPG. This was, until the early 1990s, the only 
party and the best organized group within the BNG. In fact, the BNG had inherited 
the local material resources and infrastructure from the AN-PG. As Vilas and Baz 
noted, the agenda of the BNG was initially set by the UPG -whose congresses were 
timed to take place a couple o f months before those of the BNG— even though "the 
decisional process finalized in the BNG structures, its national assembly and national 
council' (Vilas Nogueira and F. Baz, 2004). The UPG still saw itself as the vanguard of 
the front, but a vanguard which could not 'base the role of leading force in the 
mechanistic satellization o f ideological sectors which participate with us in a 
common struggle' which would denote a 'conceited' attitude as well as a 'deformed 
application of the front project'. It was to lead by the example of hard work and 
epistemological reasoning.
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9.3. Conclusion: aporia unity /  particularity.
This chapter has examined the construction of 'u n it /  and the nationalist party, the 
BNG, through some of their storytelling practices. An analysis of the stories in their 
contexts o f production shows the front and the aim for unity to be ridden within 
power struggles. It was a much more complex and protracted issue, and less 
inclusive, than nationalists and some scholarship might lead us to imagine. The BNG 
appears as an ambiguous site where, at this time, the budding idea of opening up 
spaces for the combining o f different political groups was still overdetermined by 
strong antagonisms and exclusions. However, both forms of logic were present. 
Hence, the BNG was a site torn by the tension between the establishment of 
'p lu ra lit/, maintaining the heterogeneous identities o f the particularities integrated 
in the front, and the striving for hegemony and homogeneity imposed by its 
'minimum' demands -i.e. the relation of antagonism with the Spanish Constitution 
and autonomy. This paradox, instituted at its origin in the very structure of the 
organization -and which bears the marks of history and the political conjuncture in 
the texts— has haunted the front ever since
The BNG was not the inevitable or the only possible way forward, but the victorious 
contestant in a power struggle. The front was constructed at a cost. 'Real 
nationalism' marginalized itself and steadily lost support at a time in which its 
'heterogeneous' other was experiencing success. The front was more than a mere 
'organizational' question. Unity and rearticulation of nationalist sites happened 
along the frontier delimited by opposing narratives of nation. Thus, it was premised 
along identity-based lines. The BNG formation reached the core of the ideological 
structure o f the nationalist movement, sustaining a vision of the nation and the 
collective self.
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By way of conclusion and reflection.
Anthropologist Harry Wolcott asks the question which seems to be commonplace in 
qualitative research: 'how do you conclude a qualitative study?' (Wolcott, 2009:113). 
His answer is that you do not. By which he means that 'the endings in qualitative 
studies do not have to be dramatic; they need only to be well suited for the 
occasion' (ibid. 114). So he recommends a 'conservative' closing statement which 
reviews what the study attempted and learned. I am going to follow here this 
sensible recommendation. Writing a (short) conclusion makes special sense, after all, 
in a study dealing with narratives, for we know that we crave the closure which the 
ending brings to the tale.
Hence I am going back to the questions and intentions of the study to try to sum up 
what has been learned about Galician nationalism and national identity when 
examining them. I had been intrigued about the unseen and unnoticed 
contradictions which a Marxist and nationalist identity posed for a radical 
movement. I 'problematised' this question in a double sense, the unconvincing way 
of theorising nationalism which a priori rendered movements as the Galician as 
deviant, and the nationalists own response. I set out not to undertake a theoretical 
exegesis of Marxism and nationalism, but to  examine how nationalists performed 
'nationalism' and 'Marxism'. In a study with a clear historical dimension, this could 
not be done but through the examination o f the movement at its own word: how 
they textually represented the movement to themselves and to others. Narratives 
and stories are ways of ordering our worlds, of organizing experience, what we 
perceive as 'reality' (Bruner, 1991), and I found that the radical movement in the 
1970s and the 1980s relied on intricate webs of story-lines, subplots, big and small 
tales and their resignification to struggle against Spain, struggle among themselves 
and hold themselves together at times of crisis. I asked:
• How do nationalists construct 'being nationalist' and 'being Marxist'?
•  How was the political community discursively constructed and performed?
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•  What stories did nationalists tell?
•  How are masternarratives articulated in discourse?
•  Which ones take pre-eminence? When?
• What do stories tell us about nationalism?
• What are the political effects o f storytelling practices?
• What do the stories in the movement, their organization and mechanisms, 
could tell about storytelling?
Stories -the ir citation, resignification and the myriad social practices embedded in 
them, such as demonstrating against paper factories or refusing to swear the 
Constitution— were the stuff that made up national identity. The movement relied 
on stories to put forward an alternative knowledge -and its power effects— of the 
country relying on versions of the past and the desirable futures.
The first thing I realised was that stories o f anti-colonialism did not spring up in a 
vacuum but within a political and cultural space within the Spanish left at the time of 
the last breath of francoism, which was small but had been opened up by a specific 
political conjuncture and the enmeshment o f frames of intelligibility from the Third 
World, Europe and Spain in the late 1960s and 1970s, mainly anti-colonial 
discourses, Lenin's and Murguia's blueprints, and mainly in an opposition to Spain. 
Located at the vortex o f political and cultural communities of resistance to 
francoism, narratives of Marxism and nationalism flourished throughout Spain -and 
beyond. These were not just mobilized by minority nationalisms, but by all radical, 
resisting communities to different extents and in different emplotments. In Spain in 
particular, the visibility and prestige of the Spanish communist in the resistance to 
the dictatorship made their vocabularies of motives and political language the norm 
and authority to perform resistance. These norms were subsequently cited and used 
by many others. Doing resistance credibly meant relying on the language of 
Leninism, anti-colonialism, and nation. Combining Marxism and nationalism did not 
seem to be a minority nationalist peculiarity. Stories arise in particular social and 
historical conjunctures.
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More surprising was to  realise that in the articulation of masternarratives there was 
not a clear narrative pre-eminence but the opposite. The plurality o f social contexts 
allowed -and constrained— the nationalists into performing a complex, hybrid and 
hyphenated identity which I argue refused to be defined simply as nationalist. The 
movement took Marxism seriously. They elaborated a complicated knowledge of the 
country as a colony. This started with the resignification of former stories of the 
nation. If the contemporary movement drew on nineteenth and earlier twentieth 
century nationalism, they also thoroughly transformed it. Nationalists, as we have 
seen in chapter 4, were not interested in narrating the origins of the nation but the 
loss of nationhood. They read former tales through new dominant masternarratives. 
They read and resignified past tales to  fit present circumstances and their own ends. 
Framed within a narrative o f five hundred years o f colonialism, the socio-economic 
troubles o f the country were simply an act o f aggression and the stories called to 
struggle against it.
The political community constructed turned out not to be the nation as such. In fact, 
the movement displaced the nation per se, crucially decentring the claim to 
nationhood, in favour o f a more theoretical, abstract and unknown rallying point: 
the colony. Centring the colony in the imaginary of those interpellated, 'the popular 
classes', required too extensive a pedagogical effort and was only partially readable 
in its grievances. Despite some successes, it failed to mobilise wide support outside 
radical circles familiar with its language. Their Marxism and nationalism was done 
through a logic of the supplement, where deciding which narrative was primary 
became undecidable. But what was a clear ideological effect of the institution of 
strong antagonistic frontiers (the alien oppressor and the victim theme evoked by 
colonialism) was that it made this 'emancipatory' discourse a highly exclusionary 
one, were -w ith  differences among story-lines— almost every other political force, 
even those opposing Francoism, were denationalized and political action to 
manoeuvre in the transition, to obtain even partial results, became unthinkable.
Ultimately, the hybridity and ambiguity o f colonialism as flawed rallying point, the 
abstract and theoretical languages which barely drew on folk meanings, the failure
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to realistically address many of 'the people's concerns, the victimizing mythology 
and finally, the crumbling of the conditions of possibility of any readability of the 
colonialism narrative with the transition to democracy plunged the movement into 
an identity crisis. Nevertheless, the discourse of colonialism, with all its 
shortcomings, tensions, paradoxes and serious political and ethical failures of 
imagination, was also enabling. It had been a vortex of creativity, of knowledges, of 
political might and effort on the part of many forces within nationalism -and even of 
those outside of it— which was hardly matched in its later phase.
As Plummer remarked, certain stories can only be told at particular moments (1995). 
In Galicia end of the crisis and uncertainty opened up by Franco's death with the 
establishment o f a parliamentary democracy, did away with the possibility of 
narrating the colony as it had been done. By 1981 the movement was in disarray and 
the political community was conjuncturally re-narrativized, re-imagined.
If there is a clear discursive change at this time, it lacked the narrative power of the 
colonization discourse. The movement was now on the retreat, in the midst of an 
identity crisis. They de-ambiguated and resignified their discourse and identity 
towards nationalism mostly through coy moves: the narratives of colonialism 
established clear constraints to  how the movement could refashion itself without 
unravelling. The shift was undertaken through a metonymic displacement of 
colonialism to the international sphere, the ventriloquism of democracy and the 
solipsistic equivocation of this universal and the movement per se. Ambivalently, the 
new conjuncture forces the beginning of a strategy of difference in the form of a 
new organization: the BNG. If these discursive re-narrativizations manifest the 
agency of the movement in their capacity for subverting and appropriating Spanish 
narratives, they also demonstrate the extent to which they had already lost their 
original battle for they had to resort to using the very dominant narratives they had 
opposed in order to be heard.
This study zoomed in the narrative and storied dimension and practices in the 
discourses of the contemporary Galician movement. It conceived narratives as
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political practices "iteratively doing things' within Butler's framework of 
performativity. These stories were not singular but collective and told over and over 
again in the texts, the sites, the movement and 'lived' in and through other practices. 
The myth of loss was a call to arms and an externalization of blame, the (buried) 
foundation o f every other story told in the 1970s. The story-lines of colonialism 
constructed an alternative knowledge of society which was not purely 'national' and 
had astonishing power effects: opposing Spanish narratives of nationhood, othering 
groups, mobilizing membership at times of risky political action, building myriad 
organizations -a  plethora o f trade unions, parties, assemblies, social and cultural 
organizations and so on— reconstructing the country space as dystopia and building 
an utopia as a network o f localities, fighting and struggling against national and 
social oppression. The world-system tales worked as fortifying myths at the time of 
crisis and allowed them to retain exclusionary frontiers, their identity as struggling 
and successful movement by safely containing the colonialism and imperialism 
theme. The narratives of democracy and sovereignty tried to gather support for the 
movement's decision of not swearing the Parliamentary regulation by narratively 
identifying nation, democracy and nationalism. The most startling effect was 
achieved here by their juxtaposition: the signification of continuity and renewal. 
These stories, in their plurality, juxtapositions, combinations and equilibriums were, 
to a great extent the Galician nation, the 'instruments' which performed, 
normalized, maintained and changed a certain sense of reality and understanding of 
society.
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1 He distinguishes ethnic communities by a list of six attributes and poses that 'ethnies' can come 
about through different processes (Smith 1991:23-4). Smith insists that, although ethnies are not 
primordial entities, once formed, they are exceptionally durable. He accepts that certain events may 
profoundly change the cultural content of ethnies and so he specifies four mechanisms of self­
renewal. These mechanisms, despite changes, could ensure the survival of an ethnic 'core' of a 
community across centuries. For Smith, the existence of ethnic communities helps reveal which 
groups would become nations. Then he establishes a typology of processes of emergence and 
formation of nations distinguishing between lateral/aristocratic and vertical/demotic, classifications 
that would correspond to the well known division between territorial/civic and ethnic nationalism
2 They contend, Smith lists, that the state has unfair economic policies, that it is too over-centralised 
to 'meet man's social and political needs' and that it also tends towards cultural assimilation (Smith 
1979:154-56). Thus these nationalisms are different from nineteenth century nationalism primarily in 
their goals. At least, Smith admits that these 'latter-day autonomist movements' correspond 
nevertheless 'to the basic pattern of nationalisms' (ibid, 157).
3 The linguistic turn refers to a paradigm shift in philosophy which moves from seeing language as a 
medium through which the world and its qualities were expressed, to a focus on language and its 
properties as such, and 'how the world is made for us from the meaning that language expresses' 
(Carver, 2002:52). Raymond Williams characterises the subject of modernity as one who is 'indivisible 
-an entity which is unified within itself and cannot be further divided: is singular, distinctive, unique.' 
(Williams, 1996, quoted in Hall 1996:282). Modern notions of individuality posed a conception of the 
human person as fully centred and endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action, 
whose centre is an 'inner core' that emerges when the person is born and unfolds with it, remaining 
essentially the same. The de-centring of the Cartesian subjects occurs through several critiques, Hall 
explains. Marxism displaced the notion of individual agency, Freud 'discovered' the unconscious, 
Saussure posed language as a social not individual system, and meanings as relational; Foucault 
isolates a new 'disciplinary power'; and feminism questioned distinctions of 'private' and 'public' and 
the formation of gendered subjects (Hall, 1992:277-90)
4 The way ideologies become dominant is explained by Laclau and Mouffe through the concept of 
hegemony. In the situation where there are antagonistic forces (which reveal the insurmountable 
boundaries of 'political frontiers' between groups in a society) and the frontiers between them are 
unstable or the social order is 'dislocated ', that is, is being shaken, there would probably be attempts 
by political forces at (re)constructing order. Antagonistic political forces would compete to give new 
content to the 'empty signifier' and (re)articulate differential elements, thus reinterpreting social 
order. These attempts or new political projects would be discourses posing a challenge to established 
ones, trying to become hegemonic in a Gramscian sense, that is, trying to structure political space by 
imposing closure on a new basis, naturalising their contingent articulations. These new articulations 
are 'myths' that would become an 'imaginary' or social horizon, that is, a new framework of 
intelligibility, if they become successful. Thus, as Norval points out, in discourse theory 'ideological 
struggles are struggles over the filling of empty signifiers to create a new myth and imaginary' (Norval 
2000: 330).
5 Discourse theory emphasises, therefore, the 'ultimate contingency' of all social identity, but they 
also need to make room for 'fixations of meaning' or otherwise no identity or society could ever be 
possible. Thus, Laclau and Mouffe devise the concepts of nodal points and empty signifiers. Any 
discourse is a 'system of differential elements which attempts to arrest the flow of differences' (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985), an attempt to organise society into a structured totality in order to give it meaning 
and stability'. So any discourse constructs a centre around privileged discursive points that will 
partially fix social meaning. These points are no mere moments but 'nodal points'. The main 
characteristic of the nodal points is its condition of 'empty signifier', that is, a signifier which 
embodies 'the unity of a community which, nevertheless, cannot ever be fully achieved' (Norval 
2000:330). This conceptualisation is similar, Norval suggests, to Freeden's 'ineliminable' and 'adjacent'
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(or quasi-contingent) features of ideological concepts (Norval 2000). Several examples are given: 
'justice', 'democracy' or 'the nation', for the discourse of nationalism. These signifiers implement the 
quintessential operation of ideology, Norval explains, as they bring about the illusion of (impossible) 
societal 'unity' and 'fullness'. Thus, Howarth explains, 'ideological discourses' are those which do not 
acknowledge their own contingent status (Howarth, 2000:123). Ideology for discourse theory is the 
attempt to de-contest central political concepts and relations of domination (even though, due to the 
impossibility of a final fixity of meaning, these attempts must eventually fail) (Norval 2000:326).
6 Slavoj 2izek gives an illuminating example of how a particularity stands in for the universal and its 
political efficacy (1999:204-214). 'In the rejection of the social welfare system by the New Right in the 
USA', he explains, 'the very universal notion of the present welfare system as inefficient is 
contaminated by the more concrete representation of the notorious single Afriacan-American 
mother, as if social welfare were, in the last resort, a programme for black single mothers -the  
particular case of the 'black single mother' is silently conceived of as 'typical' of the universal notion 
of social welfare, and what is wrong with it'. 'Single unemployed mother' becomes overdetermined or 
as he says a 'sinthome' : 'a knot, a point at which all the lines of the predominant ideological 
argumentation (the return to family values, rejection of the welfare state and its 'uncontrollable' 
spending, etc) meet The sinthome is what holds together the thing itself.
7 Czarniawska remarks on Lyotard's analysis, that the relation between narrative knowing and science 
is unbalanced because even though science needs narratives to legitimate itself it 'repays the favour 
in poor coin': denying narrative any legitimate claim to knowledge (Czarniawska, 2004:7; Lyotard,
1984).
8 Lichtmajer, 2006, personal conversation at Essex summer School.
9 The example Butler gives is that of conventional insults, where the force of 'fag!' or 'nigger!' is in 
being an invocation which binds the speaker to the practices and norms of homophobic /  racist 
communities (1993:227).
10 This idea refers to the common belief that nationalism is the big gap of Marxist theory, that it was 
underestimated and misunderstood by Marx and Engels, or that nationalist movements cannot be 
explained from a Marxist viewpoint (Lowi, 1998). On the one hand, Marxism bases its analysis of 
social reality on class struggle. Marxist theory was conceived, primarily, as a critique of the political 
economy of capitalism from the standpoint of the working class. At its more basic, it posits a material 
conception of history for which the way that material production is carried on and it is organized is 
the determining factor in political organization and in the intellectual representation of an epoch. 
Society is divided in classes that are distinguished in terms of the ownership of the means of 
production, and their struggle is the driving force of history (Bottomore, 1991). On the other hand, 
nationalism does away with class struggle by unifying the social classes in the 'nation', and equalizing 
every member of the nation in a horizontal attachment. Nationalism has traditionally been 
considered as a political principle which 'holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations' 
(Kedourie, 1966:9) and that 'the political and the national should be congruent' (Gellner 1983:5), and 
as an ideology that 'places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote the nation's 
well-being' (Smith 2001:9). It is a discourse that 'leads people...to think and frame their aspirations in 
terms of their idea of nation and national identity' (Calhoun 1997:6). Thus, Marx and Engels advised 
against nationalism in the belief that it could be an ideological instrument on the hands of the 
bourgeoisie to distract the working class from their 'objective' interests. Instead, a nationalist feeling 
would 'keep [the working class] in tether', persuading them to make a common front with the ruling 
classes to defend the latter interests against the working classes of other countries.
11 For a paradigmatic example of this treatment offered to so-called 'minority nationalisms' see 
Hobsbawm, 1990.
12 To mention but a few see Hall, 1990; Brubaker, 1995; Calhoun, 1997; Billig, 1987; Yuval-Davies, 
1996; Ozkirimli, 2005.
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13 Such as conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis or discursive psychology. See Schegloff, 
1997; Fairclough, 2003; Billig, —; Potter and Wetherell, 1987.
14 Another definition would be Marteen Hajer's, for whom discourse is 'the ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, categories through meaning is given to phenomena and which is produced and reproduced 
through an identifiable set of practices' (Hajer, 1995:303).
15 Howarth, 2005; Yin, 2003.
16 Denzin and Lincoln note how the researcher's biography permeates decision taking and writing in 
qualitative research: 'the gendered, multiculturally situated researcher approaches the world with a 
set of ideas, a framework , that specifies a set of questions that then she examines in specific ways' 
(2000). That is, as Atkinson et al. also remind us, researchers are biographically situated. Furthermore, 
in a reflexive mood the questions we ask are not so much 'whose side are we on?' anymore, but 'who 
we are', noting that 'we might not feel able to choose sides' (Atkinson et al., 2003:83).
17 There I negotiated a 'researcher from a foreign university' identity in an attempt to be perceived as 
having only a scholarly interest and stake -which in fact was the case. This was a delicate process as 
nationalists, particularly the UPG, have lived in a highly charged and conflictive atmosphere -among 
the different groups and from the outside- which compounded with a Leninist tradition and the fact 
that I am Galician could result in a total lack of trust towards me. While I do not claim that there was 
not a degree of mistrust -after all I had no access to some documents- being introduced by a 
respected member and 'doing researcher' did help.
18 Old issues of party periodicals, texts of congresses, video recordings and texts of speeches, 
biographies of prominent participants, etc.
19 The figures characterized not only for having produced their own work, but also because they 
created the conditions for the production of other texts and for the formation of certain rules which 
guided discussion, debate and the sense of the propositions.
20 Mottier and Bergman, personal communication at ESS, 2004.
211 talked with three key representatives of UPG of different historical periods, and two from PSG and 
its 'heir' faction within the BNG, making sure that there was variation on gender -two women and 
three men- and age -from early twenties to sixties. Access to the participants was not very 
complicated. I negotiated the interviews either directly with the participants through e.mail -some 
are well-known academics at Galician universities, and so relatively easy to contact- or with the help 
of the BNG foundation -Galiza Sempre.
22 Chronicle, reports, arguments, lists, schedules, typologies etc.
23 Once taken up, I realised -to  my initial distress- that often there was reluctance to abandon it and 
my other questions were also integrated on stories of the self.
24 There are notable exceptions to this from different traditions and perspectives -such as Bowden, 
2008; Carver, 1997; Hajer, 1995; Mottier, 2000; Shenhav, 2004, 2005; Tilly, 2002- and it seems to be 
changing as interpretive approaches gather pace. However, as an illustration of this point, see the 
panels in the methods section of the ECPR annual conference 2011: Bayesian Methods for the Social 
Sciences, Causal Inference, Measuring Constituency Preferences, Mixed Methods, National Election 
Surveys: methodological challenges and solutions, Revisiting EITM, Social Network Analysis, Time 
Series and Cross-Sectional Panel Data.
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25 The choice of software responded to theoretical and analytical needs. In discourse analysis atlas.ti is 
popular because it does not impose unwelcome hierarchies on the data nor constrictions for an 
iterative coding process which attends to different strategies and levels of generality.
26 However, when talking about normalization we might be jumping into another very thorny issue 
within nationalism: AGAL or ILGA? That is the battle about a norm akin to the Portuguese language 
favoured strongly by independentists but also by variegated groups, and the official norm akin to 
Spanish which the BNG supports - i f  only by not raising explicitly the issue.
27 They are, as Ken Plummer puts it, 'lodged in specific (situational, economic, historical) social 
moments' (Plummer, 1995:63). Hence, the political work of narratives and stories is deeply contextual
28 For instance, Borja de Riquer proposes in a seminal essay -'Nacionalidades y Regiones. Problemas y 
lineas de investigacidn en torno a la debil nacionalizacion espanola del siglo XIX'- the thesis of the 
'slow, superficial and weak' nationalization process, due, among other factors, to a patrimonial, 
corrupt use of government and state institutions, and to the underdevelopment of the ideological 
state apparatuses -school system, army, administration, etc. These weaknesses, for Riquer, allowed 
peripheral nationalisms to consolidate (Riquer, 1996:77). In fact, the weakness, strengths and 
supposed failure of the liberal nationalization process has been widely debated during the 1980s and 
1990s in Spain (see Martinez Quinteiro, 1996, for an informative explanation of the different 
positions). Firstly, liberalism in the XIX century was considered an economic failure (Nadal, Tortella) 
but a political success. This thesis has progressively been inverted: qualified the economic failures and 
questioned the political successes (Borja de Riquer, Fusi and others). The political and nationalizing 
weakness thesis is now commonly assumed, although it has been qualified from many perspectives, 
for instance as being itself a myth of the conservative nationalism that succeeded the liberal 
enterprise (Saz Campos, 2003).
29 The first bouts of nationalism in the periphery in Spain, the 'provincialismos' and 'regionalismos', 
that by the 1840s come to life -with the influence of romanticism, liberal administrative reform, 
incipient industrialization, etc- do not yet openly question the Spanish nation-even though a certain 
ambivalence of loyalties appears in particular individual figures (Beramendi, 2008; Beramendi and 
Seixas, 1995).
30 The 'Nazon de Breogan' as portrayed by poet Eduardo Pondal in his poem 'Os pinos', whose first 
four stanzas form the lyrics of the Galician national hymn.
31 The episode of the resistance of Mount Medulio refers to the battle between Roman army and the 
tribes of the north of the peninsula in the year 22 BC. In the face of defeat the tribes, Gallaecians 
amongst them, committed suicide rather than surrendering to the Roman army. The episode was 
narrated by roman historian Lucio Aneo Floro and was later mythologized by Galician nationalism.
32 It is important to note that this version of the story is, Beramendi says, that which appears in 
Murguia's mature historical writings, where he reconstructs the history of Galicia in the basis of a 
Manichean antagonistic opposition between Galicia and Spain/Castile. However, this is a departure 
from his youthful writings were, most analysts agree, he shows a more complex view of Galician 
history where the role of some Galician forces, particularly the nobility, are also harshly judged 
(Beramendi, 2008:192-196; MSiz, 1984).
33 The combination of racist principles and progressive politics is not that uncommon either. 
Veronique Mottier relates how the 'Swiss dream of order', the early narratives of Swiss nationhood, 
had Forel as founding father articulating notions of eugenics and socialism (Mottier, 2000).
34 Saz Campos explains how within Francoist ultra-nationalism diverse factions coexist which have 
different national projects for Spain: mainly 'Falangismo' and 'national-catholicism'. Among their main 
differences are the initial laicism and a fascist discourse of Europeanism, revolution and of 
imperialism in the initial 'Falangismo' (as posited by J. A. Primo de Rivera, Pedro Lain or Dionisio 
Ridruejo) as opposed to the reactionary, ultra-catholic, capitalist, Castilian essentialist but regionalist
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-in traditional sense- notions of 'national-catholicism' (as seen in the writings of Menendez-Pelayo 
and others). However, under pressure from the Church, the army, the traditionalist and monarchists -  
that is, the other pillars of francoism- as soon as 1941 the Falange had to begin the renunciation of 
their specific fascist national project and accept the 'essential' Catholicism of Spain among other 
national-catholic tenets (Saz Campos, 2003).
3SThe remains of the nationalist party, that is, those who were not killed, gone to exile or -in the case 
of the conservative wing- invited to remain quiet after the civil war, decided, following the lead of 
Ramdn Pifieiro, to retreat to cultural action and so they founded a publishing house: Galeixia. GalSxia 
and its cultural policy came to substitute the nationalist party -  the Partido Galeguista- and political 
action within Galicia -not in the Galicia without. This was perceived as the only possible course of 
action under the Francoist regime. However, culturalismo was understood in rather elitist terms: 
GalSxia concentrated its efforts in giving prestige to the language through high culture initiatives such 
as translations of German philosophers into Galcian, etc (Nufiez Seixas, 1994). Thus, their audiences 
were fairly limited.
36 The itineraries of resistant thought and practices are complex though, as Howarth shows that in 
turn, the South Black Consciousness of Steve Biko fed on Black Power movement ideology (Howarth, 
1997).
37 The conflict in Northern Ireland escalated since 1972, and in the 1970s Welsh, Scottish or Corsican 
nationalisms acquired relevance.
38 Among the signatories were the Irish Republican Movement (IRA), Union Democratique Breton 
(UDB), Su Populo Sardo, Lutte Occitane, Cumry Goch (CG), Esquerra Catalana dels Treballadors or the 
Union do Povo Galego (UPG).
39 'Contradiction' is a core concept in Marxist ontological dialectics. For Bhaskar in Marx's writings it 
might either designate logical inconsistencies, oppositions of forces -supply and demand- or historical 
dialectical contradictions (1983:110).
40 As opposed to the perception, since the third period of the Comintern, that revolution was 
imminent on a world scale and thus social-democratic parties and other 'reformist' were seen as 
acting as a brake and therefore as the immediate enemies (Beverley, 1999).
41 The theorizing of the transition in Spain is a thorny ideological issue. In recent years there has been 
a historiographic revolt -often from the quarters of social history- against the 'official' narrative of the 
process of transition. See the debate in Ayer 68 (4) in 2007 coordinated by Saz which strives to 
recover the complexity of social, economic and political processes in late francoism and demystify the 
teleology of the transition (Saz, 2007; Ysas, 2004 and 2007; Nunez Seixas, 2007; Vinas, 2007; Sanchez- 
Biosca, 2007). Equally the members of the Seminario de Estudios del Franquismo y la Transicidn have 
written extensively criticizing the dominant views (Ortiz Heras, 2003; Martin Garcia et al., 2009). This 
official narrative reflects a consensus on portraying the transition as teleology -the necessary and 
inevitable outcome of the 'modernization' process during late francoism, for democracy is assumed to 
be simply a (by)product of development- or as 'determinism of change'-the implicit idea that the 
transition could only have happened as it did, for democracy was either the only option, the result of 
francoism's own nature or worse, the end point of a process of voluntary self-reform. This consensus 
view -in spite of often providing carefully researched accounts- tends to construct top-down, elite 
driven and individualistic accounts of the transition as 'high politics' -that have Suarez, the king or 
even Carrillo as heroes- where the bulk of Spanish society figures as passive spectator of an inevitable 
process. The alternative perspectives criticise the modernization paradigm for reducing the 
complexity of events, mitigating the impact of popular subversion and dissent on the fate of the 
regime and almost presenting late francoism as a benign project (Saz, 2007).
42 After the initial autarchic economic policies of the dictatorship -in the 1940s and 1950s- were 
abandoned, the state became rapidly industrialized and opened up to the international economy
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(Tortella, 1994). The adhesion to the GATT materialized in 1963 and the regime had approached the 
EEC as regards the possibility of membership as early as 1962 (Vifias, 2007). This economic 
development, however, was monopolistic and characterized by great sectorial and regional disparities 
(Soto, 2005; Tortella, 1994). By 1973, 54 per cent of the gross domestic product was produced in 11 
per cent of the territory of the state. Conversely, 53 per cent of the territory produced just 14 per 
cent of the total wealth (Soto, 2005:333).
43 Among those that still resonate are the general strike in Vizcaya in 1962, the state wide strike of 
November 1970 against the 'proceso de Burgos' -but also the 1.600 collective conflicts registered that 
year-, the strikes in 1972 with particular incidence among the incipient working class of Vigo and 
Ferrol; Sabadell and Vitoria in 1976, and many others.
44 The regime estimated these 'troublemakers' were no more than ten per cent (Ysas, 2004).
45 There were state of execeptions in April 1967 in Vizcaya, August 1968 in Guipuzcoa, January till 
March 1969 in all Spain and again in 1970, and it was later maintained between the years 1974 and 
1976.
46 Such as the process 1001 in 1973 against CCOO and the executions of the leader of the communist 
party Julian Grimau in 1963, of ETA militants in the Consejo de Guerra de Burgos in 1970, and in 1974 
of young anarchist militant Salvador Puig Antich, and in the lapse of three weeks of five other people 
-members of ETA and the FRAP.
47 As these were seen to represent attitudes extended within the Basque and Catalan populations, 
which found outlet in cultural activities and were not necessarily transgressing Francoist legality (Ysas, 
2004:147).
48 At the time of the Burgos war council, Admiral Carrero Blanco addressed the Francoist Cortes to 
explain the governments' position before the crisis. Here he said that 'under the apparent political 
affiliation to Basque nationalism, [ETA] covers the reality of its true function as agents at the service 
of international communism' (quoted in Ysas, 2004:140).
49 As Gramsci notes, economic crisis in themselves 'can simply create a terrain more favourable for 
the dissemination of certain modes of thought and certain ways of posing and resolving questions' 
(1971:184).
50 Before his death Franco designated Juan Carlos as successor within a monarchy system. After his 
death, the king chose reformist Adolfo Suarez as his prime minister after the wave of strikes in 
January and February 1976 promoted by rupturist options against the limited reform of continuist 
President Arias Navarro (Soto, 2005).
51 The PCE (marxista-leninista), PCE (internacional), Organizacidn de Marxistas Leninistas Espafioles 
(OMLE), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Organizacion Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (ORT), 
Movimiento Comunista Espafiol (MCE), Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR), and others.
52 Leiceaga and Ldpez Iglesias note that in 1971 the non agrarian active population in Galicia was 
higher than the agrarian population (2000:30) -and the process of urbanization will continue in the 
three last decades of the century. This contrasts with estimates that in the very early days of the 
twentieth century nine out of ten Galicians were peasants (or fishermen). The reality of agrarian life 
in Galicia was however a convulsed one: 'per each one hundred men working the land in 1900, there 
were eighty in 1930 but a hundred and twenty five in 1950' (ibid, 32). If the first world war 
encouraged a considerable development and abandoning of the countryside, the civil war meant a 
veritable return to the land. Nevertheless, what Eric Hobsbawm explained as one of the key processes 
of the twentieth century, the death of the peasantry, holds for Galicia, even though not in 
comparable numbers to those of Great Britain or Belgium (Hobsbawm, 1994).
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53 Already in 1978 around 84.2 per cent of all the companies in Galiza employed less than 10 people 
and had a traditional character. (Fernandez Leiceaga and Lopez Iglesias, 2000).
54 Nuftez Seixas notes that the first movements of the Francoist state in Galicia were the virulent 
repression of the nationalist and popular front sympathizers -key representatives of cultural and 
political nationalism were killed-, the destruction of the strong associative and cooperative networks 
in the countryside and the subjection of the Galician language to a status of 'dialect' of Castilian and 
its ban from public use. Nevertheless, repression against Galician culture needed only be selective 
because the galeguista movement was considerably weaker and enjoyed less social support than their 
Catalan or Basque counterparts (Nufiez Seixas, 1994:249).
55 The 'coffee table' refers to small reunions of people from or close to GalSxia, intellectuals and some 
'youngsters' all sympathizers with nationalism who routinely gathered to talk invited by Pifteiro at his 
own house. These meetings allowed the older generation to meet with new people and exercise 
influence. However, not everyone was interested: "...because we had nothing from the previous 
generation. And Pifieiro, that everyone passed through his coffee table is radically false, some people 
did, but we did not pass" (Interview, member UPG remembering the early days of the party).
56 Most of the 'monograph' texts or articles written by the UPG to explain the phenomenon of 
colonialism either quoted and referred to Beiras's work, were prologued by Beiras, or were written in 
direct collaboration with the PSG -for instance the 'Texto Conxunto', 1973.
57 The social composition of the UPG between 1964-1974 is, Beramendi and Seixas estimated, of 
around 27% civil servants, 20% teachers, 15% workers and students respectively, 12% from the liberal 
professions, 5% artists and writers, 3% artisans and 1% peasants (Beramendi and Nunez Seixas, 
1995:223).
58 Both T&T and GS are sources of the instruments and methods of collective action used by 
nationalists in the 1970s. See also Lanero Taboas ((2008) and Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas 
(2008).
59 This is not a point about geography, narratives of the Spanish nation or Spanish nationalism, and 
negative representations of Galicians were present in Galicia as much as in the rest of Spain.
60 In this case the object connected metonymically is a not a word but an entire story. Thus, for 
instance, Lopez-Suevos claimed in an academic paper that Spain was not an economic unity but a 
heterogeneous country where development for some means underdevelopment for others -i.e. 
Galicia- and referred to: '...all this has a name: internal colonialism. And it is quite old: five hundred 
years.' (Lopez-Suevos, 1975). Here the myth of loss, the historical origin, is only metonymically 
alluded to as Galician underdevelopment or colonialism 'being old', 'five hundred years'.
61 Refers to the Castilian war of succession in 1475- 1479 between Juana of Trastamara, daughter of 
King Enrique IV and Juana of Portugal and married to Alfonso V King of Portugal, and her aunt Isabel. 
Juana, who lost the war, was nicknamed 'the Beltraneja' as her opponents claimed she was the 
illegitimate child of Beltran de Cueva, Duke of Alburquerque.
62 Thus, the Galician national hymn, written by poet Eduardo Pondal at the end of the nineteenth 
century, directly hails the nation: 'esperta do teu sofio nazdn de Breogcin' -'wake up form your sleep 
nation of Breogcin'.
63 For Cabrera Varela this translates into 'axis of radicality' where the history of Galicia as victim of 
external violence corresponds to the most radical nationalism (Cabrera Varela, 1992).
64 In the UPG's production of the story-line capitalism also transforms the Galician people by bringing 
about a new hero-class -ostensibly the proletariat- which could lead the liberation of the country. The 
leading class's objective interests are represented by the vanguard organisation, the 'patriotic
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communist party*- Other productions, such as EBoG and the PSG, coincided in many themes but 
stressed the peasants as victim-hero whose 'natural economy* is destroyed by capitalism.
65 Some writers argue that the sites were divided in this issue: where the UPG relied on a crude notion 
of third world colonialism the PSG mostly qualified it as 'internal' (Beramendi, 2007). In my 
examination of the textual productions of the sites I have not found such a clear cut division. In fact, 
in spite of the qualifications to the colonialism theme -present in texts produced by all sites, which 
served as disclaimers- all story-lines mostly represented Galicia as a colony in it strongest sense-with 
Beiras invoking dependency theorists Emmanuel and Amin when arguing, under a pseudonym in GS, 
against the leader of the Galician communist party Santiago Alvarez that if Galicia was an internal 
colony (Alvarez's argument) then it had to be first simply a 'colony*.
66 Although this is not the place to delve deeply into these arguments, I would like to note that they 
have been heavily criticized by Marxist and liberal theorists alike. The definition of development as 
'self-sustained industrial growth' and underdevelopment as the lack of it leads to circular reasoning 
and is contradictory with the proposition that the underdevelopment of the periphery is the condition 
of the development of the centre (for then either the centre's growth is not autonomous or 'self­
sustained' or the centre is not developed). Moreover, dependency theory was accused of being 
deterministic, static, assuming imperialism as a monolithic structure and of simply mirroring -  
inversing- the terms of modernization theories they were criticising with their dichotomous and 
simplistic pairings centre/periphery, dominant/dependent. These and other arguments are discussed 
in depth by Larrain (Larrain, 1989).
67 As an example we could mention one of the canonical texts of this time, the UPG's first congress, 
which in its sixty one pages includes just one paragraph of sustained discussion of cultural issues -  
when discussing its political programme for the 'popular-democratic' stage- under paragraph 'D- 
Medidas de tipo cultural i educativo*.
68 For Young rather than anti-colonialism being a major form of nationalism, it usually employs some 
form of nationalism strategically at the service of national liberation (2001:179).
69 In this sense, Chantal Mouffe has recently distinguished between 'agonism' -the recognition of the 
legitimacy of the 'other*, or the 'other* as adversary- as well as 'antagonism' -the ever present 
possibility of seeing the 'other* as an enemy (Mouffe, 2005).
70 In translating the term 'espanolismo' ( highly common in the UPG texts) as 'spanishism' I am 
following R. Mdiz (Maiz, 2003:27).
71 This could possibly be due to the fact that the second congress, in 1979, does not attempt to lay out 
'the story* of the nation -which had already been presented in the first congress- but instead deals 
mainly with the here and now, the party and movement's strategy at a time convulsed with the speed 
of political transformations -the triumph of reform, the constitution of 1978, legalization of parties, 
elections, the debate on the formation of the autonomous communities- which were mounting 
pressure on the party's narrative strategies -becoming, in fact, their conditions of impossibility.
72 In a reference to their being territorial divisions of Spanish-wide parties and to their supposed lack 
of autonomy from the central party.
73 'Las causas del atraso econdmico estaban en el centralismo y en sus consecuencias que, entre 
otras, significaban una colonizacidn regional' (Bobillo cited in Patterson, 2006 :298). The key 
difference between them is that, unlike the PSG story-line, earlier stories of nationhood typically 
considered that economic backwardness would simply disappear with the end of centralism (ibid.).
74 With the probable exception of Stalin's famous 'Marxism and the National Question', whose guiding 
question is precisely defining 'what is a nation?*
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75 For instance, in 'Galicia is a colon/, a document that narrated the economic function of Galicia as 
that exporting raw materials for 'the metropolis', written also in 1973, there is no mention of the 
working class or proletariat, only peasants are taken into account. Moreover, class conflict is here the 
conflict between 'those living in the city' and 'villagers', reflecting a nationalist frame of reference.
76 When the Great Depression did not lead to the collapse of capitalism and to revolution on a world 
scale as expected, the Comintern policies of 'class against class' -the perception of social-democratic 
parties as the main obstacle to revolution- had to change
77 Curiously, that is also the view nowadays of some nationalists who at the time were among the 
'founders of discursivit/ of the discourse of colonialism: "no fundamental, a Unidn do Pobo Galego 
na mifia opinidn & o unico nacionalismo (que estivo presente), eu creo que o demais d todo mentira. I 
na medida en que a Unidn do Pobo Galego actual d unha minoria dentro do Bloque, i ademais 
tampouco mantdn algunhas das cousas e practicas que mantina, o nacionalismo galego desapareceu 
non.., un nacionalismo galego con intensidade suficiente.[...].' Nevertheless, this person continued: 
'No que si mudei foi na perspectiva social do problema d dicir, a Union do Pobo Galego era un partido 
comunista heterodoxo, mui heterodoxo, i eso e o que a salvou, no sentido quero dicir, de que foi o 
suficientemente heterodoxa coma para non ir con todo o derrubo do sistema, como foron as vellas 
esquerdas incluido o Partido Comunista de Espana."
78 Compound categorization is a rhetorical strategy which makes explicit the 'duality' of discursive 
reliance on social, spatial and economic categories which may be commonly elided (Wallwork and 
Dixon 2004:33).
79 It is important to take into account that the concept of 'the people' does not necessarily belong to 
the repertoire of Marxism - it  stems from 'democratic-bourgeois' discourses even though it is 
appropriated at times, such as in Marxist Popular Front politics. In fact Lenin, in Theses on the 
national and colonial questions' and Roy's 'Supplementary Theses' which distinguished between 
oppressor and oppressed nations -a  significant modification of the doctrine of overriding importance 
of class antagonism- also state that the communist party should clearly differentiate between the 
interests of 'the oppressed classes' and 'the people—as this in practice means the interests of the 
ruling classes' (Young, 2001).
80 For instance, the 'time is money' metaphor frames our understanding of time as a valuable 
commodity (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
81 Although this time not so much as in previous migrations for Galician women also migrated in 
considerable numbers to Europe or to the cities in order to become mainly household labourers.
82 It is important to bear in mind that, as Rainer Luzt Bauer notes, state institutions as well as the 
church had commonly been seen as negative and as having a predatory role in relation to the 
community -i.e. bent on extracting taxes and goods from the villagers (Bauer, 1992).
83 Judicial processes and letters of complaint were the most common vehicles for open collective 
protest but it was also common to refuse to pay taxes and even the organization of mutinies (Cabanas 
Iglesia, 2006). Covertly, for fear of francoist repression, there was recourse to other strategies such as 
participation in the black economy -the estraperlo- early support for the hidden 'guerrilleiros', 
boycotts, gossip and other symbolic resistances. These were collective rather than individual practices 
(ibid).
84 The problem of the agrarian tax started in 1971 when all proprietors of agrarian exploitations 
became considered 'agrarian entrepreneurs' and their taxes in many cases trebled. In a country 
characterized by numerous small, even micro land exploitations this measure hit the rural populations 
disproportionately. This tax was rejected, not least because the system used to allocate it by francoist 
agrarian trade unions -the 'jornadas tedricas'- was seen as discretionary, inexact and blatantly 
corrupt (Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas, 2008).
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85 'Para el conjunto de Galicia la continuidad de las Elites politicas neocensitatias en el periodo 
democrStico adquiere una significacidn muy acusada. Con manifiesto mantenimiento de las 
estructuras sociales de poder y sus practicas caciquiles y clientelares' (Marquez Cruz, 1993)
86 The constitution of these new conservative parties was a top-down, elitist project -in  Galicia as well 
as in the rest of Spain- based on personal capital -friendships and personal loyalties- accumulated by 
relevant figures within the francoist establishment (Lagares-Diez, 1999). 'Notable' or 'cadre' parties, 
initially they drew social support from business groups and financial institutions -as business and 
political elites overlapped - rather than seeking mass memberships.
87 Thus, Lagares Diez suggests that, even though regional coordination acquired progressively more 
relevance as the autonomic space and institutions appeared, this provincial, personalist and vertical 
initial organization of AP profoundly marked the future development of the party in the form of 
powerful 'baronias'(Lagares Diez ,1999).
88 In the first democratic local elections of 1979 the UCD was able to present candidates in 295 out of 
a total of 312 municipalities (93.5%), AP in 208 (66.6 %) whilst the PSOE could only find candidates for 
172 (55.1%) and the BNPG in 164 (52.5 %) (Marquez Cruz, 1993).
89 For instance, in the case of As Encrobas both the priest, Don Ricardo, and Fernando-Garcia Agudin, 
secretary general of the newly formed Partido Popular Galego, acted as brokers. The priest 
commanded an unrepresentative commission of 'notables' to represent the community and agreed 
with Fenosa, the company implicated, very low prices for the lands. Fernando Garcia-Agudin, in turn, 
was outraged by the peasant proposal of a mixed property enterprise with the company and opined 
that 'it was absurd' (El Pais, 27/02/1977; Lanero Taboas, 2008).
90 T&T allocated a whole section to the national-popular tales, named 'national-popular struggles', 
which often occupied one third its space. This section was at least one page long -but often two or 
three- in a publication which had on average seven/eight pages of length.
91 Generic narratives are charcterized by the truth, and claim that they represent something typical 
and recurring (Baynham and De finna, 2005).
92 The economic compensation varied from 50.000 and 80.000 pesetas/ferrado, depending on the 
qualities of the plots (Lanero Taboas, 2008:2).
93 As Lanero Taboas has noted, the Guardia Civil's behaviour at the times of the occupations was 
confused and dubitative, trying to act as intermediary between peasants and company (Lanero 
Taboas, 2008).
94 For a detailed account of the social movement of As Encrobas and other rural struggles see Lanero 
Taboas (2008), Lanero Taboas and Ldpez Romo (2010) and Cabanas Iglesia and Lanero Taboas (2008).
95 These tales concentrated on the narration of a series of episodes conformed by negotiations, 
proposal and counterproposals by peasants and company, and stressed divisions and weakness on 
either side, although still presenting the company as being in the wrong (El Pais, 1976)
96 Although represented in brackets as a quote -i.e. literally marking what villagers said- the CCLL and 
related organizations worked so closely with the peasants during the conflict that it becomes difficult 
to delimit a clear cut set of identities and interests. For instance, for the demonstration in A Corufia 
related in the tale, permission was formally requested by a group of eight members of the village, but 
organized fully by the AN-PG. After the violent police response which dispersed it, the organizers 
called the press where some of the neighbours complained with a rhetoric which Lanero Taboas notes 
'coincided exactly with the content of the statement read by the trade unionist right before the 
violent dispersion of the demonstrators' (2008:14).
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97 The UPG's frustrated attempt at armed struggle, the most radical reading of the colonialism story­
lines, lasted less than a year and ended with the death of Moncho Reboiras, one of the key militants 
of the party by the police in August 1975.
98 Nationalists parties in Galicia obtained in the 1977 legislative elections 73.489 votes whilst 606. 726 
votes went to the UCD. Nationalism's result was a poor 6% of the vote (FernSndez Baz, 2003; 
Beramendi, 2007).
99 The Bloque had more or less achieved its objectives in the elections -T&T decided- and these were: 
'to delimit the national-popular line versus spanishism, to widen our base, to demonstrate our 
legitimacy: the Bloque's were the bigger meetings...Besides, these are very conscious votes, the 
majority of which were obtained where the movement has more organic influence, which 
demonstrates that the votes for the Bloque are the resultof the work and presence of a political line 
which is not electoralist' ('Vote: colonialism, ambiguous reformism or popular nationalism', T&T, n46, 
July 1977).
100 The 'Documento dos Coroneis', presenting the viewpoint of the UPG-lp in 1977, called the UPG 
pejoratively the 'party of the peasants, students, intellectuals and neighbours'.
101 The social and historical voices populating language, all its words and forms [...] are organized into 
a structured stylistic system that expresses the differentiated socio-ideological position of the author 
amid the heteroglossia of his epoch' (Bakhtin, 1981:300).
102 The UPG was defined by Barreiro Rivas as the 'veritable tutor of the first steps of the BNG' 
(2003:150) and by Baz as 'the main character in the BNG during the years 1983 to 1991' (2003:153).
103 That is of course not to say that they mark crucial moments of the history of Galicia, despite what 
nationalists themselves tried to tell us.
1041 am not alone in noting the relevance of these texts. For Beramendi -even though he does not 
refer to the foundational text itself- the constitution of the BNG is the 'authentic turning point' for 
nationalism (2007: 1112). As regards the relevance of the UPG's III congress, Fernandez Baz has 
already noted: 'this is a congress with all the traits to be seen as extraordinary (or at least critical as it 
influence is determinant for the organization's evolution): for the first time in a UPG congress three 
alternative texts are presented expression of the ideological fractioning present in the organization; 
the vote was secret as opposed to the habitual way of raising hands; 50% of the central committee 
was renovated..' (2003:114). The text itself notes its own relevance: 'o movemento nacional-popular 
galego e especialmente o noso partido esta nun momento crucial, xa que compre unha 
reconsideracidn da nosa practica en termos globais, unha clarification ideoloxico-politica...' (Ill 
Congress, UPG, 1982). However, none examine the textual strategies and practices put in place by the 
texts themselves, these are either ignored or taken at face value.
105 Issue number 84 is dated '15 July-15 August 1981' and the next issue, number 85, came out in 
'May-June 1982'. In them almost not a word is written about the disagreements which led, between 
mid 1981 and early 1982, to the resignation of the then secretary general of the party Pedro Luaces, 
the disaffection of around 40% of the membership (Barreiro, 2003) and almost half of the central 
committee. One article in issue 85, 'The need for a patriotic front in Galicia' -the key point of 
disagreement-, gives us some clues and justifications and it cryptically mentions 'the questioning by 
political forces of the need for a front in Galicia' in what might be an allusion to Esquerda Galega. The 
crisis will be briefly alluded to in the text of the III congress.
106 It is actually difficult to asses this estimate as Barreiro Rivas does not comment on how he arrived 
at the figure of 40% (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:145). Although the crisis is always signalled as a 'very grave' 
one, most other analysts do not specify any such figures. In fact, often the loss of rank-and-file 
membership is not mentioned at all, but speculation on the seriousness of the crisis is done just on 
the basis of number of central committee members expelled.
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107 That is, textual production towards the outside of the movement diminishes clearly -the T&T -  
while production orientated towards the inside -the 'constituent' congresses and assemblies which 
are hierarchically superior and establish the 'law' of nationalism- continues and, in fact, expands. This 
expansion is partly due to the creation of the front as new site -although other sites simultaneously 
'disappear'- but mainly to dilemmas created by the new conjuncture which demand re- 
narrativizations and life stories.
108 "A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble, consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative reforms, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, 
philantropical propositions- in short, the said as much as the unsaid" is a dispositif in Foucault's latter 
writings.. (Foucault 1977, quoted in Howarth, 2000:78). This idea is akin to the use I give here to 
'discourse'
109 Bastida Freixedo affirms that the discussion of article 2 was marred by a secret notification which 
contained 'un texto escrito en el que se especificaba cual debia ser la redaction del articulo 2. El texto 
propuesto -impuesto- decia 'La Constitucidn espanola se fundamenta en la unidad de Espafia como 
patria comun e indivisible de todos los espanoles y reconoce el derecho a la autonomfa de las 
nacionalidades y regiones que integran la indisoluble unidad de la nation espanola'. The final version 
of article 2 only changes in its last sentence: '...nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la 
solidaridad entre todas ellas'. Bastida's point is that the discussion on the recognition of the 
multinationality of the state was hijacked by the reactionary military forces which had possibly 
written that note (2007:121-122).
110 For a more detailed analysis of the narratives and debates surrounding the constitution of 1978 
and its meanings see Bastida Freixedo (2007), Balfour and Quiroga (2007), Nuftez Seixas (2001) 
Lacasta-Zabalza (1998). For more information on contemporary Spanish nationalism see also Taibo 
(ed.) 2007, Resina (2002), J.S. P6rez Garzdn (ed.) 2000.
111 Coincidentally, as we had seen, Galician nationalism also denied them the character of 
'nationalism'. This label was appropriated for peripheral, progressive and popular liberation 
movements, whilst state and Spanish nationalism could only be labelled 'chauvinism' in the discourse 
of colonialism.
112 Nufiez Seixas quotes Gregorio Peces-Barba a socialist representative in the constitutional debates 
of 1978 saying: 'We [the Socialists! take for granted that Spain, as a nation, does exist before the 
Constitution [...]. To us, the nation as a relevant fact is a matter or right which precedes the 
Constitution' (Nufiez Seixas, 2001: 737).
113 In postcolonial societies this kind of understanding based on historical opposition to an unjust, 
authoritarian regime founded the legitimacy and power to the new national governments from 
Nehru, Nasser, to more recently South Africa.
114 The statute of autonomy for Galicia was drafted by the 'Commission of the sixteenth' composed of 
members of all parties in Galicia -w ith or without parliamentary representation in the region- with 
the exception of popular nationalism -the BNPG-PSG- which decided not to participate in the process 
(Beramendi, 2007). In this they were simply continuing their policy of opposition to the political 
'reform' which had already led them to campaign for a negative vote in the referendum of the 
constitution in 1978 and which will lead them to do the same in the statute referendum of December 
1980.
115 Moreover, 19.77% of voters rejected the statute. Beramendi notes that, of 2.172,898 potential 
voters only 450.556 actually voted in the referendum (Beramendi, 2007:1107). His explanation for 
this high abstention rate was the passive stance adopted by the major conservative Spanish parties, 
AP and UCD, which did not encourage their voters to vote for the statute at all (ibid.).
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116 The myth of loss, stories of exploitation, of enclave industries, of national-popular struggles and 
others that were flesh of the story-lines of colonialism were no longer present in the narrative 
production of nationalists sites since 1982.
117 In fact, it comes in fifth place, after 'Galicia is a nation', 'democracy7, 'anti-monopolism and popular 
interests' and 'self-organization'. These are going to be the core new moments emplotted in the 
story-line of the movement, with 'sovereignty7 and 'self-determination' -key content of the first 
point- becoming the new centres overdetermining the narratives and stories.
118 A ground in the sense of foundation, colonialism underpins the new story-line of sovereignty while, 
at the same time, being 'silenced', 'obscured' or peripheral. In a different sense Ernesto Laclau talks 
about 'the name becoming the ground of the thing' (2005: 101). Naming works retroactively, 
guaranteeing the identity of an object -even through a change of all its descriptive features. The 
name, the signifier itself, supports the identity of the object (2izek, 1989:94-95; cited in Laclau). The 
name -in this case the nodal point- does not describe but performatively brings something into being. 
Then, the unity of the object -the  equivalence- is the retroactive effect of naming. In this sense, the 
name 'colonialism', the myth, guaranteed the identity of the country and that of the movement. 
However, this very name had become a problem in the new context. Thus, the moment of re-thinking 
it, of re-naming and re-narrating was critical because losing one's name could unravel the movement 
as a whole. However, as we see, the name does not need to be renounced or dropped on the spot but 
can still be cited while re-narrativized, occluded while its orders invoked. That is, it might be 
simultaneously kept and abandoned, relied upon and disavowed, in different ways.
119 There is an unsolvable disjuncture in the naming of the anti-community at this time, as we will see 
in the following section. While imperialism/USA are the clear names of the 'anti-people' at the world- 
system space/tales, the narrations of the state and nation will forcefully name the constitution of 
1978 as the negation of the community. The Constitution does not fully stand for imperialism -even 
though it does to a certain extent- neither imperialism stands for the constitution -  a movement 
which would make no sense at all- instead, what both have in common is naming the antagonism as 
the 'anti-people'. That is, it is the empty signifier and nodal point of the community -sovereignty and 
self-determination of the people- which maintains the structural position of the enemy -even not so 
clearly its content- in its spatial disjuncture: enemy is the anti-people in different forms. It will be seen 
how the constitution is not explained -as the Spanish state was in the story-line of colonialism- as 
'bearer', crystallization of imperialism and colonialism-collapsing the world-space with the nation- 
space-, but it is emplotted mostly through a new masternarrative of democracy and rights which 
maintains a neat separation between the national and the international.
These disjunctures, ambivalences, citations and displacements are what makes difficult for most 
scholars of nationalism in Galicia to 'classify' this period as continuity or break -in  that either or 
fashion. Why MSiz sees this time -up till 1989- as a simple continuity with the previous epoch of 
'colonialism' but Beramendi locates the construction of the BNG in 1982 as the epiphanic moment of 
nationalism, while Barreiro sees this change as comprising already the years 1975-1982 (Barreiro, 
2003:141). Nothing new happened or was it an epiphanic moment of change? This dilemma of 
interpretation cannot be solved by the usual strategy of splitting the answer into different domains -  
key organizational change but ideological continuity- for any organizational or institutional aspect of a 
movement is a dimension of their discourse, not independent of it—i.e. highly exclusionary and 
othering narratives such as those of colonialism would have not allowed for the formation of the 
BNG. While these exclusionary narratives dominated nationalism only the AN-PG was thinkable and 
could take place. It was the new nodal point of sovereignty, in the new conjuncture in which the 
discourse of nationalism was 'de-ambiguated' towards the nation-plot which permitted, made it 
thinkable, to build the new alliance of the BNG.
120 Imperialism, then, 'does not surrender to accept the political and social transformations of Cuba, 
Nicaragua..' and thus launches new offensives, 'the imperialist policies suffer new defeats..' (same 
tale).
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121 With the coterminous privileging of the political at the expense of the economic. Privileging which, 
as noted above, was already built in in some of the Marxist narratives of imperialism.
122 The strategy of representing dangers to the social and political community in terms of disease -  
either individualized pathologies such as alcoholism, madness or collective ones of racial or sexual 
degeneration-; and the ideal state of society as a 'health / body politic -the myth of 'pacific' republics 
as free from disease- has been common since the eighteenth century when the state was becoming 
the organizational form of the political community in Europe (Campbell, 1992:93). The representation 
of danger as disease -o r dirt- is a typical strategy for groups, Mary Douglas told us, to manage 
difference and order their environment (Douglas, 1966). However, this representation, Campbell says, 
suggest a concern not simply with a necessary order or stability for the existence of political 
communities, but a extreme degree of tightness and strictness in the 'desire for purit/ (Campbell, 
1992:93). Medical metaphors are powerful political regulative strategies based on a 'bipolarity of 
normal/pathological' with serious performative effects: they establish the norm to be followed 
casting the danger as aberration to be eliminated through radical 'cleaning/sanitizing' interventions, 
and had framed eugenicist policies, ethnic cleansings, coup d'etats or force population removals, etc 
(Campbell, 1992:92-95).
123 Moreover, this construction of imperialism as irrational aggressiveness against the peoples 
predominates in the texts of the IV congress of the UPG, II BNG assembly and the Terra & Tempo 
issues published in 1984 and 1985. This is the time when a new coalition within the UPG commanded 
by new secretary general Mariano Abalo was radicalizing the discursive production of the parties and 
implementing a kind of discursive reversal -this group will eventually form the Partido Comunista de 
Liberacion Nacional (PCLN) splinting off from the UPG and later expelled from the BNG as well. 
Paradoxically, the more radical 'Communist' identity within the UPG and the dependencist narratives 
privileged at this time where the ones more devoid of economic understanding of imperialism.
124 Anwen Elias argument is that Galician nationalisms' stand as regards the EU evolved from a clear, 
totalising critique and rejection to a more nuanced and complex 'euroscepticism' where the symbolic 
image of Europe of the Peoples was positively valorized in contrast with the 'reality' of the EU. What 
matters here now, of this study, is the explanation of why and how the integration process was 
rejected during those first 15 years of the BNG from 1982 until 1998.
Those years however, Elias lumped together as if there were no change in the understanding of the 
EEC and in the function it carried out in nationalisms' discourse. Hence, she offers a medley of 
'reasons' why nationalism rejected the EU. She simply takes the nationalists' own words at face value 
and de-contextualizes those words -as she mixes quotes from different political conjunctures taking 
place over a 15 year period ignoring their local and historical contexts. Because the data extracts on 
the EEC are not examined in the light of the rest of nationalist's narratives and politics at each 
conjuncture the meaning of terms such as 'imperialism' or 'sovereignty* -how Galician nationalists 
themselves constructed this concept as opposed to a dictionary definition- is lost, as well the 
functions this rejection played in nationalism at each time. Thus, she explains that rejection was 
based: 'first of all, in the claim the Spanish governing authorities had deceived the Spanish people 
about the true nature of Spain's accession to the European club' (Elias, 2009:83). Followed by an 
economic rejection because 'Spanish membership of the EEC would compound Galicia's socio­
economic underdevelopment...and would increase the region's dependency on the centre' (ibid). 
Then, 'the BNG also denounced the political manner in which the negotiations for Spanish accession 
to the EEC had been constructed. The deal struck ...portrayed as an institutional betrayal [...] of the 
interests of the (...) country's underdeveloped regions' (ibid.). Finally, 'Galicia's inability to participate 
in these negotiations reaffirmed the necessity for national self-determination' (Elias, 2009: 84) and 
she quotes to illustrate this point: 'our lack of sovereignty leaves in foreign hands the right to 
speculate with our vital interests...' (ANT, 1980; quoted in Elias 2009).
Here a variety of moral -political deception- economic and political grievances are signalled as 
causing rejection. The problem with this kind of explanation -apart from those methodological ones 
mentioned already- is that it is so wide and general as to clarify very little. The main problem is that
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Elias ignores the structure of blaming in the accounts she reads which is key to making sense of the 
nationalists' narratives, (and which a narrative analysis is particularly suited to illuminate). It is not the 
same to view the EEC as a potential danger lurking on the background of an 'evil' Spanish unitary 
state than to represent the EEC as being itself the embodiment of the anti-community which blocks 
Galicia's national desires, even though both plots imply a steadfast rejection of the EEC. In fact, this is 
the change that takes place in the nationalist's understanding of integration between the periods 
1980-1985 and 1985-1995. In the first period the nationalists' 'strategic' demands -and causes for 
rejection- are keenly political: sovereignty and their understanding of the EEC as twin strategy -  
together with NATO- of imperialism -itself understood as a political force for aggression towards the 
peoples and nations. In the second this rejection is emplotted differently: the EEC is a main character 
in a narrative of 'defence of our productive sectors'. Here the EEC becomes the centre, the enemy 
and the rejection is mainly economic. This narrative shift might help explaining why rejection of the 
EEC brought nationalism some electoral gains from 1989 and not before: not because the constancy 
of the nationalist claims as opposed to a 'deaf and indifferent country which eventually realises they 
had been right all along -the Cassandra myth-, but because of the shift in nationalism's narratives 
which led them to represent the grievances of the country from 1985/86 in a way which now truly 
resonated with the experiences of the Galician population, (that is, despite what nationalism said, it is 
not that they firmly held their ground and position while the rest of the country moved from support 
to opposition, but that nationalisms' way of understanding the 'damages' of membership actually 
changed, the narratives shifted, their plots, blaming, characters all varied in such way as to make 
them deal with what was a real concern for increasingly wider sectors of the population).
In fact, Elias bases her interpretation of economic rejection during those first four years (1980-84) on 
the examining of 6 articles published by ANT over that period. However, ANT is a weekly nationalist 
newspaper which must have published around 200 issues and hundreds of articles over those 4 years. 
Does it not strike as odd that of all those printed pages only six articles on the EEC's future 
consequences were published?
125 Francoist technocrats had started the approximation to the European communities already in 
1962, and applied for full adhesion in 1978, seeing in full integration to Western capitalism the 
solution to Spain's economic problems (Preston, 1986)
126 Between the years 1980-1986 'popular nationalism' produced 14 tales dealing with Nato and 15 on 
the EEC in their congresses and magazines.
127 Although the term is commonly attributed to Bakhtin, Tannen notes that in fact it was devised by 
Bakhtin's translators (Tannen, 2007:197). Nevertheless, I will here maintain the attribution to the 
writer.
128 Agency, Butler said already in Gender Trouble, 'is to be located within the possibility of a variation 
of that repetition' instead of in any transcendental subject (1990:199)
129 These texts are the third, forth and fifth congresses of the UPG -celebrated respectively in January 
1982, December 1983 and March 1986- and the first and third assemblies of BNG -taking place in 
September 1982 andl984- together with their extraordinary meetings of December 1985 and 
February 1987.
130 The Marxist, independentist community which in the 1980s sustained ETA.
131 In the words of the then PNV's president Xavier Arzalluz as late as 1988, 'if we obey it [the 
Constitution] is purely for reasons of living together. Because not to do it would unleash repression by 
virtue of the Constitution itself (Arzalluz, 1988 quoted in De la Granja, 1995:124).
132 The final wording of the statute was the result of the initial text written b y the Comision dos 16 -  
which included all parties, represented or not, which wished to take part- from which popular
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nationalism excluded itself and of the amendments incurred in its passage through the Spanish 
Congreso and Senado.
133 Again, the imagination gripped was that of the nationalist collective self, not that of the country. If 
the Parliamentary affair became the emblematic issue for popular nationalism it was widely ignored 
by the population at large. Nationalists, struggling initially with their identitary dilemma, had to admit 
already in 1984, the II assembly already lamented 'the degree of social repercussion achieved by the 
mobilizations organized'; by mid 1980s it was clear that their refusal to swear, expelling /  
abandonment of the Galician parliament had not given them the results expected in terms of de­
legitimization of the Spanish democracy. They had severely miscalculated. In 1985, when the policy 
was still widely seen as the 'moral high ground' option, discussions began on the need to abandon it. 
An internal document of the central committee of the UPG argued then that 'when we have not yet 
got the Galician people -and even ample sectors of our own collaborators- to understand the political 
meaning of our absence from the institutions due to our refusal to swear the Constitution, deserting 
now the electoral game with the same arguments would be a leap in the emptiness and a [fuxida cara 
adiante], a position hardly acceptable for our social base" (UPG, Central Committee communication,
1985). However, it was already 1987 when the 'report' to the UPG's fifth congress affirmed that "ben 
e verdade que o conflicto non acadou a dimension popular que mereci'a que nos permitirta 
rentabilizar en profundidade a discrimination de que fomos obxecto. Os meios de comunicacion 
entupiron escrupulosamente a polemica. Non obstante, a longo prazo, o deterioro do poder 
evidenciouse para sectores minoritarios de opinion." That is, nationalism had at last resolutely come 
to terms with the fact that the affair have had no popular dimension, being 'evidenf only for a 
'minority of popular opinion', as late as 1987.
134 Although I separate, for analytical purposes, the Parliamentary Affair antagonistic frontier-effects 
and re-narrativization of the country in a new discourse of sovereignty, from the discursive strategy of 
'un it/, these themes and theories were nevertheless simultaneously debated, discussed and knotted 
together. Indeed, the transposition of the narratives of nation necessarily meant a re-narrativization 
of the collective self and collective action to be pursued. Unlike most commentators of Galician 
nationalism I suggest that ideological world-view and organizational strategy cannot be disassociated.
135 With the creation of the MFPG, the electoral alliance BNPG-PSG in 1981 an the Bloque Nacionalista 
Galego (henceforth BNG) in September 1982.
136 This, of course, was not the first time these two story-lines of the country inhabited the same site. 
In 1977 the POG had split from the UPG precisely to become one of the key nationalist sites which did 
not support the colonialism story-line which hegemonized the UPG, its satellites and the PSG then. In 
fact, these two stories of the nation might be seen as the key divide in contemporary Galician 
nationalism.
137 Secondly, soon after participating in the foundation of the BNG, the PSG will split again in two: a 
section forming the Colectivo Socialista to remain in the BNG and another to join EG.
138 Indeed, the general elections in 1982 castigated nationalism further: achieving under 5% of the 
vote and no representation in the Spanish Congress -where the PSOE had gained an absolute majority 
after a landslide victory.
139 As Galicia Socialista -the PSG's magazine- claimed 'only the Bloque-PSG promised to defend the 
democratic liberties and the national sovereignty of Galicia'139 ('Galicia nation, against the 
Constitution, GS, July 1982). Something which, strictly speaking, they did not do.
140 Anxel Vence from the Spanish newspaper El Pais reported: 'La suspension de derechos aprobada 
por el pleno de la Camara incluye, precisamente, el de percibir la asignacion mensual de 60.000 
pesetas a la que tienen derecho todos los parlamentarios electos. Los tres sancionados -Bautista 
Alvarez, Lois Dieguez y Claudio Lopez Garrido- no podran tampoco asistir con voz y voto a las sesiones 
del Parlamento, formar parte de comisiones o utilizar los servicios generales de la Camara, lo que, en
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la practica, reduce sus prerrogativas a la inviolabilidad e inmunidad parlamentarias propias de su 
condicidn de diputados' (El Pais, 25/11/1982). This expelling was not unconditional. Nationalists could 
regain all their rights whenever they accepted to swear the Constitution.
141Suffused throughout the declarations and writings as regards this event, this masculinist and pride 
politics are perfectly exemplified in the MPs open letter where they declared the failure of the 
'autonomists' to achieve 'the acquiescence and taming of the nationalist lion though the humiliating 
formula of a swearing'. This claim, which quotes and summons the authority of the myth of loss and 
earlier nationalist writings which spoke of 'the taming and castration of Galicia', positions nationalists 
in the place of the country -as we will see above- and as resisting emasculation (Letter of the BNPG- 
PSG MPs, T&T, November 1982).
142 And from this extract of the I congress it is also clear the UPG's elitism and the passivization of the 
working class /  people they effect. Unlike in Lenin's writings, the working classes are not the primary 
agency and subjectivity at work in this text. The working classes would not seize power, free the 
country from national oppression and implement socialist measures. Instead, they are said to be 
'participants' in this process, a process which is carried out -by whom, we should ask, as this main 
political subjectivity remains hidden in the extract- 'for' them, 'with their interests' in mind. But 
crucially not by them.
143 Opposition to the particular contents hegemozing the universal 'democrac/ in dominant Spanish 
discourses of the transition. That is: 'the unitary state, the monarchy, the consensus', the capitalist 
market economy and membership of regional organizations such as the EEC and Nato.
144 Partha Chatterjee distinguished between the problematic and the thematic of nationalist thought. 
The problematic, he explains, is 'the object of stud/, it consists of 'the concrete statements about 
possibilities' which are justified by reference to a 'thematic', that is, an epistemological and ethical 
system which 'provides a framework of elements and rules for establishing relations between 
elements' (Chatterjee, 1986:38).
145 The Marxist plots, as we have seen, are mainly segregated and confined to the world-system 
stories, and even there 'sovereignt/ is the master signifier which hegemonizes the tales and shifts 
their content towards a political -as opposed to economic- understanding of imperialism.
146 Bastida Freixedo explains how Spanish constituents in their speeches misrepresented and 
distorted the thought of Meinecke for their own political purposes. Whilst, Bastida argues, 
Meinecke's vision of 'cultural nations' is that of a first stage towards statehood, for Spanish 
nationalists, statehood was the very limit of a cultural nation (Bastida Freixedo, 2007:127).
147 Although the results of the referendum showed an overwhelming support for the autonomy 
(73.35%) which nationalists strongly opposed, these interpreted the result positively due to the 20% 
explicit rejection and, mainly, the massive abstention rate (72%).
148 This result translated into three MPs for the Bloque Nacional-Popular Galego (BN-PG) and the 
Partido Socialista Galego (PSG), the nationalist sites representative of 'popular nationalism', and one 
for Esquerda Galega (EG).
149 This political conjuncture congealed a new societal closure in Spain -a  new episteme (Foucault, 
1976)- where, Balfour and Quiroga note, 'the margins for departing from the basic principles of the 
new democracy were narrow' (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007:47). This new hegemony had at its centre 
the constitution of 1978 -the particularity which incarnated the democratic universal. The democratic 
suturing crystallizing then was based on a series of moments differently articulated on the story-lines 
of right and left wing Spanish parties: parliamentary monarchy, historical amnesia, the Spanish nation, 
(initial) political and social consensus, recognition of individual rights and liberties, a devolved 
territorial structure and membership to Nato and the EEC. Although peripheral nationalisms were still 
the 'other', not all of them were 'enemies': the main political frontier was the acceptance of the 
Constitution and the autonomic system.
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150 As Beramendi puts it: these nationalist sites were confronted by a choice: 'ou persistir no seu 
sostenlla e non enmendalla e autocondenarse a condicion de movemento sociopolitico marxinal e 
probablemente extraparlamentario, ou ser el quen se integrase no sistema para o que tina que facer 
os cambios adaptativos pertinentes' (Beramendi, 2007:1112).
151 The PSG documented the following: AN-PG, UPG, Galicia Ceibe, Colectivo Asamblea de 
Nacionalistas (which soon withdrew), Colectivo Libertario Arco da Vella, Colectivo Avance 
Nacionalista, various groups of independents from Vigo, Lugo, Santiago, Coruna and 0  Condado (GS, 
July 1982).
152 The spanishism label and its exclusionary logic endures, nevertheless, in the discourse of other 
sites -mainly independentism- up to our day.
153 As Ernesto Laclau remarks, 'discourse involves the articulation of words and actions, so that the 
quilting function is never a merely verbal operation but is embedded in material practices which can 
acquire institutional fixity' (2005:106). Bhabha, referring to the nation more particularly had put it 
concisely: 'material and metaphorical practices are inseparable in the nation' (Bhabha, 1990)
154 That representation was, as a remainder, that of nation gravely attacked by the Spanish 
Constitution and the autonomy, both of which denied its right to existence in the form of sovereignty, 
rights of self-determination and real democracy; whilst also being part of an international struggle 
between the forces of peace and an imperialist political force of aggression against sovereignty
155 In comparison with the story-line and small stories of colonialism which were explicitly bent on 
constructing a narrative of the nation, the main stories interweaved at this time were the 'swearing 
plot', the 'world-system' tales and stories of 'sovereignty'. Of course, this does not happen by chance. 
On the one hand, the nation has already been told. On the other, although the myth of colonialism 
accrued is crumbling in a new political conjuncture which became its condition of impossibility, or 
precisely because of that, the nation stories go underground. There is an urgency to narrate the 
present situation. Because nationalism struggles to keep their identity or to change without 
unravelling bold statements and overt re-narrativizations were avoided.
156 For a definition of narrative orientation see Labov and Waleztski, 1997 and Baynham, 2006.
157 The founding text of the BNG, the Riazor assembly, is a collage text, a double-voiced and 
differently accentuated piece which is made of the uneasy linkage of fundamentally two previous 
texts: the 'Proposal for the definition of Galician nationalism's unitary organization' written by the 
PSG which was reproduced -a t parts verbatim but also with additions and amendments- in the 
introduction and ideological principles; and the proposal made by the UPG/ANPG. The result is that, 
whereas the political and organizational principles talked consistently about the 'Organization', the 
last part on the 'bodies and competencies' talks of 'the front'.
158 Comarca is a territorial administrative division comprising a number of municipalities.
278
Bibliography
Abdel-Malek, A. (1981) Nation and Revolution. Volume 2 of Social Dialectics. London: 
Macmillan Press.
Alvarez Junco, J. (1996) The nation-building process in nineteenth century Spain' in 
Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (eds.) Nationalism and the Nation in the 
Iberian Peninsula. Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
Andrews, M. (2002). 'Introduction: Counter-Narratives and the Power to Oppose' in 
Narrative Inquiry, 12 (1), 1-6.
Atkinson, P and S. Delamont (2006) 'Rescuing Narrative from Qualitative Research' in 
Narrative Inquiry, 16 (1), 164-172.
Atkinson, P and S. Delamont (2006b) 'Editors introduction: Narratives, Lives, 
Performances' in P. Atkinson and S. Delamont (eds.) Narrative Methods. 
Volume I, Narrative Perspectives London: Sage.
Atkinson, P. and Delamont, S. (2005) 'Analytic strategies' in N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln 
(eds.) Handbook o f Qualitative Research. London: Sage.
Atkinson, P., A. Coffey and S. Delamont (2003) Key Themes in Qualitative Research. 
Oxford: Altamira Press.
Atkinson, P. and A. Coffey (1997) 'Analysing Documentary Realities' in D. Silverman 
(ed.) Qualitative Research. Theory, Method, Practice. London: Sage.
Atkinson, P. and A. Coffey (1996) Making Sense o f Qualitative Data. Complementary 
Research Strategies. London: Sage.
Atkinson, P.(1990) The Ethnographic Imagination. Textual Constructions o f Reality. 
London: Routledge.
Baker, C.D. (2000) 'Locating culture in action: membership categorisation in texts 
and talk' in Alison Lee and Cate Poynton (eds.), Culture, discourse and 
methodology in text, social research and cultural studies. Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers.
Bakhtin, M. M. (1981) The Dialogical Imagination. Austin: University o f Texas Press.
279
Balibar, E. (2002) 'Ambiguous Identities' in E. Balibar Politics and the Other Scene. 
London: Verso.
Balibar, E. (1991) 'The Nation Form: History and Ideology' in E. Balibar and I. 
Wallerstein Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous Identities. London: Verso.
Balfour, S. and A. Quiroga (2007) The Reinvention o f Spain. Nation and Identity since 
Democracy. Oxford: OUP.
Balfour, S. (1996) 'The Lion and the Pig': Nationalism and National Identity in Fin-de- 
Siecle Spain' in Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith (eds.) Nationalism and 
the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula. Competing and Conflicting Identities. 
Oxford: Berg.
Balfour, S. (1990) 'El movimiento obrero y la oposicion obrera durante el franquismo' 
in Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted and Abdon Mateos (eds.) La Oposicion al Regimen 
de Franco. Estado de la cuestion y metodologia de la investigacion. Madrid: 
UNED.
Baran, P. and P. Sweezy (1966) Monopoly Capital. An Essay on the American 
Economic and Social Order. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books
Barrett, M. (1994) 'Ideology, Politics, Hegemony: From Gramsci to Laclau and 
Mouffe' in Slavoj Zizek (ed.) Mapping Ideology. London: Verso.
Barrett, M. (1991) The Politics o f Truth. From Marx to Foucault. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Barreiro Rivas, X.L. (2003) 'Da UPG ao BNG: o proceso organizativo do nacionalismo 
galego' in X. L. Barreiro Rivas (ed.) Os partidos politicos en Galicia. Vigo: 
Edicions Xerais.
Barros, C. (2006) 'Lo que sabemos de los Irmandinos' in Clio &Crimen, n 3, 36-48.
Barros, C. (1994) 'Como construye su objeto la historiografia: los Irmandinos de 
Galicia' in Hispania, n 175, 841-866.
Barros, C. (1990) 'Mitos de la historiografia galleguista' in Manuscrits, n 12, 245-266.
Barthes, R. (2000) Mythologies. London: Vintage.
Barthes, R (1996) 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives' in S. Onega 
and J. A. Garcia Landa (eds.) Narratology. New York: Longman.
280
Bastida Freixedo, X. (2007) 'La senda constitutional. La nacion espanola y la 
constitucion' in C. Taibo (ed.) Nacionalismo espahol. Esencias, memoria e 
instituciones. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata.
Baynham, M. (2006) 'Narratives in Space and Time: Beyond 'Backdrop' Accounts of 
Narrative Orientation' in P. Atkinson and S. Delamont (eds.) Narrative 
Methods II. Narrative Applications. London: Sage.
Baynham, M. and A. De Finna (2005) Dislocations/Relocations. Narratives of 
Displacement. Manchester: St Jerome Publishing.
Beiras, X. M. (1972/ 1997) O atraso economico da Galiza. Santiago: Laiovento
Benner, E. (1995j Really Existing Nationalisms. A Post-Communist View from Marx 
and Engels. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Benford, R. D. (2002) 'Controlling Narratives and Narratives of Control within Social 
Movements' in J.E. Davis (ed) Stories o f Change. Narrative and Social 
Movements. New York: State of New York Press.
Bennet A. and N. Royle (1995) An Introduction to Literature, Criticism and Theory. 
London: Prentice Hall
Bennigsen, A. and S. Enders Wimbush (1979) Muslim National Communism in the 
Soviet Union. Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press.
Beramendi, J. (2007) De Provincia a Nacion. Historia do Galeguismo Politico. Vigo: 
Edicions Xerais.
Beramendi, J. and X. M. Nunez Seixas (1995) O Nacionalismo Galego. Vigo: A Nosa 
Terra.
Beramendi, J. and R. Maiz (1991) Los Nacionalismos en la Espaha de la II Republica. 
Madrid: Siglo XIX.
Beverley, J. (1999) Subalternity and Representation. Arguments in Cultural Theory. 
London: Duke University Press.
Bevir, M. and R. A. W. Rhodes (2006) 'Defending interpretation', European Political 
Science, 5, 69-83.
Bhabha, H.K. (1994) The Location o f Culture. London: Routledge.
Bhabha, H. K.(1990) 'DissemiNation: time, narrative and the margins of the modern 
nation' in H. Bhabha (ed.) Nation and Narration. London: Routledge.
281
Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.
Billig, M., Condor, S. et. al. (1988) Ideological Dilemmas. A Social Psychology of 
Everyday Life. London: Sage
Billig, M. (1987) Arguing and thinking. A rhetorical approach to social psychology. 
Cambridge: CUP
Boggs, C. (1976) Gramsci's Marxism. London: Pluto Press.
Bottomore, T and P. Goode (1978) Austro-Marxism. London: Oxford University Press.
Bottomore, T., Harris, L., Kiernan, V.G. and R. Miliband (1991)/* Dictionary o f Marxist 
Thought, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bourg, J. (2007) From Revolution to Ethics. May 1968 and Contemporary French 
Thought. London: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Bowden, Z.A. (2008) 'Poriadok and Bardak (Order and Chaos). The neo-fascist project 
of articulating a Russian "People"' in Journal o f Language and Politics, 7(2), 
321-347.
Breully, J. (1996) 'Approaches to  Nationalism' in G. Balakrishnan (ed.) Mapping the 
Nation. London: Verso.
Brubaker, R. (1996) Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in 
the New Europe. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
Bruner, J. (1991) 'The Narrative Construction of Reality' in Critical Inquiry, 18(1), 1- 
21.
Bruner, J. (1990) Acts o f Meaning. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Burnham, P., Gilland, K., Grant. W. and Z. Layton-Henry (2004) Research Methods in 
Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Butler, J. (1997) Excitable Speech. A politics o f the performative. New York: 
Routledge.
Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits o f Sex. New York: 
Routledge.
Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge.
Byres, T. J. (1991) 'Peasantry' in Bottomore, T., Harris, L., Kiernan, V.G. and R.
Miliband (1991) A Dictionary o f Marxist Thought, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers.
282
Cabana Iglesias, A (2010) 'Passive Resistance. Notes for a more complete 
understanding of the resistance practices of the rural population during the 
Franco dictatorship' in Amnis: Revue de Civilisation Contemporaine de 
IVniversite de Bretagne Occidentale,
Cabana Iglesias, A (2006) "M inar la paz social. Retrato de la conflictividad rural en 
Galicia durante el primer franquismo" in Revista Ayer, 61, 267-288.
Cabana Iglesias, A. and D. Lanero Taboas (2008) 'Los marcos de movilizacion en la 
Galicia rural del tardofranquismo (1960-1977): las luchas contra la cuota 
empresarial de la Seguridad Social Agraria y la construccion de embalses' in J. 
M. Ortiz de Ortuno et al. (eds.) Movimientos sociales en la Espana 
contemporanea. Madrid: Abada editores.
Cabrera Varela, J. (1994) 'Las precondiciones sociales de la identidad colectiva en 
Galicia', Historia y Crftica, 4, 209-238.
Cabrera Varela, J. (1992) La nacion como discurso. El caso gallego. Madrid: CIS.
Calhoun, C. (1997) Nationalism. Buckingham: OUP.
Calhoun, C. (1993) 'Nationalism and E thn ic it/, Annual Review o f Sociology, 19, 211- 
239.
Campbell, D. (1998) 'MetaBosnia: narratives o f the Bosnian War', Review o f 
International Studies, (24), 261-281.
Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security. United States foreign policy and the politics o f 
identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Carver, T. (2002) 'Discourse Analysis and the 'Linguistic Turn" in European Political 
Science, 2 (1), 50-53.
Carver, T. and M. Hyvarinen (1997) Interpreting the Political. New Methodologies. 
London: Routledge.
Castro Perez, X. (1991) 'Las bases sociales del nacionalismo gallego' in J. Beramendi 
and R. Maiz (1991) Los Nacionalismos en la Espana de la II Republica. Madrid: 
Siglo XIX.
Connor, W. (1984) The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
283
Connor, W. (1977) 'Ethnonationalism in the First World: The Present in Historical 
Perspective' in M. J. Esman (ed.) Ethnic Conflict in the Western World. 
London: Cornell University Press.
Cortazzi, M. (1993) Narrative Analysis. London: The Falmer Press.
Chambers, S. A. and T. Carver (2008) Judith Butler and Political Theory. Troubling 
Politics. London: Routledge.
Chatterjee, P. (1993) The Nation and its Fragments. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Chatterjee, P. (1986) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Culler, J. (2007) The Literary in Theory. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Currie, M. (1998) Postmodern Narrative Theory. London: Macmillan Press. 
Czarniawska, B. (2004) Narratives in Social Science Research. London: Sage. 
Czarniawska, B. (1997) Narrating the Organization. Dramas o f Institutional Identity.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Davis, B. and R. Harre (1999) 'Positioning and Personhood' in R. Harre and L van 
Lagenhove (eds.) Positioning theory. Moral contexts o f Intentional Action. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Davis, J.E. (2002) Stories o f Change. Narrative and Social Movements. New York: 
State of New York Press, 
de Certeau, M. (1984) The Practice Of Everyday Life. London: University of California 
Press.
de la Granja Sainz, J. L. (1995) El Nacionalismo Vasco: Un Siglo de Historia. Madrid: 
Tecnos.
De Fina, A. (2000) 'Orientation in Immigrant Narratives: The Role of Ethnicity in the 
Identification of Characters'. Discourse Studies, 2 (2), 131-157.
Del Aguila, R and R. Montoro (1984) El Discurso Politico de la Transicion Espahola. 
Madrid: CIS.
Delgado, R. (1988-1989) 'Storytelling for oppositionists and others: a plea for 
narratives' in Michigan Law Review, 87, 2411.
284
Denzin, N. and Y. Lincoln (2005) 'Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of 
Qualitative Research' in N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. London: Sage
Deshpande, S. (2000) 'Hegemonic Spatial Strategies: The Nation-Space and Hindu 
Communalism in Twentieth Century India' in P. Chatterjee and P. Jeganathan 
(eds.) Community, Gender and Violence. Subaltern Studies XI. New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Douglas, M. (1966/2002) Purity and Danger. Routledge: London.
Dreyfus, H.L. and P. Rabinow (1982) Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism ad 
Hermeneutics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Eagleton, T (1976/2006,) Criticism and Ideology. A study in Marxist literary theory. 
London: Verso.
Eagleton, T. (1976/2002) Marxism and Literary Criticism. London: Routledge.
Eagleton, T. (1991) Ideology. An introduction. London: Verso.
Elias, A. (2009) Minority Nationalism and European Integration. A Comparative 
Study. London: Routledge.
Elias, A. (2009) 'From Protest to  Power: Mapping the Ideological Evolution of Plaid 
Cymru and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego', in Regional and Federal Studies, 
19 (4-5), 533-557.
Fairclough, N et al. (2004) 'Introduction', Critical Discourse Studies Vol. 1 (1), 1-7.
Fanon, F. (1963/2001) The Wretched o f the Earth. London: Penguin.
Fernan Velio, M. A. and F. Pillado Maior (2005j A estrela na palabra. Novas conversas 
con Xose Manuel Beiras. A Coruna: Laiovento.
Fernan Velio, M. A. and F. Pillado Maior (1989^ A nacion incesante. Conversas con 
Xose Manuel Beiras. Santiago: Sotelo Blanco.
Fernandez Baz, M.A. (2003) A Formacion do Nacionalismo Galego Contemporaneo 
(1963-1984) Santiago: Laiovento.
Fernandez Leiceaga, X. and E. Lopez Iglesias (2000) Estructura Economica de Galicia. 
Santiago: Laiovento.
285
Fine, G. A. (2002) The Storied Group: Social Movements as 'Bundles of Narratives'' 
in J. E. Davis (ed.) Stories o f Change. Narrative and Social Movements. New 
York: State o f New York Press.
Finlayson, A. (1998) 'Ideology, discourse and nationalism' in Journal o f Political 
Ideologies, 3 (1), 99 -118.
Finlayson, A. and J. Valentine (2005) Politics and post-structuralism. An introduction.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Flitter, D. (2000) 'Icons and imperatives in the construction of Galician identity: the 
'Xeracion Nos", Forum fo r  Modern Language Studies, Vol. xxxvi, n 3, 298-309. 
Freeden, M. (1998) 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?', Political Studies, XLVI, 748- 
765.
Foucault, M. (1984) 'What is an author?' in P. Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader. 
London: Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1984) 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in P. Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault 
Reader. London: Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1967/1986) 'Of Other Spaces', Diacritics, Vol. 16, 22-27.
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish. The Birth o f the Prison. London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1980) 'The Confession of the Flesh' in C. Gordon (ed.) 
Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. 
Hassocks: Harvester Press.
Foucault, M. (1976/1998) The Will to Knowledge. The History o f Sexuality:l. London: 
Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1969/1989) The Archaeology o f Knowledge. London: Routledge.
Fox, I. (1997) La Invencion de Espana. Nacionalismo iiberal e identidad nacional. 
Madrid: Catedra.
Freeden, M. (1998) "Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?'' in Political Studies, XLVI, pp: 
748-765
Freeman, M. (2006) 'Life "on holiday"? In defence of big stories' in Narrative Inquiry, 
16(1), 131-138.
Fusi, J.P. (2000) 'La reaparicion de la conflictividad en la Espana de los 60' in Josep 
Fontana (ed.) Espana bajo el franquismo. Barcelona: Critica.
286
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation o f Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Gellner, E. (1997) Nationalism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Georgakopoulou, A. (2006) 'Thinking big with small stories in narrative and identity 
analysis' in Narrative Inquiry, 16(1), 122-130.
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from  the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart.
Gilbert, G. N. and M. Mulkay (1984) Opening Pandora's Box. A sociological analysis of 
scientist's discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gonzalez Casanova, P. (1965) "Internal Colonialism and National Development" in 
Studies in Comparative International Development 1 (4), 27-37.
Guibernau, M. (1999) Nations without States. Political Communities in a Global Era. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Guibernau, M. (1996) Nationalism. The Nation-State and Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gwyn, R (2006) "Really unreal": Narrative Evaluation and the Objectification of 
Experience." in P. Atkinson and S. Delamont (eds.) Narrative Methods II. 
Narrative Applications. London: Sage.
Gwyn, R. (2002) Communicating Health and Illness. Sage: London.
Hajer, M. (1995) The Politics o f Environmental Discourse. Oxford: OUP.
Hall, S. (1996) "Who needs identity?" in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.) Questions 
of Cultural Identity. London: Sage.
Hall, S. (1992) "The question of cultural identity" in S. Hall et a. (eds.) Modernity and 
its Futures. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hall, S. (1990) The Hard Road to Renewal. Thatcherism and the Crisis o f the Left. 
London: Verso.
Harvey, D. (1990) The Condition o f Postmoderntity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Himmelweit, S. (1991) "Mode of production" in T. Bottomore (ed.) A dictionary o f 
Marxist thought. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hinchman, L.P. and S. K. Hinchman (2001) Memory, Identity; Community. The Idea of 
Narrative in the Human Sciences. Albany: State University of New York Press.
287
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1996) 'Ethnicity and nationalism in Europe to d a / in G. 
Baiakrishnan (ed.) Mapping the Nation. London: Verso.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1994) The Age o f Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914- 
1991. London: Abacus.
Hobsbawm, E. J.(1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality. Cambridge: CUP.
Hobsbawm E. J. and T. Ranger (1983) The invention o f Tradition. Cambridge: CUP.
Hopkin, J. (2005) 'From consensus to competition: the changing nature of democracy 
in the Spanish transition' in S. Balfour (ed.) The Politics o f Contemporary Spain 
London: Routledge.
Howarth, D. and J. Torfing (2005) Discourse Theory in European Politics. Identity, 
Policy and Governance. Hampshire: Macmillan Palgrave.
Howarth, D. (2000) Discourse. Buckingham: OUP.
Howarth, D. (2000) The difficult emergence of a democratic imaginary: Black 
Consciousness and non-racial democracy in South Africa' in Discourse Theory 
and Political Analysis. Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. D. Howarth, 
A.J. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds) Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Howarth, D. (1997) 'Compexities of identity/difference: Black Consciousness ideology 
in South Africa' in Journal o f Political Ideologies, 2 (1), 51-78.
Ismail, Q. (2000) 'Constituting Nation, Contesting Nationalism: The Southern Tamil 
(Woman) and Separatist Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka' in P. Chatterjee and 
P. Jeganathan (eds.) Community, Gender and Violence. Subaltern Studies XI. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Jauregui Bereciartu, G. (1990) 'ETA: Causas de su nacimiento, genesis ideologica y 
evolucion estrategico-pohtica' in Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted and Abdon Mateos 
(eds.) La Oposicion al Regimen de Franco. Estado de la cuestion y metodologia 
de la investigacion. Madrid: UNED.
Kamen, H. (2008,) Imagining Spain. Historical Myth and National Identity. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
Keating, M. (2002), Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereign Order, Queen's 
Papers on Europeanization (Ita ly: EUI)
288
Keating, M. (2001b) 'Nations without States: The Accommodation of Nationalism in 
the New State Order* in M. Keating and J. McGarry Minority Nationalism and 
the Changing International Order. Oxford: OUP.
Keating, M. (2001) 'Rethinking the Region : Culture, Institutions and Economic 
Development in Catalonia and Galicia* in European Urban and Regional 
Studies, 8(3): 217-234
Kiernan, V. G. (1991) 'Stages of Development* in T. Bottomore (ed.) A dictionary of 
Marxist thought. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kristeva, J.(1969/1986) 'Word, Dialogue and Novel* in T. Moi (ed.) The Kristeva 
Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Labov, W and J. Waletzky (1997) 'Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal 
Experience*, Journal o f Narrative and Life History, 7(1-4), 3-38.
Lacasta-Zabalza, J. I. (1998) Espana Uniforme. Pamplona: Pamiela.
Laclau, E. (2005) On Populist Reason. London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (1996) The death and resurrection o f the theory of ideology*, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 1(3), 201-220.
Laclau, E.(1996b) 'Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?* in E. Laclau, 
Emancipations, London: Verso.
Laclau, E. (1993) 'Politics and the Limits o f Modernity' in T. Docherty (ed.) 
Postmodernism: A Reader. New York: Columbia University Press.
Laclau, E. (1971) 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America*, New Left Review, 1/67, 
19-38.
Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. London: Verso.
Lagares Diez, N. (1999) Genesis y desarrollo del Partido Popular de Galicia. Madrid: 
Tecnos.
Laiz, C. (1995) La lucha final. Los partidos de la izquierda radical durante la transicion 
espahola. Madrid: Los libros de la catarata.
Lanero Taboas, D. (2008) Una relacion compleja: comunidad rural, conflicto 
socioambiental y organizaciones politicas en la Galicia de la Transicion. El 
caso de "As Encrobas**, in Congreso de Historia Agraria, Cordoba.
289
Larrain, J.(1989) Theories o f Development. Capitalism, Colonialism and Dependency. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Larrain, J. (1979) The Concept o f Ideology. London: Hutchinson Education.
Lefebvre, H. (1991) The Production o f Space. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lenin, V.l. (1997) Imperialism. The Highest Stage o f Capitalism. New York: 
International Publishers.
Lenin, V.l. (1975) Lenin on the national and colonial questions. Three articles. Peking: 
Foreign Language Press.
Lenin, V. I. (1960) The Right o f Nations to Self-Determination" in V. I. Lenin Collected 
Works. Volume 20, December 1913-August 1914. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart.
Lenin, V. I. (1902) What is to be done? [on line] Available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/index.htm 
[Accessed on 09 March 2009].
Leon Soli's, F.(2007) "23F- redemption or derailment of Spanish democracy?" in 
International Journal o f Iberian Studies, 20(3), 207-229.
Linde, C. (1993) Life Stories. The creation o f coherence. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Lopez-Sandez, M. (2008) Paisaxe e Nacion. A Creadon Discursiva do Territorio. Vigo: 
Galaxia.
Lowi, M. (1976) "Marxists and the National Question" in New Left Review, 1/96, 
March-April 1976, 81-100.
Lutz Bauer, R. (1992) "Changing representations of place, community, and character 
in the Spanish Sierra del Caurel" in American Ethnologist, 19 (3), 571-588.
Lyotard, J.F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Macherey, P. (1966/2006) A Theory o f Literary Production. London: Routledge.
Maiz, R. (2003) '"Making opportunities: Contemporary Evolution of Galician 
Nationalism in Spain (1982-2001)"" in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 
3(2), 20-34.
Maiz, R. (2000) A Idea de Nacion en Castelao. Salamanca: Xerais.
290
Maiz, R (1996) "Nacion de Breogan: Oportunidades poh'ticas y estrategias 
enmarcadotas en el movimiento nacionalista gallego (1886-1996)" in Revista 
de Estudios Politicos, 92, Abril-Junio, 33-77.
Maiz, R. (2001) "El nacionalismo gallego en el siglo XX". En A. Morales (ed.) Las 
claves de la Espana del Siglo XX. Ideologias y Movimientos Politicos SENM: 
Madrid.
Maiz, R. (1984) "Raza y M ito Celtico en los Orfgenes del Nacionalismo Gallego: 
Manuel M. Murgufa" in Revista Espahola de Estudios Sociologicos, 25, 137- 
180.
Maiz Vazquez, B. and B. Alonso (2003) O sindicalismo nacionalista galego 1972-1982. 
Vigo: A Nosa Terra.
Marquez Cruz, G.M. (1993) "La transicion local en Galicia: continuidad de las elites 
politicas del franquismo y renovacion de los gobiernos locales" in Revista de 
Estudios Politicos, n 80, 39-120.
Martin Garcia, O.J., D. Gonzalez and M. Ortiz Heras (2009) ""Envenenando a nuestra 
juventud". Cambio de actitudes y militancia juvenil durante el segundo 
franquismo" in Historia Actual Online, 20,19-33.
Martin, J. (1990) "Deconstructing organizational taboos: the suppression of gender 
conflict in organizations" in Organization Science, 1(4), 339-359.
Martinez Quinteiro, M. E. (1996) "Del Antiguo Regimen a la Revolucion Liberal. En 
torno al supuesto "fracaso" de la revolucion liberal" in Antonio Morales and 
Mariano Esteban (eds.) La Historia Contemporanea en Espana. Salamanca: 
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.
Marx, K. (1867/1990) Capital. Volume I. London: Penguin.
Marx, K and F. Engels (2001) On the National and Colonial Questions. Selected 
Writings. New Delhi: Left Word.
Mata, J.M. (2005) Terrorism and nationalist conflict: the weakness of democracy in 
the Basque Country" in Sebastian Balfour (ed.) The Politics of Contemporary 
Spain, London: Routledge.
McCrone, D. (1998) The Sociology o f Nationalism. London: Routledge
Meiksins Wood, E. (2002) The Origin o f Capitalism. A Longer View. London: Verso.
291
Memmi, A. (1965/1990) The colonizer and the colonized. London: Earthscan 
Publications.
Mottier, V. (2000) "Narratives of National Identity: Sexuality, Race, and the Swiss 
"Dream of Order". Swiss Journal o f Sociology, 26 (3), 533-558.
Mouffe, C. (2005) On the Political. London: Routledge.
Mumby, D. K. (1993) Narrative and Social Control: Critical perspectives. London: 
Sage.
Muro, D. and A. Quiroga (2004) "Building the Spanish Nation: the Centre-Periphery 
Dialectic" in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 4 (2), 18-37.
Nimni, E. (1991) Marxism and Nationalism. Theoretical origins o f a political crisis. 
London: Pluto Press.
Norval, A.J. (2000) "Review Article: The Things We Do With Words -Contemporary 
Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology", British Journal o f Political Science, 
30(2), 313-346.
Norval, A.J. (1994) "Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid" in E. Laclau (ed.) The 
Making o f Political Identities. London: Verso.
Nunez Seixas, X.M. (2007) "Nuevos y viejos nacionalistas: la cuestion territorial en el 
tardofranquismo 1959-1975" in Ayer 68 (4), 59-87.
Nunez Seixas, X.M. (2007) "Conservadores y patriotas: el nacionalismo de la derecha 
espahola ante el siglo XX" in C. Taibo (ed.) Nacionalismo espahol. Esencias, 
memoria e instituciones. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata.
Nunez Seixas, X.M. (2001b) "Orfgenes, desarrollo y mutaciones del nacionalismo 
gallego (1840-1982)" in F. Campuzano (ed.) Les Nationalismes en Espagne. De 
Tetat liberal a Tetat des autonomies (1876-1978). M ontpellier: Universite de 
Montpellier III.
Nunez Seixas, X.M. (2001) "What is Spanish nationalism today? From legitimacy crisis 
to unfulfilled renovation (1975-2000)" in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24 (5), 
719-752.
Nunez Seixas, X.M. (1994) "Nacionalismo e cultura en Galicia durante o primeiro 
franquismo (1939-1955)" in De Orbis Hispani Unguis Litteris Historia Moribus. 
Frankfurt: Domus Editoria Europea.
292
Nunez Seixas, X.M. (1988) 'A supervivencia do nacionalismo galego na emigration 
Americana, 1939-1960' in Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted and Abdon Mateos (eds.) 
La Oposicion al Regimen de Franco. Estado de la cuestion y metodologia de la 
investigacion. Madrid: UNED.
Ochs, E. (1997) 'Narrative7 in T. Van Dijk (ed.) Discourse as Structure and Process. 
London:Sage.
Ortiz Heras, M. (2003) 'Historiografia de la Transicion' in Actas de las VI Jornadas de 
Castilla-La Mancha sobre Investigacion en Archivos, Guadalajara, 4-7 de 
noviembre, 223-242
Ozkirimli, U. (2005) Contemporary Debates on Nationalism. A Critical Engagement. 
Hampshire: Palgrave.
Ozkirimli, U. (2000) Theories o f Nationalism. A Critical Introduction. Hampshire: 
Palgrave.
Patterson, C. (2006) Galician Cultural Identity in the Works o f Ramon Otero Pedrayo.
Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Phillips N. and C. Hardy (2002) Discourse Analysis. Investigating Processes o f Social 
Construction. London: Sage.
Plummer, K. (1995) Telling Sexual Stories. Power; Change and the Social Worlds. 
London: Routledge.
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1988) Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences. New York: 
State of New York Press.
Polletta, F (2006) It Was Like a Fever. Storytelling in Protest and Politics. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Polletta, F. (1998) 'Contending Stories: Narratives in Social Movements' in 
Qualitative Sociology, 21(4), 419-446.
Portas, P. (2003) Minority Nationalism and European Integration. The Case o f Galicia.
Unpublished MSc Thesis, Cardiff University.
Potter, J. (1996) Representing Reality. Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. 
London: Sage.
293
Prada, J. (no date) 'La transicion poh'tica en Galicia. Una aproximacion' [on line] 
Available at http://biblioteca2.uclm.es/biblioteca/celclm. [Accessed on May 
2010]
Preston, P. (1986) The Triumph o f Democracy in Spain. London: Routledge.
Prince, G. (2003) A dictionary of Narratology. Lincoln: University of Nevada Press.
Quintana Garrido, X. R. (2008) 'Bloque Nacionalista Galego (1982-2007). 
Unha viaxe inacabada cara a moderacion centrista' in Inzar Razons, n 36, no 
pages.
Recalde, J.R. (1990) 'Crisis de legitimidad en los afios 60' in Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted 
and Abdon Mateos (eds.) La Oposicion al Regimen de Franco. Estado de la 
cuestion y metodologfa de la investigacion. Madrid: UNED.
Resina, J.R. (2002) 'Post-national Spain? Post-Spanish Spain?' in Nations and 
Nationalism, 8 (3), 377-396.
Riessman, C.K. (2008) Narrative Methods in the Human Sciences. London: Sage.
Riessman, C. K. (1993) Narrative Analysis. London: Sage.
Riquer, B. (1996) 'Nacionalidades y Regiones. Problemas y lineas de investigacion en 
torno a la debil nacionalizacion espahola del siglo XIX' in Antonio Morales and 
Mariano Esteban (eds.) La Historia Contemporanea en Espana. Salamanca: 
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca.
Riviere Gomez, A. (2000) 'Envejecimiento del presente y dramatization del pasado: 
una aproximacion a las smtesis historicas de las comunidades autonomas 
espanolas (1975-1995)' in J. S. Perez Garzon (ed.) La gestion de la memoria. 
La historia de Espana al servicio del poder. Barcelona: Crftica.
Royle, N. (2003) Jaques Derrida, London: Routledge.
Rubiralta Casas, F. (1998) De Castelao a Mao. O novo nacionalismo radical galego 
(1959-1974): orixes, configuracion e desenvolvemento inicial da U Santiago: 
Laiovento.
Ruiz Miguel, C. (1997) O Dereito Publico de Galicia. Santiago: Universidade de 
Santiago.
San Martin, P. (2002) 'A discursive reading of the emergence of Asturias nationalist 
ideolog/ in Journal o f Political Ideologies, 7 (1), 97-116.
294
Saz Campos, I. (2007) 'Mucho mas que crisis poh'ticas: el agotamiento de dos 
proyectos enfrentados7 in Ayer 68 (4), 137-163.
Saz Campos, I. (2003) Espana contra Espana. Los nacionalismos franquistas. Madrid: 
Marcial Pons.
Schram, S. (1991) The Thought o f Mao Tse-Tung. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Shenhav, S.R. (2005) Thin and thick narrative analysis. On the question of defining 
and analyzing political narratives7 in Narrative Inquiry, 15(1), 75-99.
Shenhav, S.R. (2004) "Once upon a time there was a nation: narrative 
conceptualization analysis. The concept of "nation7 in the discourse of Israeli 
Likud party leaders7 in Discourse and Society, 15(1), 81-104.
Silverman, D (2010) Doing Qualitative Research. London: Sage
Smith, A. D. (1991) National Identity. Reno: University o f Nevada Press.
Smith, A.D. (1981) The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: CUP.
Smith, A. D. (1979) Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Martin Robinson & 
Co.
Soto, A. (2005) Transicion y Cambio en Espana 1975-1996. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Stake, R. (2000) "Case Studies7 in N. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, London, Sage.
Stalin, J. (1913) Marxism and the National Question, [on line] Available at h ttp :// 
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913. [Accessed on 9 
March 2009]
Stallybrass, P. (1990) "Marx and Heterogeneity: Thinking the Lumpenproletariat7 in 
Representations, 31, Special Issue, 69-95.
Stanley, L. (2008) "Madness to the method? Using a narrative methodology to 
analyse large-scale complex social phenomena7 in Qualitative Research, 8(3), 
435-447.
Stedman-Jones, G. (1983) Languages o f class: Studies in English working class history 
1832-1982, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tambling, J. (1991) Narrative and Ideology. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
295
Tannen, D. (2008) '"We've never been close, we're very different" Three narrative 
types in sister discourse' in Narrative Inquiry; 18(2), 206-229.
Taylor, S. (2006). 'Narrative as construction and discursive resource' in Narrative 
Inquiry, 16(1), 94-102.
Taylor, S. (2001) 'Locating and Conducting Discourse Analytic Research' in M. 
Wetherell, S. Taylor and S. Yates (eds.) Discourse as Data. A Guide fo r  
Analysis. London: Sage.
Thomassen, L. (2005) 'Antagonism, hegemony and ideology after heterogeneity7 in 
Journal o f Political Ideologies, 10 (3), 289-309.
Tiryakian, E.A. and R. Rogowski (1985) New nationalisms o f the developed West. 
Boston: Allen and Unwin.
Todorov, T. (1990) Genres in Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tortella, G. (2003) El Desarrollo de la Espana Contemporanea. Historia Economica de 
ios SiglosXIXyXX. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Vails Montes, R. (1986) 'Ideologfa Franquista y Ensenanza de la Historia de Espana 
1938-1953' in J. Fontana (ed.) Espana Bajo el Franquismo. Barcelona: Crftica.
Verdery, K. (1996) 'Whither nation or nationalism?' in G. Balakrishnan (ed.) Mapping 
the Nation. London: Verso.
Vilas Nogueira, J. and M.A. Fdz Baz (2004) 'El BNG: definition y evolution de su 
estructura organizativa' in Revista de Estudios Politicos, 123, Enero-Marzo, 
201-222
Villares, R. (1992) A Historia. Vigo: Galaxia.
Vincent, A. (2002) Nationalism and Particularity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Vinas, A. (2007) 'Una polftica exterior para conseguir la absolution' in Ayer 68 (4), 
111-136.
VoloSinov, M. (1979) Marxism and the Philosophy o f Language. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
Waever, O. (2005) 'European interation and Security: Analysing French and German 
Discourses on State, Nation and Europe' in D. Howarth and J. Torfing (eds.)
296
Discourse Theory in European Politics. Identity, Policy and Governance. 
Hampshire: Macmillan Palgrave
Wallwork, J. and J.A. Dixon (2004) 'Foxes, green fields and Britishness: On the 
rhetorical construction of place and national identity7 in British Journal o f 
Social Psychology, 43, 21-39.
Weedon, C. (2004) Identity and Culture. Narratives o f Difference and Belonging. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press
Wetherell, M. (1998) 'Positioning and interpretative repertoires: conversation 
analysis and post-structuralism in dialogue' in Discourse and Society, 9(3), 
387-412.
Wetherell, M. and J. Potter (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology. Beyond Attitudes 
and Behaviour. London: Sage.
White, H. (1987) The Content o f the Form. Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Research. London: John Hopkins University Press.
White, H. (1973) Metahistory. The historical imagination in nineteenth-century 
Europe. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Whooley, O. (2006) The political work of narratives. A dialogical analysis of two slave 
narratives' in Narrative Inquiry, 16 (2), 295-318.
Wood L. and R. Kroger (2000) Doing Discourse Analysis. Methods fo r Studying Action 
in Talk and Text. London: Sage.
Wright Mills, C. (1940) 'Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive' in American 
Sociological Review, (5), 904-913.
Wright, S. (2002) Storming Heaven. Class composition and struggle in Italian 
Autonomist Marxism. London: Pluto Press.
Young, R. J.C. (2001) Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ysas, P. (2007) '<• Una sociedad pasiva? Actitudes, activismo y conflictividad social en 
el franquismo tardfo' in Ayer 68 (4), 31-57.
Ysas, P. (2004) Disidencia y Subversion. La lucha del regimen franquista por su 
supervivencia, 1960-1975, Barcelona: Critica.
Yuval-Davies, N. (1997) Gender and Nation. London: Sage.
297
Appendix
1. Run Down o f Key Events in Galicia &  Spain 1973-1986
2. Galician originals o f translated texts
3. Acronyms
4. Map nationalisms 1963-1983
5. Table o f narrative shifts
6. Maps o f shifting political frontiers
298
Run Down of Key Events in Galicia & Spain 1973-1986
1973 • UPG launches the student association Estudiantes Revolucionarios Galegos, 
(ERGA).
• UPG launches Comisions Labregas (CCLL).
1974 • March 2nd, execution of Catalan anarchist militant S. Puig Antich and Pole H. 
Chez.
• April 25th, Portuguese carnation revolution.
• July, launching of the Spanish Junta Democratica (PCE) with a programme of 
‘democratic break’.
1975 • April, UPG launches the Asamblea Nacional-Popular Galega (AN-PG).
• May, UPG launches the Sindicato Obreiro Galego (SOG).
• State of exception Basque Country and Spain.
• June, Plataforma de Convergencia Democratica (PSOE), open to reform.
• August, M. Reboiras dies, end of short-lived UPG-sponsored armed struggle.
• 27th September, Francoist executions FRAP & ETA members
• 20th November, Franco dies.
• November, coronation Juan Carlos I & Arias Navarro government.
• November, mass amnesty demonstrations Vigo, Barcelona, Madrid, Seville.
1976 • January, UPG, PSG, PC, MCG and PGSD form the Consello de Forzas 
Politicas de Galicia for rupture & self-government (CFPG) which writes the 
Bases Constitucionais.
• January-March, mass strikes for amnesty and labour unrest.
• February, ANPG Monforte demonstration against paper paste factory.
• February, conflict paper paste factory in Ponteceso, Bergantihos.
• February, conflict expropriation of lands in As Encrobas.
• March, ‘Platajunta’ state level common platform PSOE & PCE, signals end of 
‘democratic break’ and beginning of ‘pacted break’ strategy.
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• June, conflict result of Urquiola oil spill in A Coruna.
• Legalization of PSOE.
• Francoist elites launch continuity parties: Uni6n de Centro Democr£tico (UCD) 
& Alianza Popular (AP).
• June, Galician Tdboa Democratica: PSOE, PCG, PSPG, ORT, UGT, CCOO 
etc; for reform & statute of autonomy.
• November, first Suarez government, Law of Political Reform.
• November, crisis and dissolution of CFPG.
• December, referendum political reform, 60% participation in Galicia.
1977 • January, Meilan Gil launches the Partido Gallego Independiente.
• Crisis of the ‘Colonels’, UPG expelling of ‘pluralist’ line general secretary 
‘Pepifio’ and G. Crego; raise of ‘orthodoxy’ with E. Souto, Lopez-Suevos, F. 
Rodriguez and P. Luaces.
• Founding of UPG-lina proletaria, from UPG split.
• March, resolution conflict As Encrobas.
• April, still illegal, UPG & ANPG launch the electoral coalition BNPG.
• April, conflict nuclear station in Xove.
• April, legalization of PCE.
• June 15th, first legislative elections, results of 2.4% and 2% of vote for PSG and 
BNPG electoral platform (UPG & ANPG) respectively.
• Pactos de la Moncloa & start of ‘desencanto’ years.
• August, UPG first congress.
• October, crisis electoral results. UPG split & founding of Partido Obreiro Galego 
(POG).
• December, A Nosa Terra weekly founded by UPG.
• 4th December, 500.000 Galicians demonstrate in favour of statute of autonomy.
• 4th December, CCLL and UPG’s alternative demonstration against agrarian tax, 
the 20.000 strong ‘tractorada’.
1978 • February, ‘Documento dos 19’ internal split PSG. Many join the PSOE.
• March, the UPG-lina proletaria becomes Partido Galego do Proletariado (PGP).
• April, constitution of the Xunta de Galicia (Galician government). President A. 
Ros6n (ex-falangista).
• June, formation of centre-right Partido Galeguista.
• July, legalization of UPG.
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• 31st October, Spanish Constitution ratified by Chamber of Deputies and Senate.
• 6th December, referendum Spanish Constitution.
1979 • January, Commission of the 16, all parties but UPG & PSG, write draft statute 
of autonomy for Galicia.
• January, Unidade Galega (UG) coalition by POG, PSG and PG.
• March, legislative elections: 5.35% and 5.87% of vote for UG and BNPG 
respectively.
• April, municipal elections.
• April, the PGP launches Galicia ceibe.
• November, UCD’s alternative project of statute for Galicia approved in Spanish 
Cortes. Minimal devolution.
1980 • June, PSG calls on Galician nationalist parties to unite.
• 11th July, Constitution of the Mesa de Forzas Politicas Galegas (MFPG) by 
UPG, AN-PG, PSG.
• PSG breaks from Unidade Galega. Split in the party
• December, Galician Statute of Autonomy ratified by Chamber of Deputies.
1981 • January, BN-PG’s starts campaign against statute of autonomy.
• 23rd February, Colonel Tejero’s attempted coup d’etat.
• 7th March, detention of B. Alvarez, P. Rodriguez and X. Bahamonde in protest 
against prohibition to celebrate ERGA’s congress.
• 18th March, Spanish senate ratifies the Galician statute.
• May, POG becomes Esquerda Galega (EG)
• 30th June, Electoral alliance BN-PG-PSG for autonomic elections.
• 5th July-October, crisis UPG (and AN-PG, INTG, etc). Renounce of general 
secretary Pedro Luaces, 10 members of the central committee and 
considerable numbers of membership. Francisco Rodriguez provisional 
secretary general.
• July, T&T issue 84. Beginning of 10 month period of silence.
• 17th October, first elections to the Galician Parliament. BN-PG-PSG: 3 seats; 
EG: 1 seat. Conservative majority.
• 19th December, first Galician Parliament constituted, X. Fernandez Albor (AP) 
president.
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1982 • 8tn-10th January, III congress UPG. P. Luaces leaves UPG. F. Rodriguez 
confirmed Secretary General.
• February, A Nosa Terra publishes Grupo de Lugo’s article calling for a 
nationalist mass democratic party.
• 23rd March, X.M. Beiras, Head of School of Economics, detained in non­
authorized demonstration in Santiago.
• May-June, T&T issue 85 published. End of 10 month period of silence.
• 14th and 15th July, BN-PG-PSG elected MPs refuse to swear allegiance to the 
Spanish Constitution to take possession of their seats in the Galician 
parliament. Use of alternative swearing formula.
• September, Riazor assembly constitutes the Bloque Nacionalista Galego 
(BNG). BNG political programme.
• 28th October, Spanish general elections, PSOE’s landslide victory.
• 2nd November, ‘failed’ opportunity of swearing. Use of alternative formula.
• 23rd November, privation of the BN-PG-PSG elected MP’s rights takes place 
with votes from UCD, AP, PSOE.
• 25th November, nationalists chained themselves to Fonseca’s palace.
• 2nd December, nationalist MPs present a criminal cause against the President 
of the Xunta de Galicia for ‘expelling’.
• 19th December, 2000 strong demonstration against ‘expelling’ of nationalist 
MPs.
1983 • PSG abandons BNG. Split ‘Colectivo Socialista’ remains inside.
• Spanish dirty war against ETA: GAL. Kidnap and torture of Lasa and Zabala.
• December, UPG’s IV congress. Mariano Abalo new secretary general.
• Launch of Coalicion Galega, centre right nationalist party.
1984 • PSG joins EG to form PSG-EG.
• 22nd December, BNG II assembly.
1985 • Beginnings of Exercito Guerrilleiro do Povo Galego Ceibe (EXPXC).
• 24th November, Autonomic elections: PSG-EG and Coalicion Galega obtained 
14 seats (24%). BNG obtained one seat.
• November, UPG’s central committee paper on need to swear constitution.
• December, BNG’s extraordinary assembly to allow swearing after elections.
• X. M. Beiras swears the Spanish constitution.
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1986 • Membership European Communities.
• BNG campaign against Nato.
• Nato referendum.
• Spanish general elections. PSOE’s victory.
• UPG’s V congress
• 25th July, Colectivo Comunista 22 de marzo, later PCLN appears. Split from 
UPG, inside BNG
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Galician Originals Of Translated Texts
Chapter 4. A new Attila in Galicia: the myth of loss 
Extracts 4.1. On myth debunking
[A] "O noso Partido naceu [...] como produto do enfrentamento 
ideoloxico coa costra dominante do espaholismo. [...] Nesta situacion 
colonial nada ten de estrano que o combate tivera que iniciarse 
precisamente pola demostracion de que a nosa realidade tina unhas 
coordenadas diferentes as do resto do Estado e, polo tanto, unha 
dinamica politica diferente." (UPG, 1977,1 congress)
[B] "As cousas son mesmamente ao reves, malia todo o que se diga. 
Unha frustracion social prematura, esodo plurisecular, raquitismo 
burgues, insolidaridade institucional, colonization financeira: eis, se 
cadra, as chaves espricativas do actual atraso economico da Galiza. O 
ruralismo, o minifundio, os foros, a inhibition empresarial, o caos 
gandeiro, a inorancia, o individualismo, o estado das comunicacions, e 
tantos outros fenomenos tan sinificativos de primeiras, non son mais, 
cando son algo, que smtomas do atraso, e non c o u s a s (Beiras, EBG, 
1972)
Extract 4.2. On the myth of loss
"Galicia como nacion colonizada._
O proceso de domination de Galicia por Espana iniciase moi cedo e 
consumase en gran parte cando os Reises Catolicos comenzan a constru- 
cion do que sera o Estado moderno espanol, imperialista, e, polo mesmo,
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fortemente autoritario. Aliados cunha parte da nobleza feudal galega, 
que tina que enfrentarse co movemento social superador do feudalismo 
no noso pais (formado por labregos que reivindicaban a propiedade das 
terras que traballaban, e que eran posesion dos senori'os, pola 
embrionaria burguesia comercial vilega potenciada a consecuencia da 
ruta do Camino de Santiago, e pola fidalguia rural), consuman a "Doma e 
castration do Reino de Galicia".
Unha vez derrotado militarmente 0 movemento popular, os Irmandinos, 
os reises castelans decapitan politicamente a Galicia forzando a que a 
nobleza galega "delegue" niles 0 poder. Esta xoga derradeiramente a 
carta de apoio a Beltranexa frente a Isabel "la Catolica", tarefa na que se 
alia aos nobles portugueses e da que saiu perdedora. Dende enton, 
queda coutada a posibilidade de evolution normal interna dun modo de 
producion feudal ao capitalista, xa que se impide 0 ascenso normal da 
burguesia e un proceso politico autoxenerado internamente na propia 
sociedade galega que queda dominada politicamente por Castela. 
Comenza asi unha longa esplotacion colonial do nose pobo. Labregos e 
marineiros tenen que aturar as cargas feudais, as cargas reais, padecer as 
fames, combater aos corsarios, servir ao Rei en Flandes, Italia ou 
Portugal, manter aos exercitos que pasan, sofrir as "Justicias", ir facer a 
seitura a Castela, repoboar as Alpujarras, colonizar America e hastra 
morrer de peste. A domination colonial modifica as suas formas coa 
implantation do modo de producion capitalista no Estado Espanol a 
partires do derradeiro tercio do seculo XIX, e agudizase especialmente 
nos ultimos 20 anos coa aceleracion do proceso de acumulacion 
capitalista e 0 ascenso do capital monopolista do Estado." ."
(UPG, The UPG and the interpretive lines of Galician reality7 in First 
Congress, 1977)
Extracts 4.3. On blame
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[A] " A frustracion da segunda revolta irmandina, seguida da derrota do 
bando da nobleza galega que tomara partido pola Beltranexa, e da 
consolidacion do estado monarquico ausoluto "espanol", supon, 
conxuntamente, 0 fracaso da transicion alen o feudalismo e mais a morte 
politica da Galiza, coidadosamente aduviada polos Reis Catolicos. Eran 
demasiados feitos decisivos concatenados pra que o pais se repuxera 
deseguida."
(AEdG, 1972)
[B] "0 novo poder real hespanol atopase cas mans ceibes en Galicia 
porque, polo enton acaban de suceder, dous feitos historicos decisivos" 
(CT, UPG&PSG, 1973).
Chapter 5. The new Attila (II): the modern colonization of the nation 
Extracts. 5.1. Colonialism as quilting point.
[A] "Comenza asi unha longa esplotacion colonial do noso pobo. [...] A 
domination colonial modifica as suas formas coa implantation do modo 
de producion capitalista no Estado Espanol a partires do derradeiro tercio 
do seculo XIX, e agudizase especialmente nos ultimos 20 anos coa 
aceleracion do proceso de acumulacion capitalista e o ascenso do capital 
monopolista do Estado."
(UPG, The UPG and the interpretive lines of Galician reality' in First 
Congress, 1977)
[B] "Por iso e vital distinguir a opresion nacional do colonialismo: o 
colonialismo e unha forma de opresion nacional, pero a reci'proca non e 
necesariamente certa [...] O asoballamento nacional superposto ao 
subdesenrolo economico e xa algo distinto: e o colonialismo. [...] O 
problema galego e un problema de asoballamento nacional, economico,
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social e cultural a vez, e a sua resolution pasa pola descolonizacion do 
pais" (Lopez-Suevos, Of Colonial Capitalism, pp 34-35,1979)
[c] "O atraso economico, a emigracion, a negation cultural, etc, son 
fenomenos que compre considerar globalmente, porque son a 
consecuencia loxica do asoballamento nacional no que o imperialismo 
confinou ao pobo traballador de Galicia ao traveso da action opresora do 
Estado Espanol."
('A party, for what?' Christmas 1977, PSG)
Extracts 5.2. On the political solution to colonialism.
[A] "As clases populares galegas necesitan soberama politica para 
acometer a reforma agraria e pesqueira, para facer unha 
industrialization racional do noso pais, para investir na Galiza os aforros 
dos nosos emigrantes, para rematar dunha vez por todas coa emigracion, 
pra convertir o galeo na unica lingua oficial da Galiza, para construer 
unha Galiza sin monopolios. So un Estado galego democratico-popular 
sera capaz de levar adiante estas medidas, imprescindibeis para encetar 
a reconstruction material e cultural do pais, e mellorar substancialmente 
as conditions de vida do noso povo.
('What is the UPG?', T&T, UPG, 1977)
[B] "Estes problemas somente seran resoltos cando o pobo galego poida 
decider por si mesmo o seu destino, cando a propiedade dos medios de 
production sexa colectiva, cando os traballadores acaden o poder 
democraticamente constituido. Esto e, nunha Galicia ceibe e socialista. 
('A party, for what?' Christmas 1977, PSG)
Extracts 5.3. On antagonisms
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[A] "Nos pai'ses como o noso ...a primeira tarefa [...] e a identification 
do nemigo principal. Este nemigo principal e a oligarquia monopolista 
espanola, e o seu istrumento represivo fundamental ao servicio dos seus 
intreses de clase e 0 Estado Imperialista Espanol."
('Justification of the formation o f the Galician national-popular bloc', I 
Congress, UPG, 1977)
[B] "O noso Partido naceu, [...], como produto do enfrentamento 
ideoloxico coa costra dominante do espanolismo. Espanolismo ideoloxico 
que contaminaba a todos os sectores sociais do pais, incluidos os mais 
politizados e preocupados pola sua realidade."
(The ideological combat7,1 Congress, UPG, 1977).
Extract 5. 4. On 'spanishism7
"O espanolismo, tanto de dereitas como das denominadas 'esquerdas7, e 
a expresion ideoloxica-politica do imperialismo, manifestado tanto baixo 
formas coloniais como neocoloniais ou pseudos-liberadoras. Por mais 
que se proclame democratas, socialistas ou mesmo comunistas, os 
espanolistas son ouxetivamente contrarrevolucionarios, dende o intre en 
que non asumen a opresion colonial de Galicia con todas as suas 
consecuencias"
(The self-organization of the Galician popular classes in order to achieve 
the above mentioned objectives7,1 congress, UPG, 1977)
Extract 5. 5. On the enemy
'Agora ben, o estado espanol unitario constitue en si mesmo a negation 
do feito nacional galego. A existencia do Estado Espanol unitario 
constitue a anti'tese da esistencia de Galicia. Galicia non podera realizarse 
politicamente mentras estea apreixada na estructura dun Estado Espanol 
unitario, sexa ou non sexa totalitario..."
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("Position of the PSG in support of the Galician political alternative of the 
Consello before the unitary platforms of the Spanish state", GS, n .l, 1976)
Extract 5.6. On alliances and frontiers.
"A dinamica imprimida ao conxunto polas forzas situadas no nucleo do 
frente nacionalista, forzas de esquerda socialistas e comunistas, debe ser 
tal que lies coma o terreo progresivamente as forzas situadas for a do 
circulo esterior, que atraia e non repela, que as leve unha tras outra ao 
rego dunha polftica nacional galega...deica esgotar o espectro das que 
poden entrar no proceso -de  xeito que ao cabo queden for a somentes 
as que pola sua indole son inasimilables nesa estratexia. Unhas delas 
encarnara ao enemigo irreductible, de clase e nacional..."
(The problems of the Galician national front at this hour: a proposal for 
unity", GS, n l, 1976)
Extracts 5.7. On narrativization
[A] "A UPG sabe que a revolucion proletaria en Galicia e a costrucion do 
socialismo e do comunismo, nesta etapa historica do imperialismo 
mundial, ten coma ouxetivo previo a consecucion da liberation nacional 
do noso pais"
(The UPG"s alternative: the national-popular struggle as a necessary step 
in the construction o f socialism", I Congress, 1977, UPG)
[B] "A UPG ten moi claro que a primeira fase da revolucion socialista en 
Galicia pasa pola revolucion nacional-popular, xa que a opresion colonial 
a que esta sometida pola oligarquia espanola, clase dominante do 
Estado, situa a contradiction entre as clases populares galegas e o 
imperialismo. A revolucion nacional-popular traducese no rachamento 
do Estado unitario, na destruction do colonialismo, na recuperation da
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soberama politica e economica que abra paso a construction do 
sociaiismo na nosa Terra."
('Consolidation of the MNPG', II Congress, 1979, UPG)
Extract 5.8. On negotiating nation and class.
"Como partido operario que e, a UPG loita polo sociaiismo, pola 
supresion da propiedade privada dos medios de production, contra a 
exploration do home polo home no camino da sociedade comunista. 
Agora ben, o proletariado non e a unica clase esplotada senon que o 
capitalismo colonial padecen-o tamen todas as clases populares galegas, 
o que determina unha convergencia obxectiva de intereses na loita pola 
liberacion nacional e social do noso pobo. Por iso a revolucion nacional- 
popular e un paso necesario no camino do sociaiismo na Galiza e precisa 
para ser realidade, da formation dunha frente interclasista integrada por 
todas aquelas clases que asumen a principal contradiction presente hoxe 
na Galiza: a que opon as camadas populares galegas a burguesia 
monopolisa do Estado espanol. [...] Por todo o anterior a UPG, na fase 
actual, preconiza a loita pola liberacion nacional e social da Galiza, como 
paso necesario para a construccon do sociaiismo..."
('What is the UPG?', T&T, UPG, 1977)
Extracts 5.9. On identity.
[A] "Nistes casos a loita de liberacion nacional e pola emancipation de 
clase coincide"
(Class antagonism, UPG, I congress, 1977)
[B] "Na situation historica actual a loita de clase e a loita de liberacion 
nacional son unha loita soa e indisoluble" (UPG, I congress, 1977)
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[C] "A loita de liberacion nacional dos pobos oprimidos e unha expresion 
do combate do proletariado pola revolucion socialista mundiar 
(UPG, II Congress, 1979, my cursive)
Extracts 5.10. On class and nationhood.
[A] "O termo nacionalismo e empregado por nos no senso de 
MOVIMENTO DAS CLASES POPULARES DUN PAIS DOMINADO POLA SUA 
LIBERACION NACIONAL e xa que logo, SOCIAL. [...] o noso conceuto de 
nacion, resposta a certos dados ouxectivos, de caracter empi'rico que son 
os que aparecen na definition de Stalin mais engadindo que neste intre 
da evolution do capitalismo a nacion son as clases populares porque a 
nacion adquire categori'a revolucionaria contra o poder burgues, A 
NACION NON SON TODAS AS CLASES, SONNO SOIO AQUELAS QUE 
ASUMEN A LOITA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL que , nas circunstancias 
actuates, e unha loita de liberacion social das clases oprimidas. Non e 
pois o noso conceto de nacion un concepto ESENCIALISTA senon 
CLASISTA. [...] Nos, como nacionalistas, non refugamos da PRIMACIA DO 
CONCEUTO DE CLASE CONTRA CALQUERA OUTRA CATEGORIA 
HISTORICA..." (The nationalist movements', T&T, n37,1976)
[B] "...e evidente que a categori'a de nacion non esta, pra nos, ao marxen 
do contido de clase, ademais de que a nacion non e unha categori'a a- 
historica que se poida definir esclusivamente por rasgos empi'ricos 
sensibeles (lingoa, cultura, xeografia). Polo contrario, pra nos as nacios 
tenen un sentido historico e social preciso."
(The class antagonism in this colonial situation', I Congress, UPG, 1977)
[C] "Nestas argumentacions sempre se confunde Estado con Nacion. 
Porque si e certo que os estados moderrnos europeos foron creados 
pola burguesia , non e menos certo que moitas nacins foron abafadas 
polo espansionismo imperialista de outras."
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(The nationalist movements', T&T, n37,1976)
Extracts 5.11. On heterogeneity in the making of the nation
[A] "Esta esprotacion sofrena todalas clas populares. Emporeso, a 
superacion da debilidade do movimento obreiro galego, e, a sua 
conversion en fortaleza, pasa pola union con todalas clas populares 
galegas, na loita para derrubar a comun esprotacion."
(CT, PSG & UPG, 1973).
[B] "Todo o pobo galego, como xa dixemos, sinifica a union nun bloque 
compacto de obreiros, labregos, marineiros e aquiles pequeno-burgueses 
(pequeno comerciantes e industriais que apenas utilicen traballo 
asalariado, profesionais liberais, etc ... ) que tomen conciencia da sua 
identidade de intreses coas clases popu-lares e renuncien, xa que logo, a 
sua identificaci6n mimetica e suicida coa cultura burguesa e antinacional 
que a colonizaci6n espanola nos imp6n. Agora ben, en todo caso, 0 
proletariado galego ten a obriga e a mision historica de asumir a 
vangarda e a direcion da revolucion nacional-popular galega, xa que e a 
clase mais dinamica da sociedade, intresada ouxetivamente na 
construcion do sociaiismo."
(The justification of the policy o f forming the national-popular bloc', I 
Congress, UPG, 1977)
Extracts. 5.12. On lack of contradictions
[A] "En linas xerais, a contradicion principal e a que opon aos labregos 
probes, medios ou acomo-dados ao capitalismo monopolista, aos 
elementos caciquiles e ao E.I.E."
('Galicia as a colonized nation', I congress, UPG, 1977).
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[B] "A inesistencia de contradicions entre as clases populares galegas, 
niste intre historico, ven, pois, determinada pola funcion colonial e o 
desenvolvemento dependente da nosa econorma. E viabel un proiecto 
politico que in-tegre a loita popular cuns ouxetivos comuns."
( 'Class antagonism in this colonial situation', I congress, UPG, 1977).
Extracts 5.13. On the new unitary figure
[A] "A inmensa maioria do proletariado galego distribuiese por pequenas 
e me-dianas empresas i en grande parte mantense como propietario 
persoal no sector primario, no agro, dando lugar a xeneralizada e grafica 
denominacion de "proletario-propietario" que corresponde 
humanmente ao labrego que fai horas estras...."
(I congress, UPG, 1977)
[B] "O papel da clase labrega non e secundario, senon preponderante: 
porque representan mais do 50% da poboacion active da nosa Terra, 
porque a esplotacion que sofre por parte do capital monopolista tiralle a 
plusvalia o mesmo que a clase obreira,[...]; porque moitos labregos son 
ao mesmo tempo obreiros industriais, porque todalas familias labregas 
tenen emigrantes nas fabricas,[...]. Por todo isto [...] a identificacion das 
relations obreiro-labregas son evidentes e a sua loita moi intima." 
('MAG', T&T, February, 1976)
[C] "Iste proletariado incipiente, en periodo de formacion, vai adquirindo 
cada vez mais inportancia cuantitativa no noso agro en gracia da 
penetracion colonial-capitalista. [...] tratase de labregos en vias de 
proletarizacion, que siguen tendo como eixo de vida o agro, que tenen 
conciencia de comunidade agraria... (T&T, n35 ,1976)
Extract 5.14. On hybridity
313
"...a simbiosis fai atipico ao proletariado, pro tamben ao campesinado, 
polo que ainda que compre matizar a vella consideration unilateral dos 
capesinos como propietarios."
('Peripheral capitalism, symbiosis and super-exploitation: the Galician 
case', Lopez-Suevos, 1975)
Chapter 6. Space and 'self-organization': heterotopias and the 'national- 
popular'
Extracts 6.1. On the construction o f the land as an economic space.
[A] '...En 1550 somentes o 10 por cento da terra estaba cultivada. A
maioria da terra galega estaba en mans do senorio eclesiastico e 
nobiliario. 0 aumento da poboacion que ocurreu dempois dos anos de 
prosperidade de comenzos do secuLo XVI, fixo que as terras, non foran 
suficentes pra soster os habitantes de Galicia, dado o desenrolo da 
teinica.''
(CT, PSG &UPG, 1973)
[B] "Emporeso, cando os paisans de Castrelo do Mino defenden as suas 
terras da espropiacion arbitraria en 1965 todolos seitores populares 
apoian a sua loita"
(CT, PSG &UPG, 1973)
[C] ''Pero a penetration capitalista no campo movese no ameto das 
relations de esplotacion colonial que atura o noso pobo: estas empresas 
tiran a materia prima a baixo prezo, colocana fora de Galicia pra ser 
transformada, usurpan as terras dos labregos -o seu meio de vida oxe por 
oxe- e danlle como alternativa a emigracion"
('The alliance of the working and peasant classes', T&T, n35, Marzal 
1976)
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Extract 6.2. The villages: As Encrobas.
"As Encrobas. O pobo unido contra o capital.
"Pedimos o traslado de poboacion pero en igualdade de conditions. 
Queremos a mesma calidade e cantidade de terra, igual clima, idioma, 
cultura e costumes. Valenos calquer lugar de Galicia, sempre que tena 
istas caracterfsticas"
Tal e a esixencia dos vecinos das Encrobas frente a intromision de Fenosa 
que pretende expropiarlles terras e casa co fin de explotar unhas minas 
de lignito pra alimentar unha central termica que tamen pensa instalar 
ah'.
Os vecinos das Encrobas a pesares das maniobras divisionistas, estan 
dispostos a todo en defensa dos seus intereses. Neste senso o dfa 29 de 
agosto organizouse na Cruna unha manifestation onde acudiron unhas 
8000 persoas, entre elas, os vecinos das Encrobas, labregos doutras 
zonas de Galicia, asi como xentes do pobo en xeral, conscientes de que 
soio o pobo unido -e sen caciques o frente- conquire a victoria.
Os berros: 'A nosa terra e nosa e non de Fenosa', 'sindicato labrego 
galego', 'Reforma agraria galega', 'Galicia ceibe sin emigracion', 
'Comisions labregas en todalas aldeas', 'Galicia ceibe, poder popular', 
xunto coa esixencia do traslado de poboacion, todo baixo bandeiras 
nacionales coa estrela roxa de cinco puntas, afirmaron o contido 
nacional-popular das reivindicacions anti-monopolistas no noso pais.
Este significado non foi entendido somentes polos participantes, senon 
que a autoridade gubernativa asumiuno conscientemente e deu orde de 
cargar no mesmo momento en que se encetaba o Himno galego.
Dias despois os vecinos das Encrobas impedfan a ocupacion das suas 
terras, obrigando aos representantes da empresa Lignitos de Meirama, 
filial de Fenosa, a negociar directamente con eles.
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Os labregos das Encrobas xa o tenen dito: 'Estamos por unha solucion 
pacifica, negociada do problema, pero si nos obrigan estamos dispostos a 
todo ../
Nas Encrobas como en Castrelo de Mino, Ponteceso, Quiroga, Xove...os 
labregos galegos din:
Non ao capital monopolista!!!
Reforma Agraria Galega I!!"
(UPG, T&T, n 40 Autumn, 1976)
Extract 6.3. The neighbourhoods: Teis.
"TEIS
Mentres se gastan millons e millons en facer obras como o 'scalestri', 
contrarias ao interes popular, pra facilitar a fuxida do noso diheiro, dos 
nosos recursos e dos nosos paisa nos pra emigracion, e garantizar a 
dependencia colonial do noso pobo, negase por outra banda, a mais 
cativa inversion naqueles problemas que ano tras ano o pobo de Vigo e 
os vecinos de Teis en particular vimos reivindicando decote, isto e: 
semaforos, aceras, pasos de cebra, limitador de velocidade, milloras do 
firme da estrada, barreiras e senates nos pasos a nivel, vivenda 
consoante coas nosas posibilidades, escolas, etc. Todo isto, que e o que o 
pobo pide e necesita e inorado polo senor Picher e da.
Os vecinos de Teis estamos fartos de ollar cos brazos cruzados a morte 
dos nosos vecinos -30 en menos de dous anos- sendo a derradeira a do 
matrimonio Bernardez Freaza e o seu fillo de 14 anos Nando, quedando o 
outro irman Miguel, de 7 anos, entre a vida e a morte. Os atropellos 
siguen e si onte foi esta familia no paso a nivel das Animas, hoxe foi o 
neno de tres anos Manolino Saraman Martinez, na Avenida de Galicia. 
Abonda de asesinatos legais.
Abonda de aturar a poh'tica caciquil e imperialista de Picher e compama.
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Abonda de aturar os orgaismos impostos polo Estado Imperialista 
Espanol. No seu beneficio e contra os intereses populares.
[c] O pobo esta disposto a loitar ate veneer. Como o demostramos nas 
mobilizacions de denuncia, repulsa e condea que vimos protagonizando 
nos derradeiros dfas.
Contra a Opresion Colonial 
A loita continual!!
O pobo vencera!!!"
('Cangas-Vigo-Teis', T&T, n 37,1976)
Extract 6.4. On routes o f struggle.
"SOLIDARIDADE CO CAPITAN FORTES
Os asesinatos perpetrados polos policfas de Fraga en Vitoria e o xui'zo 
contra 9 militares acusados de pertenecer a U.M.D. e de incitar a 
sedicion, desencadenaron en toda Galicia un forte movimento de 
solidaridade.
PONTEVEDRA
O dia 8 de marzal i en resposta ao chamamento feito pola UPG e ANPG, 
xuntamente con outras forzas politicas, o pobo galego manifestou nas 
ruas a sua solidaridade co CAPITAN FORTES e os seus companeiros, con 
motivo do xuicio.
Inda que a manifestacion convocada pras 8h. do seran na plaza da 
Ferreria non callou nese lugar, as 8,30h. concentraronse na rua Benito 
Corbal unhas 400 persoas que portaban bandeiras nacionales galegas e 
pancartas. Cantouse o HIMNO GALEGO e deronse berros de "VIVA 
GALICIA CEIBE E SOCIALISTA", "FORTES, AMIGO, O POBO ESTA 
CONTIGO", "AMNISTIA XERAL".
Dali a pouco a policia cargou e os manifestantes, en comandos, 
continuaron berrando as consinas por toda a cidade.
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Como non podi'a ser menos, a represion actuou duramente a resulta do 
que houbo varias personas feridas e outras con hematomas, sendo 
detido un manifestante pola Brigadilla da Guardia Civil que o retuvo 
hastra a 1 da manan do dia seguinte, pasando despois ao xuez onde 
prestou declaration.
SANTIAGO [...]LUGO [...JVIGO [...]AS PONTES [...] A CRUNA [...]" 
('Solidarity w ith the Basque People', T&T, n35,1976)
Chapter 7. Narrating Sovereignty (I): the world-system tales and the citing and 
disavowing of colonialism
Extracts 7.1. On citing and invoking colonialism
[A] "A UPG considera que Galicia e unha colonia do Estado espanol. Esta 
funcion, marcadamente colonial desde a perspectiva econorma, adquire 
un caracter especifico respeito do colonialismo clasico debido ao 
contexto cultural, historico e xeopolitico no que se desenvolveu a vida do 
noso pais. Os condicionamentos democraticos-burgueses actuais viri'an 
reafirmar as caracteristicas do devandito contexto."
(The colonial function of Galicia in the Spanish State and aspects of our 
political line', UPG, III congress, 1982)
[B] "GALICIA E O COLONIALISMO: Partindo do feito de que Galicia esta 
sometida a unhas relations de dependencia colonial, a actividade politica 
encaminase a tronzar esa dependencia."
(Ideological and Political Principles, Alternative of BNG, 1982)
[C] "..0 desenvolvimento socio-economico capaz de romper a 
dependencia colonial da economi'a galega e mudar cualitativamente as
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condicions de vida e de traballo para o benestar de todo o povo, 
devolver-lle o poder de decision sobre os seus recursos e a sua actividade 
economica[...]0 nacionalismo galego esta pola ruptura co actual rexime 
politico por canto, representa a negacion explicita e agresiva dos 
principios anteriores e atenta gravemente contre as libertades 
fundamentais para os cidadans e as Nacions que integran o Estado 
Espanol.
(Ideological and Political Principles, Alternative of BNG, 1982)
Extract 7.2. On displacement of colonialism
[A] "ANTI-IMPERIAUSMO: Para a nosa polftica, dirixida a consecucion de 
unha Galicia liberada, e clave o principio do anti-imperialismo militante, 
polo que a Organizacion se define pola solidaridade internacional e apoia 
todas as loitas dos pobos do Estado e do Mundo por conseguiran a sua 
liberacion nacional. Xa que logo, somos contrarios a C.E.E. e a O.T.A.N. 
por seren Organiacions, a nivel economico, e poh'tico-militar que 
representan os intereses dos grandes monopolios e do imperialismo 
europeo-occidental e americano."
('Ideological and Political Principles', Alternative of BNG, 1982)
Extract 7.3. On the new story world: the world-system
"A actual situacion internacional caracterizase por unha aguda crise 
economica e ideoloxica dos Estados capitalistas do campo imperialista, 
coa conseguinte xestacion de plantexamentos e practicas militaristas e 
agresivas contra os pai'ses e ideoloxi'as progresistas, que defenden a 
soberam'a nacional e a mellora da situacion das clases populares. A 
ameaza a distension internacional polos sectores mais reaccionarios do 
imperialismo ffxose mais patente coa acentuacion dos mecanismos da 
guerra frfa e as posibilidades reais dun conflicto internacional
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xeneralizado. Por iso, pode dicerse que o enemigo mais grande dos 
pobos e o imperialismo, capitaneado polos USA.
O obxectivo de independizarse do Imperialismo e o fortalecemento de 
procesos revolucionarios con este plantexamento esta conseguindo 
conquistas reais, que enfeblecen o corse do dominio imperial en America 
Latina, Asia e Africa (Iran, Nicaragua, R.D. Saharauf, Chad, Afganistan...). 
A resposta do imperialismo, especialmente USA, e a continue agresion, 
baixo diversas formas, contra os pobos e reximes que defenden a 
dignidade e independencia nacionais e a solidaridade internacionalista 
(Libia, Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Salvador, Nicaragua...). Asemade, 
prepara e participa en golpes de Estado militares represivos e 
antidemocratica e pro-occidentalista (Guinea Ecuatorial, Turqufa...).
[...]"
(The international political situation", UPG, III Congress, 1982)
Extracts 7.4. On sovereignty as nodal point.
[A] "A distension, a neutralidade o non alineamento, a loita pola PAZ 
MUNDIAL, esixen de nos esta conducta, como partido comunista que ten 
a sua razon inmediata de ser no desmantelamento do imperialismo, 
esencial para a consecucion do noso obxectivo de soberama nacional 
para Galicia/"
(The international political situation", UPG, III Congress, 1982)
[B] ""Dicer que o BNG se define pola solidariedade internacional, e que fai 
seus os principios do anti-imperialismo militante, non e mais que por de 
relevo a faciana fundamental dunha organizacion que proclama para a 
Galiza o dereito de autodeterminacion.""
(BNG, II assembly, 1984)
[C]""E pois, esta polftica aventureira e enfurecida dos enemigos da paz...a 
que aumentou bruscamente o actual perigo belico...a que tenta afogar a
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aspiration dos pobos a paz, a liberdade, a xustiza, en definitiva, a 
soberanfa."
(Insurrection against the bellicose threat!!', T&T, n89,1983)
Extracts 7. 5. On imperialism as irrational political force.
[A] "[...] Tres son os rasgos que caracterizan de xeito fundamental a 
polftica de Washington no mundo, imposta a os seus aliados: 1) a loita 
contra a paz; 2) a vision simplista e cavernaria dos conflitos 
internacionais e 3) a obsesion maniaca de impar a sua vontade a os 
outros Estados e povos[...] ('Insurrection against the war threat!!', T&T, n 
89,1983)
[B] "[Esta circunstancia] caracteriza a erosion e descomposition as que se 
ve sometido o sistema, privado de perspectiva, asentado cada vez mais 
nos piares da agresion, intimidation, xenofobia, racismo e discrimination 
profisional. No que os principios eticos sustituense polo anti-progresismo, 
acriticismo, anti-comunismo e odio patoloxico."
('Politic-ideological crisis and belligerence', International, IV congress, 
UPG, 1983)
Extracts 7.6. On dependency
[A] "Polos seus efeitos o inxusto intercambio desigual existente na 
actualidade entre eles e os paises desenvolvidos vese ainda mais 
agravado, incrementase a sua xigantesca debeda exterior, minguanse as 
suas posibilidades economicas, e a sua xa debil estructura ve 
profundizada a sua orientacion destinada a satisfacer as necesidades dos 
monopolios dos paises avanzados."
('The unequal incidence of the economic crisis', IV congress, UPG, 1983)
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[B] "en America Latina..., onde as extremas conditions de explotacion e 
de dependencia provocaron a insurrection armada dos pobos da area 
contra os m inoritarios grupos economicos dominantes e os seus 
valedores (os monopolios foraneos)."
(International, III congress, UPG, 1983)
Extract 7. 7. On new heterotopias: the 'hot-spots of the planet'.
"Particular importancia, no ambito da coxuntura internacional, adquiren 
as denominadas "zonas de interes estratexico" ou "pontos quentes" do 
planeta. Convertidos en perigosos detonantes dun conflito nuclear 
mundial, pola action do imperialismo e localizados en rexions ricas en 
recursos naturais, na encrucillada das principais vfas de transporte que 
ligan economicamente paises e continentes, ou en importantes pontos 
estratexicos, neles chegaron ao seu ponto culminante as contradicions 
entre a vontade dos pobos, orientada para a liberacion nacional, e a 
aspiration do imperialismo que, en aras da defensa dos seus "intereses 
vitais", pretende exercer o control total sobre a soberanfa destes e dos 
seus paises."
(The zones of strategic interest', The international situation, IV congress, 
UPG, 1983)
Extracts7.8. On NATO.
[A] "A oposicion a OTAN non pode ser separada ...da oposicion a CEE que 
e o seu soporte economico e politico"
('For peace and against NATO', PSG, GS, 4 xeira, Autumn 1981)
[B] "No entramado de tanta confusion arredor do fenomeno 
propagandfstico do referendo convocado polo PSOE e apoiado polo 
esquerdismo espanol (PCE, EE), comprenos volver a examinar as 
relacions que aquela organizacion (Organizacion do Tratado do Atlantico
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Norte) e esta (Comunidades Economicas Europeas) tenen, e como as 
duas, cada unha no seu terreo, non son mais que expresions distintas, 
faces diferentes, dun mesmo sistema: 0 imperialista.
[...]A confluencia de intreses do capitalismo monopolista a nivel mundial, 
acadou tal degrau que nos asuntos de importancia vital para o sistema 
esvaense as diferencias ou enfrentamentos que poida haber entre a CEE 
e os EEUU: a defensa dos intreses imperialistas no Terceiro Mundo, os 
acordos para apuntalar un sistema monetario internacional en franca 
crise [...].Non cabe, polo tanto, separar, aillar a Europa da OTAN, a CEE da 
OTAN, como non sexa para participaremos na propria manobra de 
confusion que comparte co espanolismo de esquerdas co 
pseudonacionalismo actuante en Galiza"
('Nato-EEC7, T&T, n96 ,1986)
Chapter 8. Narrating 'sovereignty7: ventriloquism, equivocation and the discourse of
democracy
Extracts 8.1. On antagonism & constitutional text as the anti-community.
[A] "O texto constitucional espanol non e unha sinxela formulacion das 
liberdades formais abstractas senon un enunciado de intecions 
ameazadoras e proibitivas respeito dos anceios populares. Defender as 
liberdades democraticas nor pasa por defender un texto que permite a 
restriction caprichosa e interesada das mesmas."
('Party Thesis7, UPG, III congress, 1982)
[B] "O nacionalismo galego esta pola ruptura co actual Rexime politico 
por canto representa a negacion explicita e agresiva dos [nosos] 
principios anteriores e atenta gravemente contra as liberdades 
fundamentais para os cidadans e as Nations que integran o Estado 
espanol [...] A constitution espanola e a plasmacion legal da negacion da 
nosa soberanfa popular, consagra un orden economico-social capitalista
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e posibilita, ademais, o recorte do exercicio das libertades democraticas, 
feitos polas que non aceptamos. "
(The Political framework', I Assembly, BNG, 1982)
[C] "Non cabe chamarnos a engano: a Constitucion espanola e os 
Estatutos de Autonomfa, dela derivados, son a fonte da que emana toda 
esta morea de lexislacion e actitudes represivas, xa que se trata de textos 
beligerantemente anti-nacionais, imperialistas e anti-populares, ainda 
enriba con graves anbiguedades ou cortapisas a respeito do exercicio das 
libertades democraticas mfnimas. Velaf porque razon e tan importante 
para nos non lexitimar nen aceitar semellantes textos. Eles negan o noso 
dereito a existencia; eles condicionan a nosa vida cotidiana. Tenen que 
desaparecer para que os anceios nacionais e populares vaian adiante." 
('BNG's position before the autonomic elections', II Assembly, BNG, 
1984)
[D] "A actual Constitucion Espanola nega a nosa existencia, o caracter 
plurinacional do Estado e o directo de autodeterminacion das nacions. 
Nos temos que continuar unha batalla polftica que non se realiza nen se 
gana afondando na alternativa autonomica, senon superandoa e 
contradecindoa como verdadeira oposicion."
('Unity of nationalism against the Constitution', T&T, n. 86,1982)
Extract 8.2. Sovereignty & democracy as key principles.
"GALICIA E UNHA NACION, e polo tanto ten dereito a autodeterminacion 
polftica que, de ser real, ha de concretarse nunha alternativa de 
Soberanfa Nacional [...]. DEMOCRACIA: O principio democratico e 
fundamental como inerente ao exercicio do poder polo, en condicions de 
igualdade e libertade real non so formal."
('Politico-ideological principles', BNG, I Assembly, 1982).
Extracts 8.3. Myth debunking and reverse discourse: undemocratic democracy.
324
[A] "En nome da defensa da /democracia, e mais da 'liberdade7 
elaboranse leis , como a da defensa da Constitucion, a da Armonizacion 
das autonomias que, engadidas a lei anti-terrorista, fan palidecer todo 
rastro de pureza democratica do estado espanol7
(Marco politico do dia da Patria, T&T, n 84,1981)
[B] "Non cabe dubida, pois, que este e un Rexime falto de pureza 
democratica, enfebrecido por maneiras fascistas que chegan a 
promulgation de leis agresivas cos dereitos mfnimos dos cidadans (Lei 
Anti-terrorista, Lei en Defensa da Constitucion, LOAPA,...). [...] Unha mais 
de elas e a existencia de subordination a un texto que, como a 
Constitucion, representa:
a) Un caracter politico determinado: anti-nacionalismo, monarquismo, 
economia de mercado, privatization dos servicios publicos...[..]77 
(The Spanish democracy and the siege o f the nationalist opposition7, 
T&T, n 85,1982)
Extracts 8.4. On ventriloquisation of democracy.
[A] "Son, pois, argalladas represivas anti-democraticas obsesionadas coa 
'unidade da patria7, cos principios da economia capitalista [...]. Argalladas 
que xustifican ...todos os atentados discrecionais, caprichosos, agosto do 
poder executivo; isto e policial, para perseguir e acabar cos discrepantes 
[...]. Os principios elementais dun rexime democratico formal fican en 
entredito, suspenso e bancarrota: a liberdade de expresion, 
manifestation, asociacion, reunion e folga.77
(Marco politico do dia da patria, T&T, n 8 4 ,1981)
[B] "En definitiva tratase de criar un sistema onde estea asegurada a 
vixilancia, o control, e se procede a represion para os cidadans e os 
pobos. Non estamos nun estado onde a sua principal preocupacion sexa
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asegurar os dereitos e liberdade dos cidadans senon que un dos seus 
obxectivos fundamentals e saber en cada momento o que fai cada 
individuo [...] En Nome de asegurar a seguridade cidadan estan 
xustificando todas as suas actuacions represivas e agresivas para os 
dereitos dos cidadans e dos pobos, non habendo pola contra a intencion 
de garantirlle aos homes e as mulleres os dereitos..."
('On rights', BNG, II Assembly, 1984)
[C] "A lina de defensa dun programa de soberama nacional para as 
nacions integradas e totalmente anticonstitucional, ainda que forme 
parte dun dereito democratico fundamental, cal e o direito de 
autodeterminacion. A nosa posicion, contraria ao contido da 
Constitucion espanola esta en relacion directa e proporcional coa 
defensa dun marco de liberdade publicas reais."
(The defence of a program of national sovereignty*, III Congress, UPG, 
1982)
Extracts 8.5. Ventriloquism II.
[A] "... a atitude do Goberno do PSOE a respeito dos dereitos e libertades 
dos cidadans e dos pobos, que esta traendo a primeiro piano a loita por 
impedir que se restrinxan ainda mais. As caracteristicas de actuation 
[...]acadando extremos escandalosos son:
Desprecio total polos dereitos dos pobos e polo dereito que un estado 
teria que asegurarlle a sociedade. O dereito da autodeterminacion pasou 
de ser un slogan tactico recollido nos programas nos primeiros anos do 
post-franquismo a ser practicamente indefendible e perseguida a sua 
defensa practica. O dereito a posto de traballo como premisa 
fundamental para poder falar e calquera outro tipo de dereito e hoxe 
unha ilusion inalcanzable para un importante e crecente numero de 
cidadans. [...]. Os dereitos a saude, a education, a uns servicios publicos
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en condicions, a unha vivenda digna, etc., estan vetados para muitos 
sectores populares... "
('On rights', BNG, II assembly, 1984)
[B] "En definitiva, o nacionalismo non e compatibel cun rexime 
fraudulento desde a optica da defensa das libertades democraticas 
fundamentais (liberdade de expresion, conciencia, opinion, 
manifestacion, respeito pola soberama popular)."
(A new phase for a communist party, T&T, n90,1984)
Extract 8. 6. On nationalism as democratic self.
"Compre esclarecer e reafirmar na nosa base social e ante o pobo 
en xeral que, nas actuais circunstancias politicas, e obxectivo 
prioritario do BNG a defensa politica consecuente do direito de 
autodeterminacion. Non e que se trate de que o Rexime reconeza, 
na pratica, unha 'alternativa' concreta que o vehiculice en cada unha 
das nacions do Estado, senon que se vexa obrigado a admitir a 
existencia legal, sen represions nen persecutions, das forzas politicas 
que estamos na defensa deste direito. Desta maneira, a nosa loita 
e, sinxelamente, unha defensa dos principios democraticos mmimos, 
dos direitos dos pobos, violados insistentemente na pratica e 
mesmamente na lexislacion "constitucional" do actual Rexime (Lei 
Anti-terrorista, Plan Zen, Lei de Rexime Local, Lei Eleitoral). Non cabe 
chamarnos a engano: a Constitution espanola e os Estatutos de 
Autonomia, dela derivados, son a fonte da que emana toda esta 
morea de lexislacion e actitudes represivas, xa que se trata de 
textos belixerantemente antinacionais, imperialistas e anti-populares, 
ainda enriba con graves anbiguedades ou cortapisas a respeito do 
exercicio das liberdades democraticas minimas. Velai por que razon 
e tan importante para nos non lexitimar nen aceitar semellantes 
textos. Eles negan o noso direito a existencia; eles condicionan a
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nosa vida cotidiana. Tenen que desaparecer para que os anceios 
nacionais e populares vaian adiante."
('BNG's position before the autonomic elections", BNG, II Assembly, 
December 1984)
Extracts 8.7. On policy choices.
[A] "A expulsion dos parlamentarios nacionalistas sera o eixo central da 
loita pola democracia en Galicia e no estado mentres a situacion non se 
normalice. Podemos afirmar que do restabecimento dos dereitos que 
nos corresponden nas institucions por mandato popular depende, en 
grande medida, o resultado final da batalla pola democratizacion e 
soberama de Galicia."
('Protest actions against the expelling of the nationalist 
parliamentarians', T&T, n 8 8 ,1983)
[B] "O nosos obxectivo consistiria en convencer ao pobo de que esta 
position e esencial se queremos que a loita eleitoral sirva , cando menos, 
para conquistar unha minima democratizacion da vida politica das 
institucions, para obrigar ao Rexime a que tena que aceitar a nosa 
existencia politica (loita polo dereito de autodeterminacion)."
('BNG's position before the autonomic elections', BNG, II Assembly, 
December 1984)
Chapter 9: Narrating 'self-organization': the myth o f unity and the BNG
Extract 9.1. On citing 'colonialism' and re-signifying the nation
"Galicia necesita unha plataforma de unidade nacionalista na que 
todos,..., superemos as diferencias que nos afastan e atopemos o camino 
para a construction dunha Galicia soberana e o seu pleno 
desenvolvemento politico social. A situacion politica da nosa Nation
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reclama-o con urxencia. [...] En Galicia a penetracion dos monopolios e a 
expoliacion das nosas riquezas ten-se acentuado... A constitucion 
espanola consagra esta situacion. A persistencia dunha Administracion 
Central ferrea, a falla de competencias estatutarias e de institucions 
axeitadas, o xeito anti-democratico e mesmo "anticonstitucional" con que 
se esta levando a posta en marchadas institucions autonomicas, a 
represion cultural e lingtiistica, a certa hecatombe economica que supora 
para Galicia o ingreso do Estado Espanol no Mercado Comun caracterizan 
unha dramatica situacion ante a que a capacidade de resistencia do Pais 
tense demostrado insuficiente."
("Organize the resistance", GS, PSG, May 1982)
Extracts 9. 2. Unity is a front, a party, an organization, plurality.
[A] "No cuestionamento que fan algunhas forzas poh'ticas, da necesidade 
dun Frente Patriotico en Galicia, evidenciase non so a valoracion que se 
ten do feito colonial, sinon tamen a posicion con respeito ao proceso 
politico do Estado, o marco constitucional e a autonomia. Para tentar 
xustificar a inviabilidades dun proxecto frentista, escomenzase por dicer 
que Galicia esta situada en Europa e as sociedades europeas son moi 
complexas e tenen un grau de desenrolo que imposibilita un proxecto 
frentista proprio dos paises terceiromundistas, [...] a ninguen se lie 
oculta que Galicia esta en Europa..., pero a necesidade de un Frente 
Patriotico basease na ausencia de Soberama Nacional e na situacion 
economica de moitos sectores e clases sociais, que tenen un interes 
obxectivo en tronzar a colonization que padecemos."
(The need for a patriotic front in Galicia", T&T, UPG, 85, May-June 1982)
[B] "Non se trata de repetir experiencias historicas alleas tanto no tempo 
como de realidade politica senon de atopar formulas de artellamento 
politico dos diversos sectores e correntes que componen a esquerda 
nacionalista. Trata-se de constituir, no respeto da pluralidade ideoloxica
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e organica un campo de militancia comun para turrar xuntos do carro da 
nosa liberation national e social."
('Mulling over the nationalist u n it / ,  PSG, GS, July 1982)
[C] "Dada a situation do Pais... faise necesaria a criacion dunha nova 
Organization Unitaria dos nacionalistas"
('Proposal for the definition o f the unitary organization of nationalism' 
PSG, GS, July 1982)
[D] "A formulation practica desta unida-de ten que plasmarse na 
existencia dun Frente Patriotico. Polos condicionantes sinalados no 
apartado primeiro que ten o noso pais respeito das colonias clasicas, e 
pola experiencia recoilida nos anos que levamos intentando potenciar 
unha politica frentista, decidese que compre reformular a organization 
existente. Esta reformulation debe asentarse nos seguintes criterios:
a) Conseguir que o Frente abranga a amplitude maior posibel.
b) Reconecer formalmente a existencia organizativa e ideoloxico- 
politica das diversas tendencias que o integran.
c) Apoio ao seu funcionamento democratico dentro do pleno respeto 
aos principios ideoloxico-politicos que o definen.
d) Defensa dun programa de soberama national..."
('The policy of unity of nationalism', UPG, III Congress, January 1982)
Extracts 9.3. Tension between the logics o f unity and antagonism.
[A] "A consecution do obxectivo de soberama nacional pasa pola 
formulation practica dunha politica de unidade, o mais amplia posibel. 
Esta politica de unidade ten como eixos os seguintes: forzas politicas 
proprias de Galicia como participates; defensa da autoorganizacion 
nacional a todos os niveis; defensa do direito de autodeterminacion, 
concretado nunha alternativa de soberama nacional. Estes eixos 
signifi-can non aceptar a Constitution espanola nen a alternativa
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autonomica. A formulacion practica desta unida-de ten que plasmarse na 
existencia dun Frente Patriotico."
(The policy o f unity o f nationalism', UPG, III Congress, 1982)
[B] "...coincidimos en que a reformulacion organica da unidade necesaria 
debe facerse a partir do respeto pola diversidade ideoloxico-politica que 
constitue o nacionalismo real. Partindo de este respeto, e posible unha 
unidade e a existencia dun campo definido e eficaz de militancia, non 
obstante, para ser ferramenta util e positiva para o noso pobo, ha de 
basearse en pontos rmnimos, pero perfectamente definidos e 
irrenunciabeis, sen os casi estarfamos a constituir un fraude politico." 
('Political alternative of the BNG', BNG, First Assembly, September 1982)
Extract 9.4. On policing o f nationalism.
"Non ten dereito a nomearse nacionalista quen aceita textos legais que 
non o reconecen sequera simbolicamente. Non ten dereito a nomearse 
nacionalista quen avala na practica, con descaro ou ambiguedade 
farisaica, os canles represivos, antidemocraticos e anti-nacionalistas do 
actual rexime Espanol, que sustenta, xustifica e lexitima a sua politica en 
base aos devanditos textos legais (Constitucion e Estatuto de 
autonomia)"
('Unity of nationalism. Galicia nation against the Constitution', n86, T&T, 
UPG, July-August 1982)
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Acronyms
AN-PG Asamblea National-Popular Galega
AP Alianza Popular
BNG Bloque Nacionalista Galego
BN-PG Bloque National-Popular Galego
CCLL Comisions Labregas
CCOO Comisiones Obreras
CFPG Consello de Forzas Politicas Galegas
CG Coalition Galega
EG Esquerda Galega
ERGA Estudantes Revolucionarios Galegos
MC Movimiento Comunista
MCG Movemento Comunista de Galicia
MFPG Mesa de Forzas Politicas Galegas
ORT Organization Revolucionaria de Trabajadores
PCE Partido Comunista de Espana
PC Partido Carlista
PCG Partido Comunista Galego
PCLN Partido Comunista de Liberation Nacional
PG Partido Galeguista
PNG Partido Nacionalista Galego
POG Partido Obreiro Galego
PSG Partido Socialista Galego
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol
PGSD Partido Galego Social-Democrata
PTE Partido de los Trabajadores de Espana
SOG Sindicato Obreiro Galego
UCD Union de Centro Democratico
UG Unidade Galega
UPG Union do Pobo Galego
UPG-lp Union do Pobo Galego- lina proletaria
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Union Pobo Galego
(UPG) 1964
'Common Text'
PSG-UPG 1973
UPG-linha proletaria 1977—► PGP 1978—►Galiza-Ceibe-OLN 1979
Partido Socialista Galego
(PSG) 1963 |
CSG-PSG 1978
Asamblea Nacional-Popular Galega
(AN-PG) 1977-1982
Galician
Nationalism
1 9 6 3 -1 9 8 3
Bloque Nacional-Popular Galego
(BN-PG) 1977-1982
Mesa FPG 1980 
UPG, AN-PG, PSG
Consello FPG
UPG, PSG, PSDG 1976-77 
'Bases Constitucionais'
* Unidade Galena (UG)
PSG, POG, PG 1979-1980
Partido Obreiro Galego (POG) 1977
( 1 9 8 2 - )  
Bloque Nacionalista Galego
UPG, PSG -► CS, 1983
Grupo de Lugo 
1981
Esquerda Galega 1981
PSG-EG
1983
/
Date Nodal Point / Plot: 
retroactively makes sense of 
& links elements in a story.
Narration of the Nation UPG political demands: 
Plurality of links condensed
Representation/
subjectivities
Enemy
1975 Colonialism 
(The ‘anti-fullness’of
‘The colony’-dystopia. 
Myth of loss
Popular front -  ‘Bases 
Constitucionais’/rupture with the
‘The People’ = 
‘Workers,
‘Spanish 
Imperialist State’/ 
‘Oligarchy’
communitarian being. Not a (Diverse sites offer different 
productions )
Francoist system- end of emigration - 
rational industrialization - defence of
Peasants, 
Fishermen’ &
‘Spanishism’
demand but a protest) ‘Pseudo­
National and social 
liberation 
(goal/floating signifier)
Counter-story: POG, the European 
nation
agriculture-popular front Petty
Bourgeoisie
nationalism’
‘centralist state’
1982 Sovereignty 
(Fullness o f communitarian 
being)
Nation will be popular 
nationalism itself: 'os 
autodeterministas'
A nation under attack: negation of 
sovereignty/ economic disorder/ 
repression of nationalism/ need for 
organised resistance/ denied national 
rights & status / nation ‘up in arms’ 
like other nations
World peace /anti-imperialism- anti-Nato - 
anti-EEC - collective national rights - 
citizenship rights -  democracy- integral 
economic development -patriotic front
‘The nation and 
the citizens’/ 
Social sectors 
(vacillantly)
‘unitary state’ / 
Spanish 
Constitution of 
1978 / Statute of 
Autonomy- 
‘ Spanish forces in
Nationalism=democracy Galicia’
=nation Counter-story : complexity of Galician 
society, European nation, important 
degree of (societal) development, 
possibility of working within the 
autonomic and constitutional system, 
organized in a mass party
‘Imperialism ’-US 
(rough passage)
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